INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(1919-1945)

by

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PREFACE

This book is the second, revised and enlarged edition of my book entitled *International Affairs 1919-1945*. It is a short history of the relations of nations from the end of the first World War to the close of the second. The work is not based on original documents and primary sources ; in fact any research on so vast a subject is almost unthinkable. However, numerous text books on International Relations, Regional and Local Studies and specific issues have been consulted, and an attempt has been made to make the story of international relations more interesting, readable and easy to grasp.

The book is primarily meant for the honours and post-graduate students of Indian and foreign universities and also for those who propose to take up civil service examinations. The world today has become very small and the need for a general knowledge of world affairs is growing. Not only the academecians, but all the enlightened citizens need to understand the events taking place around them. The present work does not claim to fulfil wholly that purpose but it does, in an humble way, attempt to provide the general background to the events during the post-war (1939-1945) period. I would be satisfied if the venture succeeds in its limited purpose.

Since the publication of the first edition, several communications, from as far as the Secretariat Library of the West Bengal Government, have been received asking me to bring the present work upto date, that is, upto 1958 or 1959. But as I am at present involved in a research programme at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, I find myself unable to fulfil that ambition of my patrons. However, I do hope the second volume (1945-1959) would come up in course of time

This edition of the book is a marked improvement over the earlier. The first chapter has been enriched by the provision of a background to the first World War. Several additions have been made in the second chapter on The League of Nations and the fifth chapter on Breakdown of Security. The chapter on 'United States in World Affairs' has been written almost anew. The various factors influencing foreign policies of nations have been added to the last chapter. The British Foreign Policy has

been rewritten. The general arrangement of the book has been readjusted. Footnotes and bibliographical references have been added and selected readings towards the end of each chapter have been made richer and more authentic.

In the writing of this book I was greatly encouraged by Prof. D.R. Bhandari, formerly of Ramjas College, Delhi, Dr. Amba Prasad, Reader in the Department of African Studies and Prof. A.N. Agarwala, Department of Economics, Ramjas College. I express my deep gratitude to all of them. My friend, Mr. M.R. Ganapati Rao, in the Department of International Finance, I.S.I.S., obliged me by going through the proofs and my thanks are due to him too. My old student and friend, Mr. Roshan Lal Gupta, now at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, also helped me in more than one way and I thank him for that.

I should also appreciate the close co-operation which Mr. B.V. Gupta, Director, Metropolitan Book Co. (P) Ltd., extended to me in bringing out this book.

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CHAPTER I

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1919

Background of World War I

On July 23, 1914, Austria-Hungary issued a declaration of war against Serbia, and soon began the wide-spread conflict which engulfed the whole world. This war has been called World War I, and the first total war of human history. About 90 percent of the world's population was involved; the entire economic resources for the execution of military operations were mobilized; the battles were fought on several fronts in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in distant seas; and non-European powers like the United States of America, Australia, Canada and Japan were involved. Altogether, some sixty-five million men were mobilized and at least, ten million lost their lives. Ammunition and supplies of every sort were expended with unheard of lavishness; and the cost of four year's fighting has been estimated at nearly two hundred billion dollars.

Why after all this disaster befell mankind and why Nations beset against Nations? This is a relevant query to any analysis of the post-war events in the sphere of international political relations. The strains and stresses, which impelled nations to fall out in 1914, were vast and varied. It was not one nation but many that brought the war; it was not one cause but a multiplicity of them that goaded the nations to wage it. The imperialistic ambitions of the European powers, the determination of England to keep in tact her mastery of the seas and control of the empire, the challenge to British commercial, industrial and naval supremacy by the newly unified German state, the French desire for a revenge upon Germany, the Italian desire for "irredentism", and the Austro-Russian contest for the control of the Balkans, the rivalry among the newly emerging communities of the Balkans Peninsula—these were the issues which formed the back-ground of World War I. Each one of them was important in itself and needed some elabotate explanation.

Imperialist Ambitions of European Powers

Imperialistic ambitions of the European nations during the nineteenth century were essentially economic; and were largely the consequence of the Industrial Revolution. This revolution, or rather evolution, transformed the economic basis of human society. Communities of men, formerly organized as independent units, or at least, less dependent upon others, became more and more interdependent for their lives and sustenance. Machines took the place of hands; mills and factories sprang up in large numbers; and new processes of production and trasportation were instituted for the old. Goods and capital were available in abundance. The need of sources of raw material, markets for manufactured goods, and colonies for investing the surplus capital was felt in almost all the industrialized states of

Europe—England, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Land and resources abroad were limited while the demand for them was ever-increasing. This expanding search for colonies and markets abroad led to competition, conflict and rivalry among the states of Europe. The history of international relations during the nineteenth century and early twentieth was the history of these national rivalries and the out-break of the war in 1914 could largely be explained in terms of this phenomenon.

England's Imperial Hegemony and Germany's Challenge to it

Of all the countries of Europe, England was first and foremost in industrialization. Quite early in the race, she had established a vast empire abroad "on which the sun never sets" and had attained the honour of "mistress of seas." London became the centre of international economics and politics, and therefore an eyesore to the European nations. As Hall and Davis have put it : "France and the British Empire clashed at many points in Siam, in Egypt, in Oceania, north of gulf of Guinea, and along the head-waters of the Nile. The British Lion and the Russian Bear growled at one another across half a dozen Asiatic frontiers ; and the Trans-Caucasian Railway had brought Russian Cossacks within striking distance of the Khyber Pass".[1] But the real challenge to British security and prosperity came from the newly-unified Germany.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had completed the unification of Germany and thereafter the attention of its leaders was directed toward industrial, commercial and naval expension of the country. The great historian of German, Von Treitschke, taught the German youths that the days of England's greatness were gone and those of Germany's greatness had begun. Most Germans believed him. England saw in the new Germany a threat to her own security.

In the beginning, however, no specific grounds of disagreement between the two countries existed. Moreover, Bismarck was fully aware of the formidable might of the British Empire and so long as he remained the Chancellor of Germany (till 1890), the two countries maintained, atleast a show of, friendship. He, however, was sure that a final combat with England was inevitable, and therefore began to prepare the German nation for that eventuality. Bismarck, moreover, knew that France was the irreconcilable enemy of Germany and must be surrounded by a grouping of friendly powers. As early as 1873, a League of Three Emperors—comprising Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, was organized. When at the Congress of

1. Hall, W.P. and Davis, W.S., The Course of Europe since Waterloo (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Ins. 1957) p. 493.

Berlin in 1878, Austria and Russia grappled with each other over the Near Eastern question, Bismarck's choice fell upon the former; and Austria was provided a foot-hold in the Balkan Peninsula,[2] and Russia felt cheated.[3]

On October 7, 1879, Bismarck concluded with the Austrian Chancellor, Count Andrassy, the Dual Alliance, which bound Germany to defend Austria against Russia. This alone did not satisfy the German Chancellor. On may 20, 1882, the Dual Alliance was expanded into Triple Alliance, when Italy was persuaded to join it. With Austria in friendly Alliance, with Italy in bag, and with Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, Bismarck left Germany in a secure position at the time of his forced retirement in 1890.

The new Emperor of Germany, William II, who ascended the throne in 1888, did not very much like what Bismarck had done. He refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and the result was that Russia went into the fold of France. In 1891, the France. Russian *Entente* was made; and in June 1893, it was cemented by a commercial treaty of far-reaching importance.

In 1890, Germany however signed a treaty with England, liquidating certain colonial disputes, England assuming a protectorate over Zanzibar, and Germany annexing Helgoland.

During 1890's, Anglo-German relations remained cordial. But the tide began to turn when England became involved in a war with the Boers in South Africa, and the German press and the people began openly to condemn British atrocities there. Infact, the causes of conflict between England and Germany were too deep for any continued friendship. William II had openly declared that Germany was no longer to be content with supremacy upon the continent of Europe, but was determined to assess her position as a World Power. The Germans saw no justification in England, a small island in their north, controlling a vast empire abroad; they envied England's superiority and felt that the latter should share her markets and colonies with other European peoples. Navy was considered as the backbone of any commercial and imperial progress and the preamble of the Navy Act of 1900 openly declared: "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against her would involve such risks even for the mightiest naval power as to jeopardize the supremacy of that power."

2. Austria was allowed to "occupy" and "administer" the two Balkan principalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. Ivan Aksakoff shrieked: "The Congress is a conspiracy against the Russian people in which the Russian representatives have taken part". The Tsar also spoke bitterly of the European coalition against Russia under Bismarck's leadership.

That such pronouncements were directed essentially against her, England well knew. Moreover, the British had not forgotten the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein by Germany without their consent; and the wife of Edward VII, Queen Alexandra, was a Danish princess. The English viewed with disfavor "the German tariff system, the embryonic German navy, the Teutonic demands for colonies and the commencement of German competition over-seas in steel and iron products."[4] Moreover, the harshness of tone and vulgarity of manners of new Germany jarred the sensibilities of the British.

In view of the new challenge from Germany, England gave up the policy of "splendid isolation" which the latter had been pursuing with regard to Europe since the Battle of Waterloo of 1815. The diplomatic isolation of London made the British statesmen nervous and eyes were cast around for friends and allies. On January 30, 1902, a treaty was signed with Japan in the Far East. On April 8, 1904, the Anglo-French convention was concluded and the two countries forgot their historic rivalry. France served as a bridge for the continued estrangement between England and Russia; and on August 31, 1907, a comprehensive Anglo-Russian convention was signed. The Dual *Entente* between France and Russia became *Triple Entente*. By 1908, the European countries had chosen sides, and waited for the opportunity when they could fall out and satisfy their deep colonial urges.

French Desire of Revenge Upon Germany

France was one of the oldest of the nation-states in Europe and enjoyed a unique position in the diplomatic set up of the continent. The war which broke out between France and Prussia in 1870 gave to Paris a rude shock. Her national pride was humbled; her most-coveted areas of Alsace-Lorraine were occupied by Germany; and her industrial and economic development greatly hindered Throughout 1870's, cries were raised in France for a war of revenge upon Germany. The French found the loss of Alsace-Lorraine difficult to forget. Bismarck had himself said during the war: "France will consider any peace simply as an armistice." He tried to distract French mind from Alsace-Lorraine France turned to the building of a new empire—especially in North Africa. But here she conflicted with England, their rivalry culminating in the 'Fashoda' incident (in the Sudan) in 1898 This was a very grave situation for the Parisians. They had to decide whether they could afford the luxury of having both Germany and England as enemies. Ultimately their continental problem out-weighed their imperial interests; and the choice of France felt upon England rather than Germany.

4. *Ibid*, p. 492.

Hence the Anglo-French alliance of 1904, and the *Triple Entente* of 1907.

Italy's Desire for "Irredentism"

Another European power responsible for the war of 1914-1918, though less directly, was Italy. Disunion and foreign domination had been the curse of the Italian peninsula for several centuries in the past. Intriguing dynasties ruling over a number of small states had made impossible the emergence of a united Italian state. It was the liberal ideas of the French Revolution that stirred the Italian patriots to act unto the direction of establishing a united national state, free from foreign domination (Austria had been dominating her large parts since long) and despotic governments. "With Mazzini's moral enthusiasm, Garibaldi's sword, Cavour's diplomacy, and Victor Emmanuel's tact and good sense," the unification of Italy was achieved in 1870. In that year a war broke out between France and Prussia. The French armies were withdrawn from Rome in order to be put into the field against Prussia; and the city was occupied by Emmanuel with Italian troops. It soon became the capital of united Italy.

The year '1870' brought to an end one era—the era of Italian unification, and inaugurated another—the era of "Italia Irredenta" or "Unredeemed Italy", comprising Trent, Trieste, and the eastern coast of the Adriatic, still under the Austrian control. The Italians would not rest content until these lands, once forming part of the Roman Empire, were redeemed. Moreover, the heritage of economic bankruptcy; and the rapidly growing population impelled the leaders of new Italy to look around for more land and economic resources. Irredentist propaganda was launched. and eyes were cast for an empire in northern Africa. She looked toward Germany another insatiated power, and one that had already helped her in taking Venice from Austria, for friendship. But friendship with Germany involved friendship with Austria-Hungary—the arch enemy of her unity. Bismarck, however, was anxious to make up their breach, and as a result of his efforts, Italy agreed to join Germany and Austria-Hungary in a Triple Alliance in 1882. She joined a grouping of European powers, interested in challenging the *status-quo* and establishing empires abroad.

Rome fixed her eyes on northern Africa. But as Grant and Temperly have pointed out: "her colonial ambitions had been baulked at Tunis in 1881, checked in Abyssinia in 1896, and succeeded only in 1911 when she obtained the sterile area of Tripoli."[5] Italy's real opportunity came only when the two groups

5. Grant, A. J., and Temperly, H., Europe in the Nineteenth Century (1789-1914) (New York, Longmans, 1927) p. 436.

of European powers—Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were involved in a life and death struggle, and both needed her participation in the war on their side. England was more profuse in her offers and Italy left the Triple Alliance. In April 1915, a secret treaty was signed between London and Rome, whereby the latter was to receive, as a reward for her intervention in the war on behalf of the Allied nations, part of the Austrian Tyrol (the Trentino), the city of Trieste, the eastern littoral of the Adriatic, and the Dodecanese islands.

Austro-Russian Contest for the Control of the Balkans

Another cause leading to the outbreak of war in 1914 was the contest for the control of Balkan Peninsula between Austria-Hungary and Russia. And the issue was complicated by the mutual dissensions and rivalries among the Balkan dependencies of the Sultan of Turkey. Inspired by the French Revolution, the Christian subjects of the Ottomon Emperor in the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, were yearning for independence and national self-determination. By the end of the nineteenth century, the spirit of revolt against Turkish domination had almost disrupted the Muslim rule ; but the problem of these peoples, instead of being resolved, was complicated still further. Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia began to conflict with each other for the control of fertile Macedonia. Moreover, the polyglot character of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was challenging the aggressive and highly-developed nationalism of Serbia. That Empire was a conglomeration of several nationalities and creeds, and the Hapsberg monarchs had not been able to fuse them into one nation. In the southern provinces of the Empire particularly there were more than five million Serbs or Slavs desiring union with their brethren in Serbia. Serbia was also inciting them, and had been dreaming of "bigger Serbia." The Pan-Slav or "bigger Serbia" movement was launched in these provinces. The rulers of the Hapsberg dynasty took to repression, and obstructed the fusion of their Slav population into Serbia. This irritated Serbians very much. Moreover, Serbia had also not reconciled to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (these were also inhabited by Slavs) by Austria soon after the Treaty of Berlin.

There was still another complication. Russia had been compelled by the European powers, in particular England and Austria, to give up the concessions obtained by her from the Sultan of Turkey in the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. What the Tsar got in the Treaty of Berlin hardly satisfied him ; and what Austria secured in the Balkan Peninsula intensified Russian enmity of the Hapsberg monarchy and also of Germany. When therefore Serbia raised the cry of "bigger Serbia", Russia supported her and came forward as the 'protector' and 'big brother'

of the Slavs. St. Petersberg (capital of Russia) saw in these developments an opportunity of getting control of Constantinople, a warm water port in the south, and the straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus, the approaches to the Mediterranean sea. The attainment of these two had been the historic objectives of Russian foreign policy.

This situation was incompatible with the German interests in the Near East. The German statesmen had been launching a Berlin-Bagdad Railway project, and the Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean was not conducive to the realization of their aims.

Apart from the Austro-Russian contest, there was more trouble and even before the war of 1914-1918, the Balkan Peninsula had been the scene of three little wars in 1911, 1912 and 1913 successively. The first of these wars was fought by Italy against Turkey. The Italians occupied the Turkish island of Rhodes, and the Dodecanese archipelago, and bombarded the forts at the entrance of Dardenelles. Turkey was helpless and sued for peace. In the autumn of 1912, the treaty was signed and Tripoli was yielded informally to Italy.

As the Italo-Turkish war drew to a close, Turkey was faced with another challenge—this time from the Balkan states. Several factors united the Balkan states against Turkey. Austria had occupied Bosnia, and this created in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia misgivings, lest Austria should carry on the thrust into Macedonia—thus bringing to an end their territorial ambitions. Secondly, the recent success of Albanians in resisting the Turks and Italy's annexation of Tripoli from Turkey gave evidence of the weakness of the Sultan of Turkey. And thirdly, the Russian diplomats had been striving hard to bring about Balkan unity. In consequence, there followed a series of Balkan alliances and understandings binding Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro. Once they were united, they jointly asked the Sultan to introduce drastic reforms in Macedonia. Turkey failed to respond and the four Balkan powers declared war against Turkey. The Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, ended the first Balkan conflict. Turkey ceded to the Balkan states not only all of her territory in Europe but also the island of Crete. But the treaty had no provisions as to how the spoils of victory should be divided Italy and Austria coveted Albania and Bulgaria stood firm in regard to Macedonia.

This situation led to the outbreak of the second Balkan War (June-July, 1913) in which Bulgaria fought alone against Serbia, Greece and a new foe, Rumania. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, 1913, brought to an early end the second Balkan war Bulgaria was all but expelled from Macedonia, Rumania gained at the expense of Bulgaria 2,687 square miles

and 286,000 inhabitants, Serbia nearly 15,000 square miles in Macedonia and about 1,500,000 people, and Greece obtained 18,000 square miles, and 1,700,000 inhabitants. Victor or vanquished—none of the belligerents,however, believed that the territorial decisions would be permanent. "The victorious Serbs and Montenegrins", as Grant and Temperley have put it, "thought they would have to fight Austria-Hungary before they could rest on their laurels. The defeated Bulgars made overtures for an alliance both with Austria-Hungary and the Turks so as to be revenged on their former allies. The Greeks hovered uncertainly between the Entente and the Austro-German alliance. All of them expected a new war very soon, and thought any treaties made in 1913 to be the merest scraps of paper."[6]

None of them was to be disappointed. On June 28, 1914, a young Bosnian student, who was a member of the Black Hand, a secret society of Serbian terrorists, murdered in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne. All Austria was aghast and filled with indignation and revenge. Serbia was held responsible for the crime and on July 28, war was declared on her. Realizing that Russia was mobilizing against Austria, as also against her, Germany declared war on the country of the Tsar on August 1. On French refusal to give guarantee of neutrality, war was declared upon her also on August 3. On August 4, the German troops invaded Belgium ; and shortly after, England was at war with Germany. Within five weeks of the Sarajevo episode, Europe was plunged into the maelstrom of World War.

Prior to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, war was considered as the only legitimate means of settling international disputes. The two international conferences, held at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, had failed to bring any reduction of armaments, although the conduct of war was regulated and the principle of voluntary arbitration had been accepted.

A Court of International Justice had been established at the Hague for the purpose of introducing legal regulations in the relations between states ; but its directives and decisions depended upon the qualms of ambitious adventurists of Europe. The urge for greatness was so acute, interests so vitally far apart, and the accumulating armaments so huge that war among the empire-seeking states was inevitable. Had it not been for these factors, the murder of the Archduke would have not brought the tragedy of 1914-1918.

PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1919

The war lasted for 1,565 days and came to an end on November 11, 1918 when the Government of Germany signed the

6. Grant and Temperley, op. cit. p. 478.

Armistice terms To her, the war meant complete annihilation; to the three great and historic empires, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottomon, it meant disintegration ; to England, it meant almost a complete economic and financial breakdown ; for France, it meant the recovery of national prestige and avenging the wrongs of '1871' ; to the United States of America, the war meant unusual prosperity, and to Italy, it meant not 'redemption' but disappointment. To all humanity, the four years of ferocious fighting meant frustration, starvation, hunger, homelessness, bloodshed and misery. The time for which the Allied and Central Powers were yearning however came and humanity heaved a sigh of relief.

The victors were happy over the victory which, they scarcely hoped, would come. In thousands of cities, towns and villages, the inhabitants wildly hailed the end of the armed combat. There was jubilation all around that the forces of aggression had been defeated.

But, as E.H. Carr has put it, "beneath the rejoicings of victory a deep note of anxiety made itself heard."[7] Although the headache of the problems of war was over, there was the headache of the problems of peace in the offing. The realisation of the problems yet to be solved tempered the spontaneity of the joy. The victors were faced with the most crucial liabilities and fearful responsibilities of peace-making ; the vanquished were sad and slightly disappointed over the thought of the morrow.

Assembling of the Peace Conference

However, after the surrender of Germany, invitations were sent to the Allied countries, big and small, to send their delegates to the conference to be opened up at Paris to draw the peace terms with the defeated powers. In recognition of the heroic part played by France, Paris was chosen as the site of conference and early in 1919, the delegations began to arrive. Delegates from the defeated powers were not invited to participate in the work of peace making–their's being the role of putting down their signatures on the completed documents. Russia, since it had gone Red and had concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers in March 1918, and was not on good terms with the Allies, because of its repudiation of capitalism, was also not represented. In January 1919, the conference formally met at Versailles near Paris, and began the stupendous task.

Problems before the Peace Conference

The peace-makers at Paris had assembled not only to make peace but to perpetuate peace, 'not only to solve one problem but a legion of them', 'to make the world safe for democracy', and to give to the dependent peoples of the world the right of

7. Carr, E. H., International Relations Between the Two World Wars (London, Macmillian, 1947) p. 26.

self-determination.' As Dr. Langsam in his book, 'The World Since 1914',has observed: "The Paris assemblage was called upon not only to draw up peace terms which would satisfy at least the more important of the twenty-three Allied countries and agree on a covenant for a league of nations that would be acceptable to forty or fifty not particularly friendly nations, but it had to feed the starving millions in Central and Eastern Europe, control the restless victorious armies, satisfy hysterical public opinions at home, and make peace among the dozen nations that fought their own little wars after the first World War came to an end. Poles and Ukranians, Rumanians and Hungarians, Greeks and Turks,Serbs and Montenegrins,Czechs and Germans,Russians and Armenians, Italians and Yugoslavs, all were engaged in combat. Over-riding all of them was the clash between the idealism of Wilson of the U.S. and the secret treaties which the various European States had had of necessity to draft during the war itself. The Great Powers themselves were so much at odds over policies and view-points and so divergent were their interests that the Versailles treaty in its final form might not have been signed at all, had there been a second Bismarck or Talleyrand to look after the interests of Germany."

Initial Disadvantages and Misfortunes of Peace Conference

Apart from these major and conflicting proplems, the conference met under certain initial disadvantages. The peace-makers were committed to "open covenants openly arrived at" and there was to be no secrecy about the proceedings. This led to the assembling in Paris of hundreds of press correspondents of different countries. Very often, they interpreted the proceedings differently than what the speakers meant and the result was chaos.

Secondly, while at the other important conferences of the modern period (Vienna and Berlin), the number of peace-makers was comparatively small, there ware at Paris some seventy-two each with a horde of assistants and secretaries and each pulling the wires to his own side.

Thirdly, while at Vienna in 1815, the diplomats had been guided by the doctrine of 'prize to the victors and punishment to the vanquished', they at Paris were committed to 'no annexation, no punitive damages and no war indemnities'. And this the Allies had accepted with the provision that compensation was to be made by Germany "for all damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air." Thus, the Allies were to divide the spoils of war with the utmost vigilance and forbearance.

Fourthly, the site of the conference was also a great misfortune. As Dr. Keynes has observed : "Paris was a night-mare and every-one there was morbid. The entire atmosphere was see-

thing with the spirit of discontent, hatred, vengeance cynicism and spite".[8] Similarly, Dr.Charles Seymour in the intimate papers of Colonel House, Wilson's private secretary, has recorded:"Paris was a bad place for business, where we were hampered by the atmosphere itself; where German guilt was assumed a proved fact; subconsciously the shell-shocks of Paris affected the nerves of all the delegates" Commenting upon the atmosphere of the conference, Dr. Langsam has also observed : "The masses were hysteric, and the mass hysteria rendered the statesmen paralytic."

The choice of Paris as the seat of the conference was thus a great blunder. It did not provide a place congenial for the drafting of a 'just-peace,' committed as they were to such a document through the Wilsonian peace programme.

Personal Element of the Diplomats at the Peace Conference

It has also been said that the personal element of the diplomats, who had assembled to make the peace, determined much of its subsequent character. "An idealist soaring high in the heavens, with an air of romantic melancholy about him, a brilliant orator, but an unskilled statesman from the European standards, unaccustomed to the rough and tumble bargaining with his political equals, having curious capacity to close his eyes to unpleasant facts, Wilson was all the time thinking of something not convincing to the European diplomats." Moreover, he had lost the confidence and goodwill of his own countrymen, particularly the Republicans, after the elections of 1918, who were wholly distrustful of his Administration. To make matters worse, just before leaving for Europe, he committed a gre " diplomatic blunder. This was in the selection of his four advisers. Two places of course were given to Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State and Colonel House, his friend and counsellor. The other two went to General Bliss and Senator White, of course estimable men, but having not much influence in political circles. Two experienced Republicans, like ex-President Taft and Senator Elihu Root, could very well be chosen, because, after all it was the entire American nation and not only the Democrats that had gone to the war. And then, his own knowledge of European affairs and problems was limited and sometimes he failed to appreciate the view point of the European diplomats.

Lloyed George, who headed the British delegation, was the leader of the Liberal Party whose slogans were : 'Make Germany pay, 'Shilling for Shilling and Ton for Ton. By the elections of December 1918, he himself was committed to ruthlessness toward Germany. And this stood in complete contrast to the Wil-

8. Keynes, J. M., Essays in Persuasion. (London, Macmillan, 1933), p. 5.

sonian peace programme and the war-time declarations and promises which the Allies had made to the peoples of Europe. Commitments at home thus conflicted with commitments abroad.

The French delegation was led by M. Clemenceau who, though quite old, was still a tough figure. He had the interests of France dear to his heart, and robustly proceded to safeguard them. His main objective was 'to weaken Germany and to exalt and strengthen France.' This objective he tried to realise in every possible manner. He, as president of the conference, was enough misfortune for its work. As has been remarked: "He was uncontrolling and uncontrolled, sleepy and pugnacious; he arose himself from the long slumbers of sleep only when the interests of France were at stake or when there was an opportunity of strengthening his country at the cost of some smaller power."

Italy was represented by Premier Orlando, who was "quite a learned, eloquent and artful diplomat." He had come to the conference with a definite aim—the fulfilment of the promises made to Italy in the secret Treaty of London in 1915 as the prize of her participation in the war on the side of the Allied countries. It was for the attainment of those objectives that he endeavoured all through his stay at Paris.

Greece, Poland, Belgium, South Africa, Portugal, Siam, Esthonia, Korea and a few others also sent their delegates—all of them with conflicting aims, and scarcely of one, coinciding with the other.

The conference had its another misfortune in having Dutasta as its Secretary General. He was thoroughly incompetent for the task entrusted to him. He owed his appointment to his close friendship with the president of the conference. Due to the intensity of the war which demanded concerted efforts of the Allies, no peace plan could be previously prepared. Had the Secretary-General been really an intelligent man, he might have remedied the ommission of an agreed plan by the constant preparation of agenda papers. But Dutasta was thoroughly unfit for such a task.

Organisation of the Peace Conference and Defects Therein

The first plenary session of the conference was held on January 18, 1919. Some seventy-two delegates, plenipotentiaries and numerous substitutes represented the thirty-two states. Each delegation needed at least one hotel to accommodate its large array of secretaries, advisers, journalists and representatives of varied interests.

This was too large and unwieldy a group to conduct busi-

ness efficiently and promptly and only six plenary sessions were held. Most of the real work was done by a Supreme Council of Ten, made up of two representatives from each of the five Big Powers, the U. S. A., the U. K., France, Italy and Japan. The smaller powers gave expression to their views on various matters through their representatives on the various advisory commissions. Soon it was felt that even the Council of Ten was too large for secret and expeditious dispatch of business and therefore in March, 1919, it was reduced to a Council of Four, consisting of the chiefs from the U. S., the U K., France and Italy. This Council of Four was further reduced to three when Italy withdrew her delegation as a protest against Wilson's refusal to meet her special claims. Thereafter the 'Big Three' conducted their meetings in strictest secrecy and the full conference was relegated into the background just to register the decisions of the Big Three.

The conference revealed much defects in its organisation and functioning, Most of the work of the conference was done by the 58 commissions which it appointed. These commissions comprised technical experts. This technical experience of the country in question was a great disadvantage, when it came to framing decisions which should have been wide, impartial, unprejudiced, and adjusted to the needs of the country. From the very beginning, these commissions were not encouraged to express their views upon policy or principle. For example, the commission on Greece was asked to decide whether the area claimed by the Greek delegate, Venizelos, in Smyrna region was the one which accorded with the zone of Greek population. It was not asked to report whether or not it was wise to allow the Greeks enter into Asia Minor at all. Moreover, as regards the settlement of the various claimants, no definite instructions were given whether the guiding principle would be 'self-determination' or 'historical claims' or 'economic necessity'. The result was that the final arrangements of peace satisfied some and wholly dissatisfied the other states.

Heavy Task before the Peace Conference

Last, but not the least, great misfortune of the conference was the heavy task it undertook to perform. The diplomats at Paris not only wanted 'to liquidate war but to found a new order in Europe'. They had assembled to rectify the psychological wrongs, *viz.*, the human nature of settling disputes by fighting. And this task they undertook at a time when its performance had become still more difficult because of two reasons, first, because of the invention of new and more deadly weapons of war which encouraged and inspired the aggressors and second, because the world had become democratic where the entire policy of the diplomats lay at the mercy of the ignorant masses. The old institution of international wars had been reinforced by

the two modern forces, which Toynbee has called, 'the drive of industrialism and the drive of democracy'.

It was in the midst of these general obstacles and initial disadvantages that the diplomats assembled at Paris to found a new order and to enter into a new epoch, where the mistakes of the past would not be repeated, and as, one commentator has put it, "where never again shall brute force sit on the throne of justice, nor barbaric strength wield the sceptre of right".

Drafting of the Versailles Treaty

The peace conference was faced with several immediate problems before it could start its real work and no progress could be possible unless they were resolved. Some of them as Dr. Langsam has recounted, were : (1) the wording of a league of nations covenant ; (2) the question of French security and the left bank of the Rhine ; (3) the Italian and the Polish claims ; (4) the disposition of the dependencies and colonies of the defeated powers ; (5) and the settlement of reparation for damages that had been done by Germany.

(1) *The wording of a League of Nations covenant :*

A good deal of controversy arose over the advisability of incorporating the covenant of the League in the general peace treaties. Wilson wanted that it should be included in the treaty, lest the powers, in their preoccupation with other urgent matters, should shelve the covenant indefinitely. On the insistence of Wilson, the second plenary session held on January 25, 1919, appointed a commission, with Wilson as its chairman, to draft the covenant. He presented a completed report to another plenary session of the conference on February 14, 1919. It met with considerable criticism, and after the insertion of twenty-six changes, the covenant was finally adopted on April 28, 1919 ; and with it, the first problem was solved.

(2) *The question of French Security and the fate of the left bank of the Rhine :*

The second urgent problem was : How to provide security to France for which she was very alert. Although the Allies had won the war, France did not feel herself secure in the future. The Frenchmen knew the recuperative power of the Germans and feared a loss of their peace any time in the future. This fear made the French delegates panicky, and the only means of satisfying them was to so cripple Germany—politically, militarily, economically, territorially, and commercially—that she could never again raise her head to threaten France. Rhine was considered as the first barrier provided by nature and so the French delegates demanded that Germany's western frontier be fixed at the Rhine and secondly, that the ten thousand square miles of territory between the Rhine on the East

and the Netherlands, Belgium and France on the West, be erected into an autonomous, neutral state more or less under French protection. But the American and the British delegates were entirely opposed to this creation of another Alsace-Lorraine.

After prolonged discussion, a compromise was arrived at. The territory in question was to be under the Allied occupation for a stated period of years after the signing of the treaty—the northern sector for five years. the central zone for ten years and the southern sector for fifteen years. It was also agreed that the time limits would be subject to Germany's prompt fulfilment of the other parts of the treaty ; otherwise the occupation might continue indefinitely. The area of over 31 miles east of the Rhine was to be de-militarized which meant that neither armed forces could be maintained nor fortifications erected in that area.

Besides this, in order to assure France still further, Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to sign special treaties which guaranteed that both the U.S. and Great Britain would come to the aid of France in case of German invasion. On June 28, 1919, therefore, when the Versailles Treaty was signed, two supplementary Guarantee Treaties, one Franco-British, and the other Franco-American were also signed.

Relating to this problem of French security was another : the disposition of the Saar Basin. This Rhenish territory, partly Prussian and partly Bavarian, was known to be one of the world's greatest steel and coal-producing area. Since most of the French coal-mines in the north had been destroyed by Germany, Clemenceau demanded that the basin should be ceded to France as compensation for her heavy losses.

Ethnologically and historically, the territory had been German for long with most of the population German. The problem before the conference was : how to give to France the German coal without giving to her the German people and German territory ? A committee of the American, British and French experts was appointed and according to its recommendations, France was given ownership of all the coal mines, and the value of the entire coal removed was to be credited to Germany's reparation account. While certain important rights were reserved to France, the territory was to be governed by a commission of the League of Nations. After fifteen years, the people of the area should express their desire by voting as to "the sovereignty under which they wished to be placed." This sovereignty might be an autonomous state under League control or it might be France or Germany. If the people should choose to go back to Germany, the latter should repurchase control of the mines from France at a price that was to be determined by three experts,

one German, one French, and third, an appointee of the League.

(3) *The Italian and the Polish claims* :

Another important problem related to the Italian demands which had now exceeded the limits promised in the secret Treaty of London. Italy, formerly promised the territory extending from the Brenner Pass in Tirol to the port of Valona in Albania, plus the Dodecanese Islands, and some land in the Asia and Africa, now also laid claims to the port of Fiume and an extra part of the Dalmatian coast, both of which had belonged to Austria-Hungary. Italy demanded Fiume not only for reasons of commerce, but for reasons of strategy too. Adriatic sea had been the bone of contention between Italy and Austria-Hungary in the pre-war days and now, that Austro-Hungarian Empire was gone, Italy did not like that any another rival should come on the stage. Without Fiume, Italy felt, Yugolavia could not become a great maritime power. This was naturally resented by the Slavs, and they put forth their own arguments to support their case. The Council of Four thoroughly examined each case and finally recommended that a Dalmatian line should be drawn, giving Italy somewhat less than what had been promised to her at London. This was resented by the Italian delegates and they left the conference in disgust. This Fiume-Adriatic controversy continued even after the conference had ended and was finally decided by direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia.

The Polish question was not so controversial as that of Fiume. The Allies had agreed that an independent and united Poland should be created with access to the sea. A committee was appointed to fix the boundaries of the new state. In order to give to Poland an outlet to the sea, Eastern Prussia was severed from Germany add put under Polish control. Thus in clear violation of self-determination, 300,000 Germans and the important city of Danzig were put under Polish control. But owing to the opposition of Lloyd George, who had no interest in a strong Poland and who feared a German-Polish war, the Marienwerder district east of the Vistula River was not to be given to Poland without a plebiscite. Moreover, Danzig was made a 'free city' to be administered by the League of Nations, though economically it was made subservient to Poland.

Incidentally, however, this arrangement satisfied France in two ways First, it weakened Germany and secondly, it created a strong ally on the eastern frontier of Germany to checkmate Soviet Russia.

(4) *The Question of the Settlement of Colonies of the Defeated Powers:*

The colonies of Germany and dependent provinces of the Ottoman Empire were the other troublesome issues. Difference of opinion arose as to their fate. Some of the Allied statesmen

proposed outright annexation and partition ; others denounced it imperialistic and against the declared war aims of the Allies. Their restoration to the former masters was neither expedient nor politic. A new formula needed to be evolved and this was done by General Smuts, who proposed a plan known as the 'Mandate System.'

According to this plan, the territories that were to be taken from Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were to be assigned to the League, which, in turn, was to "delegate its authority to some other state which it might appoint as its agent and mandatory, subject to certain supervisory restriction." All members of the League were promised "equal commercial and trading opportunities in the mandated territory and the mandatories were obliged to present to the Mandate Commission of the League annual reports regarding the progress during the course of the year.

(5) *The Question of Reparation* :

The last item to be settled was reparation. In their pre-armistice note of November 5, 1918, the Allies had stipulated that Germany, being mainly responsible for the war, would be expected to pay for "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air." But when the conference commission on reparation met, the British and French delegates demanded that Germany must pay for all costs of the war and for pensions as well as for actual damages. In view of the pre-armistice note, the Americans disliked the demand and referred the matter to the Council of the Four. It decided that except in the case of Belgium, the war costs were not to be added to the damages. The U. S. members of the Reparation Commission wanted to fix a definite sum, definite time and methods of payment because they thought it would be beneficial to both sides. The allies would know the exact amount of money on which they could rely for reconstruction purposes and the Germans could make definite plans for paying off their debt. But this was not liked by the other members of the commission. They wanted that Germany must be "made to pay to the limit of her capacity" and any definite amount, howsoever large, would be unsatisfying to their countrymen. The matter was therefore shelved for future settlement, making only a temporary arrangement for immediate payment. It was decided that by May, 1921, Germany should pay a total amount of 5 000,000,000 dollars in gold or its equivalent. In the meantime, a special reparation commission would be appointed to fix the total amount; and to regulate the method of future payments.

These main stumbling blocks having been removed, the conference proceeded to give the treaty the final form.

Signing ofthe Versailles Treaty

Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Germany :

All the details of the treaty were completed by the beginning of May 1919, and Germany was ordered to send her delegates to receive the peace terms. Germany declared its intention to send subordinate officials to bring the document to Berlin for detailed consideration by the authorities. This was interpreted by the Allies as an insult and warning was given to Germany to send a full-fledged delegation immediately. The warning was heeded and a delegation of six members reached Paris on April 29.

From the very beginning, the Allied Generals wanted that Germany might not sign the treaty so that they might have an excuse to over-run Germany altogether. As written by Henry White to Senator Lodge : "Marshall Foch had distinctly stated in the presence of General Bliss that nothing would give him more satisfaction than the refusal of the Germans to sign the treaty, as in that case, he would be able to enter Germany as the head of an Allied army, to over-run the country completely, to take possession of the financial centres and to squeeze out every bit of money available throughout the land."

The manner in which the treaty was prepared and presented to the German delegates was indicative of that end. As Dr. Langsam has stated : "the movements of the delegates were carefully restricted ; they were guarded by Allied officers, were kept in their hotel behind barbed wires and were forbidden to communicate with the Allied deputies."

In the Trianon Palace at Versailles, the peace terms were formally presented by Clemenceau to the German delegates on May 7, 1919 The Allied delegates, while entering the Palace, were presented a guard of honour but it was withdrawn when the German delegates came in. Addressing the Germans, Clemenceau said: "You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our accounts. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace." Much to its disappointment, the German delegation which was accompanied by a large number of experts on many subjects learned that there would be no negotiation. The delegation was informed that three weeks would be allowed during which they were to consider the terms and that complaints, if any, should be submitted in writing.

As was natural, the form and contents of the peace terms created an outburst of feelings in Germany, and the entire nation—the radicals, the reactionaries and the moderates, as

one man—resented them. When the proposed terms were published in the newspapers, the Germans denounced them in unmeasured terms. The President of the German Republic condemned the terms as "unfulfillable, unbearable and ruinous". Similarly, the President of the National Republic cried: "Our enemies have laid before us a treaty which surpasses by far the fears of our greatest pessimists." The Chairman of the Armistice Commission said: "The treaty of Versailes is the work of the evil."

On May 29, the German delegation submitted to the Allies a detailed memorandum elaborating its criticism of the treaty, denying the only German responsibility for the war, and emphasizing the impossibility of fulfilling all the terms of the treaty. If the Allied treaty covered 230 large printed pages, the German reply covered 443 which contained a whole list of counter-proposals.

The Allies set up ten committees to consider the German memorandum, and their deliberations resulted in an Allied reply on June 26, 1919. Only a few objections were accepted and the Germans were given a week's time, either to accept or reject the revised treaty in toto. Failure to do so would mean Allied invasion.

Most of the Germans preferred invasion to accepting that disgraceful peace ; but the German Chancellor, Hindenburg, felt that further resistance was impossible under the circumstances. On June 22, the German assembly at Weimar agreed to accept the peace terms, subject, of course, to certain objections concerning "the articles accusing Germany of the sole war-crime, and demanding the surrender of certain war criminals for trial before the Allied courts, and condemning Germany's action in violating the code of war."

The very next day, the Allied ultimatum was given: "Either accept the terms by seven o'clock in the evening of Monday, June, 23, unconditionally or get ready to face the invasion." The Germans had no alternative and their acquiescence came two hours earlier, at a little after five, though of course with the utmost bitterness in the mind of the entire nation.

The German delegates, who came to Versailles for the last time to sign the final document, were again restricted in their action and guarded as if prisoners in the Allied hands. At 3 o'clock in the after-noon of June 28, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors, the German delegates signed first and the Allied delegates followed.

Basis of Peace Settlement

(I) Wilsonian Programme :

The Drafting of the Versailles treaty was not an isolated

event in itself, but was rather the outcome of a long peace programme, already agreed upon between the Allies and the Central Powers. The famous Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, Four Principles of Febuary 11, 1918 and Five Particulars of September 27, 1918 enunciated by Wilson, the U. S. President, in his addresses to the Congress formed the basis of the peace settlement.

When the Alies and the Germans laid down their arms on November 11, 1918, they did so because of a formal agreement not only on the immediately operative terms of the truce, but also on the principles of the final settlement. These principles were as follows:—

FOURTEEN POINTS

1. There were to be no secret treaties; all the international agreements must be "open covenants of peace openly arrived at."

2. There must be absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas alike in peace and war, except as they may be closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

3. There should be the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers to trade among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

4. There should be adequate guarantees that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

5. There should be impartial adjustment of all colonial claims on the principle that the interests of the population must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

6. There should be the evacuation of all Russian territory, and the independent determination of her own political development and national policy.

7. Belgium should be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit her sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored and the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorroine be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomus development.

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free access to the sea, and the relations of the Balkan states be determined along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality.

12. The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities under Turkish rule be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development; and the Dardanelles be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish State should be erected including the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population, which should be assured a free and secure to the sea and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations to be formed for affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In a subsequent address to Congress on February 11, 1918, the President enunciated Four Principles of settlement. The first principle was that "each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that is permanent."

The second principle was that "peoples and provinces were not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty, as if they were chattels or pawns in a game, even the great game now for ever discredited of the balance of power," but that, principle third stated, "every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states."

The last principle was that "all well-defined national aspirations should be accorded that utmost satisfaction that could be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that, in time, would be likely to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

In another speach in New York city on September 27, 1918, Wilson laid down what came to be known as his

"Five Interpretations" of his Government's duty with regard to peace.

(1) "The impartial justice meted out must involve no distinction between those to whom we wish to be just, and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards, but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

(2) "No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement, which is not consistent with the common interests of all.

(3) "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

(4) "And more specially, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of economic boycott of any form, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League itself as a means af discipline and control.

(5) "All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world".

Here two questions arise: First, did the Germans lay down their arms in reliance upon a pledge given to them by their enemies that the ensuing peace terms would conform absolutely to the twenty-three principles enunciated by Wilson? Secondly, if so, did the Allied and the Associated Powers observe or violate that pledge, once Germany was at their mercy?

On October 5, 1918, Wilson was requested by the Germans to grant them peace on the basis of his own Fourteen Points and nine subsequent principles.

On October 8, Wilson demanded of Germany the reply of three questions: (*a*) Did the German Government themselves accept the Fourteen Points as the basis of the desired treaty? (*b*) Would they at once withdraw their troops from all foreign soil? (*c*) Could they give assurance that the present and future government of Germany would be placed on a truely democratic basis?

On October 12, the Chancellor replied all these questions in the affirmative

On October 14, Wilson sent to the German government another note telling them that first, "no armistice could be negotiated which did not provide absolutely satisfactory safe-

guards for the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Allied and the Associated armies; secondly that, "submarine warfare would be discontinued forthwith", thirdly, that a "democratic government would be established in Germany."

On October 20, these conditions too were accepted by Germany. On November 5, Wilson sent to his Associates the replies and assurance he had received from Germany.

The Allied Governments attached two more conditions: first, regarding the question of the 'freedom of the seas' and the second, extending the principle of restoration so as to cover "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

On receipt of this note, the German government sent their emissaries to receive the armistice terms; and the same were signed at 5 A.M. on Monday, the 11th November, 1918, in the forest of Campaigne.

Now these armistice terms were drafted by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. In this Council, the U.S. was represented by Colonel House. He gave a wholly new interpretation to the fourteen points and sent his own commentary to the Allied Governments. The effect of this was that the more alarming points became more palatable to the Allies. For example, point first was interpreted to mean, not that diplomatic negotiations should henceforth be conducted in public, but simply that when negotiations had resulted in treaties, they should be published.

Point third might mean the establishment of universal free trade; but according to House, it was not intended to forbid any tariffs so long as they were applied against all foreign countries alike. It only meant 'open door' for raw materials, and the prohibition of the discriminatory tariffs between the members of the League of Nations.

In point four, dealing with disarmament, House interpreted the phrase 'domestic safety' to mean 'self defence'.

Point fifth, dealing with colonial claims, did not mean (as the Germans very naturally supposed) that they were to have a fair share of colonial territory, but only that, whatever nation received ex-enemy colonial territory, was to be responsible for it to the League.

Point seventh dealing with Belgium was interpreted to mean that Belgium was to be indemnified of all war costs.

Point eight, concerning France, meant that France was not to be given full war costs but only indemnity for damages.

The Allied Governments claimed that they had accepted House's version of the fourteen points ; and the Germans came to know of the version much later as the rest of the world did. The German Government imagined that she surrendered on a pledge; the Allies imagined that they accepted the Wilsonian peace programme as revised by House. It was to this extent that the Peace Settlement might be said to have been based upon Wilsonian ideology.

(2) *Secret Agreements and Promises as the Basis of the Peace Settlement* :

The diplomats at Paris, even if they wanted a just peace, were steeped in the nationalistic tradition. They were aware, as Palmer and Perkins in their book "International Relations" have put it, of their '[1]pledges to each other, without which there might have been no victory ; [2]of their solemn statements of war aims ; of their own encouragement of national aspirations ;[3]of the ancient grudges smouldering within Europe ;[4]of the sacred trust of their own government's national policies ; [5]of the disturbing implications of the Russian Revolution ; and of countless other restraining, limiting influences. It is not too much to say that the combination of commitments and hard been facts predetermined the "*Peace of Paris.*"[9]

(1) One such treaty was signed between Great Britain and Italy on April 26, 1915 in which Italy was promised. in return for a declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary, first, the Trentino, Trieste and Northern Dalmatia, secondly, sphere of influence in the Asiatic Turkey, thirdly, a special war loan and part of the war indemnity and fourthly, Italy was assured that the Papacy would not be supported in any diplomatic action taken against the wishes of the Italian government.

(2) A similar understanding was given to Rumania in August, 1916, when the Allies agreed to concede the two provinces of Bukovina and Transylvania, which she had since long coveted in return for her participation in the war on the side of the Allies.

(3) Another group of secret arrangements related to the partition of Turkey at the end of the war. In March, 1915, England and France agreed to give Russia the city of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits along with the adjacent territory on condition that Constantinople be maintained as a 'free port' and that freedom be guaranteed for the commercial shipping in the Straits,

(4) Compensation for France and England was arranged in April, 1916 when France was assigned a sphere of influence in Syria, Cilicia, southern Kurdistan and Adana, and England in

9. Palmer, N. D. and Perkins, H.S., International Relations. (London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1953), p. 458.

Palestine and Mesopotamia. At the same time, Russia was granted an additional zone of influence in Armenia and adjacent territories in north-eastern Anatolia.

(5) In May 1916, came the Sykes-Picot agreement whereby a more precise definition was made by England and France as to which of Turkey's Arabic territories would be administered by them and which they would turn over to an independent Arab state or federation of states.

(6) On April 17, 1917 came the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement in which Italy was granted a sphere of influence in the Anatolian districts of Smyrna and Adalia.

(7) Moreover, there were two more secret treaties signed under the stress of war. In February 1917, in return for certain naval assistance, the British promised to support the Japanese claim to the German rights in Shantung and to the German islands north of the equator which Japan had already seized.

(8) In a similar agreement a month later, Russia offered to support French claims in Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar Basin and the Rhineland in return for French assistance in achieving Russia's territorial claims with regard to the Central Powers.

(3) *The Russian Revolution:*

The collapse of the Tsarist monarchy and rise of Bolshevism in Russia was the most important single development during the war. Had it not been for the timely intervention of U.S., the victory of the Allies would have become almost uncertain. Moreover, the change greatly influenced the conditions under wh ch the Peace Conference met. (1) Since communism was a challenge to the Western Democracies, Russia became an 'international outcast' and all post-war arrangements were to be made without her participation. (2) The recognition of new states carved out of the former Russian territory and the enlargement of Rumania became easier. (3) The evasion of secret treaties involving Russia became possible and Constantinople and the straits were left for the Turks. (4) In Russia, France lost a very powerful ally and henceforth would have to look for other friends, *i.e.*, smaller states of Eastern Europe. (5) The establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and the incorporation of its Covenant in the Versailles Treaty were also in a way inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution.

(4) *The Rise of Nationalism:*

There were, in Eastern Europe, several minority groups who had been aspiring for independence for long and had all the the time been suppressed. Most of them were in the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. The first World War presented to them a golden opportunity and even before the

collapse of these empires, the patriots there began to devise plans for independence after the war. The Yugoslavs, for example, set up as early as May 1915, a committee in London which on July 20, 1917 issued the Declaration of Corfu. This document called for the union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the constitutional monarchy with a constitution to be drafted at the end of the war by a popularly-elected constituent assembly.

Similarly, Poland had suffered several partitions made by the imperialist states and the condition of the Poles was drawing the sympathies of the entire world. When the war began in 1914, both Russia and the Central Powers tried to win over the Poles to their own side. Early in the war, Russia announced her approval of the union of all Poles in a united and autonomous kingdom. In November 1916, the Central Powers declared that Poland would be set up as an independent state with a hereditary monarch and a constitution. Similarly, late in 1917, the Allies recognised the Polish National Committee formed by Ignace Jan Padeerwski. Thus, the peace-makers at Paris confronted the fact of a provisional Polish Government in actual operation and it was almost difficult to set it aside.

Equally dissatisfied were the two other minority groups: the Czechs in Austria and the Slovaks in Hungary. They were closely related Slav groups and were aspiring for unity. Early in 1915, the leaders of these minority groups organised the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and called upon their followers to desert the Austrian armies. It soon began to operate as a provisional government in exile. In September 1918, the U. S., Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan recognised the Paris Council as a *de-facto* government. Towards the close of October, the Council declared the end of the Austrian rule and the establishment of an Independent State of the Czechoslovaks. Here also, the Paris assemblage confronted a *fait-accompli*.

Similar developments took place in the Baltic states. The Finns, the Esthonians and the Lithuanians were all clamouring to establish independent and constitutional states. Early in the war in 1914, the Tsar sought to Russify the country. This stimulated among the Finns the keen sense of nationalism and in December 1917, when Russia was in confusion, they declared their independence and soon after, set to work to erect a democratic government of the republican form. A similar attempt to Russify the Esthonians was also going on for long but in March 1917, the new Russian Government granted a large measure of autonomy and on November 28, 1917, Esthonia was declared an independent state. In March 1917, Latvia was also granted limited self-government, and on November 11, 1917, the leading Allied powers recognised the independence of the Letts.

Like the Letts, the Lithuanians were also promised certain rights of self-government by the Russian Provisional Government and were shortly after recognised by the Allies.

In all these cases,the efforts of the national groups to achieve independence were encouraged by the Allies and the United States. This was done during the war to take advantage of the internal troubles of the enemy states, but this presented a serious problem once the enemies had been defeated. The spirit of nationalism, once kindled, could not be curbed, and the Allied diplomats assembled at Paris could not afford to do otherwise. This was a hard fact and to close eyes to it would have been most undiplomatic.

President Wilson tried to assume that the thirty-two states at Paris were meeting with clean slates to write an enduring and a just peace; but he was sadly disappointed. His was the only country not solemnly bound by treaties "to do something" for one or the other states when the great day came. Otherwise, most of the victorious nations, which gathered, wanted something either from Germany or from one of the other defeated states. To grab for oneself it was natural to let others have their share and so the treaty, resulting from such an assemblage, was not without its "log-rolling."

(5) *Wartime Promises and Declarations:*

The statesmen also had in their minds the various promises they had made to their peoples during the war. As C. E. Black and E. C. Helmreich have put it: "these were a conglomeration, running the gamut from 'Hang the Kaiser' to 'Making the World safe for Democracy,' and seeling to it that this was really to be the 'Warto end War'..... A genuine fear of a resurgent Germany which might try to undo the work of the Peace Conference gripped the hearts of many. Germany would have to be weakened to a point where she could never make such an attempt. The delegates did not have to look far to see the devastation of war. With passions still hot a natural desire to punish was understandably at hand.)

In addition, the makers of the treaty were greatly plagued by old frontier ambitions and fear of the future among the nations. This was particularly true of France who was nervous about her further security and therefore demanded to occupy the territory on the left bank of the Rhine. But this was not acceptable both to England and U. S., as it was a gross violation of the 'self-determination of nations which had been set up as a guiding principle for the conference.

Besides, during the year 1915, the British Government had made vague and general promises to the Arab leader, Husain, the Sheriff of Mecca, regarding the independence of the

Arab peoples after the war. This commitment was not made known even to the French. At the same time, the British Foreign Secretary, Balfour, had promised to the World Jewry a 'National Home' in Palestine in a public declaration issued in November 1917.

PEACE SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE

Treaty of Versailles with Germany:

The purpose of the Treaty of Versailles, as stated in its preamble, was "to replace the state of war by a firm, just and durable peace." The Treaty was a lengthy document running in to 440 articles.

A. Territorial Clauses

In the West of Europe:—

(1) Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.

(2) Most of Posen and West Prussia were ceded to Poland.

(3) After a "plebiscite" conducted by her own authorities, Belgium obtained Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet.

(4) The coal mines of Saar to be the property of France (in compensation for the destruction of the French mines). The territory to be administered by the League of Nations for a period of fifteen years, after which a plebiscite had to be held. If this should favour return to Germany, France was to be paid compensation for relinquishing the mines.

In the North of Europe:—

As a result of a plebiscite held in March 1920, Denmark received Northern Schleswig, taken from her by Prussia and Austria in 1864, and by Prussia alone in 1866.

In the East of Europe:—

(1) Silesia was partitioned between Germany and Poland the former having more than half of the people and land area, and the latter occupying the economic resources.

(2) Danzig (seized from Poland in 1793) together with about 750 square miles of adjacent territory, with a population almost wholly German, was made a "Free City" under the protection of the League of Nations, but was included in Poland to provide the latter a corridor to the sea. Poland was to have charge of the City's foreign relations.

(3) Memel was to pass to the Allies who would determine its future.

In Austria:—

The Union of Germany and Austria was fobidden without the unanimous consent of the Council of the League. Germany acknowledged and promised to respect the independence of Austria.

The total result was that Germany lost in Europe about six million population and about 25,000 square miles of territory, of which Lorraine and the Polish part of Upper Silesia were of considerable industrial value.

B. Territorial Clauses

In the Colonies :—

Germany renounced "in favour of the principal Allied and the Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions", these being later apportioned by Britain, France, Belgium, Japan, Union of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand as "Mandates of the League."

In the Pacific :—

(1) The islands north of the equator and all German rights in Kiaochow (in China) were transferred to Japan.

(2) German New Guinea, Nauru, and the islands south of Equator were mandated to Britain.

(3) German Samoa was mandated to New Zealand.

(4) The rest of the islands were mandated to Australia.

Besides these, all special rights and privileges of Germany in China, Siam, Siberia, Morocco and Egypt were given up. All her property and concessions in the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria were forfeited. Germany was forbidden to maintain or build any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right. Existing fortifications were to be dismantled and armed forces could not be assembled there.

C. Economic Clauses

(1) A Reparation Commission was to be appointed by the Allies to determine the total amount of reparation and the method of payment. Meanwhile upto May 1, 1921, Germany was to pay in gold, ships, securities or commodities the equivalent of nearly 5,000 000,000 dollars. If the Reparation Commission so demanded, Germany was also to build ships for the Allies upto a maximum of two hundred thousand tons a year for five years.

In case of default, the Reparation Commission was empowered to recommend any action.

(2) Germany also agreed to make annual deliveries of coal for ten years as follows:—

7,000,000 tons to France; 8,000,000 tons to Belgium; 7,700,000 tons to Italy and smaller amount to Luxemberg, if so directed by the Commission.

(3) In addition to coal, Germany was to pay the Allies coal-tar, ammonium sulphate, dye-stuffs and chemicals in huge quantities.

(4) The products of the Allied countries were to be accorded the most-favoured-nation treatment.

(5) The Elbe, Oder, Niemen and the Danube rivers were declared 'international.' Together with Rhine, they were placed under the control of an International Commission so that free access to the sea might be provided for the land-locked countries of Central Europe.

(6) The Kiel Canal and its approaches were made "free and open" on equal terms to the merchant and war-vessels of all countries at peace with Germany.

(7) All German property, private as well as state, in the former German colonies and in the Allied countries was confiscated.

(8) Large number of horses, cattle, sheep, etc., to be delivered to France and Belgium in compensation for those confiscated during the war.

D. Military Clauses

(1) The general staff to be dissolved; conscription to be abolished.

(2) The army was limited to 100,000 men including a maximum of 4,000 officers. These forces to be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to control the frontiers.

(3) The manufacture of armaments, munitions and war materials was limited and such materials could be stored only at points to be notified to the Governments of the Allies. No war materials to be exported or imported. Poison gasses, armoured-cars and tanks were to be neither made nor purchased.

(4) Fleet not to exceed 6 battle-ships (of 10,000 tons), 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats and a personnel of 15,000. All submarines were forbidden.

(5) All educational establishments, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and generally speaking, asso-

ciations of every description, were not to occupy themselves with any military matters.

(6) Helgoland to be dismantled and the Baltic and North Sea coasts to be kept free from fortification.

The Allies reserved to and later did appoint Commissions of Control to supervise the execution of the disarmament clauses with extensive powers of investigation.

E. Legal Clauses

The "war guilt" clauses of the Treaty of Versailles stated that "the Allies and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which they and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies".

(1) War was declared an international crime and the war-monger an international criminal.

(2) The ex-Emperor William II of Hohenzollern was charged "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" ; and he and such other persons as should be accused of "acts in violation of the laws and customs of war" to be surrendered to the Allies for trial. Eventually, the trials were permitted to be held in Leipzig where the court procedure was perfunctory. Only a few of the less important 'war criminals' were tried and they received light sentences.

F. Sanctions

(1) To ensure fulfilment of the treaty, there was to be for fifteen years an Allied occupation "at the cost of Germany, of the left bank and bridge-heads of the Rhine." The occupied territory was to be evacuated in three stages. The right of re-occupation either within or after fifteen years was reserved in the event of default ; in the event of earlier fulfilment, occupation would end with fulfilment.

(2) To supervise the execution of the treaty, various commissions were appointed *e.g.*,for the determination of frontiers, the administration of internationalized rivers and of the occupied areas, the supervision of plebiscites and the ensuring of disarmament.

As a result of all these arrangements, the Versailles Treaty reduced the European area of Germany by one-eighth and her population by 6,500,000. It deprived her of all her colonies and virtually of all holdings and investments abroad. Her navy, formerly second to Britain, was nearly wiped out and remained not much larger than that of Belgium. By her European cessations, Germany lost potash, iron. coal, zinc, lead and food; by her colo-

nial cessation she lost oil, rubber and fibre supplies. The result of all this was that for a long time, even the industrial plants which Germany retained were incapable of working at their former level of efficiency. Finally, Germany signed a blank reparation cheque. Thus, as one writer has put it: "economically crippled, politically segregated, militarily humbled, nationally humiliated and physically exhausted, Germany stood like a pale person just out of the game."

Characteristics of the Versailles Treaty

As E.H. Carr has put it: "the Treaty of Versailles had certain special characteristics which determined much of its subsequent history."[8]

(1) *A 'dictated peace'* :—In the first place, it was a "dictated peace". Because of the hatreds and misconceptions bred by ruthless propaganda, the war left the victorious nations in a vindictive mood. The peace was not negotiated between the victors and the vanquished by a process of give and take, but was imposed upon the defeated powers under duress. Not a single member of the German delegation met the Allied delegates face to face except on two formal occasions of the presentation of the peace terms and the signing of the final documents. "Even on these occasions, the usual courtesies of social intercourse were not observed." When the Germans came to sign the document, they were not allowed to sit by the side of the Allied representatives, but were rather escorted in and out of the hall in the manners of criminals, conducted to and from the dock." As they left Paris for Versailles, mobs showered them with stones and vocal abuses. "These unnecessary humiliations", as Carr says, "which could only be explained by the intense bitterness of feeling still left over from the war, had far-reaching psychological consequences both in Germany and elsewhere. They fixed in the consciousness of the German people the conception of a "dictated peace" ; and they helped to create the belief, which became universal in Germany and was tacitly accepted by a large body of opinion in other countries, that the signature extorted from Germany in these conditions was not morally binding on her."[9]

(2) *Terms of Treaty too harsh* :—When the terms of the draft treaty were made known to the Germans, they were regarded as "staggering in their severity and impossible of fulfilment." The whole scheme seemed designed to keep the country in perpetual subjection. While Germany was to be stripped of her armaments and left naked before her enemy, the Allies were entitled to ask for impossible sums as reparatiops, and to occupy German territory as a guarantee for payment. Loud complaint went up that

8. Carr, op. cit., p. 4.
9. Ibid., p. 5.

the instrument differed widely from Wilson's peace programme, upon the faith of which, Germany contended, she laid down her arms. As Benns has remarked: "The prospects of a crushing reparation amount and of a long military occupation, the forced destruction of the mechanism and equipment of the German national army under the eyes of an Allied Commission and the abolition of conscription were the humiliations difficult to bear. Most obnoxious too were the arrangements for the Eastern frontiers, the revival of Poland, the Polish Corridor to the sea, severing East Prussia from Brandenburg and the cessation to Poland of a large slice of the industrial area of Silesia, which, but for German brains and German capital would never have attained to its swift and imposing development. That the Germans should be compelled to renounce all the conquests of the great Frederick was the least easy for their pride to accept."

(3) *Reciprocity was not observed* :—As Adams Gibbons in his book, 'Introduction to World Politics', has observed: "Since reciprocity was not promised in the disarmament, transportation and economic clauses of the treaty, Germany virtually signed away her sovereignty and put herself into the hands of the receivers. All the ideals upon which the Treaty was based were forced upon Germany alone and completely disregarded by the Allies. With reciprocity in all matters where it would have been for the common good, the treaty would have been a peace of justice. Without reciprocity it was a peace of force and its terms were possible of execution only so long as the force that caused Germany to sign it continued to make them execute it."

(4) *Treaty not based upon the promises made* :—In their imposition of the terms upon Germany, the Allied Powers took the position that everything demanded of Germany was just and reasonable in itself, the reasons being that Germany was responsible for the war and had to be perished. The basis of the Treaty was in reality not the Wilsonian principles but the victory of the Entente Powers. In his book 'Peace Making' 1919 H. Nicolson stated: "Our Covenants of peace were not openly arrived at; seldom has such secrecy been maintained in any diplomatic gathering. The freedom of the seas was not secured. So far from free trade being established in Europe, a set of tariff walls was erected, higher and more numerous than any known before. National armaments were not reduced. The German colonies were distributed among the victors in a manner which was neither free nor open-minded, nor impartial. The wishes, to say nothing of the interest of the populations, (as in the Saar, Shantung and Syria) were flagrantly disregarded. Russia was not welcomed in the society of nations, nor was she accorded unhampered freedom to develop her own institutions. The frontiers of Italy were not adjusted along the lines of nationality.

The territories of Poland included many people who were indisputably not Polish. The League has not in practice been able to assure political independence to great and small nations alike. The territorial settlement in almost every case were based on mere adjustments and compromises between the claims of rival states. Elements of discord were, in fact, perpetuated." Thus, the pre-armistice terms were openly ignored, because the framers of the Treaty were sure that Germany would have done the same thing had she been in their place.

(5) *Germany's overseas possessions parcelled out among the Allies* :—The Treaty of Versailles divided Germany's overseas possessions among the British, French and Japanese, and cancelled the concessions and leases and took away the property of Germans in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire–Egypt, Siam, China and the parts of the world under the domination of the victorious colonial powers. Germany renounced her privileges of extra-territoriality in countries where the European powers and the United States enjoyed a special regime for residents and traders. But the victorious powers did not give up their own enjoyment of these privileges The Treaty of Versailles has also been criticised on some other grounds. It was asserted by some that German disarmament was intended to be preliminary to a general reduction of armaments and this general reduction did not take place. The reparation settlement was criticised as being difficult to apply and injurious alike to victors and vanquished.

Several of those who signed the Treaty of Versailles have denounced it bitterly. General Smuts said : "The promise of the new life, the victory of the great human ideals for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfilment of their aspirations towards a new international order and a fairer better world, are not written in this treaty. There are territorial settlements, which in my humble judgement, will need revision. There are guarantees laid down which, we all hope, will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate."

It has come to be remarked that the "peace settlement of Versailles was a curious blending of hypocrisy, hatred, vengeance, idealism and materialism. It was couched in moral terms flatly at variance with the language they had used during the war." It was because of these characteristic features that the scholars and statesmen have come to remark that the Treaty of Versailles was not an arrangement for peace, but for another war, or to put it in other words, the origins of the second World

War were to be found in the Peace Settlement of 1919. It was this treaty which led to the rise of nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy and which ultimately thrust the world into another camouflage after a short period of twenty years.

12. Justice and Injustice of the Treaty

But was the Treaty of Versailles really unjust? Did it really deserve the condemnation that had been showered upon it from almost every quarter? The answer to these questions would obviously depend on what we mean by "just". If "just" means simply "in strict accordance with Wilson's speeches"—since these were the basis of settlement agreed on at the armistice, there can be little doubt that in parts the treaty was unjust to Germany. It was unjust in the sense that the lasting destruction of Germany's aggressive power was made its paramount aim whereas the general sense of Wilson's speeches could rightly be taken to mean that Germany's interest would be equally considered along with those of the allies in a general world settlement. But neither Germany nor the Allies could reasonably be expected, after probably the worst war of history by then, to rise to this high level.

T. E. Jessop has commented in his book, 'The Treaty of Versailles, Was it just?', that the fact was, that in accepting Wilson's speeches, the Allies made promises to Germany which they did not fulfil. It appeared that even in making them at the armistice they (with the exception of Wilson) did not intend to fulfil them all. Why? First because, they knew that under the then existing external and mental situation, some of the promises could not be fulfilled. Second because, they believed that in dealing with a country with Germany's record, some of them ought not to be fulfilled. And third because, they were aware that Germany's appeal to Wilson's speeches, made at a time when the German army and submarines were fighting as foully as ever, was dishonest, a deliberate and clever move to avoid most of the usual consequences of defeat.

Under such a situation, there would be a difference of opinion among the moralists. Those for whom such precepts as "promises must be kept" were absolute whatever the circumstances and the consequences, will condemn the treaty outright. Those, for whom morality consists in doing whatever was feasible to improve a given situation, will regret the dilemma into which the Allies were forced and will have a tolerable attitude of the treaty.

As Jessop has pointed out: "From the broad and concrete point of view the question of justice must be considered in the light of the circumstances and conditions under which the

Allies lived and worked, the chief aims and achievements of the peace-makers, and the needs of the world. The peace-makers had to satisfy not one victor but many. On the vanquished side there was only one party—Germany, who had no concerns to watch but her own, a position that completely simplified her viewpoint. On the victor's side there were twenty-seven signatories. The interests of these states were at many points divergent and tremendous difficulty was experienced in bringing about even the appearance of a reconciliation. France, for example, was thoroughly realistic but above all on ensuring security againts a bigger and industrially richer neighbour, Germany which within fifty years had twice invaded her territory. Unlike France. Britain wanted to bring Germany back to something like her former place in the economic life of Europe, because until the war she had been almost her biggest customer one of her biggest suppliers. Italy's aspirations, fixed chiefly on the Mediterranean, conflicted with the interest of France and Britain. Rumania, Greece and the Arabs had each entered the war at a stipulated price and this price had somehow to be paid. Besides these, the Allies had prior commitments contracted during the war at their moments of stress and there were certain accomplished facts which they were obliged to recognise."

He further points out: "Equally unfavourable was the atmosphere in which the Treaty-makers had to work. Although they were the victors, they were near to exhaustion through the long struggle and were still boiling under a sense of injury both at having had the war thrust on them and at the exceptionally ruthless way in which Germany had conducted it. All wounds were utterly raw, all tempers frayed, and the Conference being the mirror of the world, all the delegates saw cinematographically the tumbling chaos of many peoples just released either from the hands of brutal oppressors or from the legitimate disciplines of war." To this might be added Keynes's note, "Paris was a nightmare and everyone there was morbid. The people were hysteric and the hysteria of the masses made the statesmen paralytic." Moreover, during the war, the governments of the Allied countries had created among their peoples "war mindedness," which was so essential for winning the war. But it reduced the belligerent peoples to a state of mind where they were incapable of making a decent peace. This fact was vividly brought out by Ray Standard Baker in his book 'Woodraw Wilson and World Settlement.' "Critics of the Versailles Treaty after the event forget that peace had to be made in an atmosphere still reeking with the fumes of war and still more or less dominated by the military spirit. It could not have been otherwise. For four years the nations had been committed to the use of every agency in building up a war psychology, to giving men the martial spirit, instilling hatred as an antidote for fear, driving nations into an artificial unity of purpose by the force of sheer

necessity.....Build up such a psychology for four years, inoculate the entire public opinion of the world with it, and then ask four men at Paris—or one man at Paris to change it all in three months ! It was not merely a world peace that had to be made, but a world psychology that had to be changed."

From such soil and such seeds, no better production could be expected.

As for the aims of the Allied statesmen, they wanted to undo the harm done by Germany, permanently to take the sting out of her, to redesign Europe as far as possible on the principle of self determination and to find some means of substituting arbitration for war as the method of resolving disputes between states. More particularly, the Allies set themselves to free Belgium, to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, to sanction and provide the material conditions for the rebirth and stable continuance of Poland, to make adjustments of frontiers so as to reduce minorities to a minimum, to compel Germany to contribute as much as could be got from her towards the cost of reconstructing the areas which her armies had devastated and of replacing the ships which her submarines and raiders had sunk, to disarm Germany so drastically that she would cease to be a menace to her neighbours, to allow Italy to have large slices of Austria-Hungary, to divide up and annex practically the whole of Persia and Turkey, to enable Russia to occupy parts of East Germany and of the Austrian Empire, and to establish an international organisation for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. All these aims obviously seem just and right and they were all to some extent achieved. That they were achieved at the expense of defeated Germany was inevitable.

If the extent and horror of the war were borne in mind, we could say that the provisions of the Treaty were not more severe. As Jessop again says: "Germany was never over-run ; only a relatively small and strategically definite part of the country being occupied ; apart from the lands restored by the armistice agreement to their inhabitants or historic owners, there were virtually no annexations, with the big exception of the colonies (taken on strategic grounds) and plebiscites were held in areas of mixed populations, so that except to avoid enclaves, no area of anything more than a trifling size with a German majority, except Memel, was placed under non-German rule. The separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany was of course, unfortunate, but no better alternative presented itself. On the whole the political settlement was remarkably just to Europe ; to Germany, it was not punitive but mild—in startling contrast to the dreadful settlement which her government had planned to impose. It freed oppressed nations, left far fewer minorities under alien rule than there had been since nation-states came into existence and deprived Germany of the mili-

tary striking power that had been the chief support of her diplomacy in peace as well as her ruthless weapon in war. It declared the judgement of many nations that Germany was no longer to regard her smaller neighbours as satellites for exploitation. And it set up the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Office.

Moreover in 1918, Germany imposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on Russia and the Treaty of Bucharest on Rumania. The terms were of the utmost severity and showed that Germany would give little mercy to her vanquished enemies. President Wilson had enumerated his Fourteen Points before this time but the revelation of Germany's temper caused him to modify his position and he increasingly spoke of the necessity of crushing German militarism. This fact must be kept in mind as part of the explanation of the harsh terms meted out by the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's Germany denounced the terms of the Treaty as 'monstrous; but the Allies very well retorted that Germany herself pointed the way by her action at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and that the Peace Treaty was not based upon the Fourteen Points only.

PEACE SETTLEMENTS WITH SMALL POWERS

Treaty of St. Germain with Austria

The Council of Four at Paris was not busy with drafting the peace terms with Germany alone but the peace terms to be offered to the allies of Germany were also drafted. A draft peace treaty was offered to the Austrian delegation on June 2, 1919. Certain amendments were made to incorporate some of the Austrian demands and the treaty was finally signed on September 10, 1919 at St. Germain.

The Preamble of the treaty declared that "the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had ceased to exist and had been replaced in Austria by a republican Government."

Article 88 of the Treaty forbade the re-union of Austria and Germany, the purpose being to prevent the strengthening of Germany by the addition of several million of Austrians and to protect Czechoslovakia against a German encirclement.

The Austrians were compelled to change the name of their state from German Austria to "the Republic of Austria".

In Article 177 Austria was made to accept responsibility for causing loss and damage to the Allies.

The territorial readjustment of Austria-Hungary was not an easy task. Not only were Austria and Hungary to be satis-

fied, but all the heirs of the old monarchy—Rumania, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were aspiring for a share of the booty. It was easy to take the land from Austria-Hungary; but it was too difficult to divide it among the victors. Great efforts were made to conciliate all the claimants but in the effort to please all, none was pleased.

(1) Italy obtained from Austria the South Tirol, the Trentino, Trieste, Istria and some islands off Dalmatia.

(2) Poland received Austrian Galicia.

(3) Rumania was awarded Bukovina.

(4) Yugoslavia got Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Dalmatian coast and islands.

(5) The Austrian territory of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia was comprised into a new state known as 'Czechoslovakia'.

Thus three-fourth of her territory and people were detached from Austria.

(6) Austria surrendered her entire naval force, retaining only three boats for police purposes on the Danube. Her army was reduced to 30,000 volunteers.

(7) Austria agreed to all terms arrived at between the Allies and her former friends; gave up all rights, privileges and concessions in non-European areas; assented to blank reparation cheque; acknowledged the right of the Allies to try Austrian "war criminals". Austria herself was granted free access to the Adriatic Sea via the areas formerly included in the Austrian Empire.

(8) The Articles of the Versailles Treaty, dealing with the League of Nations covenant and the I. L. O., were also adopted.

An Estimate of the Treaty

Austria, the prime mover in the war was the greatest sufferer. Her empire, extensive army and glorious dynasty all disappeared in the whirlwind. The Hungarians declared themselves independent; the Czechs and Slovaks broke away. The Serbs exploited their victory in the south. In the end, a small republic of some six million people, specifically forbidden under the Treaty of St. Germain to join itself with Germany, except with the consent only to be obtained by a unanimous vote of the League was all that was left of the once famous empire which had ruled over fifteen races and had given the law to Central Europe.

Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria

In order to escape the severity of the peace terms, Bulgaria

sent a long memorandum to the peace conference, stating that Bulgaria's entry into the war was largely the fault of the ex-king Ferdinand, who had abdicated on *October 4, 1918* and therefore she did not deserve much punishment ; rather she had a right to a considerable extension of her territory, particularly in Macedonia and the Dobruja. This logic was disliked by the Allies and they reminded Bulgaria that she was a defeated power, and could not get what she desired. Bulgaria had no alternative but to submit and the final peace treaty was signed on November 27, 1919.

(1) For reasons of military and strategy, Yugoslavia was given four small regions in Western Bulgaria, all of which contained Bulgarian majorities.

(2) Greece was awarded Western Thrace and a slight improvement in the Greco-Bulgarian boundary with the result that Bulgaria lost her coast-line of the Aegean Sea. She was, however, promised economic outlets to the Aegean Sea.

(3) The strength of Bulgarian army was fixed at 20,000 men, and her other armed officials at 13,000.

(4) Her navy was dis-established, though for police and fishery duties she was allowed to retain four torpedo-boats and six motor-boats, all without torpedoes and torpedo apparatus.

(5) Bulgaria had to accept reparation amounting to 450,000,000 dollars, payable in thirty-seven years from January 1, 1921.

Thus Bulgaria was made one of the weakest powers in the Balkan and all the time she had to depend upon outside help for her existence.

Treaty of Trianon with Hungary

It was on June 4, 1920 that the peace treaty was signed with Hungary in the large Trianon Palace at Versailles. The delay was the result of the inrernal troubles in Hungary. On the one hand, a fierce struggle ensued among the communists, the socialists, republicans and the monarchists to control the reins of government. On the other hand, frequent and violent demonstrations against the Allies were visible all around. They influenced the peace-makers to the extent that they made one important concession in that they allowed the new state to take the name of Hungary rather than 'Hungarian Republic' which they had done in the case of Austria'

All the states round about Hungary were allowed a share in the old Magyar Kingdom. Rumania received Transylvania ; Yugoslavia obtained Croatia-Slavonia ; Slovakia became part of the new state of Czechoslovakia ; Austria was given west Hungary.

Thus, the entire Magyar population was divided. Hungary's army was cut to 35,000 men and her navy reduced to a few petrol boats. Through a 'guilt clause', she was made liable to pay reparation also. The other terms of the treaty were similar to those with Austria and Bulgaria.

An Estimate of the Treaty:

The Hungarians were stripped of Slovakia which was transferred to the Czechs of Transylvania which was conquered by the Romans and of Croatia which now became part of Yugoslavia. Some six hundred thousand men and women of Magyar race, some four and a half million of former subjects of the Hungarian crown passed under alien domination. The lovely mountain region of Transylvania where the Magyar nobles went for pleasure in sports was gone. The sentiments of the Hungarians might be very well imagined.

PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST

Treaty of Sevres with Turkey

The disposition of the Turkish Empire presented the most controversial and complex of all the issues faced by the Peace Conference. The area included in this Empire was the bone of contention between England, France, Russia and Italy for long. The complexities had been heightened by the numerous secret treaties and arrangements the Allies had made during the war to partition this Empire. To make matters worse, Russia went Red and published all these secret understandings. This made the peace-makers move very cautiously, and the negotiations continued upto August, 1920.

The terms with Turkey were signed on August 20, 1920 by the representatives of the Sultan.

(1) Turkey was made to surrender all her rights and concessions in Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Tripolitania, Tunisia and Morocco, and also over Arabia, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria.

(2) Smyrna and South Western Asia Minor were put under the temporary control of Greece.

(3) Italian occupation over Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands was confirmed though she promised eventually to cede the latter to Greece.

(4) The zone of the Straits was 'internationalized and demilitarized.' Constantinople remained under Turkish sovereignty.

(5) Turkey agreed to recognise Armenia as a free and independent state with boundaries to be drawn by Wilson.

(6) Autonomy was to be given to Kurdistan and her boundaries were to be rectified in favour of Iran.

(7) Spheres of influence were granted to France and Italy in Anatolia, as a result of an agreement between Britain, France and Italy.

Thus, nothing was left of the old and vast Ottoman Empire except mountainous Asia Minor and a corner of Europe. The Turks were completely subjected to the Europeans and Lloyd George was only mincing matters when in 1920, he declared in the House of Commons that the arrangements to be made with the Sultan would release "all non-Turkish population from Turkish sway." As a matter of fact, the treaty resulted in complete subjection of the Turks by the Europeans.

Circumstances Leading to the Lausanne Conference

Even before the treaty came into force, a group of Turkish Nationalists led by Kemal Pasha rose to overthrow it. They were helped in their purpose by the internal and international conditions. The position of the Allies after the peace settlement became very deplorable.Their exhausted armies clamoured for demobilisation. France was jealous of her own ally, Britain, because she knew that the conquest of Turkey had been completed by British troops. Bolshevist revolution was making its own headway and there was the fear of a similar rising in Turkey. Italy standing on the verge of a revolution was pursuing imperialist aims. So England and France, in order to forestall trouble, encouraged the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, to occupy Smyrna in Asia Minor. This served the purpose of the Allies in that they were relieved of the necessity of urgent action in Turkey. On May 15, 1919, the Greeks, aided by the Allied warships, occupied Smyrna. The Turks bitterly resented this violation of their territory by their most despised enemy. From this resentment, a widespread movement of national revolt was born and the young Turks rose as one man to safeguard the honour of their country. Within a year, the Kemalists had swept the whole country and established 'a provisional government' at Anatolia. By the end of 1919, nearly the whole of Anatolia acknowledged the control of the 'provisional government.' Elections were held and a parliament with the Nationalists majority met at Constantinople on January 28, 1920.

This body published a National Pact which listed six Articles—the first three dealing with the application of the principle of 'self-determination to all those areas of the Ottoman Empire which still contained large number of Turks'; Article fourth demanding the security of Constantinople and agreeing to open

the straits to the commerce of the world ; Article fifth confirming the rights of the minorities in Turkey, and Article sixth demanding the abolition of foreign capitulations and restrictions inimical to the country's development in all matters.

This pact ran counter to the Allied aims. On March 16, 1920, the Allied forces officially occupied Constantinople, seized and deported several of the Nationalist deputies to Malta. The Sultan was forced to disavow the Nationalists' movement and to declare that Kemal Pasha and his followers were in revolt against the Government of Turkey.

On April 24, 1920, the terms of the Treaty of Sevres were published by the Allies. The Sultan submitted but the Kemalists refused to accept them.

The Greeks, favoured by the Allies, advanced from Smyrna into Asia Minor to enforce the terms of the Treaty of Sevres. In the meantime, the Nationalists established friendly relations with the Bolshevist Government of Russia and the latter supplied them arms and ammunition. The Turks, thus strengthened, prepared themselves to meet the Greek armies.

In November 1920, Venizelos fell from power and the ex-king Constantine, who had been hostile to the Allies during the war, returned to the throne in Greece.

This resulted in the coolness of relations between Greece and the Allies. Britain became less enthusiastic and France openly began to favour the Turks because of her dislike for Constantine.

The Greek armies, now desolated by the Allies, were slowly driven back by the Turks and in September 1922, Kemal drove the last Greek troops from the soil of Asia. Flushed with victory, the Kemalists now turned their attention to Constantinople. The situation became critical. The French and the Italian Governments withdrew their forces and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Turkey seemed for a moment inevitable. But Kemal stopped in time. An armistice was concluded on October 11, 1922. The Greeks were ordered to evacuate and restore to Turkey all Thrace. Invitations were issued to France, the U.S.A., Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Japan to meet at Lausanne to revise the Treaty of Sevres.

But before the Conference could meet, the question of the relationship between the Sultan's Govt. and the Nationalists' Government needed settlement. The possibility of amalgamation of the two governments was lost as the Sultan had declared the Kemalist Government as "illegal" and the Kemalist movement as

"rebel." On November 1, 1922, the Nationalist Assembly, however, declared the abolition of Sultanate in Turkey and the Sultan fled on a British vessel leaving the country to its own fate.

On November 20, 1922, negotiations for peace were opened at Lausanne between Nationalist Turkey on the one hand and the Allied Governments on the other. Turkey insisted on the fulfilment of the National Pact. But this was not possible for the Allies to do. The result was failure of the conference in February, 1923.

But in April, negotiations were again opened and this time, Turkey received most of what she demanded. The Treaty of Lausanne concluded in July, 1923 embodied the following :—

(1) "Turkey recovered eastern Thrace, including the city of Adrianople.

(2) "Constantinople was restored as an integral part of the Turkish state.

(3) "The zone of the straits was demilitarized and open to the ships of all nations in time of peace, and when Turkey was neutral, in time of war. In the event of Turkey's belligerency, enemy vessels might be kept out of the straits but not so the neutral vessels.

(4) "The boundary of Syria, as agreed with France in 1921, was confirmed.

(5) "All Allied claims for reparations arising from the first World War were renounced ; all capitulations were recognised as abolished, on the promise that Turkey would soon introduce judicial reforms and would adhere to the same provisions regarding minorities as had been agreed to by the other European countries.

(6) "The foreign control of customs was lifted and no restrictions were placed on Turkey's military, naval and air forces.

(7) "A small Anzac area on the Gallipoli peninsula was perpetually granted to Britain, France and Italy. Here, the three countries might appoint custodians to watch over the graves of the soldiers who died in the campaign of 1915. But the region could never be built up or fortified.

(8) "Turkey renounced all her claims over Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Iraq and Syria and recognised British occupation over Cyprus".

A supplementary Greco-Turkish convention provided for a compulsory exchange of Turkish subjects in Greece for Greek subjects in Turkey.

The treaty of Lausanne was the only peace treaty which for thirteen years was accepted as valid and applicable by all its signatories and which, even in 1936, was modified by voluntary agreement and in one particular. It was because of several factors which distinguished it from the rest of the peace treaties. First, it came into existence nearly five years after the end of war when bitter passions had subsided ; secondly, it was not imposed but negotiated by a long process of bargaining between the parties ; and thirdly, it was signed on neutral territory and not in any Allied capital.

SETTLEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Eastern Europe also presented a complex of problems after the end of the war. The three great empires of Germany, Austria and Russia had been disintegrated and the peoples, freed from their subjugation, needed settlement. During the war, the Allies had stimulated in the East European states an intense feeling of nationalism as a means of weakening the Central Power and the defeat of the latter gave this nationalism free range.

Poland

Poland had been partitioned four times by the Powers of Europe and there was among the Poles a strong sentiment for national unity. The first World War presented to the Poles a favourable opportunity but here too, the prospects of their independence oscillated, as the armies of Russia and Centrol Powers pushed each other back and forth across Eastern Europe. In August 1915, Warsaw fell into the hands of the Central Powers who, in order to win them over to their side, promised to the Poles an independent state under a constitutional monarchy. But this plan did not satisfy them. A more favourable opportunity presented itself when Russia went Red and the Provisional Government recognised their independence in all the territory where the Polish people constituted a majority of the population.

This decision of the Provisional Government was followed by a statement from President Wilson favouring an independent and unified Poland. This declaration was welcomed by the Polish leaders, who began to work for internal unity so as to present at the peace conference a solid front to defend its territorial and political claims. The Polish delegation demanded to be included in the new Poland all territories inhabited primarily by Poles. This principle in general was acceptable to the Allies and the following arrangements were made :—

(1) Danzig was made a 'Free City' under the League of Nations to be supervised by a High Commissioner. According

to this arrangement, the 170,000 Germans of Danzig would not be under direct Polish rule although Poland would control the commercial relations and communications of the port. A Polish Corridor was created along the Vistula to the Baltic connecting with Danzig. Thus, free and secure access to the sea was given to Poland.[10]

(2) In addition to the Polish Corridor, Poland was granted some territories outright. These were the greater part of the old German province of Posen and small bits of East Prussia and Middle Silesia.

(3) Poland also obtained the two large provinces of Western and Eastern Galicia from the former Empire of Austria-Hungary.

Both Germany and Poland received substantial minorities, 350,000 Germans being transferred to Poland and 572,000 Poles remaining in Germany.

THE BALTIC STATES

The Baltic Provinces of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been ruled by almost all the neighbouring powers for long. The nineteenth century nationalism affected these peoples and a desire for independence developed. The first World War presented a grand opportunity which they were quick to seize. On the eve of the war, these provinces were under the control of Russia. When the latter went Red in 1917, the 'Provisional Government' of the Bolsheviks encouraged them to set up a National Council, preparatory to deciding on the form of government. But to their misfortune, almost the entire Baltic region went under the occupation of Germany in the spring of 1918. Throughout 1918 and 1919, the Baltic provinces were the scene of a bloody struggle and it was only after a great deal of bloodshed that the German troops were forced to withdraw. Next year in 1920, the Soviet Union freed them from her bondage, recognised their independence and signed peace treaties with them. On the insistence of President Wilson, the Allies also granted to them *defacto* as well as *de-jure* recognition. In 1921, they were admitted to the membership of the League of Nations as free and independent states. In the years following, they adopted republican constitution and set out on a course of parliamentary government.

SOVIET UNION

In March 1917, there occurred in Russia the most important event of the modern era, *viz.*, the Bolshevik Revolution and

10. This arrangement was very much resented by the Germans who keenly felt the division of their state and the Polish Corridor came to take a place in German emotions similar to that of Alsace-Lorraine in France after 1870.

the Allies lost not only an important war ally but were faced with a tremendous challenge in her. The Western world thought the Bolsheviks were in conspiracy with the Germans and had brought Russia over to the side of the Central Powers. They also feared lest Bolshevism should spread into Central and Western Europe. During 1919, there was increasing evidence in Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria that the extremist forces might be able to establish themselves on a long term basis. This fear was further heightened by the pronouncements of the newly-organised 'Third International' in Moscow which openly strove to arouse the peoples of Europe against their governments.

Under these circumstances, the Allied statesmen decided upon a joint intervention in the Russian affairs, but not with any intention of permanently staying there ; rather on condition that the territorial integrity of Russia would be respected. In their task, they were assisted by the forces of counter-revolution organised by the White Russians. Aided by the Allied forces, the White Russians inflicted crushing blows upon the Bolsheviks. But a turning point came when, in the summer of 1919, the Allied statesmen, forced by the public opinion in their countries, decided to stop further intervention and withdrew their forces by October 1919. Without the Allies, the Whites were unable to resist the Bolsheviks more than a few weeks and in January 1920, the entire region was in the hands of the Bolsheviks. By October 1920, the civil war had come to a close.

While the Bolsheviks were thus extending their authority over the greater part of the former Russian Empire and defeating one by one, the forces of opposition, important developments were taking place in Paris. Representatives of the various governmental authorities in Russia were in conference with the Allies and were devising some means of overthrowing the Bolsheviks. The Allies, on the other hand, were divided in their attitudes. France was wholly opposed to any move which might imply recognition of the Bolsheviks, while U.S. and Great Britain were inclined to encourage a compromise among the contesting groups in Russia. On the insistence of President Wilson, however, invitations were sent in January 1919 to the representatives of all shades of opinion, including the Bolsheviks, to meet in conference and find a common basis of agreement. The White Russians rejected this offer, but the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to confer, provided that the Allies withdrew all their aid to the anti-Bolshevik regimes, lift the blockade of Russia and enter into diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviks. These terms were found unacceptable both to U.S. and Great Britain and no further attempt was made seriously to obtain Russian participation in the Peace Conference. This meant the absence of the Soviet Government from some of the basic decisions regarding the future of Europe.

THE TREATY OF RIGA

The Allied statesmen could afford, for the time being, to arrange peace terms with The Central Powers without the participation of any Russian Government ; but the problem of drawing up frontiers between Russia and Europe remained and needed an early solution. The "Curzon Line" which determined the Eastern frontier of Poland, did not satisfy the Poles and soon after, the Polish forces under Piludski, taking advantage of the civil war in Russia, occupied Kiev in May, 1920. A counter-attack was launched by the Red Army with the result that Polish resistance was broken. But very soon technical assistance came from France and Pilsudski succeeded in breaking the Russian advance. Having been disgusted by the process of advance and retreat, the Russians sued for peace. The Treaty of Riga was signed in March 1921 and Russian frontiers in Eastern Europe were, at least for the time being, settled.

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CHAPTER II
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In 1920, the starting point of world politics was the formation of the League of Nations. Its establishment at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 represented the most ambitious effort thus far made to extend the method of international organisation into the sphere of international political relations. Between the collapse of the Holy Alliance and 1914, many people throughout the western world organised themselves, in their private capacities, to promote co-operation across national frontiers in the religious, scientific, economic and cultural spheres. By 1914, there were over thirty international organs invested with varying powers of control over the individual national administration. More important of them were : Danube Commission (1856), International Telegraphic Union (1865), Pan-American Union (1890), International Institute of Agriculture (1905), and International Health Office (1907).

Genesis of the League

During this period, no serious effort was made to set up an international organisation of states to deal with broader political questions. It was the world shattering cataclysm of 1914-18 which brought disaster to all peoples alike, that goaded the people to demand a league of states so as to avoid the recurrence of similar tragedies in the future life of mankind.

In the year 1915, various efforts were being made in Great Britain, the United States, France and even Germany, to form committees which might prepare some tentative proposals for the organisation of concert of powers. One such committee was formed in England in May, 1915 and was known as "League of Nations' Society." A similar committee was formed in U.S. in June of the same year. It met in Independence Hall at Philadelphia and adopted a Four Point Programme. In the summer of 1917, Pope Benedict XV addressed a message to all the belligerent powers exhorting them to reduce their armed forces and devise a system of compulsory arbitration of all disputes. On January 22, 1917, President Wilson addressed the U.S. Senate on a "World League for Peace" and proposed four points : (i) "Peace negotiations after the war to include some concert of powers that might avoid similar catastrophies again ; (2) "extension of the Monroe Doctrine so as to embrace the whole world, so that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation, and that all peoples should be left free to determine their own destiny, and their own way of development, unhindered, unafraid and unthreatened ; (3) "all nations to avoid entangling alliances which dragged them into competition for power and a net of intrigues and selfish rivalry ; (4) "there should be governments with the consent of the gove-

rned, freedom on the seas and armaments to be limited to the need of internal peace and security."

In the end, Wilson declared: "these were American principles ; American policies ; they could stand for no others."

In one of his speeches before the British Trade Union on January 5, 1918, Prime Minister Lloyd George emphasised the creation of some international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the danger of war.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points peace programme, the last of which declared: "A general Association of Nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Thus, there was a universal and passionate longing for peace and the League of Nations was to be established as the instrument thereof. But the revolutionary discontent of the working class was the more potent force. Those elements of the working class that were not openly revolutonary at the end of the war were making sweeping demands crystallised in the ideas of the League of Nations and of an International Labour Organisation, for a new world order that would prevent a recurrence of war and give the workers social justice. All accounts of the Peace Conference agreed on how the fear of social revolution haunted the peace-makers and how the League and the I.L.O. were looked upon as concessions necessary to avert a big trouble from the workers. On his way to the Peace Conference, on board 'the George Washington', President Wilson said: "The poison of Bolshevism is being absorbed as a protest against the way the world has worked. It will be our business at the Peace Conference to fight for a new order. That order must be based upon, and guaranteed by, a League of Nations."

President Wilson's chief adviser, Colonel House, wrote in his diary at the Peace Conference on March 22, 1919 : "The Peoples want peace. Bolshevism is striking root everywhere. Hungary has succumbed. We are sitting on a powder barrel that may at any moment be exploded by a spark." He also drew the conclusion that a new order based on a League of Nations was the only possible alternative to the break-up of the old order in social revolution.

Lloyd George also wrote in his Confidential Memorandum to the Big Four at the Peace Conference : "The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent but of anger and revolt

amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existing order in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of population from one end of Europe to the other. In some countries, like Germany and Russsia, the unrest takes the form of open rebellion ; in others, like France, Great Britain and Italy, it takes the shape of strikes and of general disinclination to settle down to work. He was particularly afraid of social revolution in Germany, for then, all Europe would go Bolshevik and join up with the Russians. He therefore said : "It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peace with Germany. If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism, we must make the League of Nations into something which will be both a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing with their neighbours and a menace to those who would trespass on the rights of their neighbours, whether they are Imperialist Empires or Imperial Bolshevists. An essential element, therefore, in the peace settlement is the constitution of the League of Nations as the effective guardian of international right and international liberty throughout the world. It is essential that the leading members of the League should present a united front to the forces both of reaction and revolution."

Similarly, General Smuts, in his pamphlet 'The League of Nations—A Practical Suggestion', observed : "The League of Nations must be the wise regulator, the steadying influence in the forward movement now set going among the nations of the earth. The League should become the great 'International' for the workers of the world."

Essentially and truly, it was these objectives and aims that created the League of Nations after the Great War. On November 11, 1918, the armistice terms were signed by Germany and in January 1919, the Peace Conference opened in Paris. The Conference set up a special commission representing fourteen Allied nations to prepare a draft for the covenant of the League. On February 14, 1919, the tentative draft of the covenant was presented to the Conference. A few subsequent changes were made in the covenant, and on April 28, 1919, the revised document was accepted unanimously at a plenary session of the Conference. It was embodied in the first twenty-six articles of the Treaty of Versailles. On January 10, 1920, the League of Nations came officially into exixtence—the day when the Treaty of Versailles also came into effect.

STRUCTURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Aims of the League

The Covenant of the League of Nations is a remarkable document. It consists of a lofty preamble and twenty-six arti-

cles. It lays dawn the aims of the League of Nations, the conditions of membership, the general framework of its organisation and obligations which the member-states accept in order to decrease the chances of war and to increase the chances of world peace and prosperity of the people.

The preamble of the League lays down its aims and provides as follows :

"The High Contracting Parties,

"In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace aud security ;

"By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war ;

"By the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations ;

"By the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments ;

"And by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another ;

"Agree to this covenant of the League of Nations."[1]

The main purposes of the League of Nations therefore are two: "to achieve international peace and security, i.e., to prevent future wars by establishing international relations on the basis of justice and honour, and to promote co-operation, material and intellectual, between the nations of the world, that men's lives may become easier, happier and nobler."

Membership Of the League and Obligations of the Member-States

The Peace Conference invited all the Allied states (except Russia, because she had had the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and was treated by the West as an International out-caste) and thirteen central states to become the original membrs of the League. Other states could be admitted only after election by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. Thus, at the first Assembly in November 1920, there were 42 original members of the League. At this Assembly, 6 new states were admitted, including Austria. At the second Assembly, 1921, three more states were admitted ; at the third Assembly, Abyssinia and the Irish Free States ; at the fifth Assembly, 1924, San Domingo ; at the seventh Assembly, Germany, thus bringing the total upto 55.[2]

1. The Covenant of the League of Nations.
2. U.S.A. did not join the League though Wilson was its maker.

By signing the Covenant of the League, the states, though retaining their sovereignty, individual aspirations and interests, agreed to observe the rules of international law and to respect international covenants and treaties. They agreed to work for the general interests of the world which were, in the last analysis, not incompatible with their own. They agreed to utilize the machinery of the League and its processes for the redress of international grievances. Recourse to war or threat of war, considered as the only legitimate means of settling international disputes, were discarded and procedures of arbitration, adjudication or conciliation were adopted.

Organisation of the League

The structure of the League could be described in terms of its major organs : the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Labour Organisation and the Technical Commissions.

The Assembly :

The third and fifth Articles of the Covenant indicated the scope and purpose of the League Assembly. It was the representative and deliberative organ of the League, consisting of all its members, with each entitled to one vote in accordance with the ancient principle of state equality. The Assembly met in Geneva every September and held several special sessions. Each member state sent three delegates and several alternates to the Assembly meetings. The delegates from each state cast their votes as one.

The Procedure :

The Assembly elected its own presiding officers and made its own rules of procedure in harmony with the provisions of the Covenant ; it followed the usual principles of parliamentary procedure and operated through committees, six in number, on constitutional and legal questions, technical organisations, on reduction of armaments, on budgetary matters, on social and humanitarian questions and on political questions. Special committees for particular purposes could also be appointed.

The Functions :

The functions of the Assembly were very broad though somewhat vague. Article 3 of the Covenant declared that it "may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." In practice, it exercised three general types of powers—electoral, constituent and deliberative.

In the exercise of its electoral functions, it elected new members to the League by a two-thirds vote, when necessity

arose ; it elected three of the nine non-permanent members of the Council every year by a majority vote ; and in conjunction with the Council, it elected 15 judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice every nine years by majority vote. It also approved the nomination of the Secretary-General by the Council.

As a constituent body, it amended the Covenant in accordance with the provisions of Article 26. In this capacity, it acted by majority vote, but amendments were to be approved by the unanimous vote of the Council and were subject to ratification by the Member States.

As a deliberative body, the Assembly considered general political, economic and technical questions of international interest, advised the reconsideration of in-applicable treaties under Article 19, supervised the work of the Council and of the technical commissions, and prepared the annual budget of the League.

These important functions made the Assembly the dominant organ of the League though because of its nature and size, it could not act so swiftly and expeditiously as the Council.

The Council of the League :

The Council was designed to be a small body to serve as the executive committee of the Assembly. Its seats were to be divided among the Great Powers and the lesser powers—the former having them permanently and the latter, by rotation.

Originally it was decided that the Council should have five permanent seats, to be assigned to U.S.A., the U.K., France, Italy and Japan, and four non-permanent seats to be assigned to Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain in 1920, their successors to be periodically chosen by the Assembly. But since the U. S. withdrew itself from the international organisation, the ratio in 1920 was of 4 : 4. In 1922, two more non-permanent seats were created and were assigned to Poland and Yugoslavia. In 1925, Germany was invited to enter the League, but she refused unless invited on terms of equality with the great powers and provided a permanent seat on the Council. Brazil, Spain and Poland also put forth their demands for permanent seats. This created an impasse. Germany could be admitted in the League only by 2|3 majority of the Assembly but a permanent seat on the Council needed the unanimity of the same body. On March 18, 1926, a special committee was set up to consider the situation. The Committee recommended a new category of membership known as semi-permanent and Germany entered the Assembly and the Council. In 1931, when Japan withdrew from the League, only four permanent members were left on the Council. By

1939, the Council consisted of 3 permanent members, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R., and 11 non-permanent members.

Procedure :

Each member of the Council had one vote and decision taken by the Council had usually to be unanimous. There were certain exceptions to the unanimity rule—relating to matters of procedure, amendments to minority clauses in peace treaties and recommendations on disputes between members of the League.

The presidency of the Council changed at each session—one country succeeding another in alphabetical order. As a general rule, the Council met in public but it could meet in private when it deemed necessary. The Minutes, however, were always published.

The Council appointed one of its members to act as the rapporteur (usually one who had no interest in the mattes under consideration) and he prepared his statement with the necessary assistance from the Secretariat and submitted it, together with his suggested solution, for the consideration of the Council.

Its functions :

The functions of the Council were as broad as those of the Assembly. It could deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. In practice, the settlement of international disputes was the most important function of the Council. The Council had executive, administrative and supervisory functions also in connection with the Danzig, the Saar Valley, the Mandate System, etc. It was to decide when the Covenant had been broken and what action should be taken. The Council could deal with disputes between Members of the League. It carried out recommendations of the Assembly and prepared plans for disarmament. It nominated the Secretary-General and approved his appointments to subordinate positions in the Secretariat. All other League functions were shared concurrently by the Council and the Assembly.

In fact, all legal actions of the Council were merely recommendations, because the League could not bind any Member state without its consent, and all actions of the League were legally subject to ratification by the Members before they became binding upon them.

The Permanent Secretariat of the League :

The Secretariat was an international civil service of almost 600 experts, officials and subordinates residing at Geneva. The

members of the Secretariat were in no way responsible to their respective national governments ; they were in the common service of all the Member States of the League alike. The Secretariat was headed by a Secretary-General appointed by the Council with the approval of the Assembly. His immediate assistants were two deputy Secretaries-General and two assistant under-secretaries. The Secretariat was divided into sections, each under a director. The officials of the Secretariat were not recruited by the civil service examinations, but were chosen by the Secretary-General on the basis of professional competence, with a proper regard for the distribution of posts among the various states. The success of the League's work was largely due to the existence of the permanent Secretariat which made the summoning of the Assembly and Council sessions regularly possible. It also ensured the working out of the details of decisions arrived at by the Assembly and the Council. Thus, it gave continuity to the activities of the League of Nations unlike the activities of the former leagues, such as the Concert of Europe devised in 1815.

Technical Commission :

Around the League were organised a number of Technical Agencies, Commissions and Advisory Committees. Two of these were provided for in the Covenant itself—the Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments and the Permanent Mandates Commission. The others were established by the Council as bodies of technical experts to give the necessary information and advice on the various complex issues falling within the competence of the League. There were several such technical organisations, the more important of them being the Economic and Financial Organisation, the Organisation for Communication and Transit, the Health Organisation and International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Each of these organisations was served by the appropriate section of the Secretariat of the League.

Permanent Court of International Justice :

Wilson regarded the creation of a world court as a necessary feature of the Peace Settlement. Article 14 of the Covenant entrusted to the Council of the League the task of formulating and submitting to its members plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. In accordance with this provision, the Council appointed a commission of jurists in 1920. The commission prepared a constitution of the proposed court, which after some modifications, was adopted unanimously by the Assembly on December 13, 1920.

The Court comprised fifteen judges representing the principal legal systems in the world and set permanently at the

Hague in the Peace Palace. The judges were elected for nine years.

The Court was competent "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character, submitted to it by the parties and to give advisory opinion upon any question referred to it by the Council or Assembly of the League." Its jurisdiction extended to (1) all disputes regarding the interpretation of various treaties, (2) all disputes regarding the interpretation of international law, (3) and all disputes arising from the existence of a pact, the establishment of which constituted a breach of either international law or any international engagement.

The existence of this Court for passing judgement on international disputes was an immense advantage to the world. Of special importance was the clause known as the 'optional clause' which had been signed and ratified by most of the countries, who thereby undertook to refer all disputes of a legal nature to the world court.

With the collapse of the League in World War II, the P.C I.J. ceased to function. It came to a formal demise with a resolution of the last Assembly of the League in April 1946, which marked the end of the League itself. The P.C.I.J. handed down 32 judgements on disputes between two or more countries in the period from 1922 to 1940. But none of these cases, as Professor Grant Gilmore has commented, was of any great 'significance or importance', if those words be taken to refer to the bright hope of a better world. They were the undramatic, unspectacular run-of-the-mill cases which any court, international or national, is primarily equiped to handle. They were, since the Court's jurisdiction was limited to cases which the disputant states were willing to have adjudicated, cases on which the states concerned were willing to take a chance of losing".

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

As Professor Leonard has remarked: "Out of the deliberations of governments in 1918 to prevent future wars came the far-reaching pronouncement in the Treaty of Versailles that "universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice."[3] What was meant by "social justice' was not defined, but the governments had in mind the deplorable condition of the labour all over the world which imperilled the the peace and harmony of the world. From the beginning of the 20th century, the workers had established non-official organisations in different countries of the world to exercise pressure upon their governments as well as upon the employers to ameliorate their condition. The first World War brought a

3. Leonard, L.L., International Organisation (New York, Mc-Graw Hill, 1951) p. 448.

rgeat awakening in the minds of the labourers. Workers the world over began to feel that the man on the field was impotent without the help and co-operation of the man in the factory. As the war, therefore, came to a close, international meetings of national labour groups became increasingly insistent in their demands for action. One inter-Allied labour group called upon governments to incorporate in the peace treaties provisions that would "ensure to the working class guarantees of a moral as well as a material kind, concerning the right of association, emigration, social insurance, hours of work, hygiene and the protection of labour in order to secure them against the attacks of international capitalist competition."[4]

It was to satisfy these demands of organised labour and to fulfil the pledges made to them by the various belligerent governments during the war that the Paris Peace Conference decided to incorporate a labour organisation in the League Covenant.

Perhaps the stronger motive was the one expressed by the British delegate at Versailles: "I need scarcely remind you of the urgency of this work of labour amelioration because it is known to all of us that new thoughts are surging up all around and among us, and as a result, the world is at present in a ferment."

The delegates had their eyes and ears turned to the East (Soviet Russia) and the news they were hearing every day was disquietening. Only a few days before, the Communists of Russia had issued invitations to the workers of the world to meet in a conference in March to establish the "Third International and very soon, the Third International formulated its "Manifesto to the Proletariat of All Countries."

Thus influenced, the Peace Conference set up a "Commission on International Labour Legislation." The Commission deliberated for about two months; and on April 28, 1919, the Conference accepted its proposals and incorporated the constitution of the I.L.O. as part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles.

The I.L.O. agreement stated that 'the central aim of national and international policy should be the implementation of the principle that all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity."

Prof. Leonard says, the acceptence of these principles by governments was merely a first step; their real significance would be tested by the efforts made to achieve them.. The task was truly challenging. Improvement in the status of labour went

4. Ibid., p. 469.

to the heart of the social system of all states, touching upon the policies of governments in their most sensitive zone. Social security and full employment called for government intervention in the affairs of business which was repugnant to the economic system of many countries ; it required heavier taxation and higher labour costs, all of which reduced profits. How far would governments, functioning in social system built on competition, free enterprise and some monopoly control, be prepared to go in this direction ?"[5]

I.L.O. Principles and Functions

The object of the I.L.O. was "to gain recognition for workers as human social beings rather than as mere commodities to be bought cheaply and to be exploited in the process of industrial and agricultural production." This could be achieved through : (1) improvement in the working conditions, (2) assurance of economic security through adequate terms of labour, wages and pensions, (3) establishment of the status of labour as an active participant in the policies of production, (4) provision of welfare services for the workers and their families.

Structure of the I.L.O.

The I.L.O. consisted of three principal organs : (1) *The General Conference*, comprising all member states, met annually to establish the general policies of the organisation and approve the recommendations and conventions which made up the "International Labour Code." Each member state sent four delegates—two representing the government, one representing the employers and one, the workers. All delegates could vote independently and usually it happened that delegates from the same country voted differently.

(2) *The Governing Body* consisted of thirty-two members and functioned as the executive committee of the organisation. It met four times each year to prepare for the convening of the conference and to supervise the work of the secretariat. The tripartite representation continued in this policy organ too—sixteen of whose members represented governments, eight employers and eight workers. This three-fold representation had been provided to harmonise the interests of labour with those of the management.

(3) *The International Labour Office* served as the permanent Secretariat of the organisation and was housed in a separate building over-looking the Lake of Geneva. It worked under a Director-General, assisted by a huge staff of some 350 experts appointed by the Director. It gathered and published informa-

5. Ibid.

tion on labour legislation and assisted the Governing Body in preparing for the conferences.

The I. L. O. was linked with the League in that (1) its budget was voted and approved annually by the League Assembly, (2) secondly, in that, it acted as adviser to the League in such matters as forced labour, slavery, industrial problems arising from the settlement of refugees and the like.

The I. L. O. having the same membership as the League actually commenced its activities before the League did. However, as the League's membership declined, that of the I. L. O. increased, totaling 57 in 1939. Several states, which were not the members of the League, joined the I. L. O. Some states, like Brazil and Japan, continued to be member of the Organisation even after withdrawal from the League. And in the last years before 1939, when the central institutions of the League were becoming more and more powerless, the I. L. O. was raised to new strength by the adhesion of the United States. The Organisation provided an international forum for the discussion of labour legislation ; it prepared the way for the formulation of international standards of labour legislation and worked as a useful agency for the collection and publication of labour statistics. In 1940, the Labour Office moved its headquarters from Geneva to Montreal and was able, during the years that followed, to maintain its regular activities with less interruption and less reduction than might have been expected. It was recognised in due course as a specialised agency of the United Nations after the end of second World War.

MINORITIES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

During the pre-war days, the governments of Europe adopted the policy of forcible assimilation of national minorities within their frontiers. Un-assimilated minorities were viewed with alarm becauset heir loyalty could not be trusted. They constituted a hostile element in the population, and could, at any time, conspire with neighbouring enemy nations of their own blood and language. Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey, which had the largest minority groups living under their control, always tried to compel them to adopt the culture, language, creeds and institutions of the majority group, but they were unsuccessful. With the break-up of the above four empires as a result of the first World War, the Peace Conference was faced with the problem of dealing with the minorities living therein. In some cases, they were given the right of self-determination and incorporated into new states, with the result that that the minorities of Europe were reduced from 54,000,000 to about 17,000,000. But still 7,500,000 Germans, 3,000,000 Magyars, 1,350,000 Bulga-

6. For detailed study on the work of the I.L.O., see History of the I.L.O. by the Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.

rians, 500,000 Yugoslavs and 4,500,000 Ruthenians and Ukranians were placed under alien rule in France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Their forcible assimilation with the majority groups was likely to result in widespread domestic trouble and international tension throughout Central Europe. So, the Peace Conference of 1919 devised a new formula. Provisions obliging the new states to protect their rights and liberties were to be made in the treaties between them and the Allied Powers, and the League of Nations was made responsible to see that those obligations were carefully observed. The first such minorities treaty was imposed upon Poland and signed on June 28 1919. Other treaties followed with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, Austria, Hungary Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Albania, Finland and Danzig. Thus, fifteen states of central and south-eastern Europe were obliged to give up their efforts at forcible assimilation and to protect and safeguard the rights of minorities living within their frontiers.

The minorities, without any distinction of birth,nationality, language, race or religion, were entitled to "the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief, rights of citizenship, equality before law, equal civil and political rights and any language".

Two methods were devised to ensure that these obligations were properly observed. First, the guarantee treaties were made a part of the fundamental law of the states concerned; secondly, the League was made responsible to protect the interests of the minorities.

But the arrangement did not work well :

The Council of the League did consider some petitions of the minorities and remedied some of their grievances. But permanent harmony could not be achieved and the various states responsible for the protection of their rights became indifferent. On September 13, 1934, the Polish delegate told the Fifteenth Assembly that Poland would not co-operate in protecting the minorities, unless all the members of the League undertook similar obligations to protect the minorities in their respective countries. Next day, the British, French and Italian delegates declared that "no state could release itself from such obligations by unilateral action". Thus the Polish proposal fell. But several other states along with Poland did not care to protect the interests of the minorities and refused to co-operate with the League.

Open persecution of the Jews began in Germany and the League failed either to halt Nazi anti-Semitism or to provide shelter for its victims. This very soon became an international problem. On October 26, 1933, the League Council appointed

James G. MacDonald as High Commissioner to arrange relief for refugees coming from Germany. But without adequate funds, this vast problem could not be solved, and on December 27, 1935, he resigned from the job and requested the League to exercise pressure on Germany "by all pacific means" to end the persecution. But the League failed to act and thousands of Jews were left homeless and starving. In the meantime, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and several other countries followed German example and drew innumerable Jews out of their territory. During the second World War, millions of Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs and Russians were put to death by the fascist countries and the world was again faced with a tremendous problem of rehabilitating and resettling the minorities.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

The maintenance of peace pre-supposed, among other conditions, the possibility of having recourse to methods of pacific settlement for the disputes which might arise between states. The Covenant provided a system for the pacific settlement of disputes, involving the existence of organs and procedures for this purpose. The Covenant contained four kinds of provisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. In the first place, Article 11, which aimed at the prevention of war and at arresting hostilities in the event of their having broken out, led indirectly to preparing a way for the settlement of the dispute. In the second place, Article 13 provided, in certain cases,for a judicial or arbitral settlement of the dispute. In the third place, Articles 15 and 17 provided procedure for submitting disputes to an enquiry by the Council or the Assembly and closing with the adoption of a report. In the fourth place, Article 19 provided for the possibility of seeking a solution of the dispute in certain cases by a modification of existing law.

1. Maintenance of Peace :

The purpose of Article 11 was to ensure the maintenance of peace. It did not relate directly to the settlement of international disputes, but aimed at removing or alleviating emergencies which threatened peace between nations. In order to achieve this result, it would often be necessary for the organs of the League of Nations to deal with the dispute which led to the emergency to find a solution for this dispute or to point the way to a solution. Article 11 could be invoked both by the states parties to the dispute and by the other Members of the League.

2. Arbitration or Judicial Settlement :

In virtue of Article 12, the Members of the League between which there arose a grave dispute i e. a dispute likely to lead to a rupture, must submit the matter either to arbitration

or judicial settlement (Article 13) or to enquiry by the Concil (Article 15).

By 'judicial settlement' was meant a settlement brought about by a properly-constituted international court—that is to say, a court of justice applying rules of law with a permanent bench (*e. g.* the P. C. I. J.). Settlement by arbitration was effected by the awards rendered by one or more international arbitrators appointed to decide a case or series of cases. Arbitration and judical settlement were reserved for disputes relating to questions of law, commonly known as "judicial disputes" *e. g.*, the application of an international treaty.

The Covenant did not make it compulsory to resort to arbitration or judicial settlement and a question could not be submitted to such settlement unless, in the opinion of the states parties to the dispute, the latter was suitable for such solution.

On the other hand, states had the option of accepting an obligation to resort to judicial settlement by signing the 'Optional Clause' of Article 36 of the Statute of the P. C. I. J. (forty-two states were bound by this Article) or an obligation to resort, according to cases, to judicial settlement or arbitration by acceding to the General Act of September 26, 1928. (Twenty-one states were bound by this Act.)

Lastly, states might, by concluding particular treaties (usually bilateral treaties) for the pacific settlement of disputs, stipulate that disputes which arose between them should be submitted to judicial settlement, arbitration or conciliation (On November 15, 1934, 238 treaties of this kind had been registered with the Secretariat of the League).

The fourth paragraph of Article 13 provided for the enforcement of judicial or arbitral award. The Council of the League was responsible for "proposing" to the Members of the League the necessary steps to give effect to such awards.

3. Submission of Cases to the Council or the Assembly:

(*A*) *Disputes between States-Members*

We have seen in the previous section that Article 13 did not compel Members of the League to resort to arbitration or judicial settlement. Hence, if the states parties to the dispute had not otherwise contracted the obligation to submit the disputes arising between them to arbitration or judicial settlement (Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, General Act, particular treaties), the only obligation by which they were bound was to submit their dispute to the Council or to the Assembly according to the procedure laid down in Article 15.

The disputes submitted to the Council under Article 15 might be of all kinds. In examining them, the Council made allowance both for the legal and political aspects of the question. Without neglecting the strict letter of the law, it was allowed to take into account considerations of equity and expediency.

Article 15 might be applied even when a state of war existed between the parties to a dispute as was affirmed in the opinion given on September 24, 1934, by the first committee of the Assembly, to which the question had been referred in connection with the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, who were officially at war with one another (Article 15 had already been applied in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, when act of hostility had occurred between the parties without war having been declared).

The procedure set up by article 15 consists of two stages : (*a*) The conciliation stage : The Council, after the parties had stated their case, attempted to bring about agreement between them. If it succeeded, it took note of this agreement and the proceedings came to a successful conclusion. (*b*) The decision stage : If conciliation had failed, the Council drew up a report. In doing this, the Council endeavoured to establish the facts and indicated the blame attaching to the parties and then above all, to propose a solution likely to put an end to the dispute. This Council report was not a judgement or an arbitral award. The decision emanated from the Council, which was a political body and not a court of law ; it had not the authority of a judicial sentence and was not binding on the parties. Nevertheless, the Councils report was more than the proposal of a mediator. It stated and judged the facts of the case and recommended a solution with all the authority conferred on it by its position as an international body directly or indirectly representing all the states Members of the League of Nations. This moral authority was the greater in proportion, as the report was adopted unanimously or by a large majority.

Article 15 conferred competence to deal with a dispute in the first instance on the Council, but the Council might decide to refer the dispute to the Assembly and one of the parties might also make such a proposal. In both cases, the same procedure was followed.

The parties alone might lay the matter before the Council or the Assembly in virtue of Article 15.

Only grave disputes *i.e.*, disputes likely to lead to a rupture, might be dealt with by the procedure laid down in Article 15.

Lastly, among disputes of a political nature, there was one

class which was not liable to the procedure of enquiry by the Council or the Assembly—namely, questions which by international law were solely within the "domestic jurisdiction" of a party. Such questions were, for instance, those connected with the constitutional or administrative organisation of a state.

(B) *Disputes between two states of which only one or neither was a member of the League (Article 17).*

"In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a state which was not a member of the League or between states not members of the League, the state or states not member's should be invited to accept the obligations of member ship in the League for the purposes of such dispute upon such conditions as the Council might deem just". (Article 17, Para, 1).

Two situations might arise: (*a*) The non-member state or states might accept the Council's invitation. In that case, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 would apply in principle. (*b*) The non-member state or states, when invited, might refuse to accept the obligations of membership of the League for the purpose of settling the dispute. In that case, none of the procedures laid down in Articles 12 to 15 applied. If, however, the state which was not a member of the League, resorted to war against a member-state of the League, the sanctions provided for in Article 16 were applicable to it. In cases of dispute where neither state was a member of the League, and if both the parties to a dispute, when so invited, refused to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such recommendations as would prevent hostilities and would result in the settlement of the dispute.

4. Changes in Treaties and in Existing Law

Article 19 conferred special competence upon the Assembly. It gave the latter the power, not of revising treaties on its own authority or of itself changing international conditions but of inviting the states concerned to proceed to an examination of such treaties and conditions. Essentially this Article aimed at enabling the law to be adjusted to new circumstances. Unlike arbitration and judicial settlement, it was, from certain points of view, a procedure of legislative nature. The initiative of asking for the application of Article 19 could be taken by any Member of the League acting on its own responsibility. (Assembly resolution of September 25, 1929)

ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAGUE—*Political*

(A) Settlement of International Disputes

In twenty years of its existence during the two World

Wars, the League of Nations was called upon to decide about forty political disputes. Some of the more important disputes are listed below.

Eupen and Malmedy.

Germany addressed to the Council, during the years 1920-1921, a series of protests against the attribution of Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium. The question was discussed by the Council and on September 20, 1920, it decided to recognise as final the transfer of the districts o fEupen and Malmedy to Belgium. On February 22, 1921, the Council instructed the Secretary-General to inform the German Government that its decision was final.

Dispute between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Island, 1921.

Both Finland and Sweden claimed sovereignty over the islands. The majority of the islanders was Swedish, desiring union with Sweden. The Swedish Government supported their claim and tried to negotiate with the Government of Finland on the matter. The Finnish Government, however, held that Finland's sovereignty over the islands was indisputable because they had been given to her by the Peace Settlement. The conflict of views became bitter. Britain called the attention of the Council to the dispute. Finland claimed that the matter lay purely within her 'domestic jurisdiction' and the League was not competent to deal with it. The Council however appointed a Commission of Jurists to investigate into the matter, and give its opinion. The Commission reported that the matter was not of 'domestic jurisdiction' as Finland claimed. Thereafter, a Commission was sent for on-the-spot inquiry. Upon receipt of its report, the Council decided that Finland's claim for sovereignty ought to be recognised but that the Swedish character of the people was to be preserved. The decision was accepted by both the parties.

Dispute between Poland and Lithuania over Vilna, 1920-22.

Another dispute arose between Poland and Lithuania over Vilna. In July 1920, Lithuania had signed a treaty with the Soviet Government by which the latter recognised her claims to Vilna. But soon after, a Polish General, taking Lithuanians by surprise, occupied Vilna. Long negotiations, conducted by the League of Nations, failed to dislodge the Poles. In 1923, the Lithuanians occupied Memel which was, since the Treaty of Versailles, under Allied control. As a reaction, the Allies recognised Vilna as belonging to Poland. The Lithuanian Government, refusing to recognise the action of the Allies, declared a 'state of war' with Poland and frontier disputes became very frequent. In 1927, some Lithuanians were expelled from Vilna. At this, the Lithuanian Government referred the whole matter to the League on October 5, 1927. The representatives of both the

countries held conferences under the auspices of the League and though the matter was not fully solved, the tension subsided and that was a success for the League.

Dispute between Great Britain and France over the Nationality Decrees, 1922.

Another dispute arose between Britain and France in November 1921, over the nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco. France issued decrees in Tunis and Morocco that any person born in France or on the territory of French colonies would be a French citizen. These decrees conflicted with the British nationality laws which claimed the children born of British parents, who themselves were born within His Majesty's allegiance, as British citizens.

The British Government proposed that the matter be referred to arbitration; but France refused the offer, on the ground that the matter lay solely within her 'domestic jurisdiction'. The issue was referred to the P.C.I.J. which decided that the matter was not purely of domestic jurisdiction. The dispute, however, was withdrawn from the Council and decided by mutual negotiations between the foreign ministers of the two countries.

Dispute between Greece and Italy. (The Corfu Incident)

The fifth dispute arose between Italy and Greece. On August 27, 1923, an Italian general, two officers and one chauffeur were murdered on Greek soil. The Italian Government demanded apologies and full reparation for the crime. Greece accepted some of the conditions but refused the others. As a result, the Italian naval authorities occupied the island of Corfu as a guarantee of reparations. On September 1, 1923, Greece referred the matter to the Council under Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant. The question was discussed at the 26th session of the Council. The President of the Council on September 17, 1923 notified the Council of a communication from the Conference of Ambassadors, announcing the settlement of the dispute, as a result of diplomatic negotiations undertaken by the Conference.

Dispute between Turkey and Great Britain, (Iraq) over Mosul—1924-1926.

The sixth dispute arose between Turkey and Great Britain (which held a mandate over Iraq) over the district of Mosul. The treaty of Lausanne had provided that, if not settled, the dispute would be submitted to the Council of the League. When the matter was referred to the Council by Great Britain on August 6, 1924, Turkey questioned the jurisdiction of the latter. The Permanent Court of International Justice gave advisory opinion up-holding the right of the Council to fix the boundary.

A Committee of Investigation was appointed. It held an on-the-spot enquiry and submitted its report. On the basis of its recommendations, the boundary was fixed by the Council; but it failed to satisfy Turkey. The settlement was finally made through negotiations between United Kingdom and Turkey. The frontier traced by the Council, with some slight modifications, was recognised by the Treaty of Angora, June 5, 1926.

Dispute between Bulgaria and Greece over the murder of Greek Officer, 1925-26.

Another dispute of a very serious nature arose between Greece and Bulgaria. In October 1925, a commander of the Greek frontier post and one of his men were murdered by the Bulgarians. By way of reprisal, a Greek army marched into Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria at once appealed to the League on October 22, 1925 under Articles 10 and 11. The Council met at Paris, exhorted the Greek Government to withdraw its troops and requested British, French and Italian Governments to send military officers for on-the-spot enquiry. The Greek forces retired from the Bulgarian soil and Greece was made to pay compensation for violating Bulgarian territory. Greece accepted the verdict of the League, but there was some bitter comment on the different conceptions of 'justice' which had prevailed two years before when Greece suffered aggression under precisely similar circumstances at the hands of Italy when the latter had occupied Corfu.

Dispute between Japan and China over Manchuria—1931-33.

In 1931, there occured the most serious dispute so far between Japan and China over Manchuria. Japan occupied Central Manchuria on September 18, 1931, alleging that China had destroyed her railway properties. China appealed to the League under Article 11. On September 21, 1930, the Council passed a resolution calling upon the disputants to withdraw their troops. But the order was ignored by Tokyo. On Octobtr 24, 1930, the Council called upon Japan to withdraw its troops by November 16. By this date, Japanese forces were fighting their way into Northern Manchuria. On December 10, 1931, the Council appointed a five-man Commission, headed by Lord Lytton, to study the situation. When Japan attacked Shanghai, China again appealed to the Assembly which adopted a resolution (March 4, 1932) calling for "Japanese evacuation of Shanghai." Tokyo did indeed quit Shanghai under the Armistice of May 5, but continued to hold Manchuria. After a leisurely visit to the Far East, the Lytton Commission issued a report of 100, 000 words on October 3, 1932, recommending much too late a reasonable compromise. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Japan and accepting these

recommendations. Tokyo rejected them and left Geneva. The other League powers did nothing apart from refusing to recognise Manchukuo.

Dispute between Italy and Ethiopia over Walwal, 1934.

The Italian attack on the remote Ethiopian village of Walwal in the winter of 1934 presented the League with the most serious test to its system of collective security. An Anglo-Ethiopian Commission accompanied by an Ethiopian armed escort, seeking to properly define the boundary lines, was stopped by an Italian military force, camped on Ethiopian soil. On December 5, 1934, the Italians launched an attack with tanks and planes, dispersing the Commission and Ethiopian forces. Three days later, Mussolini protested to the Ethiopian ruler, Haile Selassie, against the attack and demanded compensation and apologies.Ethiopia adopted a conciliatory attitude, and urged Italy to agree to submit the matter to arbitration under the procedures of the Treaty of Friendship of August 2, 1928. On December 14, Italy replied that arbitration was unnecessary, since Ethiopia was responsible for the crime and accordingiy, again demanded apologies and reparation. Ethiopia made an appeal to the nations of the world to exercise their good offices to check the designs of Italy. But none of the Member Governments intervened or called for a Council session, as they should have done under the Covenant without waiting for the parties to do so. When troop movements and renewed fighting continued, Ethiopia, on January 3, 1935, formally called upon the League to act under Article 11. The Ethiopian notice called upon the Secretary-General to "forthwith summon a meeting of the Council."

Both France and Britain succeeded in prevailing upon the Ethiopian delegate to agree to the omission of the dispute from the agenda. On January 15, 1935, Ethiopia appealed again and it now seemed inevitable that the Council would debate the crisis. Italy adopted the strategy of delay. Whenever it appeared that the Council might intervene, Italy would make a concession and go through the false motions of furthering a peaceful settlement with Ethiopia, meanwhile speeding up the war preparations. By March 16, Ethiopia became so much alarmed at the Italian preparation that another appeal for action was made to the League.

On March 22, Italy denied Ethiopian charges of war preparations, and expressed her willingness to submit the dispute to arbitration. The British and French delegates at Geneva made both governments agree to prompt arbitration of the dispute. On May 25, the Council acknowledged this agreement and further committed itself to act, if the arbitral panel was not established within two months and if a settlement was not reached in three months.

This delay provided Italy more time for preparations and she secretly ordered new mobilisations. On July 24, 1935, Ethiopia asked the Secretary-General to convene the Council in extraordinary session. The Council met on July 31, and broke the impasse by acceding to the arbitral arrangements demanded by Mussolini. On September 3, the arbitral commission reported that neither the Italians nor the Ethiopians had been responsible for the Walwal incident.

On October 3, 1935, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia. Ethiopia asked for action under Article 16. The Council appointed a 'committee of six,' which reported that the Italian Government had resorted to war in utter disregard of its obligations under Article 12 of the Covenant of the 'League.'

On October 9, the Assembly adopted the report and voted to apply sanctions. The appeal for sanctions met with a surprisingly unanimous response from the League Members and by November 18, 1935, the 'economic siege' of Italy was complete. On December 8, the peace plan agreed to between Hoare and Laval became known whereby Italy was to be rewarded with the control of two-thirds of Ethiopia. The pious resolutions and inquiries of the League availed nothing against bombing planes. Addis Ababa fell to the invaders; Haile Selassie fled, and the entire country lay at the mercy of Mussolini who could, on May 5, 1936, announce to the world that "the war is finished—Abyssinia is Italian." On July 2, 1936, within a year after the full attack had been launched, the Assembly voted "to bring to an end the measures taken in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant."

Reflections on the Settlement of International Disputes by the League.

During its life time, the League considered some 60 disputes : of these, 35 were settled according to the pacific procedures of the League ; 20 of them were resolved by the parties concerned independently of the League ; and 11 were settled by 'dictation' by one of the parties. The peaceful settlement of the 35 disputes was influenced by the fact that the League might act if the parties did not resolve their differences themselves or through procedures of their own choice. But the peaceful methods of the League were not utilised in all disputes ; several aggressions succeeded. The reason for that obviously was that the principal powers did not consider war or threat of war their immediate concern ; they rather, injected the idea that a war was not their concern unless it affected their 'vital interest.' Prof. Leonard has rightly remarked: "The Member states did not identify their interests with opposition to war wherever it might occur, thereby impressing upon potential aggres-

sors the new mores of international life so hopefully established in the Covenant." Accordingly, governments were unwilling to commit themselves in advance to apply sanctions, preferring to decide for themselves after a dispute had arisen, with the decision dependent upon whether or not they found their vital interests affected. In part, this policy of governments resulted from their doubts concerning the ability of the League to provide the framework for halting aggression and war. Important states were not members of the League and could not be counted upon to co-operate in coercive measures.

(B) The Mandate System

After the war, most of the territories and colonies of the Central Powers fell to the lot of the Allies, and they presented a serious problem to the Anglo-French statesmen. Out-right annexation of these areas was politically impossible because the Allies, through the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, which were the basis of the peace settlement, had committed to an 'impartial adjustment of all colonial claims on the principle that the interests of the population must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government, whose title is to be determined." Complete independence and self-government was also neither expedient nor profitable, because public opinion in the Allied countries was full of revenge upon the Central Powers and was desiring to make up their war losses. That the losses would be made up at the cost of the defeated powers was quite natural. A way out of this dilemma was suggested by General Smuts of South Africa in a plan called 'the Mandate System.' It was embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, which was an integral part of the treaties of peace with Germany and other defeated powers.

What was the mandate system ?

Under this system, the territories detached from Germany and Turkey were not placed in the ownership of any state but were entrusted to certain states called 'Mandatory States' to be administered by them in accordance to conditions laid down in written agreements called 'Mandates,' between the League of Nations and each Mandatory. The mandatory powers were obliged to present to the League annual reports "on the condition of administration and progress in the mandated territory." These reports ware to be examined by a special commission of the League, known as the Permanent Mandate Commission. This Commission was comprised not the representatives of governments, but eleven experts, the majority of whom were drawn from non-Mandatory countries, and who were selected by the League on the basis of their special and technical knowledge. A representative of the Mandatory power could, however, attend the meetings of the Commis-

sion, when the report of his government was under consideration, so as to give any additional information that might be required. After a thorough examination of the report, the Commission would present it to the Council of the League together with its own observations. On the basis of this report, the Council would give further directions and suggestions, if necessary, to the Mandatory power.

Types of Mandates

The colonies and territories of the Central Powers were grouped into three categories "according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances." These categories were A, B and C. In 'A' category were placed those communities of the Turkish Empire which "had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."

Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordon were mandated to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to France.

In 'B' category were included the former German possessions in Central Africa, which were "at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications, or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League." Thus, 1/6 of Cameroons, 1/3 of Togoland, and most of the German East Africa (Tanga nyika) were given to Great Britain. The remaining 5/6 of the Cameroons and 2/3 of the Togoland went to France; and the northern coast of East Africa, Ruanda-Urandi, was given to Belgium.

In 'C' category were placed German south-western Africa and hundreds of Pacific islands which had once belonged to Germany. These, "owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of

its territory subject to safeguards mentioned above in the interest of the indigenous population."

Thus, German south-west Africa was assigned to the Union of South Africa ; German Samoa to Newzealand ; the Island of Nauru to the British Empire ; New Guinea to Australia ; and the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshall islands to Japan.

League Supervision Over the Mandatories

The League of Nations exercised its supervision over the mandatory states through the Permanent Mandate Commission, the Council and, to a lesser degree, the Assembly. The Permanent Court of International Justice decided disputed legal matters concerning the mandates ; while the health and legal sections of the Secretariat, the standing committee on the White Slave Traffic, the Internarional Labour Office and the Temporary Slavery Commission gave valuable assistance in the various technical fields.

Methods of Control—Reports

In order to enable the League to keep itself informed about the state of affairs in the mandated territories, certain methods were devised. The first of them was the annual reports by the mandatory powers. Each of the mandatories undertook "to supply to the League each year a report which dealt with main legislative and administration developments, the general health, economic and social conditions of the native population, the measures taken to insure their economic and educational progress, the conditions of labour, whether or not, the prohibition of liquor, arms and drugs had been faithfully observed, the financial position of the territory and the main political events of the period."

The report was thoroughly examined by the members of the P.M.C., who could call the representatives of the Mandatory power in order to obtain from them fuller information on matters which the report did not make clear, or on condition which seemed to them to be unsatisfactory. When the Commission had finished its scrutiny, it prepared its own report and submitted to the Council. The League Council considered the report and made its own observations, and these went to the Mandatory power concerned.

The reports were usually not the statement of the actual state of affairs in the mandated territories. They were supplied by the Mandatory governmnts, and were likely to be weighed in their own favour. Often the P.M.C. failed to make good decisions, because of the inadequacy of information at its disposal.

Petitions

The natives of the mandated territories were also entitled

to submit petitions to the P.M.C., though such petitions could be sent through the medium of the Mandatory power. This was thought to be a very important method of representing the grievances of the people; but here again their utility was lost because, while forwarding them to the League, the mandatories could attach their own observations and explanations and thereby the entire weight of the petitions was lost. Certain individuals in Syria and Nelson in Samoa, attempted to seek a hearing in Geneva; but they were objected to by the Mandatories on the ground that the procedure would place the ruling power and the subjects on the same position, and rather the ruling power in the position of a defendant.

In 1926, the P.M.C. suggested that the reports supplied by the mandatories every year should be on the basis of a more extended questionnaire, so that, more accurate and specific information concerning conditions in the mandated territories might be had. But the British Premier Chamberlain, denied the suggestion on the ground that the immense questionnaire proposed was "infinitely more detailed, infinitely more inquisitorial than that which was being used" and asserted, that the Commission was threatening "to extend its authority to a point where the government would no longer be vested in the Mandatory power but in Mandates Commission". On the rejection of this proposed questionnaire, Dr.Kastl commented : "it is symptomatic of the fact that in the eyes of many of the interested parties the international supervision of the Mandates Commission must stop at the point where it becomes inconvenient to the Mandatory powers."

However, the major objectives of the P.M,C were three :

(1) "to make the mandate system a reality and not an excuse for outright annexation ;

(2) "to maintain the economic "Open Door" and commercial equality for all powers so that the mandated territories shall not be a source of political and economic profit to the mandatory ; and

(3) "to promote the welfare of the native inhabitants."

Certain Features of the Mandate System

The mandate system was different from the nineteenth century system of outright annexations, in that, the Mandatory state was forbidden by the terms of the mandate from doing a number of things which were possible under the earlier system.

First, the mandates in no way ceded the territory to the Mandatory states ; simply they exercised authority on behalf of the League. Secondly, the Mandatory states were subject to certain restrictions as to the recruiting and training of the inha-

The Conference made the following six recommendations :—

1. "Labour, capital and goods must be allowed to flow freely in all countries, so that their economy may be revived.
2. "Co-operation and not competition should be the aim of industry.
3. "Custom duties, dangerous and useless as they were. should be given up; or at least made relatively stable.
4. "The world, being at present over-industrialised, the states should enter into industrial agreements so as to regularise production.
5. "Agricultural and industrial production must go side by side.
6. "Industries should be rationalised so that the cost of production might diminish."

The results of the Conference were not very encouraging and the tariffs and customs, instead of decreasing, rose up. Nevertheless, the Conference was an important event, in that it gave birth to the International Relief Union. The governments agreed to finance a fund, to extend "first aid" to stricken areas, where the entire population was affected and the local government was unable to provide adequate assistance. The Union had its agents throughout the world who immediately reported whenever a disaster occurred. The Union helped the Indian Government during the earth-quakes in 1934 and 1935. The Union proposed to give assistance to the Spanish Government during her civil war, but the latter made other arrangements. Similarly, the Fund considered to help the Chinese during the floods of 1938, but could not do so, as the affected areas were under the control of Japan. The Union was successful not so much in accomplishments as in making the governments recognise the need for collaboration through international agency in the relief of stricken areas.

The International Monetary Conference of 1933

When the world was in the grip of economic crisis, the Council of the League convened a conference in London in 1933 to devise common policies to stabilise the economies of the various countries. But the Conference failed to achieve its objectives as the governments preferred to take independent measures to meet the crisis.

Commenting upon the economic activities of the League, Prof. Leonard writes: "Within the period of only a couple of decades, governments moved from comparative 'isolation' to intensive collaboration through international organisation on their common economic and financial problems. For the first

time in history, the agenda of international meetings were crowded with economic questions, tariffs. depressions, access to raw materials, customs formalities, and financial reconstruction. This did not mean that programmes were undertaken in all these spheres or that concrete policies resulted. Nevertheless. it was of great significance that these subjects were being discussed and studied jointly by governments and by organs established by them. This was a far-reaching step in the direction of greater international economic collaboration".[12]

(C) Financial

The Financial Reconstruction of Austria:

By the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, the Austria-Hungarian Empire was split into seven states—a new and diminished Austria, a new and diminished Hungary, a new Poland, a new Czechoslovakia, a Serbia expanded into Jugoslavia, an enlarged Rumnnia and Italy. During the years 1918-1920, the whole of Central and Eastern Europe presented scene of misery, starvation, poverty and financial breakdown, and Austria was was the worst affected. The government of the new republic faced a serious problem of financial reconstruction. During the three years which followed the end of the war, about £40 million were advanced by the Chief Allies for the purpose of keeping the Austrians alive. But this kind of assistance could not continue for long. Vienna seemed to be a ripe field for a Communist revolution ; and the chances were that a broken Austria might perforce proclaim its attachment to Germany.

In the spring of 1921, the Allied powers asked the League to prepare a plan for the financial reconstruction of Austria, so that it might become self-supporting. A special Council Committee was set up to deal with the Austrian problem. In order to save the Austrian krone from complete collapse, Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia advanced, though reluctantly, some more million pounds in the spring of 1922. On October 4, 1922, Austria, Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia signed three protocols under the auspices of the League Committee and these became the basis of Austrian reconstrnction. The Austrian scene changed rapidly for the better. Public confidence revived ; the Krone became stable ; prices began to fall. In December 1922, the League appointed Dr. Zimmerman, as its Commissioner-General in Vienna. In the summer of 1923, a new loan was floated with complete success in London, Paris, New York and other centres. By 1924, the Budget was balanced without drawing on the loan ; and the latter could be used for the purpose of positive economic reconstruction. By the end of 1925, the Austrian Government had full control over its budget, and six months later, on June 30, 1926, the League's Commissioner was withdrawn from Vienna.

12. Leonard, op. cit., p. 335-6

During 1930-31, Austria, as all other states, was affected by the world-wide economic crisis. On an application by the Austrian Government in August 1931, a new form of collaboration with the Financial Committee of the League was established; a League's representative was kept at Vienna, and an adviser to the National Bank of Austria was appointed. A new agreement, defining the purpose of this collaboration was approved by the Council, and signed by Austria on July 15, 1939. Under this protocal, the Governments of England, France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands gave their guarantee each for a specific portion to a new plan of the Austrian Government, which was issued in August 1933. This loan helped to consolidate the Austrian currency.

Economic and Financial Restoration of Hungary:

Hungary was also faced with the problems of economic and financial reconstruction. Not only that, Hungary, unlike Austria, "was an active and a disturbing element in the political scene of Central Europe. She felt the humiliation of defeat as bitterly as Germany herself; and lost no occasion of protesting against the territorial losses imposed by the victors."[13] Moreover, Yugoslavs, Czechs and Rumanians still remembered the oppressions they had suffered at the hands of Magyar rule and they were still claiming reparations from Hungary. However, in collaboration with the chief Allied powers, they agreed to waive their claims and bind themselves to respect the independence and sovereignty of Hungary. All these engagements were consigned to two protocals signed in Geneva on March 14, 1924. A loan was floated without difficulty. Stability and prosperity were recreated earlier than expected.

The League Commissioner in Budapest, who was Jeremiah Smith, an American banker, a man of exceptional quality who soon appeared to the Hungarians as their best friend, was removed in June 1926. Thereafter, the work for Hungarian reconstruction coincided with the labours of the Dawes Committee, with which the League had no direct concern.

In September 1931, however, on request from the Hungarian Government, the League undertook a fresh enquiry into the financial position of Hungary. Permanent collaboration with the Financial Committee was established through the intermediary of a representative of the Committee in Budapest and of an adviser attached to the National Bank of Hungary.

The Problem of Greek Refugee Settlement:

Another important financial operation of the League was the floating of a foreign loan of 10,000,000 pounds sterling for

13. Walters, F.P. A. History of the League of Nations, 2 Vols. (London, Oxford Varsity Press, 1952). I, p. 261.

the settlement of refugees in Greece. As a result of the Greco-Turkish hostility in the autumn of 1922, more than a million Greeks returned to their country as refugees and presented a colossal problem to the government. The task was beyond the competence of the Greek Government and an appeal was made to the League. The League sent Dr. Nansen to investigate, and medical experts to advise on measures to deal with the problem of sickness ond sanitation.

A Greek Refugee Board was established and two loans, in 1924 and 1928, were advanced to the Greek Government under the auspices of the League. The Bank of Greece remained in touch with League Financial Committee, which it periodically consulted on questions of general financial policy. Further, at the request of the Greek Government, investigations were made on the spot into financial and economic situation by the Financial Committee in February 1932 and May 1933.

As in Greece, the League assisted the Bulgarian Government in the resettlement of its refugees. In 1928, help was given to stabilize its currency. In February 1932 and in April 1933, the Financial Committee sent delegations to Bulgaria to investigate into its financial and economic conditions. A League Commissioner and an adviser were attached to the National Bank of Bulgaria.

League and the Saar Basin :

The Treaty of Versailles had put serious responsibilities upon the League regarding the question of the Saar and the question of Danzig. The Saar basin was an industrial area nearly two thousand square miles in extent and was rich in coal-mines. It had a German population of nearly three-quarters of a million. The Saar coal-mines had been placed in French ownership "as a partial compensation for the deliberate destruction wreaked by the German army upon the coal-mines in northern France." The French delegation at the Peace Conference had advanced historical reasons for the annexation of the territory ; but due to the opposition of President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George, the French demand was not conceded. On an American proposal, it was decided that the territory "should be governed for fifteen years by a Commission appointed by the League; and that after fifteen years, the Saar-landers should decide for themselves whether the Saar should return to Germany, or be entrusted to France or continue to be governed by the League." The League's Governing Commission was to comprise of a Frenchman, a Saar inhabitant, and three members belonging to countries other than France or Germany. The Commission was directly responsible to the Council of the League.

On February 13, 1920, the Council drew up for the Gov-

erning Commission instructions which embodied a statement of principles and rules of procedure based on the Treaty provisions. It laid down as a fundamental principle that the Commission's sole interest should be the welfare of the inhabitants of the Territory. In March 1922, an Advisory Council of 30 representatives, elected by all the inhabitants of the Territory, was established on the basis of universal suffrage. The League Council also admitted the right of the Saar inhabitants to address petitions to it through the Governing Commission which was to forward them to the Council, with or without comment. During the years 1920-30, the Commission submitted to the League Council some forty periodical reports, and this is enough to give the idea of the work done by the Commission in ten years.

During this period, however, the work of governance was jeopardized by the political atmosphere. The Saar-landers resented a government of foreigners and aspired for democratic institutions. Moreover, they could also not reconcile to the exploitation of their industrial potential by France. The prospect of the plebiscite in 1935, however, kept the Saar-landers tranquil. But "two years before the date to which all were looking forward, the placidity of the Saar was roughly broken by the advent of a Nazi Government in Berlin."[14] The German press and radio launched almost a campaign for the forceful occupation of the Saar territory. On October 14, 1933, the day Germany left the League, Hitler broadcast a speech in which he urged France to return Saar to Germany. But the French Government was not ready to give him a "cheap victory."

Throughout 1933-34, Nazi threats and invective were in full blast. In January 1934, the League Council took up the question of the organization of the plebiscite. In early January 1935, the plebiscite was held and 90 percent of the electorate voted for immediate reunion with Germany. On January 14, the Plebiscite Commission reported that the voting had taken place "with perfect discipline, and dignity." Two days later, the Council, in the presence of the Governing Commission and the Plebiscite Commission, resolved that on March 1, 1935, the whole territory should be united with Germany.

League and the Free City of Danzig:

The second responsibility of the League arising from the Treaty of Versailles was in relation to Danzig. Just as France had claimed the coal-mines and annexation of the Saar basin to compensate for her war losses, similarly, Poland demanded the annexation of Danzig as essential to her development, as also to ensure to her free access to the sea. The population of Danzig

14. Ibid., p. 587.

was predominantly German; and Wilson and Lloyd George were unwilling to place purely German territories under alien rule. The powers at the Peace Conference were confronted with a very serious territorial problem. Ultimately, the settlement was made and was much different from that for the Saar. The port, with a few miles of the neighbouring country-side, was detached from Germany, and established as an autonomous State under the name of the Free City of Danzig. The position of Danzig, the rights of Poland and the duties of the League of Nations were defined in an agreement signed between Poland and Danzig on November 9, 1920.

The inhabitants of Danzig were given autonomy in respect of internal affairs; they were not to pass under Polish rule and were not to form part of the Polish State. The Free City was, however, included in the Polish customs regime, and was subordinated to Poland in respect of its relations with other states including Germany. Danzig was placed under the protection of the League. Its constitution, framed by representatives of the Free City in agreement with a High Commissioner of the League, was guaranteed by the League. The port of Danzig was to be administered by an International Harbor Board. The League also appointed a resident High Commissioner with power to settle Polish and Danzig disputes in the first instance, both parties retaining the right of appeal to the Council of the League.

The Free City came officially into existence on November 15, 1920. The constitution, which had been drafted in co-operation with the High Commissioner, was finally approved by the Council in May 1922, "with certain amendments, of which the most important was probably the stipulation that the constitution cannot be modified without the League's permission, and that the Free City cannot, without the previous consent of the League, serve as a military or naval base, set up fortifications, or authorize the manufacture of munitions or war material on its territory."[15]

Owing to the nature of the constitutional relations between the Free City and Poland, quite a good number of disputes occured between them. Most of them arose out of matters which the Peace Treaty and the agreement between the parties had left in abeyance or insufficiently defined. While quite a number of them were settled by direct agreement, a large number of cases were brought to the notice of the Council. Some of them were later on withdrawn, and settled by direct negotiations through the good offices of the High Commissioner.

One of the most valuable services which the League rend-

15. League of Nations' Ten Years of World Co-operation. (London, Hazell, 1930) p. 385.

ered the Free City was the assistance given in re-establishing its financial position. On a programme prepared by the Financial Committee, the Danzig Government undertook a series of reforms for the purpose of stabilizing the currency. Two loans—one issued by the Danzig municipality in 1925, the other by the Free City itself in 1927, were successfully floated under the auspices of the League. The purpose of both was to finance public works.

The peace-makers of 1919 had thought the settlement of the Danzig question would be permanent; but it could not be permanent. As Walters has put: "a purely German City, torn from the Father-land, made to serve the economic interests of Poland, placed under a guarantee of the League, which used its position not to assist the Free City but to intrigue against the *Reich* provided a sufficient basis for the demand of revision on the part of militant Germany, which she became when Hitler was its dictator"[16] In January 1934, a pact was signed between Germany and Poland, whereby the latter accepted the German suggestion that all disputes between Danzig and Poland should, hereafter, be settled by direct discussion between the two states. The League Council was ignored, and when in February 1937, Carl Burck-Hardt assumed the office of the League High Commissioner in Danzig, the old connection between the League and the Free City was gone. The Danzig Nazis, inspired by Hitler, inflicted all sorts of injustices on Liberals, Socialists, Communists and Jews in the 'Free City.' By the last weeks of 1938, Burk Hardt found it "more and more difficult to induce the Nazi chiefs to listen to the voice of reason." The Munich Pact gave the Nazis added confidence in themselves, and they contemptuously began to disregard the opinion of the democracies.

Throughout the "agitated summer of 1939," the League High Commissioner tried to prevent any explosion in Danzig; but the Nazis there openly began to prepare themselves to recover the city by force. The German propaganda continuously harped on the wrongs of Danzig. On September 1, 1939, the Germans invaded Poland; and within a fortnight, not only Danzig, but the whole Poland was in their hands.

(D) Intellectual Co-operation

The League also had an International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, consisting of seventeen members appointed by the Council. Its essential object was to develop international co-operation in all intellectual fields in order to safeguard peace by a closer union and better understanding between peoples. Its work included: (1) the scientific study of international relations (annual conferences); (2) co-ordination

16. Walters, II. p. 793.

of national centres of educational information, problem of adult and workers' education ; (3) instruction of the youth in the aims of the League of Nations and in international relations ; (4) international action to remove from school text-books passages harmful to international understanding ; (5) the educational problem and international aspects of broadcasting ; (6) co-operation between national and central libraries ; (7) co-operation among scientific museums and the theatre, music and poetry from the international point of view ; (8) preservation of monuments and works of art, etc., etc.

(E) Social and Humanitarian

Article 23 (c) of the Covenant obliged the Members of the League to entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children. The League appointed an Advisory Commission for the protection and welfare of children and young people. This Commission was divided in two committees: (1) The Traffic in Women and Children Committee; (2) The Child Welfare Committee.

In 1921, the Commission drew up a convention for the suppression of traffic in women for immoral purposes. In October 1933, this convention was extended by a new convention providing for penalties for the international traffic in women of full age, even with their consent, for immoral purposes in another country. (Earlier agreements penalised only the traffic in women under age.)

The League was also engaged in the suppression of obscene publications. Ever since it was set up, the Child Welfare Committee carried out an exhaustive study of all laws relating to the age of marriage and consent, and as a result of this study, several countries amended their laws so as to raise the age for marriage. This Committee also studied the problems of cinematograph, illegitimate children, return to their homes of children and adolescents, and assistance to foreign minors.

(F) Refugee Relief Work

In pursuance of a resolution of the 1930 Assembly, the International Office for Refugees under Dr. Nansen was established to carry on and complete as rapidly as possible—and in any case not later than the end of 1938, Dr. Nansen's work on behalf of Russian, Armenian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish refugees. In the course of the financial year 1933, the office administered funds for the relief of refugees to a total of approximately 925,500 francs. During this period, it relieved in different ways 91,125 refugees and found stable employment for 7,000 persons.

Under a resolution of the Fourteenth Assembly, the Council took the necessary steps in October 1933, to set up a purely autonomous organisation for the relief of refugees from Germany. The Council invited the Argentine, Belgium, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S.A., to appoint representatives for this purpose to the governing body of the new organisation.

On September 25, 1926, the Assembly of the League approved the International Convention for the Suppression of Slavery with the object of preventing and suppressing the slave trade and bringing about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms. The parties to the convention undertook to take all necessary steps to prevent compulsory or forced labour from creating conditions analogous to slavery.

At the request of the Chinese Government, the Technical Organisations of the League rendered meritorious assistance in the economic reconstruction of China after 1931. The League also launched a campaign against the production, manufacture, sale, transport, and use of the narcotics.

WHY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS FAILED

The grandiloquent structure of the League of Nations with all its glittering ideals, ambitious aims and elaborate machinery failed to deliver goods to mankind, "to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, "to make the world safe for democracy" and "to establish peace on essential justice." It also failed to avoid the recurrence of similar tragedies in the future life of mankind, and after a short period of twenty years, the world was again thrust into a conflagration of disaster which was this time much more intense and widespread. Quite naturally, the question of why the League failed had been repeatedly raised. A multitude of answers had been given, but unfortunately there was no simple or easy answer to this query. However, its failure could be explained in terms of the following analysis.

Incorporated in the Ill-fated Versailles Treaty :

It has been asserted first, that the Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated in the ill-fated treaty of Versailles. The Treaty, as one commentator has put it 'was an ill-balanced document combining within it contempt, spite, vengeance, idealism of Wilson, imperialism of Lloyd George, and materialism of Clemenceau. Hypocricy was its burden.' The Covenant, part and parcel as it was of the Versailles Treaty, was ill-destined from its very inception. As Norman Bentwich has remarked: "The League of Nations was a dishonourable daughter of a disreputed mother".

Moreover, the peace that was signed at Versailles and which the League of Nations, was designed to perpetuate was a political peace in which the fundamental economic arrangements of nineteenth-century Europe were taken for granted. The great issues that were coming to the front—the question of economic democracy and the need of economic unity under large-scale industrial technology—were ignored. Europe "was partitioned into an increased number of economically unstable and strategically indefensible small states. Germany, the economic hub of the continent, was crippled in so far as Britain and France found it in their power to do."[17] This disorganized and broken world of competing nationalist enterprizes, the League was expected to preserve and make secure. Wilson himself told his commission of American experts that he was "not much interested in the economic subjects" that might be discussed at Pasis. His League "did not represent a vital change, but simply an attempt ta give organisation to the old chaos".[18]

Based upon Wrong Assumptions :

From the outset, the League was based upon three fundamental assumptions which were emphasized again and again. The first assumption was that democracy would be the prevailing system of government within the League and in world affairs. A second assumption was that all states that mattered in world affairs would shortly become members of the League.[19] The third assumption was that armaments would be reduced and limited by international agreements.[20]

Upto the great slump of 1928-29, these assumptions appeared to be broadly justified. After the slump, it appeared evident that they were based on a forth assumption, which was not mentioned in 1919, and that assumption was that the economic system would continue to function after the war as it had done before, with private enterprise as its mainspring. So long as that tacit assumption held good, the three assumptions were valid and during the years of the first post-war slump and

17. Richard Hofstadter: The American Political Tradition and the Men who Made It
(New York, Altred A. Knopf, 1951) p. 269.

18. Ibid.

19. By 1929 the entry of Germany and the other ex-enemies, the growth of the League from forty-two to fifty odd states, the increasing co-operation with the U. S. A., and the beginning of co-operation with the U. S. S. R., made this assumption seem reasonable.

20. Here progress in the first ten years was quite real though indirect. There was no renewal of the arms race, and it was mostly due to the growing confidence in the League. The chief naval armaments were partially limited in the Washington and London Conferences. Lengthy discussions and various abortive treaties paved the way for the preparatory Commission of a Disarmament Conference that was also to organise collective security against aggression.

great slump, the League gained strength as well as prestige. But the partial break-down of capitalism in big slump created a new situation in which the three liberal assumptions became more and more remote from reality. With them, the League and liberalism itself as a political force began to fade away and new forces began to shape world events.

(3) Started with Some Handicaps

The League started its career with some initial handicaps. The absence of the U. S., whose presence would have acted as a sobering and cooling influence in the prejudiced counsels of the League, was a great blow to its prestige. It also suffered from incompleteness. The colonial peoples were represented only by their masters. Soviet Russia, no less than defeated Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey, was not invited in the initial stages. However, the feeling developed that the League was not a gathering of nations but "an assemblage of the victorious imperialists and of their satellite states which had assembled to preserve the fruits of their victory and maintain the *status quo*." Such a feeling was, however, based upon certain realities, for all accounts of the Peace Conference bore witness to the fact that the League was organised not so much to maintain peace and for pacific settlement of international disputes as to counter-act the forces of socialist revolution. Great Britain strengthened Germany, Japan and later on, France strengthened Italy as a bulwark against the U.S.S.R. and the Frankenstein monster devoured its own creator. The whole system of collective security, embodied in the Covenant of the League, broke down because of the aggressions of Germany and Japan. As Potter has put it : "The League of Nations failed—in so far as it failed—because the peoples of Germany, Japan and Italy preferred to support their governments in careers of imperialistic conquest, and because the peoples of England, France and the United States discouraged their governments from taking effective action early enough to stem the tide of Axis aggression. The peoples and governments of totalitarian states were more responsible for the destruction of international collaboration under League auspices than those of the liberal states, but the latter must bear a large share of negative blame." [21]

(4) Covenant Contained Some Constitutional Defects

Some critics hold that League failed because of certain of its constitutional weaknesses also. In case of disputes brought before the League Council under Article 11, decisions of the Council must be unanimous (including the votes of the disputants) in order to adjudge a nation guilty of having violated the

21. Potter, P. B., International Organisation (New York, Appleton, 1948) p. 254.

Covenant by resort to war or unjustifiable aggression. This necessited that the evidence should be very convincing, especially in the present age of political rivalries and alliances, to bring about a unanimous verdict under Article 11 or even under Article 15 (which excluded the vote of the disputants.) Should be decision not be unanimous, the disputing nations would be free to resume their hostilities after a period of three months.

Moreover, the Covenant did not abolish all rights to make war, but did attempt to establish a method of distinguishing between a defensive and an offensive war. Thus, by permitting exceptions to the prohibition of war, the Covenant seemed to assume that war remained the normal solution of international disputes.

(The League system suffered from several other weaknesses. Under Article 16, the League Council could only 'advise' what military and naval action might be taken against the aggressor. There was no guarantee that this 'advice' would be accepted. Moreover, difficulties arose after the establishment of the League. Article 16 of the Covenant condemned 'resort to war' and prescribed penalties if such war resulted from a violation of the Covenant itself.)Italy in 1923, Greece in 1925 and Japan in 1931, declared that, although they exercised force, they did so without the intention of making war ; and the Secretary-General of the League, in 1927, reported that war between two states depended upon their intention and not upon the nature of their acts however drastic they might be. But such a doctrine ran the danger of condemning merely the word 'war' and permitting acts as cruel and extensive as war itself.

In 1921, the Blockade Committee reported to the League Council that "the state which undertakes armed action against another state is regarded as having committed an act of war against all the Members of the League, but that this action could not create a state of war." The Second Assembly in 1921 resolved that the action of the defaulting state could not create a state of war, but merely entitled the other League Members to resort to actual war or to declare themselves at actual war with a Covenant-breaking state. Moreover, the League did not possess force capable of acting immediately against an aggressor. The Covenant did not completely guarantee security ; it contained 'gaps,' and, under certain circumstances, permitted war. In such an eventuality, it was incapable of executing its own decisions. Moreover, the League could not take initiative in matters affecting the peace of the world, and could not discuss a given situation unless it was referred to it by a Member

(5) Conflicting Interests of Members.

The failure of the League was, however, fundamentally not

due to the weaknesses of constitution or structure, serious as these might have been. The real culprits in the failure of the League were the Member-States. Potter has rightly remarked : "It was not the League of Nations but the Nations of the League which faild, in so far as there was failure. The legal obligations, or the legal theory of the organisation was defective on this side perhaps, but this did not preclude action by the Members for effective promotion of security and welfare beyond what was required of them ; it is probably true that they lived up to their obligations in the main, but they certainly failed to live up to the ideals or the principles or the clear implications of the Covenant. The techniques of the Council and numerous conferences and even of the Secretariat were too 'diplomatic,' but this was mainly because of the attitude taken by the governments of the Member-States. Certainly, the League did not fail because of any major defects in its general structure or even defects in the structure of individual organs. For what it is worth the conclusion can be adopted almost without qualification that the League failed especially in the maintenance of peace and security—because its leading members, France and Great Britain failed to support it with sufficient vigour in the Manchurian and the Ethiopian cases."[22]

(6) Based upon Pillars of Unequal Strength

As an organisation for the maintenance of world peace, the League of Nations rested upon four pillars, viz., the provision for the reduction of armaments (Article 8), the guarntees against aggression (Articles 10 and 16), the settlement of disputes (Articles 12 to 15 and 17) and the provision for peaceful change (Article 19.) The drafters of the League Covenant made the guarantees against aggression very strong, while the provisions for the reduction of armaments and for peaceful change were relatively weak. Thus, the League suffered from imbalance, as the pillars were not of equal strength. Order, of course, is the most essential condition of all civilised life, and without it no justice and freedom is prssible. But as Vandenbosch and Hogan have remarked, "No amount of force can maintain a status-quo which large numbers of peoples have come to regard as grossly unjust. Order and change must be linked together as Siamese twins ; the one is impossible without the other. The League Covenant probably placed too much emphasis upon order and too little upon change."

(7) League the Outcome Power Politics

Moreover, it must be remembered that the League and the I. L. O. were born of a revolt against power politics, international anarchy, imperialism and the exploitation of the workers by the plutocracy. Their aim was to provide an alternative

22. Ibid., pp. 253-4.

and better way of conducting world affairs. They were intended as a first step towards a new civilisation based on social justice and world government.

But the great slump of 1928-29 showed that in the ten years since the war, they had not gone far and fast enough towards world government and social justice. The depression drove up unemployment figures to three million in Great Britain and conditions in U.S.A., Germany and Japan were still worse. They, therefore, decided to put a stop to all this 'nonsense' about the League and social justice. Their motto was: "Back to pre-war—back to international anarchy and power politics in world affairs, and back to a monopoly of government for the propertied classes in home affairs". The democratic governments of the West, and particularly the National Government of Great Britain, associated their survival with the Fascist regimes. Both the theory and practice of fascism believed in constant warfare. This was obviously the blow struck at the very roots of the League.

With such conflicting interests and fictitious motives, the best of international organisation, what to speak of the League, would have been worse than useless.

APPRAISAL OF THE LEAGUE

That the League failed to maintain peace and provide security—the most important of its functions—is no doubt true; but we can not close our eyes to the excellent work of the League in the sphere of social welfare. As Potter says: "If measured by what other international organisations had accomplished in the past, the League performance, even in the security field, rates very high, indeed higher than that of any other international institution, with the exception of a very few highly special and limited agencies".[23] It was the first effective move towards the organisation of world-wide political and social order, in which the common interests of humanity could be seen and served across the barries of national tradition, racial difference or geographical separation. Walters has also remarked: "The establishment of the League was a revolutionary step in the sense that it involved a forward leap of unprecedented extent nd speed accompanied by extra-ordinary changes in the conduct of international relations—changes of principles, changes of method, changes even in the general convictions which form the basis of public opinion. Before the League, it was held both in theory and practice that every state was the sole and sovereign judge of its own acts, owing no allegiance to any higher authority, entitled to resent criticism or even questioning by other states. Such conceptions have disappeared for ever...

23. Ibid., p. 252.

The belief that aggressive war is a crime against humanity and that it is the interest, the right, and the duty of every state to join in preventing it is now everywhere taken for granted". He further remarked : "The League, as a working institution, is dead, but the ideals which it sought to promote, the hopes to which it gave rise, the method it devised, the agencies it created have become an essential part of the political thinking of the civilised world, and their influence will survive until mankind enjoy a unity transcending the divisions of states and nations".

Both the International Labour Organisation and the Permanent Court of International Justice were highly successful institutions, and both survived the League in fact, if not, in each case, in name. The Secretariat itself was far from failure ; indeed it ranked near the other end of the scale ; its officials and staff did about all that they were asked to do, or even more. Attempts at times have been made to show that the Secretariat ran the League.

When all is said against the League, a few words should not be missing in appraisal of its social and health, economic and financial, and medical and humanitarian services to mankind. When it is adjudged a failure, its achievements should not be over-looked.

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CHAPTER III

REPARATIONS AND INTER-ALLY WAR DEBTS

It has been the historically well-established right of a victor to recover, if he can, and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the whole costs of a war from his defeated antagonist. But the war of 1914-18 was so destructive in its consequences that it was beyond the capacity of the Central Powers to pay for the war costs, and therefore in the course of the armistice negotiations, the Allies, through their Note of November 5, 1918, restricted themselves to a claim for "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air". It was upon the basis of this claim that the Germans laid down their arms.

Reparation at the Peace Conference

But the course adopted by the Allies was much different in many respects. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson had provided for damage in invaded territory—Belgium France, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, but they did not cover losses at sea by sub-marine or bombardment at sea or damage done by air raids. But the Note of November 5, mentioned above, emphasized that reparation applied to all such damage whether by land, by sea or from the air. Not only that, the Allies, later at the Peace Conference, argued that "all damage done .....from the air, covered the entire costs of war, for the entire costs of the war has to be met by taxation and such taxation is damaging to the civilian population". Thus, once the Central powers were at their mercy, the Allies sought to discover, in order to realise the full war costs, what was not there in the Note of November 5. The expectations of the people had been aroused to a degree that it was impossible for the Peace Conference to set down a sober estimate of the total and the Treaty therefore left the amount of the claim and method of payment for future settlement by a special commission, known as th Reparation Commission by May 1, 1921. Prior to that date, Germany was to pay a sum of 5,000,000,000 dollars to the Allies. It was contemplated that the eventual payments would be spread over a period of at least thirty years.

Before the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the Allied Governments had, however, agreed through negotiations with the German Government to consider any offer which the latter might make of a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability. The first step in this direction was taken at San Remo Conference of April 1920, when it was decided to invite Germany to direct conference with a view to fixing the total liability. This conference took place at Spa in July of the same year, and for the first time,

the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister met the Allied delegates on equal terms. The conference did not succeed in its main objective ; but it settled the complicated question of the distribution of reparation receipts. France was allotted 52 per cent of the total receipts, the British Empire 22 per cent, Italy 10 per cent, Belgium 8 per cent and all other claimants, the remaining 8 per cent.

Germany's Failure to pay Preliminary Amount

Germany failed to pay the preliminary amount and to carry out some of the disarmament provisions. On March 3, 1921, the Allies issued an ultimatum to Germany, but this remaining unheeded, three German towns of Ruhrort, Duisburg, and Dusseldorf were occupied by the Allied troops on March 8.

Germany appealed fruitlessly first to the League of Nations, and then for the mediation of the U.S., but by this time, the issue was entering on another phase, for on April 27, 1921, the Reparation Commission published its decision, fixing Germany's total liability at £6,600 million. On May 2, the Supreme Council, after making preparations for the military occupation of the Ruhr in the event of German recalcitrance, asked the Reparation Commission to transmit to Germany a schedule prescribing the time and manner for discharging her obligations. This was accordingly forwarded on May 5, accompanied by an Allied ultimatum. The schedule demanded an immediate payment of £50 million by the end of the month. Under threat of the Ruhr valley being occupied by the Allied troops, if it was not so done, the schedule was accepted by the Government of Chancellor, Joseph Wirth.

Why Germany Failed to pay the Reparation Instalment ?

Through a loan provided by a number of London financial houses, the first instalment was paid by Germany by August But this was the first and the last payment for more than three years. A number of circumstances, as Benns has recounted, made it almost impossible for the German Government to fulfil her obligations. In the first place, post-war Germany had no international credit, and even if she had had, no countries in the world, with the possible exception of the U.S., were in a position to advance Germany any large amounts immediately. She, therefore, could not settle the reparation demands by foreign loans. In the second place, owing to the Allied blockade, which had so long cut her off from sources of raw materials and at the same time destroyed her pre-war commercial system, Germany was faced with the necessity of buying extensively abroad, but was unable to export immediately an equal amount of goods. Her foreign trade, therefore, failed to bring into the country gold or foreign exchange which might have been used to make the reparation payments. On the contrary, the adverse

balance of trade was drawing from Germany the little gold that she had. In the third place, Germany was handicapped by a tremendous flight of capital from the country. The capitalists were fearful lest their capital should be used for reparation payments and they hastened to put, as much of it as possible, out of the clutches of the government. Considerably more than a billion dollars was thus placed beyond the reach of the government. All these causes combined together to cause a tremendous inflation of German currency. And they, coupled with a very definite lack of "the will to pay" made it rather impossible for the German Government to fulfil her obligations.

A severe currency crisis began in Germany, and the value of the *mark* began to fall considerable. In November 1921, it had reached 1,000 to the pound ; and in the summer of 1922, its fall was catastrophic—3500 *marks* to a pound. Financial experts everywhere began to realise the incapacity of Germany to pay, even if she desired to pay. The British Government proposed that all cash payments by Germany should be postponed for two years. But the proposal was not welcomed by France, as she had rivetted her eyes upon the Ruhr Valley, partly, because, its occupation would strenthen her security, and partly because, the profits of the German industry could be forcibly transferred to the Allied countries. The British, bearing in mind that Germany had been one of their best customers in pre-war days, had gradually come to realise that economic ruination of Germany could only lead to increased British economic distress. Hence Lloyd George, anxious to reopen the German market to British goods at the earliest possible moment, was anxious to implement the moratorium. But France was adamant the other way. Poincare would agree to the moratorium only on condition that Germany transferred to France control the mines and dyestuff factories in the Rhineland. But Lloyd George did not like to disrupt the German economic life further and the remaining months of 1922 were spent in an exchange of notes between London, Paris and Berlin.

Occupation of Ruhr

In December 1922, Germany could not make the full deliveries in kind ; and the Reparation Commission without the concurrence of the British representative, declared her in 'voluntary default.' Germany maintained that the default was involuntary, resulting from the necessity of drawing up new contracts with the timber companies because of the declining currency. But France would not listen. On January 10, 1923, the French and Belgian Governments announced that because of defaults in the German Reparations deliveries, a Mission of control would be sent sent into the Ruhr, the heart of the German coal and steel industries, and that the Mission would be accomanied by adequate troops. The next day the Mission

settled at Essen and a state of seize was proclaimed. The British Government regarded the occupation as illegal and refused to participate in the venture.[1]

Consequences of the Occupation of the Ruhr :

The occupation of the Ruhr proved a blunder for France and a disaster for Germany. It was a blunder for France in that she lost the goodwill and co-operation of her important ally, Britain ; it created a lasting bitterness in the minds of the German people towards France. The occupation proved disastrous for Germany in that her finances, which were already in a deplorable state, collapsed altogether. The embittered Germans could not fight, but they inaugurated a campaign of 'passive resistance' in which representatives of all classes of the population participated. The government ordered the inhabitants of the occupied-territory to pay no customs duties, no coal taxes which could come into French hands and forbade them to render any assistance to the French under threat of severe penalties. Thousands of men in the Ruhr were thrown out of employment and food became scarce. No only in Ruhr, millions of people suffered even outside, because of the cutting off of goods from that district The telephone, telegraph and railway service came to a standstill. The mines and factories were closed. Newspapers refused to publish French and Belgian decrees. Local officials disregarded foreign commands. The German Government entered upon a programme of financial assistance to all those miners, railwaymen, officials and industrial workers who, by reason of passive resistance, lost their means of support and stopped all reparation payments. The *mark*, which had already fallen considerably, lost all its value and before the end of 1923, 50,000 milliard *marks* could be obtained for a pound.

In the midst of such circumstances, the French and Belgians tried to set up a separatist state called 'Revolver Republic' in the Rhineland by the loyal inhabitants. As Dr. Langsam has put it: "Discontented workers and radicals, released convicts, and rowdies from all over Germany were imported into the Rhineland and encouraged to proclaim the region independent." This step was very much resented by London, nothing to say of the Germans; and France had to withdraw her support from the movement in February 1924.

ATTEMPTS TO PUT GERMANY'S FINANCIAL HOUSE IN ORDER

THE DAWES PLAN

The 'passive resistance' policy of the German Government

1. Angell, J. W., The Recovery of Germany (New Haven, U. S. A., Yale University Press, 1929) Angell called France's accuption of Ruhr a "costly, vindictive and shortsighted act."

brought untold miseries upon the people; and the mass discontent led to the fall of the Cuno Ministry on August 12, 1923. A new cabinet was organised under Stresemann who, soon, on September 26, announced the abandonment of the policy of 'passive resistanse.' On October 24, 1923, in a note to the 'Reparation Commission, Germany declared her willingness in principle to resume payments under the Treaty of Versailles and requested an examination of her capacity to pay. Fortunately, the Allied powers were also engaged in more or less continuous negotiations with each other, and after the cesstion of German intransigence, Baldwin appealed to the Government of the U. S. to collaborate in an investigation into Germany's finances. The reply was favourable and resulted in the appointment, at the end of the year, of a committee presided over by an American General, Charles G. Dawes, and including representatives of Britain, Italy, Belgium and France. The Committee was charged with an inquiry into the means of balancing the German budget and the measures to be taken to insure the stability of the currency. The Committee met in Paris. Its conclusions and recommendations, submitted on April 9, 1924, constituted the so-called Dawes Plan. After some delay, the Allies met in London in July to discuss the new proposals ; the Germans were called in : and on August 16, the plan was approved. The documents were formally signed at the end of the month, and on September 1, 1924, the Plan went into effect. It contained the following recommendations:

(1) A new currency known as the *Reichmark* was to be created at the old parity and was to be controlled by a Bank of Issue, independent of the German Government.

(2) Germany's currency being stabilised, she would pay annually for the first five years £50,000.000. Later on, this amount would be raised to a maximum of £125,000,000. Future payments would be increased or decreased according to an index of prosperity.

(3) Lest these payments should again disturb the exchange, it was proposed that they should be paid by Germany in *marks*, and the Allied Governments would be responsible to exchange them into foreign currencies.

(4) For the successful working of the scheme, it was thought necessary that Germany should be in full possession of her entire territory and therefore French occupation of the Ruhr was to be abandoned.

(5) In order to provide Germany a currency reserve and to enable her to pay her first annuity, which would fall due before the benefits of the plan would have had time to mature, she was to receive a loan of £40,000,000 from the Allied Governments.

(6) A special Agent-General, not the Reparation Commission, was made responsible for the payment of reparations and to see that the plan worked well.

No change, however, was made, in the total obligation for reparation payments placed upon Germany by the Reparation Commission in 1921.

Merits of the Dawes Plan

(1) The plan limited the Allied demands to sums which Germany was to pay while in stable conditions.

(2) The question of payment was separated from that of transfer and the creditors were made responsible to deal with it.

(3) The plan removed reparation from the sphere of political controversy and treated it like an ordinary commercial debt. The problem was taken from the unsatisfactory Reparation Commission and given over to an Agent for Reparation who was to be an American citizen.

(4) The plan contained a provision against the use of military sanctions except in the event of flagrant German default and then, only by joint agreement of all the Allies.

(5) Germany could now be declared in default only by unanimous vote, with U.S. participating. Thus, U.S. and Britain could control the anti-German policy of France.

Demerits of the Dawes Plan

The Plan was not without faults. Germany was still left in the hopeless position that any increase in her financial well-being would entail an increased obligation, and she was thereby deprived of any incentive to accumulate savings which would merely pass into Allied hands. And then, it set up the fatal precedent of lending Germany the wherewithal to pay reparation. Germany was paying her debts and reparations out of the money coming from America. She was clearing off one debt and incurring the other.

The principal injuries which the Dawes Plan inflicted upon the Germans, have been "psychological rather than economic". They arose, as Angell has put it, "from the natural general humiliation at being submitted to any system, however friendly in its execution, of protracted supervision and control by foreigners."[3]

The Plan, however, resulted in the general economic recovery of Germany. During the five years of its operation, Germany more than made good the losses inflicted by the war and

3. Angell, op. cit, p. 76.

the inflation period. In some branches of her economic life, she became as strong as in 1913; the currency was stabilized; in 1925, the general volume of industrial production for the first time drew near the pre-war level; most industrial firms made money; and on average, the German population was at least as well off as it was before the war. The government's budget became balance; and the *Reichmark* was once more one of the worlds' soundest institutions."[4]

THE YOUNG PLAN

The Dawes Plan worked well for some years. Germany was making her payments easily and regularly. She now desired that the Allied control over the finance involved in the Dawes Plan as well as the Allied occupation of her territories should be removed as early as possible.

Time and conditions favoured Germany. Public opinion both in England and France developed that the occupation of the Rhineland was an unnecessary waste and should therefore be withdrawn. In the League Assembly of 1928, representatives of the five principal reparation powers and Germany decided that arrangements should be made for an "early evacuation of the Rhineland", and that a committee should soon be appointed to prepare a complete and definite settlement of the reparation problem.

Such a committee was appointed in 1929 under the chairmanship of an American financial expert, Owen Young. It met at Paris in the month of February 1929. Its deliberations lasted for about four months and on June 7, 1929, it submitted to the governments a plan, which came to be known, after the name of its chairman, as "Young Plan" The Plan contained the following recommendatians :—

(1) Germany was to pay annual instalments of £100,000,000 for thirty-seven years, as well as twenty-two smaller annual payments, sufficient to cover the war-debt payments of the Allies to the U.S.

(2) The control of the foreign governments over Germany was to be removed; and the German Government itself was made responsible for transferring the sums paid. One safeguard against exchange difficulties was, however, provided. About one-third

4. Angell is of the opinion that the setting up of the Dawes Plan alone did not bring about economic recovery of Germany. It simply served to set up the preliminary conditions—removal of the Allied pressure, stabilization of the national finances and currency and the restoration of general confidence. The recovery, he wrote, was due to two principal factors. One was the so-called "'rationalization" of German economic life, the other was foreign loans and other importations of foreign capital.

of each annuity, that is, £33,000,000, Germany was obliged to pay; but the balance of £66,000,000 could be postponed for a maximum period of two years.

(3) A Bank of International Settlements was to be established to receive and distribute the money among the reparation countries. It was also to function as the International Central Bank.

The Young Plan was an improvement upon the Dawes Plan and was said to remove the defects of the latter. But it met some difficulties in being adopted by the governments. In order to adopt the plan, as well as to settle the details of the evacuation of the Rhineland, the powers again met in a conference at the Hague in August 1929. After 1927, British attitude on international questions was in line with France. In order to placate France, the British expert on the Young Committee had agreed to allow some increased percentage of reparation payments as allocated to France by the Spa agreement of 1920. This was not liked by the new Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Snowden. He insisted on the Spa percentages and obtained the greater part of his demands. So, the Hague Conference endorsed the Plan in a somewhat different version from what it was submitted by the Young Committee. A political commission of the Conference also decided that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from the Rhineland by June 30, 1930.

The Young Plan came into effect on May 17, 1930 and according to schedule, the last Allied troops left the German soil. The inauguration of the Young Plan might be said to comprise the climax of the period of 'pacification' which had been inaugurated by the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Pacts in 1925.

THE INTER-ALLY WAR DEBTS

Closely related to the problem of reparation was that of the inter-Ally war debts, which were also the legacy of the war. Prior to the entry of the U. S. into the war, Britain had advanced some billions of dollars in loan to France, Italy, Russia and lesser Allied powers. Eighteen days after the U. S. joined the belligerents, U. S. Congress authorised the lending of $3,000,000,000 to the Allies at 5 percent interest. Other loans followed during the remainder of the war and in the post-armistice period.

Views about these Debts at the Peace Conference

The debtor countries of Europe argued at the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 that the creditor countries in general, and the U.S. in particular had only been contributing in cash—a form of support to the Allied cause, which less wealthy nations had provided in the shape of 'flesh and

blood'. This school of thought favoured all-round cancellation of the debts as being "morally sound and economically expedient".

France favoured the cancellation of the debts provided reparations were left untouched, because the amount which she was to pay as her debt obligation was less and the amount which she expected to receive as 'reparation for her losses' was much more.

Britain had been creditor as well as debtor on a large scale with balance on the credit side. Although they were ready to meet their obligations vis-a-vis the U.S., the British favoured cancellation on the grounds that "the enormous non-commercial debts were a milestone round the neck of the world in its attempts to recover from the destructions and calamities of the war". The British announced their willingness to cancel the war debts owed them by the other Allies, if the United States adopted a similar stand.

Such an attitude of the Europeans threw the whole odium upon the U.S. The attitude of the average American was that why should he pay for the cost of a war started and conducted by the 'quarrelsome Europeans'. Moreover, when they (Europeans) were squeezing Germany, why should not they pay the American debt ? At the Peace Conference, therefore, President Wilson declined the British proposal.

Solution of the Inter-Ally Debt Problem.

Early in 1922, the U.S. Government officially requested all its debtors to take the necessary steps to pay their debts to the U.S. On February 9, 1922, U.S. Congress set up the "World Foreign Debt Commission" to arrange funding agreement with the debtors, most of whom had not yet paid any interest on the loans. Although the British still favoured a general cancellation of both war debts and reparation claims, all the debtor states entered into funding agreements with the U.S.[5] The agreements provided for the repayment of the advances of approximately $22,000,000,000 over a period of sixty-two years.

As long as Germany paid her reparation instalments to the Allies, the latter were able to make their war debt payments to the United States. Between September 1924 and September 1928, Germany paid to the Allies about $1,350,000,000 These instalments, Germany was able to pay out of the huge sums loaned to German interests by foreign bankers, chiefly American. Thus, as Gathorne Hardy has put it : "The American money had been making a kind of circular tour to Germany, from Germany to the claimants of reparation and from these, back again to the U.S. in the form of war-debt payments".

5. For details of these agreements, see Keynes, op. cit, p. 69.

The Young Plan, which was devised to set Germany's financial house in order "finally and completely" and to enable her to pay her reparation instalments without interruption was based on the assumptian that world trade would expend both in "volume and in value." But unfortunately, soon after the drafting of the plan, the situation began to change. In 1929, there occured the Wall-Street Crash and the beginning of the economic depression which brought in its train a drastic shrinkage in the volume of world trade and a rapid and steady fall in commodity prices.

Economic Crisis of 1929 and its Causes.

There was no one opinion as to the causes of the economic depression. To some, the crisis resulted from the fact that in the autumn of 1929, the American capitalists stopped all loans to the countries of Europe, with the consequence that the industrial production there, based as it was on the American capital, came to a stand-still. It also resulted in the drying up of the purchasing power all over the world resulting in a general and catastrophic fall in prices. Moreover, the withdrawal of the U. S. help badly affected the debtor countries of Europe; they could no longer borrow money from the U.S.with which to pay their debts. The debtor countries, therefore, made most of the 1930 reparation and debt payments by transfer of gold. This created scarcity of gold, which further depressed the prices of commodities. In order to keep their industries and agriculture alive, they resorted to exchange and import restrictions, high tariffs and quotas. This resulted in the complete breakdown of international trade. This in itself resulted in the bankruptcy of the European Governments as well as the people.

The others attributed the crisis to the over-supply and consequently decreasing value of silver, which, it was asserted, greatly dried up the purchasing power of those countries—particularly India and China—which were on the silver basis.

The agricultural products, it was further asserted, were in surplus, which inevitably brought a decline in the price of these commodities with the consequent diminishing of the farmer's ability to purchase manufactured goods. Moreover, the invention of more and more labour-saving machines in the post-war period led to the decreased manpower needed in certain types of manufacturing and this, in turn, led to increased unemployment which further resulted in the decline of purchasing power of the workers. The new machines, on the other hand, produced huge quantities of goods, which caused congestion and congestion led to the closing down of factories, which meant more and more unemployment and more and more drying up of purchasing power.

Whatever the causes, the depression resulted in complete breakdown of the finances of several countries. International

trade came to a standstill; factories stopped working; and unemployment figures increased everywhere by leaps and bounds.

Spread of the Crisis.

Symptoms of the depression, however, appeared first in Germany. The incident, which precipitated the financial crisis in Central Europe, occured in Austria. The *Credit-Anstalt*, by far the largest private bank in the republic, came to the verge of collapse in June 1931 Credit was widely shaken in the solvency of Central Europe as a whole,and it adversely reacted on Germany, where the banking crisis was already developing, largely because the American bankers began to recall their short-term loans. In order to avoid panic, the Austrian Government issued a decree "guaranteeing the foreign obligations of the Bank". But the bankruptcy was so world-wide and the trouble so acute that such palliatives would not do. The situation in Germany was constantly deteriorating. In July alone, the *Reichsbank* lost gold to the value of £50,000,000. The German financiers also precipitated the crisis by constantly withdrawing money to hoard or transfer abroad, from one of the largest financial institution in the country—the *Darmstadter* and National Bank. This bank had to be closed on July 13. Next day, the government declared a two day's emergency bank holiday for all the banks in Germany except the *Reichsbank*. Germany seemed to face national bankruptcy.

To prevent such a catastrophe, with all its repercussions upon the rest of the world, President Hoover came forward on June 20, 1931, with a proposal to postpone the payments of all reparations and inter-governmental debts for one year beginning July 1. The proposal, which came to be known as 'Hoover Moratorium', was welcomed by all except France. She was interested in the continued bankruptcy of Germany. while the proposal was designed to recover Germany's finances, On the pressure of Great Britain, France agreed to the proposal on condition that Germany gave her railways as security to the Bank of International Settlement and that, she paid interest on the postponed annuities. Even this result was obtained by a fortnight of hard bargaining and the delay proved fatal for Germany. The confidence, which was generated by the proposal, was lost and just a week after the moratorium had been accepted by all concerned, one of the largest German banks, mentioned before, stopped payments.

The Slump in Great Britain.

The Hoover Moratorium, however, solved the German problem and that of some other countries for the time being. But the financial position of Britain was very miserable. Her economy was in a much stronger position than those of the states of Central Europe, but it soon gave signs of reacting to

the crisis in Austria, Germany and other central and south-east European states, except Czechoslovakia, The Southern hemisphere also could not escape the contagion. At the end of 1929, Australia and Argentine were forced to suspend the payment of gold due to the fall in agricultural prices. Brazil was bankrupted by the collapse of the coffee market.

These misfortunes struck a mightly blow upon Great Britain for she had played an important part in the reconstruction of Central Europe, had large financial intersts in the three extra-European countries, and the economic distress in all these countries had an adverse effect on the British investments. The Hoover Moratorium had postponed the payment of intergovernmental debts and reparations and this served to soften the blow of the collapse on central Europe. But British financial interests were so widespread and the balance of trade and loans on which her economic stability depended was so delicate that a decisive readjustment of British finances could not be postponed for long. In September 1931, England went off the gold standard. This move was necessitated by the heavy withdrawals of foreign holdings in London, (The British deficit budgets and adverse balance of international trade caused nervousness among the foreign creditors and during the last one week of July alone, Britain lost gold to the value of £21,000,000) and by the unfavourable balance of British trade.

The fall of the English pound had immediate international repercussions, for the currencies of many other countries had been based on it. The Scandinavian countries, New Zealand and, Somewhat later, South Africa followed the British example and they too "went off the gold." In the years following 1931, a general depression settled down over Europe and influenced almost every branch of economic activity. Industrial production in Europe, exclusive of the Soviet Union, declined to 92 per cent in 1930, 80 per cent in 1931 and 72 per cent in 1932 of the 1929 level. Employment also considerably declined.

The Slump in America :

Despite its unusual prosperity as a result of the war, the U. S. did not in any sense dominate the European economic scene. Nevertheless, its relations with Europe as a creditor in particular and as a participant in world trade in general were such that any sudden change in the economic set up of either was bound to have repercussions upon the other. In 1929, the U. S. manufactured 5,358,000 motor cars, 55 million tons of steel and about three pairs of boot per head of the population. Other production was also more or less in the same proportion. The productive capacity was even more and the purchasing

capacity and consumption at home were much less. The success of operations on this scale depended on the continuance of purchasing power in the outside world. But the purchasing power all-around was drying up and the American goods found no market. The result was a crash—stoppage of factories, unemployment, congestion, falling prices and the other attendant evils. It had its repercussions over the international markets.

The Hoover Moratorium was due to expire on July 1, 1932 but the German Government was convinced that she would not be able to resume reparation payments at the end of the scheduled period. Availing herself of a provision of the Young Plan, Berlin requested the Bank of International Settlements to convene a special advisory committee of financial experts to investigate Germany's capacity to resume reparation payments in July. This Committee met on December 7, 1931 at Basle and reported that Germany would not be able to resume reparation payments at that time. It also recommended that a conference should be convened to finally settle the problem of all inter-governmental debts at the earliest possible time so as to avoid a further worsening of the world economic situation.

The Lausanne Conference of 1932

In consequence of this report, a conference was arranged at Lausanne in June 1932, to decide upon a lasting settlement of the inter-governmental debts as well as other problems caused by the great slump. The date orginally proposed had been January, but delay was caused by the negotiations between Britain and France, who had strongly divergent views on the question of reparation. France exerted pressure upon Germany that the latter should pay her annuities of the Young Plan earlier than all other foreign payments; but Britain insisted that Germany should first pay for her imports, then for the commercial debts—so that the credit of Germany might be restored in the world market, and then, of course, she must pay for reparation.

The United States was, however, precluded from association with the conference or the preliminary discussions because the Congress had, in December 1931, passed a resolution that "it was against the policy of Congress that any of the indebtedness of foreign countries to the U. S., should be in any manner cancelled or reduced."

After three weeks of deliberations, an agreement was reached on July 9, 1932, that the reparation payments, stipulated in the Young Plan, should be set aside and replaced by an obligation upon Germany to pay, into a general fund for European reconstruction, the sum of £ 150 million. To meet

this obligation, the German Government was to deliver to the Bank for International Settlements bonds of that amount. Thus as F. Lee Benns, in his book "European History Since 1870," has remarked: "the Lausanne agreement constituted one more recessions in the series of ever-diminishing demands upon Germany for reparation. An Allied demand in 1921 that Germany assume an obligation to pay $56,500,000,000 was followed in the same year by the Reparation Commission's decision that the total figure should be $33,000,000,000. This stood legally as Germany's obligation until the Young Plan reduced it to an amount which was equivalent to a cash payment of approximately $9,000,000,900. Two years later came the Hoover Moratorium, and then in July 1932, the Lausanne Agreement which drastically revised Germany's obligations to a total cash payment of only $750,000,000 with the possibility that even this amount might never be paid. By a contemporary "gentlemen's agreement," signed by the creditor powers on July 2, the ratification of the Lausanne agreement was made dependent upon satisfactory settlemet between them and their creditors, i. e., with the United States. The questions of reparation and war debts were thus once more inextricably linked together and the final solution of reparations problem rested upon the willingness of the United States either to cancel or to reduce the debts due to it from the Allies.

WAR-DEBT NEGOTIATIONS

The centre of interest now shifted to the United States. Although the problem of reparations was gone, the problem of inter-Ally Debts remained, and it opened with a fresh vigour after the expiry of the Hoover Moratorium. The U.S. Government was faced with severe financial trouble and a budget deficit of £8000,000,000. She resumed her demand for the return of her debts. The Allied Governments maintained that the Lausanne agreement, practically cancelling Germany's reparation payments, was made in the hope that the United States would consider favourably the revision of the war debt payments. Immediately after the presidential elections, notes were, almost simultaneously, presented by the British and French governments in November asking for a suspension of payment of the instalments due in December, pending discussion of the whole question. But the U. S. Government in reply held that "reparations are solely European question in which the United States is not concerned" and refused to recognise that "the Lausanne agreement was made in reliance upon any commitments given by this Government." The U. S. Government was unmoved and refused to consent to the postponement of the instalments due either from Britain or France.

Under these circumstances, the British Government pai the whole instalment in gold ; five states made merely "toke

payments" while the other seven, including France, defaulted altogether. By and by, it was becoming evident that the effort of the United States to collect some $22,000,000,000 of war debts would not be successful. As the year 1932 saw the ending of all reparations payment, so the year 1934 witnessed the end of the war bebt payments to the United States by the Allied countries. In June 1934, the U.S. Congress provided a law ruling out token payments as a means of avoiding default and cancelling out all payments of war debts.

Thus, the German reparations were dead; inter-Ally debts were dead; and the American war debts were also dead. But the liquidation of inter-governmental obligations did not result in any "sane re-ordering of international economic relations." On the contrary, economic troubles of all countries persisted and the international trade was still at the lowest ebb. This was a tremendous problem and its solution needed the concerted efforts of economic experts of all countries.

The World Economic Conference of 1933

The Lausanne Conference of 1932 had decided to ask the League of Nations to convene a World Conference on monetary and economic questions. The immediate objects of the Conference were to lower tariffs, to restore satisfactory international monetary standards, and to reduce other restrictions on commerce and loans which had been imposed during the crisis. But the more primary issue was the stabilisation of currencies. When Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the White House in March 1933, the whole financial system was on the verge of collapse. In the following month, she went off the gold and the value of the dollar fell down by about 30 per cent. In such a circumstance, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. also agreed to participate in a conference, the former on condition that inter-Ally debts were not discussed. In the month of June 1933, sixty-four countries met in London. It was preceded by extensive studies on the part of economic experts and by negotiations among the principal participating states.

But the enthusiasm and hopes, with which the presentatives had met, were soon watered down when France and her allied countries which were still on the gold standard (Italy, Switzerland the Netherlands and Belgium) demanded that all talk about reduction of tariffs and removal of trade barriers must follow a general stabilisation of world currencies. The United States, which had gone off the gold standard some weeks before, announced on June 22 that "measures of temporary stabilisation now would be untimely". The British Government, while favouring the desirability of stabilisation, seemed to have no fixed policy and sometime sided with one view and sometime with the other. Cutrency stabilisation was by no means the sole issue on

which the countries of the world were unable to agree. No compromises could be made on such problems as tariff reductions, co-operation of central banks and the resumption of international lending. The Conference, however, dragged on till July 27 and then adjourned *sine die* with practically nothing of its great task accomplished.

In the years following the World Economic Conference, economic conditions throughout the world witnessed a slight improvement, but this recovery was almost entirely domestic in character. International trade showed no marked improvement. States were mostly guided by what had been termed as 'economic nationalism' and the steps they took included, as Dr. Langsam has put it, "further currency devaluations, regulations governing the production of raw materials, public-works programmes, currency exchange restrictions, the development of new industries to supply goods otherwise kept out by tariff schedules and import quotas, and the like." As he further pointed out, "almost nothing was done to break down the international trade barries, stabilize exchange, solve the intergovernmental debt problems or restore economic good feeling and friendship among the nations. With Nazi Germany leading the way, the nations of the world continued to place political obstacles in the way of international trade. In the end, this intensification of economic nationalism with its resultant controlled national economics, helped bring on the second World War. More and more people came to believe that the difficulties of international economic relations could be alleviated only by recourse to force.

INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREAT SLUMP

The economic crisis of 1930 was one of the most important event in the history of international relations between the two World Wars. It had its repercussions far and wide and its consequences were of a far-reaching nature.

Economic Nationalism :

The first result of the slump was the breakdown of international trade and the inauguration of what came to be termed as 'economic nationalism'. In spite of the partial breakdown of capitalism during the slump, the vested interests of capitalism, in order to earn profits, insisted on quotas, subsidies, tariffs and other restrictions on international trade in order to protect the home-made goods. They suceeded so well that, at the height of depression, world trade had been cut down by two-thirds. But in doing so, they soon found that they were losing the foreign markets for their own exports ; and the home markets, protected by high tariffs, were found glutted. This worsened the situation still further.

Race of Armaments :

Closely connected with this was the second consequence—a race of armaments. Protection, subsidies and quotas, the vested interests explained, were neccessary not only to keep the foreigner out of the home markets, but also in order to be self-sufficient and strong in case of war. Very soon, war preparation became an integral part of the process of "recovery" from the slump. The official publications of the International Labour Organisation and the League of Nations recorded, year by year, how re-armament was increasingly becoming the backbone of economic recovery in all capitalist countries. In the annual report of 1936, of the I.L.O., Director Harold Butler recorded that "it is notorious that a great expansion of armament manufacture is taking place in all the principal industrial countries either for their own account or for that of foreign customers..... In so far as industrial prosperity is founded on warlike preparation, it is not only sinister but hollow and unreal. The manufacture of arms adds nothing to national wealth.. .....When a country imports materials for armaments, she produces nothing to export in return. Under the existing system of barter trade, she has to content with fewer of the imports needed for feeding her people or providing materials for normal economic activity. Moreover, it contains an even greater menace, in that countries, which have become dependent on armaments, for keeping down their unemployment and thus maintaining a fictitious prosperity, no longer dare to slacken the pace of their war manufacture for fear of the social consequences which would ensue."

Rise of Nazism in Germany:

More important of these was the part the slump played in bringing about the sudden conversion of Germany to National Socialism. The evidence for this was not far to seek. The popular belief that the rise of Nazism in Germany was the result of her harsh treatment at the Peace Conference and disgraceful Versailles Treaty appeared to be superficial, if subjected to a critical investigation. Ten years after the Versailles Treaty in 1928, Hitler polled only 800,000 votes. Obviously, the Germans had not forgotten the Versailles Treaty between 1918 and 1928 and suddenly remembered it again between 1928 and 1930. This was also not due to any other international injustice upon Germany in those two years. Rather, when in 1924, Ruhr was occupied by the French and Belgian troops and which caused the greatest of indignation in Germany, Hitler polled barely 900,000 votes—a little more than in 1928, when the policy of conciliation was being applied and had resulted in the Locarno Pacts and Germany's admission to the League. But the fact that Hitler's votes increased by some 800 per cent in 1930 could not be explained by Germany's international-ill-

treatment. The only explanation for the success of Fascism in Germany could be given by the world slump which hit her so hard that there were 7,000,000 unemployed and a ruined and desperate middle class, and that the plutocracy were ready to do anything to avert the danger of social revolution to save Germany from Bolshevism. Hitler himself declared that he considered the democracies as "deeply tainted with and in constant danger of succumbing to Bolshevism." He made no secret of it that "anti-Bolshevism was the main reason for and justification of the Nazi regime." At the Ninth Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress on September 7, 1937, Hitler proclaimed : "Wars and defeats have a less disastrous significance in the life of the nations than the internal crisis of the social structure. After a lost war, a nation can swiftly recuperate. But, once the internal order of a nation has been disturbed, centuries may pass before recovery is effected. Then, a nation may fall and never recover again".

Spread of Communism :

Outside Germany also, the economic depression exerted a considerable political influence. Socialist parties rapidly grew up in most European countries and in France and parts of eastern Europe, communism made headway unknown since the early post-war years. The 'Communist International' revived its activities and guided the communist parties in different countries to form the so-called Popular Front coalitions with other left-wing parties. During this period, the communist parties, of course, could not gain a pre-dominant position, but the Popular Front experiment proved very successful and communism, as a way of life and system of government, became very popular.

Growth of Fascism :

The slump also produced a crop of semi-Fascist regimes in most of central Europe and a large part of south America, and Fascist movements in practically every capitalist country. Among the countries of South America, most affected were Peru and Bolivia both of which experienced a sudden change of government. In both cases, the new administration was before long engaged in hostilities with a neighbouring country.

Japan's Aggression Against China :

It was the great slump which was partly responsible for Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Japan was a rising power in the Far East, but her rise was checked by the U. S. at Washington in 1921-22 through the Four Power Pact, the Five Power Naval Treaty, and the Nine Power Treaty. She had submitted to these humiliations and checks because of her internal weaknesses ; but she had not reconciled to them. All the time, she was waiting for an opportunity and this was provided by

the great slump, which rendered the U. S., Britain and the other powers interested in the Far East, helpless. The statesmen in all the countries were busy in finding a way out of their economic ills and, therefore, could not be feared. Moreover, Japan was also adversely affected by the economic depression and the government was faced with a critical situation at home. There, the finance capital had developed to a point where the "family" banking houses of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo known as the Big Three—held one quarter of Japan's finance capital, while five more firms held another quarter, that is, the Big Eight held one half. These financial groups, in conjunction with the Satsuma and Chosu clans (big land-owning families of the old feudal aristocracy, which traditionally supplied navy and army officers respectively; of late they had begun to fuse, socially and economically with Japanese Big Business) practically dominated Japan's public life. In the distress caused by the slump, their domination was challenged by the mostly lower middle class and the Younger Officers' movement in the army. Moreover mass discontent was visible all round and 'dangerous thoughts' were surging among the intelligentsia. Apart from this, there was the imperative necessity of feeding the large and growing population of the country. In his 'Survey of International Affairs,' 1931, Toynbee has rightly summed up the situation not only in Japan, but all around in the world as a result of the economic depression. "Racked by the remorseless turning of the economic screw in the long drawn-out course of the world depression: the Japanese people at last followed the lead of the Japanese Army in reverting from the policy of commercial expansion to the policy of military conquest.....They despaired of continuing the attempt to win their national livelihood in the economic field, in which 'intelligent management' seemed doomed to frustration by inhuman forces beyond human control; and in this mood they returned to the primitive crude expedient of attempting to hack out a livelihood with the sword, simply because the sword, however, rough and clumsy a tool it might be, was at least a tool which the human hand seemed capable of grasping and wielding for the possible attainment of human ends." [6]

Italian Aggression Against Ethiopia:

Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 was also in a way the consequence of the slump. Italy had been delivered to Fascism by the first post-war slump of 1922-23. Taking advantage of the financial hardships of the people, Mussolini had become the torch-bearer of Fascism, but he failed to relieve the social and economic distress of the peple. External conditions from 1924 to 1934 were not favourable for an

6 Survey of International Affairs 1931 p.403.

aggression ; only the great slump made it possible. The slump of the 1930's added to the miseries of the people. In order to divert the attention of the people from the domestic troubles and also to find an area for exploitation for enriching his country, Mussolini inaugurated an era of adventurous policy abroad. Hence the Ethiopian episode. That adventure was successful in producing a state of mind where the Italian people would put up with anything for a considerable time.

In September 1931, Japan launched an invasion upon the Chinese province of Manchuria, and after an year's fighting, brought it under her subjugation. The League of Nations declared that Japan's action was a clear case of aggression but no action was taken and the aggressor went unpunished. Not only that, this event served as an encourgement to Mussolini and Hitler who learnt that the road to aggression was a bed of roses. One aggression was committed after another and the ultimate result was the second World War in 1939.

In the end, we might analyse the difficulties caused by the interplay of economic and political forces. As Gathorne Hardy has put it : "political fears hamper that economic co-operation which is essential for recovery, and the restoration of that confidence which is the necessary prelude to it. The prosperity due to rearmament veiled the persistence of the underlying depression. On the other side, pre-occupation with economic difficulties tended to distract the minds of statesmen from the political danger which threatened and isolated nation from nation in a way highly prejudicial to that combined effort in which lay the hope of security."[7]

7. Gathorne-Hardy, G. M, A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1939 (London, Oxford, 1934) p. 288.

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CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The Great War of 1914-18 was the first total war known to history ; it was a war fought to "make the world safe for democracy" "a war to end wars". And when the Allied diplomats met at Paris after the end of hostilities, they had come "not only to make peace but to perpetuate peace."[1] The destructions and calamities wrought by the conflict convinced them that something definite must be done to 'save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war', 'to avoid the recurrence of similar tragedies in the future life of mankind', and to attain the 'twin purpose of peace and prosperity'. The pre-war institutions had failed to deal efficiently with the rapidly-increasing number of international problems—security, health, finance intellectual co-operation and communications. International law had displayed its impotency to check the aggressive intents of the powers, as there was no sanction behind it. And a system of sanctions could not exist without a permanent international organisation. The statesmen were therefore convinced that the future peace should be established on a well-defined system. But the governments differed as to what the system meant ; how was it to be applied ; and what action was required to assure peace. Some thought that wars resulted from the accumulation of armaments and therefore suggested that disarmament should be the first step, Others urged priority for a 'collective security system', because the nations would agree to disarm only when they felt secure. The ideal of disarmament meant "the maintenance of the minimum of military and navy consistent with the internal defence and policing" ; the theory of collective security, in the words of Prof. Schuman, meant that "peace in the world can be maintained through the co-operative coercion of peace-breaking states by peace-loving states.[2]

Security Provisions in the League Covenant

The statesmen, in their enthusiasm for future peace, adopted both the ideals and incorporated them in the Covenant of the League of Nations which was established as an instrument for world peace and economic prosperity of the peoples. The ideal of disarmament was put in Article 8 which stated that the members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations",[3] The ideal of collective security was incorporated in Articles 10 and 16, which stated :

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1. These were Wilson's pronouncements during 1917.
2. Schuman, F.L., International Politics. (New York, Mc-Graw-Hill, 1948) p. 355.

"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.....".

Additional coercive strength was to be derived from Article 16 which stated : "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its Covenant under Articles 12 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.....".[4]

When put together, these Articles appeared to mean that if any state should attack another, all other nations acting through and under the League would undertake to protect the victim of aggression. The system was, therefore, one of collective security' and the League of Nations was to serve as its first instrument.

But from the very beginning, many were sceptical of the League's ability to maintain peace. This feeling of uncertainty had two aspects : some states feared that they might be called in to put down aggression when their own interests did not seem to be involved ; others feared aggression in spite of the League. Those who held the former view tried to weaken the security provisions of the League Covenant and those who held the latter tried to strengthen them by arranging multilateral and unilateral pacts of Friendship, of Neutrality, of Arbitration, of Conciliation, or of Mutual Assistance.

STEPS TO WATER DOWN THE LEAGUE'S SECURITY PROVISIONS

The very first session of the League Assembly proved crucial for the future work of the organisation. The governments realised that they had assumed obligations which could be invoked any time. Their uneasiness was heightened by the unstable climate of international politics. Although the war had ended, Turkish troops were still busy in Greece in an effort to maintain Turkish rule in the Balkans. In Russia, civil war was going on and the Western States were concerned not only with the unhappy prospect of Communist regime being entrenched in Europe, but with the open warfare between Poland and the newly-emerging Soviet Union. Situation in the Far East was equally far from satisfactory, as China was constantly resenting the special privileges given at her cost to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles.

Similarly, U.K. was dissatisfied with Wilson's insistence on

3. The Covenant of the League of Nations.
4. Ibid.

territorial guaransees, and with the obligations to apply sanctions ; she constantly pressed for a relaxation of those obligations. So, on Britain's insistence, the second Assembly which met in 1921 gave a wholly new interpretation to Article 16, and it was interpreted to mean that :

(1) "Each member would be free to decide for itself whether or not an actual breach of the Covenant had occurred in a given situation and was only then under an obligation to apply sanctions.

(2) If the Council should decide that there was a breach and convey its opinion to members, that opinion should not be binding. Each government would decide for itself the form which sanctions should take—diplomatic, economic, or military and that, sanctions would be applied gradually.

(3) "Resort to war would not automatically create a state of war with all Members of the League".

Further, it was decided that "a complete breach of diplomatic relations need not occur immediately, but instead, the heads of missions might be recalled while consular relations might be maintained".

Thus, the very heart of the 'collective security system' was seriously undermined by these interpretations.

In the Assembly of 1923, a new interpretation was offered to Article 10 as well. Each member, it was proposed, would be free to decide for itself the extent to which it would be bound to comply with any request of the Council for giving force to that Article. The resolution was not carried through, but the fact that it was supported by twenty-nine states, was of considerable significance.

SECURITY AND FRANCE

During the post-war years, France was the one country most concerned about her future security and peace. She had been a central factor in the diplomatic history of European state system. During the 17th and 18th centuries, she was like a planet round which a satellite of other states revolved. The year '1815' witnessed the end of an era—the era of the French hegemony in Europe. The years that followed were years of apprehensions and frustrations. Henceforward, Germany was a vital factor in French reckoning. The defeat of France in 1870 was a national defeat, it transferred the balance of power in favour of Germany which, in respect of national resources and growing population, was at all hands out-manoeuvering France. Alsace-Lorraine became the magical words for the Frenchmen.

From 1871 to 1914, the constant burden of French foreign policy was the recovery of the lost possessions. In this, she

succeeded in 1918 when Germany was defeated and lay at her mercy. All France was happy. "But the jubilation of 1918", as Carr has put it, "was short-lived. Beneath the rejoicings of victory, a deep note of anxiety made itself heard". France was successful because the New-World (the U.S.A.) hurled its weight in favour of the Old, and there came a moment in 1917 when three hours delay would have been fatal to France. There was constant fear and inferiority complex, lest Germany should be stronger in the course of a few years. "Twice within the living memory of man", as Dr. Langeam has put it, "had the pounding of German military boots been heard on the French soil, and the citizens of the Third Republic were fearful of still another incursion". The fear of the people made the statemen nervous ; all the time, they had the security of France as the chief motive of their foreign policy.

Security meant insurance against invasion from the East ; assurance was not to be had unless the prospective invader was kept in a position of political inferiority and military helplessness. This was what France tried to attain at the Paris Peace Conference. She demanded the possession in perpetuity of the Rhine and its bridges across which any invader from the East must pass. This demand was not conceded by the other Allies (U. S., and U. K.) on the ground that it would involve the separation from Germany of more than five million Germans living there, and that would mean the violation of the principle of 'self-determination'. France abandoned the claim bitterly. The Allies, however, provided in the Versailles Treaty for the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine for fifteen years by the Allied forces, as well as for its permanent demilitarization. Simultaneously with the Versailles Treaty, the U.S. and Great Britain concluded separate treaties with France "guaranteeing to her all assistance in the event of any unprovoked attack against her by Germany". But these treaties meant little confidence to France as the U.S., upon whom she had pinned her faith withdrew herself from the European affairs as early as 1920-21.

Having been disappointed by the Peace Conference, as also by the guarantee treaties, France fell upon a system of military alliances to encircle Germany by friendly states. In February 1921, she entered into a treaty with Poland. The system of alliances was also linked with the states of the Little *Entente* (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania) by the fact of a common interest in the preservation of the Peace Settlement. But even these steps failed to allay the anxieties of France. She started negotiations with London for an Anglo-French pact, guaranteeing the observance by Germany of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles (fortifications or armed forces in the demilitarized zone of the Rhine). But the British reply was sent in a memorandum by Lord Curzon in February 1922.

"In so far as British public opinion will endorse our guarantee, it will be in the belief that it can only become operative in the event of a German army actually crossing the French frontier... As to obligations elsewhere, the two Powers, not waiting for any one else, are to examine in common the measures necessary to ensure speedily a peaceful and equitable settlement. Of course, this might mean that they would jointly refer the case to the League of Nations. But if so, the provision is unnecessary. On the other hand, it is probably intended by the French to mean that the settlement of the future European disputes is a matter primarily for Great Britain and France, and that the rest of the world is to look on until our two governments have made up their minds what they will do...A military alliance of this description between Great Britain and France could only result in rival, and might be hostile combinations between other Powers... and it is inconsistent with the theory upon which it has hitherto been assumed that the postwar policy of Europe is to be based".

France was thus sadly disappointed both by the League of Nations security system and by her important ally, Great Britain. Apprehending that the world was relapsing to the prewar system, France proceeded to strengthen the League as the last and the only bulwark of future peace and civilisation.

ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEAGUE'S SECURITY SYSTEM

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance

The first attempt in this direction was made in the form of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The First Assembly had set up a Temporary Mixed Commission with the task of preparing a plan for the execution of the disarmament obligations contained in Article 8 of the Covenant. The Commission made little progress until the principles which were to guide it were laid down by the 1922 Assembly in Resolution XIV.[5] The Commission was asked to prepare a draft treaty, accepting as its starting point the inter-dependence of the reduction of armaments and further guarantees of security. On the basis of drafts submitted by Lt. Colonel Requin of the French delegation, and by Lord Rebert Cecil of the British, the Commission prepared the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. In 1923, the Fourth Assembly amended it and submitted for approval.

The Treaty provided that "if the Council believed that there was reasonable ground for thinking that a menace of aggression had arisen, it could apply eeonomic sanctions against the aggressor state, call upon any of the contracting

5. For text of the resolution, see League of Nations, Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings, I, p. 291.

parties whose military assistance was required, determine the forces which each state furnishing assistance should place at its disposal, prescribe measures for the communications and transport connected with the operations, prepare a plan for financial co-operation so as to provide for the state attacked and for the states furnishing assistance, the funds they required for the operations, appoint the higher command and establish the object and nature of its duties."

Secondly, the Draft Treaty made more precise the method of determining the aggressor by suggesting that the Council might fix "neutral zones which the parties might be forbidden to cross." Should the armed forces cross that neutral zone, such action would strongly help the Council in determining the aggressor. The Council might further propose an armistice and invite the disputants to put their claims before the League or the World Court, as the case might be and refusal to accept this invitation would provide additional evidence of aggression.

Thirdly, the treaty provided that the aggressor would bear the whole cost of operations undertaken by the powers to prevent aggression and all reparations for damages caused by its aggression. It was hoped that this would act as a deterrent to the prospective aggressors.

Fourthly, the signatories were to co-operate in the general disarmament scheme which the League Council might propose, and Mutual Assistance "was to be given only to parties which had reduced their arms".

Draft Treaty, a Failure

In spite of all the merits, the Draft Treaty failed. In the autumn of 1923, the Labour Government, under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, rejected it on the ground that "the apportionment of liability on continental lines cut fatally across the structure of the British Commonwealth with its world-wide responsibilities. Some parts of the Empire might be at war while others remaided at peace (a situarion regarded at that date as intolerable) or Great Britain and her Dominions would be subjected to a wholly dis-proportionate share of the burden of resisting aggression in all parts of the world."

Although the British action sounded its doom, the Soviet Union and the United States also objected to the treaty. Some governments rejected it,because it did not go far enough and they desired to strengthen the international guarantees of assistance still further, others criticised it because it went too far and entailed too many obligations. It was asserted that the Treaty had been too concerned with sanctions and not enough with the settle ment of disputes. Whatever the reason, the first attempt to strenthen the security system of the League failed.

The Geneva Protocol

The Draft Treaty was gone, but it was becoming increasingly Elear that some alternative method of establishing the security on a more stable basis should be found out. It was being felt that 'arbitration' should be added to the twin bases of the Draft Treaty "disarmament" and "security." A draft-treaty subsmitted in the summer of 1924 by a private American group, under the chairmanship of Professor Zames T. Shotwell, supplied the key to the problem.

The Fifth Assembly, 1924, acting under the initial stimulus provided by the presence at Geneva of Ramsay MacDonald, a pacifist by nature and determined to end the war-minded-ness which lingered in Europe and M. Herriot, head of the liberal government in France, set out to draft a new plan "based on the famous trilogy, arbitration, disarmament and security." This new plan came to be called the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The Protocol provided the following :—

(1) "Compulsory arbitration was to be the only legal means of settling international disputes. If a nation refused to accept the procedure of pacific settlement, or to accept a decision of a recognised third party, including the Council, or violated provisional measures laid down by the Council, it would be deemed the aggressor. Should the Council not be unanimous, it could require, an armistice of belligerents by a two-thirds majority vote, and the partywhich rejected the armistice or violated it, was to be held the aggressor.

(2) "After the Council had designated the aggressor, it might invite the signatory states to apply immediate economic and military sanctions. But, whereas the Draft Treaty provided that the Council should have a voice in directing these measures, the Protocol provided that each signatory power should remain in control of its own forces. The states were thus to remain judges of the manner in which they were to carry out their obligations.

(3) "The Protocol defined in more detail the steps to be taken in imposing sanctions and in giving the economic and financial support outlined in Article 16 of the Covenant.

(4) "The Protocol paid far less attention to special regional treaties although they were not wholly ruled out.

(5) "The signatories were to take part in an international conference on June 15, 1925, for the reduction of armaments and the Protocol was to come into force only after the conclusion of a disarmament convention."

Merits of the Protocol :

The Protocol was an improvement upon the Covenant. The Covenant was defective in two ways, first, in that, the Council decisions needed unanimity which was rarely forthcoming ; and secondly in that, the League had no jurisdiction in matters of internal nature. The first defect was removed by the provision that all disputes of a legal nature were to be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice, whose decision was binding. All other disputes were to be decided by the Council and in case the Council failed to reach a unanimous decision, the dispute was to be referred to a Committee of Arbitrators whose decision was binding. The second defect was removed by the provision that matters of domestic jurisdiction were to be submitted to the procedure of conciliation.

Defects of the Protocol :

But the Geneva Protocol was not wholly free from defects. It did nothing to strengthen the powers of the Council under Article 16 of the Covenant or to make military sanctions obligatory. It failed to satisfy French quest for security, though it satisfied one vital interest of France and her Allies—the perpetuation of Versailles, and in particular, of its territorial arrangements. So they accepted it in the spirit of the saying—"Make the best of the bad bargain." But this time again, the disappointment came from London and the Conservative Government announced in March 1925 that she was not willing to accept the protocol.

Why Great Britain Refused ?

Most of the writers of text books on international affairs have maintained that Britain's refusal was the result of the fall from power of Ramsay MacDonald in November 1924 who had taken the leading part in formulating the proposals of the Protocol. The Conservative Administration, which succeeded, argued, first, that it would be (Arguments taken from Mander's 'Foundations of Modern World Society'). "unwise to erect an over-ambitious organisation imposing obligations beyond those which nations would accept in practice. Better be content with modest workable schemes than indulge in pretentious paper constitutions which would be ignored when the test came. Better trust to the logic of experience than rush into methods which were the mere creations of theoretical reasoning and in advance of present public opinion."

Secondly, Britain argued that "for the League to be preoccupied with penalties and sanctions would alter its character, transforming it from an institution of co-operation to one of coercion. International society must develop along other lines by taking disputes in hand before they had reached the breaking

point ; by promoting friendly co-operation it should seek to maintain a spirit of mutual adjustment rather than to bring force and restraint into the fore-ground and to encourage peaceful change by conciliation and compromise rather than to introduce legal and forceful methods."

The British Dominions—Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India—also greatly determined the attitude of London to the Protocol. The Governments of the Commonwealth countries feared two things, first that, the Protocol permitted foreign interference in their domestic policies, secondly that, it increased the danger of their becoming involved in war over European frontiers. It stabilised for ever a territorial *status-quo* which public opinion considered unjust. Besides, the British Government maintained that the Protocol took the navy away from its true function of imperial defence, because it might lead to ill-feeling between Great Britain and the U.S. and thereby would wipe out whatever chance there might be that the latter would one day enter the League. If Britain, for instance, were called upon to put its fleet at the disposal of the League and that fleet tried to shut off the U. S. supplies from the aggressor, a serious controversy involving the U.S. and Great Britain, as well as the U. S. and the League, might develop.

But in the opinion of Gathorne-Hardy, there were some other and perhaps weightier reasons for Britain's unwillingness to accept the Protocol. The Conservative Government was faced with urgent problems in Russia arising out of the 'Zinoviev letter', and in Egypt, consequent upon the murder of Sir Lee Stack in November 1924. He did not agree with those who maintained that the Protocol was rejected by London, only because there was a change of administration. He maintained that, "No doubt, the exigencies of party politics in the heat of a general election tend to subject the whole policy of opponents to a criticism which makes the subsequent acceptance of any part of their programme difficult, but it is impossible to contend that the Protocol was simply scrapped on account of its origin. Continuity in foreign policy has been a tradition in Great Britain which Conservatives, perhaps more than any other party, have been inclined to follow, and though the majority in the new Parliament contained a certain number of men who favoured isolationism, this was certainly not the attitude of the new Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austein Chamberlain."[6]

Whatever the reasons, on March 25, 1925, Chamberlain formally announced before the Council of the League that London was not accepting the Protocol. Another attempt to

6. Gathorne Hardy. G.M. A Short History of International Affairs 1920—1939.
(London, Oxford, 1950) p. 71.

stengthen the security system of the League failed ; and once again Great Britian, in the French reckoning, was the 'villain of the peace.'

The Locarno Agreements

Background of the Agreements

Even before the decision to reject the Protocol had been taken, Chamberlain had been looking for some other way of reducting the fear of future war. On the continent also, the necessity of guaranteeing against the main dangers threatening peace was being increasingly felt and more so, due to the fact that the guarantee provided by the Covenant of the League was proving illusory. The other effort was made, and this time it resulted in the Locarno Agreements.

This attempt required, as a background, a brief sketch of political situation. French fear of German aggression was the basis of all security problems. The economic and political conditions in Germany were far from satisfactory, and the Allied powers differed as to the policy to be pursued towards her. France could not reply upon Britain to perpetuate the weakness of Germany. Germany had gained some strength by signing the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 with the Soviet Union, by which provision had been made for the rapid expansion of Russo-German trade. The old fear of a Russo-German friendship once again made the French foreign office unhappy, for no one could tell what these two non-League states might do. France adopted towards Berlin a stiffer attitude, declared her in 'voluntary default' on reparation and, much against the Anglo-American opposition, occupied the Ruhr in January 1923, and made another attempt to establish small separatist German states along the Rhine.

In the hope of easing the tension between France and Germany, Berlin made, during 1922-23, several attempts to negotiate frontier guarantees, anti-war pledges and arbitration projects as between the two governments ; but all the time, the offers had been turned down. Out of sheer disappointment, the German Government declared a policy of 'passive resistance.' This brought untold miseries upon the German people. The Government of Cuno was forced to resign and a new government was formed with Gustav Stresemann as the Foreign Minister. France failed to collect reparations from Germany by force and agreed to a general overhaul of the reparation settlements. In November 1924, the Dawes plan was devised, and on November 18, French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr.

On September 26, 1923, stresemann had declared the end of 'passive resistance,' and had launched, what came to be called the 'policy of fulfilment.' On January 10, 1925, he put forward his

famous suggestion for a 'Rhineland Pact,' whereby France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy should jointly guarantee the inviolable character of the Franco-German frontier.

The French were aware that the Germans had not accepted the Treaty of Versailles as final, and that they would renounce it at the first opportunity. As Briand wrote : "The Treaty of Versailles will always be a source of irritation. It was the fruit of war, of victory. It can be called, and is called, a treaty imposed by force, under duress, that the defeated party is morally justified in repudiating when it can do so". That Germany should of her own free will reaffirm her acceptance, not only of the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, but also of the demilitarization of the Rhineland was welcomed by France. She, however, insisted that Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia should also be invited to attend the parleys.

Chamberlain also saw a great good in the German suggestion. That Germany and Italy should jointly guarantee a reciprocal promise of non-aggression between France and Germany, was welcomed by the British public opinion which sincerely believed that Germany needed protection against France much more than France against Germany. Once convinced of the advantages of the German offer, Chamberlain proceeded to arrange the conclusion of the Rhineland Pact. In October 1925, delegates from the seven states met at Locarno, in Switzerland. For the first time since the war, all the powers met on equal status and in a spirit of goodwill and friendliness. Most of the proceedings were informal and the occasion was marked by the coining of a new phrase 'Spirit of Locarno', to describe the changed atmosphere. In this atmosphere, the following agreements were drawn up :

Rhineland Pact :

The most important of these agreements was the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium. By this Treaty, usually referred to at the time as the Rhineland Pact, and later simply as the Treaty of Locarno, Germany, Belgium and France bound themselves first, to regard their existing frontiers and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, as 'inviolable'; and secondly, in no case to attack, invade or resort to war against one another. For all possible disputes between them, they accepted a complete system of peaceful settlement on the lines of the Geneva Protocol. These obligations were placed under the guarantee of Britain and Italy as well as of the three states directly concerned. Any claim that they were being violated was to be addressed to the Council and, if the Council confirmed the complaint, the guarantors were to come at once to the assistance of the injured state. If the violation took the form of flagrant aggression, the

guarantors were to act at once though they would at the same time bring the dispute before the Council and accept its decisions. As in the Protocol, the aggressor in such case would be the one who refused to submit to arbitration or to carry out the arbitral award.

Arbitration Conventions.

The Rhineland Pact was accompanied by a group of four Arbitration Conventions. The first two between Germany and Belgium, and Germeny and France, laid down in detail the methods of peaceful settlement to which these countries had already bounds themselves by the terms of the Pact itself, The other two were between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia, These conventions also provided an elaborate system of arbitration, conciliation, or resort to the Council. The parties further pledged themselves to refrain, during the dispute, from any acts which might aggravate or extend it, and in this connection, to carry out any measures ordered by the Permanent Court, the Council of the League or the Conciliation Commission.

At the same time, separate treaties were signed between France and Poland on the one side, and France & Czechoslovakia on the other. By these each pledged armed support, in execution of Article 16 of the League Covenant, in case Germany should attack the other[7].

All these agreements were signed at Locarno on October 16 1925, and commonly came to be called 'the Locarno Agreements'.

Reflections on Locarno Agreements.

The Locarno Agreements inaugurated a new era —a era of pacification, in the Continental affairs. Dr. Langsam has called it as "precussors of a new era in world history. Austen Chamberlain described it as "the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace"[8]. On October 17 1925, the day after the initialling of the Locarno Pact, The Times' published a leading article saying,"..... the worst of the long travail is over at last..... the light of a new dawn is at last breaking upon the world." For the first time since the Great War, the German representative met the Allied statesmen on terms of equality and cordiality. The Pact, though assailed by the extremists in both the countries, France and Germnny, marked the beginning of reconciliation between

8. Quoted by Carr, of, cit, p. 97.

7. Although these treaties were signed at Locarno, they were, strictly speaking, outside the proceeding of the Conference, and were not formally endorsed by the other powers represented there.

the victors and the vanquished. It completed the work which the Dawes Plan had begun by bringing Germany back into the family of nations' not indeed on terms of complete equality, but as a full and a respected member.

"The immediate effect on international relations in Europe," as Gathorne-Hardy has remarked, "was undoubtedly most favourable. The sense of improved security which the British guarantee implanted in the minds of Germans and Frenchmen had an importance far out-weighting that of the question whether, on occasion arising, it would prove for Great Britain to fulfil her obligations. A democracy can hardly resort to war without the support of national opinion and, while it is comparatively easy to enlist this on the side of a known ally, the existence of two alternative allies or opponents complicates the situation. During the crisis preceding an outbreak of war, symprathy may very well have rallied to the side which eventually proves to be the aggressor; a sudden *volte-face* is then difficult. It is more probable that, in such a case public opinion would be hopelessly devided on the merits. So long, however, as Briiish intervention was feared by the potential aggressors of both sides, it seemed unlikely that the reality of the Pact woulp be put to the test. To scare the war-maker from his purpose is a more useful task than to arrest or defeat him when his offence has been committed. At the time of its adoption, at any rate, the Locarno Pact was a most effective and formidable looking scare-crow. which went far to justify the opinion of its creater, Mr. Austin Chamberlain, that its erection "marked the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace."[8]

Shortcoming of the Locarno Agreements

But the hope of those who believed that the Pact would bring permanent friendship between France and Germany were belied. The Locarnn Pact gave a measure of satisfaction to France in so far as she Franco-German frontier had been now voluntarily accepted by Germany. But that was not all. France would have liked to have similar guarantees of the eastern frontiers of Germany, for that involves the security of her clients, the powers of the Little Entente. Great Britain and Italy assumed no obligations in regards to Eastern Europe. Britrin could not tolerate in hegemony of France on the Continent, and so wanted to restore Germany to equality with France. A strong Germany also promised to serve as a fit bulwark against Soviet Russia's expansion which believed in the world communist revolution, ond the dictatorship of the proletariat; and since a strong Germany could be possible only at the cost of her neighbours, Poland and Czechoslovakia, London would not

8. Gathorne-Hardy. op cit p. 76,
9. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

agree to guarantee their security against German aggression.

Moreover, the German Government had agreed to the loss of Alsace-Lorrine and of Eupen and Malmedy ; but the loss of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia remained, as Prof, Schuman has put it, " fostering wound in the hearts of all patriots, and none could abandon the hope of recovering these territories in the future. Their recovery however, demanded a new dismemberment of resurrected Poland— and behind Poland stood France and the Little *Entente*, firmly resolved to maintain frontiers as they were".[10] At Locarno, Germany refused to guarantee the eastern frontiers, but only agreed not to resort to forcible measures of revision. "The Nationalist party, as Walters has put it, "acted with its habitual perfidy. Its leaders individually accepted the acts of Locarno, the more so since they knew that Germany badly needed financial help from the United States, and that this would only be forthcoming if American investors could foresee a period of peace in Europe. They waited therefore to declare themselves until it became clear that their opposition would not prevent the treaties from going through ; and, once assured of this, they withdrew from the government and carried on a campaign of vituperation against a policy which confirmed for ever the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. They intensified also their attacks upon the League, which was described at once as an "assemblage of chattering pacifists, and as an alliance of victorious powers, which would hold Germany for ever in the bonds of Versailless and force her into war with Russia."

The causes of friction such as Germany's demand for arms equality, for colonies and for the removal of the war-guilt clause from the Treaty of Versailles were not removed. All these served as a fuel for the Nazi Party which was vigorously fanning the flame of national sentiment in the hope of gaining enough strength to take over the government.

The 'Spirit of Locarno', as it came to be called, prevailed only for four years; and after 1929, relations between France and Germany began gradually to deteriorate.

The Locarno Pact was also not well received by those states in Eastern Europe which revolved in the French orbit. Poland, for example, never liked the differentiation between the Rhine and the Vistula frontiers, which the Great powers had conceded by guaranteeing the one and not the other. Soviet Union also looked upon the Locarno agreements with suspicion and distrust. Britain's unwillingness on the one side and Germany's refusal on the other to guarantee the eastern frontiers

10. Schuman, op cit, p. 683.
11. Walters, F. P. op. cit. Vol. I, p. 293.

of the latter served as a glaring eye-opener to the Soviet diplomats who vigilantly watched the movements of the Western Democracies. Four days before the signing of the Locarno Pact, a new trade agreement was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union, and was hailed by the latter's press as the Anti-Locarno Pact. This was followed by a Russo-German non-aggression treaty in April 1926, in which the signatories promised to remain neutral in case either was attacked by a third power. Other provisions indicated that the Russian statesmen were making sure that Germany would not participate in any economic sanctions which the League might impose upon Soviet Union.

Moreover, the Locarno agreements, although eased European situation and brought Germany into the charmed circle of nations, emphasized local and regional pacts instead of universal and general commitments like the Geneva Protocol. Its proponents convincingly argued that states would be more willing to accept the more limited and specific obligations than the general and vague commitments of a universal nature But, as Mander in his book 'Foundations of Modern World Society,' has observed, "the problem of peace was not as simple as that. The World War of 1914-1918 had its origin in eastern Europe and in problems arising from outside Europe, as well as from the Alsace-Lorraine question." He further argued that "the Locarno agreements were of limited value, because the general diplomatic situation might so develop as to reduce the Rhineland problem to a secondary factor. Suppose that Germany joined Austria without getting the consent of the League Council, or made war on Poland, would France be justified in invading Germany in order to fulfil its treaty obligations despite its undertaking at Locarno not to attack, invade or resort to war against Germany? If relations deteriorated, and the general framework of security were weakened, could the Locarno pacts be expected to survive? In reality was it more than a limited step, depending for its continental usefulness upon a strengthening of the wider foundations of international society? Could the whole be achieved by a successive solution of the parts or was a more organic and comprehensive answer necessary? Time was to provide an eloquent answer".

MORE ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEAGUE SECURITY SYSTEM

The year 1925 seemed to mark the beginning of a new era in international relations. The war-mindedness seemed to be diminishing; Germany entered the League in 1926; Japan seemed loyally to be observing the Washington treaties of 1921 22; statesmen emphasised Article 11, the article of conciliation, and seemed to discard Article 16, the article of threat and punishment; they asserted that the League of Nations should endea-

vour to spiritualise politics ; it should not use the method and temper of war to eliminate war, and it should not behave like a world policeman ; rather the 'Spirit of Locarno' should be extended to other regions of the world. Between 1919 and 1925, the Great Powers concerned themselves in erecting a system of penalties against the aggressor, but after 1925, the system of sanctions fell into the background and there was less talk of Article 16.

The Eighth Assembly of the League adopted a resolution saying that : "All wars of aggression are and shall be prohibited, and every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes of every description which may arise between states". In order to give effect to these ideals, the League set up a "Committee on Arbitration and Security." It was to work out a plan that might provide security guarantees to all states, and which in turn might reduce their armaments to the lowest possible figure. As the states were found unwilling to enter into general conventions like the Geneva Protocol, the Norwegian Delegation in the Assembly suggested the conclusion of regional treaties between pairs and groups of states as applicable between themselves. On the lines of this suggestion, the Committee prepared a number of "model treaties" which formed the basis of the "General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", adopted by the Ninth Assembly in 1928. The main provisions of the Act were : (1) Each pair of signatories of the Act should set up a permanent conciliation commission to recommend a pacific settlement of disputes as between them; (a) all disputes of a legal nature should be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice whose decision should be binding ; (3) disputes of a non-legal nature should be submitted to a Committee of Arbitrators.

The Act however did not meet with much success. Only some of the smaller states like Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Finland; Holland and Sweden accepted it and even some of them not in full.

In 1926, the Finnish Delegation had proposed a scheme by which states, which were victims of aggression, could receive financial assistance. It pointed out that small states which accepted disarmament proposals would be placed at disadvantage in the event of being attacked, and that their limited financial resources would make it difficult for them to purchase war materials from abroad suddenly. It therefore suggested that 'special arrangements' should be made so as to enable the attacked states to get loans on easy terms from her fellow-members of the League to withstand an aggressor nation.

After a long discussion of four and a half years, the proposal became the "Convention on Financial Assistance" in 1930 ; but it could not come into effect. It was to wait upon the

conclusion of a general Disarmament Convention and since the Disarmament Conference failed, it also met the same fate.

Commenting upon the League's attempts to strengthen its security system, Walters remarked: "The Model Treaties elaborated by the Committee on Arbitration and Security.....gave little satisfaction to their authors. Inspite of a gallant attempt to revive over the adoption of the General Act, something of the enthusiasm which had prevailed at the birth of the Protocol four years before, there was a widespread feeling that the new instruments were destined to remain ineffective. The Protocol had been rejected, but it had exerted a living influence ; it had led to Locarno, and to the hopes of other Locarnos in Eastern and Southern Europe. But a dozen draft treaties with long and complicated titles, distinguished from one another, in many cases only by inconspicuous differences of wording—what was to be looked for from these ? No doubt they represented a coherent and logical political system ; if they could have generally accepted, they might well have constituted a new protection against the danger of war. But in the absence of public interest or conviction, they remained little better than theoretical exercises, and the time and trouble spent on them provided easy weapons for those who sought to ridicule the League as an impractical gathering of sentimentalists and idealists. If the new system of international relations was to prevail, it must do so not by logical perfection but by the solid support of public opinion for the great principles of the Covenant"[12].

THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT (PACT OF PARIS), 1928

Genesis of the Pact

If the nations inside the League failed to keep up the Spirit of Locarno, and arrange regional security pacts, they succeeded well enough to maintain it outside. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol had failed to still the fear of war and guarantee security to France ; the Locarno Agreements guaranteed security, but only a measure of it, and France's clients—the power of the Little *Entente* were still in the precarious position of being attacked any moment. The French quest for security continued, and this time was brought forth the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In April 1927, M. Briand, the Foreign Minister of France, inspired by some American citizens in Paris, and desiring to extend the network of treaties of arbitration and non-aggression, proposed to the United States a declaration by the two countries renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and agreeing that a settlement of all disputes arising between them should be brought about only by pacific means.

12. Ibid., p. 383.

The American Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg foreseeing little possibility of a war as between the two powers, suggested in December1927 that the proposed treaty, out-lawing war, should be madeuniversal so as to include all states. Briand considered it carefully and to his great credit agreed to Kellogg's proposal. The American Secretary thereupon sent a draft treaty to Germany, Italy, Great Britain and Japan. Public opinion rallied to its support and, in most countries, helped in pursuading the governments to accept it. Eventually, on August 27, 1928, delegates from fifteen nations, including U. S., U. K., Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India and theBritish Dominions, met at the *Quai d' Orsay* and signed a general treaty for the renunciation of war. rI came to be called the Pact of Paris or Kellogg-Briand Pact. It was left open for membership to other states as well and invitations were at once sent to the other forty-nine governments including that of the Soviet Union to accede to the treaty.

The Pact was one of the shortest treaties on record and included the following articles :—

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective people that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instruments of national policy in their relations with one another.

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature, or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The Pact, before coming into force, was to be ratified by the respective governments in accordance to their constitutional requirements. On July 24, 1929, President Hoover proclaimed the Pact in force. By the close of 1930, it had been adhered to by some sixty-one states.

Shortcomings of the Pact

The Pact of Paris was the first pact of universal application and the first attempt to obtain peace by mobilising world opinion. But soon after its coming into force, it was subjected to a lot of criticism. Norman Bentwitch called it "an international kiss purely Platonic promising nothing for the future". It provided no machinery by which the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy could be enforced against a violator, nor any method of determining whether or not a particular act was a violation of the Pact. For its success, it was entirely dependent upon the mercy of its signatories. Unfortunately, too many suspicions remained in different countries

as to the exact meaning of the two relatively short articles of the Pact Even during the course of negotiations, much insincerity of the powers was displayed. The American Secretary, of State, for example wrote that "every nation alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence"; and it was plain that under self-defence, he included the defence not only of the national territory but also of vital interests and policies such as the 'Monroe Doctrine'.

Similarly, France made the following reservations :

(1) "The Treaty should not become effective until universal adherence was given and special agreements provided to the contrary.

(2) "Each signatory should retain its right of legitimate self-defence.

(3) "If one signatory violated its pledge not to engage in war, all others would be automatically released from their obligations thereunder.

(4) "The Treaty should not interfere with the previous obligations of France under the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, or her neutral treaties.

Similarly, the British Government formally announced "there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and security. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must]be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect."

Senator W. E. Borah of the U. S. declared more specifically "we would have a perfect right to send an expedition anywhere into Mexico or China, if it were necessary, in order to protect the lives and property of our citizens against actual threatened attack."

A similar statement was made by the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Parliament in 1929, when he said : "Manchuria and Mangolia are, of course, within the sphere where our right of self-defence can be exercised.....In case, the peace of Manchuria was disturbed, Japan should be justified in taking necessary measures as a measure of self-defence. In such cases, Japan should not be bound by the anti-war Pact."

And indeed, when Japan undertook the conquest of Manchuria in 1931, she claimed the benefit of the right of self-defence thus recognised, declaring that Manchuria was no less vital to her self-defence than the Suez Canal to Britain or the Panama Canal to the United States.

Thus, the efficacy of the outlawing of war was lessened by the reservations and interpretations placed upon the text by a number of signatories. The Great Powers banned the wars of aggression, but reserved to themselves the right to determine whether their actions were offensive or defensive. As quoted by Black and Helmreich in their book, "Twentieth Century Europe', Edwin M. Borchard put the situation thus : "Considering these reservations, it would be difficult to conceive of any wars that nations have fought within the past century or are likely to fight in the future that cannot be accomodated under these exceptions. Far from constituting an outlawry of war, they constitute the most solemn sanction of specific wars that have ever been given to the world."

The Pact was put to test in 1929, when a dispute occured between the Soviet Union and China and resulted in a movement of Soviet troops into Manchuria. The fighting resulted in loss of life as well as property. The American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson invoking the Pact of Paris, appealed to the parties to settle their differences by peaceful means. But the Soviet Union simply charged the Washington Government with unworthy motives, and strongly asserted that it was strange that the United State, which had not recognised the Soviet regime, should address an appeal to her. Stimson's attempt revealed further weaknesses of the Pact ; (1) 'the disadvantage of having no recognised machinery and procedure for calling upon disputants to desist from hostilities ; (2) 'the danger of misunderstanding if any government took the initiative in reminding states of their obligations, the Pact having conferred upon no government the explicit right to do so ; (3) 'the lack of recognised procedures of investigating the cause of the dispute and of proposing remedies.'

The Pact, as it existed then, was a 'tiger without teeth' ; it had stated principles, but provided no machinery to implement them. It was in the historic phrase, "a high sounding nothing", or as cynics put it an "Instrument of International Confusion."

Merits of the Pact

In spite of all the imperfections and shortcomings of the Pact of Paris, Carr has called it "a considerable land-mark".[13] It was the first political agreement in history of almost universal scope, and no less than sixty-five states accepted the Pact. It, at least, displayed the willingness of states to pronounce a ban on war as a legitimate means of settling their disputes. It did provide a certain measure of security to France, at least for the time being.

The Pact symbolised a new willingness on the part of the

13. Carr, op. cit, p. 119.

U. S. to undertake responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. It added to the effectiveness of the League system of collective security in that, both the Council and the Assembly could henceforth rely upon the American co-operation, when they took steps later on to prevent or put an end to the wars of the following decade in Manchuria—on the Amazon, in the Chaco and in Ethiopia.

The discussion might be concluded with an observation of Gathorne-Hardy, who maintained : "as a gesture indicative of a new ethical attitude to war, (the Pact of Paris) was undeniably impressive. It was particularly important in that it created a basis, upon which the great nations outside the League, the United States and Russia, could take a direct interest in the collective organisation of peace..... it served at the moment as a magnificent advertisement of the pacific disposition of the world, and might have been thought to constitute a great step forward on the road to international security."[14]

The Pact of Paris was, however, the last attempt of the nations to strengthen the security system of the League on a collective basis But as ill-luck would have it, and as the fate of the various attempts at security revealed, the major world powers were seeking security, but were not collective in themselves. Instead of effectively utilising the existing machinery of collective security to check the aggressor states, they ignored or evaded their responsibility and resorted to the policy of 'appeasement.' And 'appeasement' did not really satisfy the aggressors. Tension between the major powers increased steadily until it resulted in the second World War in September 1939. The year '1931' witnessed the collapse of the collective security system, and the first bomb dropped by Japan upon Manchuria was a bombshell for this system. Events took place in quick succession, and the world was thrust into the juggernaut of destruction.

Collective Security—A Myth

The ideal of collective security, embodied in the Covenant of the League, by the searchers after peace seems to be difficult of achievement. The phenomenon constantly "reappears in history, from the Greek leagues through the medieval empire, the Holy Alliance, the European concert and to the League of Nations"; but it is beset with numerous difficulties.

The first difficulty in the attainment of collective security is the clashing interests of nations, resulting from differences in the stage of material advancement and economic prosperity. Some states are interested in *status-quo* ; others are revisionists ;

14. Gathorne-Hardy, op. cit., pp. 183 184.

some possess the sources of economic growth; others lack it. Some states are more secure in terms of natural frontiers ; others are exposed to easy foreign intervention, and this variety of interests stands in the way of any long-term collective approach to world problems. Nations having identical problems become friends, and look upon others with distrust and hostility. Friends wink at the aggression just as unhesitatingly as the enemies condemn it. There is hardly an international problem on which all sovereign nations think alike.

Another problem in the establishment of the collective security system is that of defining aggression. The League Covenant contained no definition of aggression ; it left to the Member states to decide for themselves whether a nation had committed an act of war, or acted in violation of Article 10. The Geneva Protocol of 1923 attempted to provide a definition ; but it was never ratified and the process of determining an aggression was not put in practice.

Another weakness of collective security is that the forces to be used against an aggressor are to be left under national authority until a crises arises, when they would be transferred to international control. This means that in the last analys is, nations are free to turn over such forces to the international authority or not as they please.

And then, military action by an international authority might lead to a major war in which the out-come would be doubtful but heavy losses would be certain. "The enforcement of peace", as one commentator has put it," by the armed force of states against states, while widely endorsed in principle, is seldom embarked upon in practice by disinterested states". When actually undertaken, it obviously produces war and not peace. Walter Lippmann has rightly commented upon this phenomenon :

"When the issue is less than the survival of the great nations, the method of collective security will not be used because it is just as terrifying to the policeman as it is to the lawbreakers. It punishes the law-enforcing states, at least until they have paid the awful price of victory, as much as the lawbreaking states. There would be little surgery if the surgeon had to amputate his own arm when he was called upon to amputate his patients' leg. There would be little enforcement of law in our cities if in order to arrest burglars, murderers and violators of the traffic ordinances, the police had to start a fight in which the court house, the jail and their own houses were likely to be demolished. The method of collective security is too crude, too expensive, and too unreliable for general and regular use."

And then, economic and diplomatic sanctions have their own limitation. Even if it were possible to get a world-wide economic blockade, complete in all its details, the effect would of course be disastrous to an aggressor highly dependent upon foreign trade. Here again, the nations, applying the sanctions, must also suffer, because they would stop their own trade as well as that of the aggressor. Moreover, a state bent upon aggression might insulate itself against economic sanctions, to a degree at least, by stock-pling essential war materials. And if the aggressor were a nation with a balanced economy, like the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., economic sanctions would do little harm. So far as diplomatic sanction is concerned "it is an expression of disapproval, but as a means of coercion it is a mere slap on the wrist". And then, sanctions require a great deal of cooperation and understanding between states perhaps more than can be expected of sovereign-nations.

Thus Strausz-Hupe and Possony have put it: "In a world which is rent asunder by conflicting ideologies striving for global dominance, and which is also split into various societies of different structure and into different, more or less closed, economic systems, collective security cannot obtain."[15]

DISARMAMENT

Theory and Logic of Disarmament

If peace and security have been the oldest problems of mankind, disarmament also has been one of the oldest dreams. It has been hoped that the abolition of armaments, besides being an indisputable economic advantage, would also produce peace. Although quite an old ideal, the problem in its present acute form was of relatively recent origin. However, in order to appreciate the problem of disarmament, one would have to examine the theory and logic of armaments prevailing during the 17th—century—the age of the emergence of nation-states on the Continent of Europe. The views prevailing among the states then were the old views: 'might was the best defence,' 'God was always on the side of big battalions'; and that 'by becoming strong, the other party remains calm and no struggle ensues.'

But such dictums led to the Hobbesian state of nature in the family of nations, which meant fear, suspicion, panic rivalry and ultimately war. The situation became acute during the last hundred years when new and terrible weapons of destruction and inhuman methods of warfare came into vogue. There

15. Strausz-Hupe, R. and Possony, T. S. International Relations (New York, Mc-Graw-Hill, 1954) 313.

was no reasonable relationship between the matter of dispute and the method of settling it. War was the only means of settling international disputes, and the continuous preparations for it threatened to destroy the foundations of modern world society. The statesmen quite early began to realise that the existing brutish state of international relations should be brought to an end. A contract among the nations as to the limitation and reduction of armaments seemed an obvious remedy. The old myth of the Roman writer, Vegetius—'If you want peace, prepare for war,' was exploded as early as the seventeenth century ; and statesmen and scholars busied themselves in finding ways and means of disarming the nations as the necessary road to peace.

Problem of Disarmament in Historical Perspective

In the modern times, the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 was the first to stipulate that all existing fortifications were to be demolished and that no new fortifications were to be erected.

In 1710, John Bellers drew up a scheme for the federation of states in which there was the greatest necessity of limiting the number of troops and ships.

The Russo-Turkish peace of Kuchuk Kainarji (1773) forbade Turkey to maintain fortifications on the Crimean peninsula.

After the Napoleonic wars, the Tsar of Russia, Alexander I, wrote a letter to Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary on March 21, 1816, and asked for limitation of armaments in Europe.

The Treaty of Paris of 1856 after the Crimean War provided for the demobilisation of the Russian Black Sea fleet and thus neutralised these waters.

In 1863, Nepolean III, the Emperor of France, because of his weak position; proposed to Russia and Great Britain the desirability of reducing the armaments, and thereby restore confidence among themselves.

In 1888, the Tsar of Russia addressed a note to the governments of Europe, asking them to meet at the Hague and devise a scheme for reducing their arms. The proposal was welcomed by other powers of Europe and in 1899, the first international conference to reduce armaments met. A committee of military and naval experts was appointed to study the limitation of arms. The committee concluded that any agreed limitation of armaments at that time was impossible. The conference, however, made two declarations prohibiting the discharge of projectives and explosives from the air, the use of asphyxiating gas and the use of expanding bullets. Twenty-seven countries including all the Great Powers signed this declaration.

At the second Peace Conference, convened at the Hague in 1907, forty-three countries, including all the Great Powers except China, agreed to the prohibition of the use of poison or poisoned weapons as part of the regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land. This conference did not seriously discuss the reduction of armaments but it adopted a British resolution, stating that military expenditure of states had much increased since 1899 and that governments should seriously examine the question.

In the early years of the twentieth century, war preparations were in full swing. Nations in Europe were spending major portions of their budget on the manufacture of atmaments. In 1914, they fell out among themselves, and the most-devastating war of human history began. The conscience of mankind was stirred ; and a intense need was felt for the abolition and destruction of arms and ammunition.

The American President, Woodrow Wilson, put before the belligerents of Europe a peace programme in January 1918, Point 4 of which obliged the powers to reduce their armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,"

When the powers met in a conference at Paris after the war, disarmament was conceived as one of the essential conditions of future peace. Provision for this was made in Article 8 of the League Covenant which was an important part of the Versailles Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article 8 provided that "the Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligation".

Paragraph 2 mentioned that "the Council taking into account the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments".

Paragraph 4 stated that "after these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council".

Paragraph 5 provided that "the Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendent upon such manufacture can be prevented.....".

Paragraph 6 obliged the Members of the League "to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their arma-

ments, their naval and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes".

Moreover, paragraph (*d*) of Article 23 provided that "the Members of the League will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest."[15]

Between the two Great Wars of the present century, governments both within the League and at special conferences made various attempt to devise a suitable formula to provide the basis for disarmament.

Attempts at Disarmament through the Peace Treaties

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Allied statesmen incorporated heavy disarmament provisions in the Peace Treaties with the defeated powers. The German General Staff was abolished, military conscription in Germany was forbidden; and the German military was limited to 100,000 men. Tanks, poison gas, heavy artillery, and aircraft were forbidden to the German army. Munition plants were dismantled or converted to peace purposes, and Germany was subjected to the supervision of inter-Allied military, naval and aeronautical commissions to ensure observance of these terms. The Rhineland was demilitarised and Germany was forbidden to maintain forts or garrisons within a 50-kilometer zone east of the Rhine. For fifteen years, the Rhineland and the Rhine bridge-heads were to be subjecced to Allied military occupation. The Imperial German navy was surrended, and for the future, it was limited to 6 battle-ships not to exceed 10,000 tons, 6 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. Germany was denied the right to construct or use submarines or military and naval air planes. Under Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany undertook "to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by majority vote, may consider necessary".

Austrian army was limited to 30,000 men, Hungarian to 35,000 men, and Bulgarian to 33,000 men. Similar efforts were made to disarm Turkey through the treaty of Sevres; but since it was soon repudiated by the Young Turks, the Straits Convention of 1923 limited Turkish garrison at Constantinople to 12,000 men; the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were demilitarised; and the number and size of war vessels to be admitted to the Black Sea were limited.

When the German delegation declared that they agreed to armament reductions, providing that these were the beginning

15. Covenant of the League of Nations.

of a general reduction, they were told that Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers. The representatives of these Powers, nevertheless, added that "the German reductions were to be looked on as a first step and that the League of Nations would make general disarmament one of its first duties, since this was one of the most 'fruitful preventives of war".

DISARMAMENT THROUGH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(1) Establishment of the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions : (1920)

In order to implement the provisions of Article 8 of the League Covenant, a Permanent Advisory Commission was established. The Commission, consisting of the Military, Naval and Air experts, representatives of each member of the League Council, was to furnish the Council with advice as to the execution of Article 8 and of Article 1, paragraph 2 which dealt with the armaments of the states newly admitted to the League. In December 1920, the Commission formally advised the Council that reduction of armaments at that time would be pre-mature.

(2) Establishment of the Temporary Mixed Commission (1920—1924)

The same year, the Assembly of the League considering that disarmament was not merely a technical problem, invited the Council to creat a new commission. In 1921, the Council established the Temporary Mixed Commission comprised of experts (not government representatives) and instructed it to submit to the Council proposals for the reduction of armaments.

The Third Assembly in 1922 accepted the following general principles enunciated by the T.M.C : (1) No scheme for disarmament could be successful unles it was general. (2) Many governments could not seriously reduce their existing armaments unless the safety of their countries was guaranteed. (3) Such a guarantee could be provided by a defensive treaty of mutual guarantee, open to all and ensuring that any signatory state, if attacked, would receive assistance from all other signatories in the same part of the world. (4) The guarantee would apply only after, the reduction of armaments had been carried out according to a general plan.

In 1923, the T.M,C. submitted to the tAssembly a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance for international aid to victims of aggression, but it failed of its purpose due to the rejection by certain Great Powers, including the U S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U.K.

(3) The Geneva Protocol (1924).

On October 2, 1924, the Assembly of the League adopted

the Geneva Protocol which : (1) prohibited recourse to war in any circumstances; '(2) established means for determining the aggressor whereby the aggressor should be presumed to be that state which refused io resort to arbitration, or to comply with an award, or refused to comply with the provisional measures prescribed by the Council ; (3) made the application of sanctions compulsory after the determination of the aggresior ; (4) provided that all disputes should be terminated by a binding decision, pronounced by the Permanent Court of International Justice or the Council of the League unanimously, or by a board of arbitrators.

The Geneva Protocol was signed by nineteen states. It was agreed that it would come into force when a general plan for the reduction of armaments was adopted by a disarmament conference of all countries which was to be convened by the Council in June, 1925.

During the Council session in March 1925, the Protocol failed to secure generel acceptance and more specially. the acceptance of certain Great Powers, and it was eventually abandoned.

(4) Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (1930).

The Temporary Mixed Commission ceased to function after 1924. In Europe, efforts were made to achieve security outside the League by the conclusion of regional pacts such as the Locarno agreements. After the conclusion of these agreements, the League Assembly, again in 1925, turned to the question of disarmament and requested the Council "to make a preparatory study with a view to holding a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments."

The Council, accordingly, abolished the T.M C. and replaced it by a Prepatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. It functioned until December 1930, when it was dissolved after preparing a Draft Convention on Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and a Final Report.

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments met at Geneva on February 3, 1932. Sixty-one states, five of which were not members of the League, including the U. S , participated. After two years of deliberation, general agreement seemed to have been made on the following points : (*a*) prohibition of certain methods of war ; (*b*) bombing from the air, use of chemical, incendiary and bacterial weapons ; (*c*) principle of quantitative and qualitative limitation of armaments; (*d*) publicity of national defence expenditure ; (*e*) supervision of the execution of the convention. But no agreement could be reached as to the methods of applying these principles. In the

meantime, the international situation had seriously deteriorated, and now formed an unfavourable background to the Conference. Japan had attacked China to the openly-proclaimed unconcern of the British Government. Economic crisis and internal political movements in certain countries added to the general dis-quietude.

In 1933, Germany abandoned the Conference and soon after, the League ; the same year, Japan also left the League. Germany began conscription in 1935 and with it, all the League's efforts to achieve disarmament came to an end. The years from 1925 to 1930, devoted to the details technical work of the preparatory commission, proved unless and they were doomed to be so. "The inclusion of so many powers in the Conference and the immense amount of details involved, with consequent divergencies of view", as R. M. Mac-Gregor in his book 'Order or Disorder' has put it, "must have obscured the real nature and purpose of the proceedings, which was to arrange for the fulfilment by the victorious allies of their share of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to the reduction of armaments. The vanquished powers had been compelled to disarm, and the obligation, implied in the statement that their disarmament was an initial step in a general limitation of armaments of all nations, had never been fulfilled. The relationship between France and Germany formed the core of the problem of European appeasement, the achievement of which was an essential pre-requisite to the reduction of armaments. To treat this merely as one of the difficulties to be got over at an all-world congress on every aspect of warfare was too optimistic."

Moral Disarmament.

The Disarmament Conference at Geneva also discussed the problems of moral disarmament at the instance of the Polish Government. It considered measures which governments might take in order to ensure that education, imparted by means of broadcasting or the cinema, might be inspired with mutual respect and good understanding between the nations. Measures were also considered relating to the press. On September 23, 1936, an International Convention concerning the use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace was concluded under the auspices of the League.

EFFORTS AT DISARMAMENT OUTSIDE THE LEAGUE

(1) Washington Conference 1921-22

The first and fruitful attempt at multilateral disarmament outside the League was made as early as November 1921, when the American President, Warren G. Harding, invited the other naval powers—Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to attend a conference in Washington. This was later on broadened to

include China, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands, for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems. The Conference met from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, and resulted in the adoption of six treaties which were designed to put an end to naval rivalry and to solve some of the problems of the Far East.

First two treaties were signed among the five most important naval powers. The first treaty, called the Five Power Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed on February 6, 1922, provided for the scrapping of approximately 40 per cent of the capital ships already built or being constructed by the three Great naval powers, U. S., U. K., and Japan. For the future, definite limits were placed upon the quota and the tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers permitted to each state, the total tonnage being fixed at a ratio of approximately 5 : 5 : 3 for United States, Great Britain, and Japan and 1·67 each for France and Italy. No new capital ships were to be constructed for ten years.

A draft treaty forbiding the use of sub-marines and poison gas in warfare was signed, but it failed of adoption because of the French refusal to ratify it.

Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were also prohibited from acquiring any new basis in the Far East, or from increasing fortifications or facilities at bases already established. The United States was thus prevented from developing the naval stations in the Philippines, Gaum and Samoa (but not Hawaii), Great Britain, those in Hong Kong and Wei-Hei-wai (but not Singapore); Japan those in the Bonin and Kurile Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Liu-Kiu Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores.

Besides the disarmament treaty which was to continue into force till 1936, two other political treaties were also signed : the Four Power Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. In the Four Power Pact, the U. S., U. K., France and Japan agreed to respect each others rights in the Pacific and to confer, should controversy arise between them or their interests be threatened by a third power. In the Nine Power Trerty, the five Great Powers, plus China, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands agreed "to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of China." They also promised to support the 'Open Door' principle for all of China.

Several other agreements and resolutions relating to the problems of China were also signed at the Conference.[17]

17. For these, see chapter on International Relations in the Far East.

Reflections on the Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference may be considered as virtually the only important success recorded during the two World Wars in the quest for international disarmament. The signing and success of the treaties resulting from the Conference needed a brief consideration of the peculiar circumstances prevailing at the moment.

Under the Treaty of Versailles, the sea power of Germany had been almost crippled: The Russian navy, while formally still existant, had become a negligible factor. So was the case with the small Austrian navy. Thus, there remained only five navies in the world : the Royal Navy, the U. S. fleet, the Japanese fleet and the relatively small fleets of France and Italy. In terms of tonnage and numbers, the Royal Navy was still supreme, but the American fleet had grown considerably and was engaged in a construction programme which would have given naval leadership to the American flag. The British sailors and statesmen began to look with alarm at the growth of the U. S. navy. Following the century-old tradition that England was to maintain the largest fleet in the world, they contemplated a large naval construction programme designed to outbuild the U. S.

During the war, Japan had also extended its influence on the mainland of Asia and threatened European and American interests in China. Moreover, she was not satisfied with her position and was contemplating to expand her area of influence ; and for this, she was projecting a huge naval construction programme.

Both of these situations provoked a lively American counter-action. Already in 1916, the U. S. had embarked on a great naval building programme, partly because Great Britain had interfered with what America considered to be its legitimate neutral trading rights, and partly because during the war, Japan had extended her influence in China. After the war, the American Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, was reported as saying: "If Great Britain insists that Britannia rules the waves, the U. S. will lay two keels to every one Britain does, or five to one if necessary". The American attitude was due to the fear of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 which was still in force,and behind which Japan was constantly expanding her influence in the Far East. It had become very unpopular in American political circles, and had awakened anti-British sentiment. This had determined, in turn, the American decision to carry out its naval construction programme which would have made the U.S. Navy the strongest in the world.

However, moderate views prevailed in other countries, and the conditions there were favourable for a naval limitation pro-

gramme. Britain was heavily in debt, and did not possess the industrial capacity to compete seriously with the U.S. in a naval armaments race. Japan, though formally a strong power, was essentially weak, and could not afford a *detente* with Washington. And then, Japan knew perfectly well that it could not outbuild the U. S. or obtain parity. Moreover, she did not need parity, because she had only one coast-line to defend, while the U. S. had to keep naval forces in two oceans and Britain in several. Hence, the American proposal to allow Japan 60 per cent of the U. S. naval strength was welcomed by her. Italy's naval interests were limited to the Mediterranean Sea. Having no concern over the size of the Anglo-American or Japanese navy, Italy was interested in obtaining parity with France, and when she attained it, she was quite happy. France, having no clear-cut naval policy, expressed her opposition but, as she was not interested in enlarging her battleship strength, she accepted the U. S. proposal to allocate battleship strength among Great Britain, U. S , Japan, France and Italy in the proportion of 5 : 5 : 3 : 1·67 : 1·67.

These stipulations limited naval armaments most effectively. They were accepted by the five powers because they had no political purposes to serve by establishing its naval superiority over any of the others, and that all of them had both political and financial interest in stabilising armaments at the existing levels. If naval armaments were limited or reduced proportionately for all, the "security" and the fighting potential of each would be unaffected. The smaller powers accepted them because they avoided a race which would be very costly to them. The Big Powers (Great Britain and U.S.) accepted them because it meant a reduction in their expenditure, an economy which seemed of inestimable advantage in 1922. The greatest relative gains were made by Japan.

(2) Geneva Conference, 1927

If the Washington Conference had reduced the number of capital ships and terminated competition in their construction, it left the powers quite free to construct whatever other types of vessels they desired. This failure was due to the fact that they had divergent interests which could not be measured by a common yardstick. For example, it was impossible to determine that if the U. S. needed 100 destroyers, the British Empire, due to its geographical configuration, would need 130 destroyers in order to have the same amount of security as the United States. However, by not limiting all categories of vessels, the Conference had left the way open for an Anglo-American "cruiser race", which began to strain relations between the two countries, especially by 1926, when it became clear that the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, which the League had

appointed in 1925, was not going to achieve speedy results. President Colvin Coolidge of the U. S. decided to call another conference to limit the construction of the types of vessel not covered by the Washington agreement. Invitations were sent to the five Great Powers. Great Britain and Japan accepted, but France and Italy refused the invitation, the former on the ground that outside conferences would hinder the disarmament work of the League, and also because France wanted to discuss the problem of security along with disarmament proposals, while the Anglo-American powers insisted upon confining the conference to technical problems of reduction and limitation ; the later on the ground, that Italy's geographical situation made further limitation unwise. The result was that only Great Britain, U. S., and Japan participated in the conference which was held at Geneva from June 20 to August 4, 1927.

Most of the representatives were admirals and naval experts, and had not much enthusiasm for abolishing their own jobs. Differences between Great Britain and the U.S. very soon became visible. The U. S., since it had few bases, needed cruisers with long cruising range and therefore favoured the large type. The British Government needed a large number of small cruisers, for it had naval bases scattered over the world and was also reluctant to concede cruiser parity to the United States. Thus, the U. S. navy needed long range cruisers but not in large numbers, the Royal navy required large number of cruisers with comparatively short radii of action. No compromise could be reached and on August 4, 1927, the Conference ended in failure. Throughout the Conference, the Japanese delegates "played a minor role, quite content to see the differences between the Anglo-American representatives".

(3) London Conference, 1930

The failure of the Geneva Conference caused considerable suspicion and ill-will between Washington and London. On February 13, 1929, the American Congress authorised the President to construct fifteen 10,000 ton cruisers and one aircraft-carrier at a cost of $ 274 million. This caused great uneasiness in London. However, the political climate favoured a rapproache ment between the two countries. The wide acceptance of the Pact of Paris in 1928 provided a more hopeful atmosphere and encouraged a new movement for disarmament. Public opinion everywhere favoured the reduction of arms. In 1929, changes in government occurred in both the U. S. and England. Ramsay MacDonald, as head of the second Labour Government, went on a goodwill tour to the U. S., in October 1929 and offered to reduce England's cruisers from 70 to 50 units. The American President was found to be conciliatory, and on October 8, invitations to a new naval conference to limit all types of warships,

were dispatched by the British Government to the United States, Japan, France and Italy.

The Naval Conference opened in London on January 21, 1930. By this time, the Sino-Russian crisis of 1929 had revealed the bankruptcy of the Pact of Paris and the need for further machinery was felt. France asked Great Britain if it would be ready to use its fleet against an aggressor named by the League ; and as to what would be its attitude to Article 16 of the Covenant. London would make no such commitment until she was assured of Washington's willingness to cooperate in case of a crisis. The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, was not ready to bind his country to a consultative pact. This stand precluded any possibility of a political agreement which would induce France to join in further disarmament plans. Moreover, Italy demanded the right to have in all categories parity with France which had been granted to her in capital ships at Washington in 1921-22. This was not liked by France which maintained that, to permit Italy parity with her, would be to give Italy actual superiority in the Mediterranean, since France had two sea-coasts to defend. Both France and Italy withdrew from the Conference, leaving the three major naval powers once more "to wrestle with the problem of cruisers, destroyers and submarines."

The three powers signed a Naval Treaty on April 22, 1930, whereby the signatories agreed to extend their "capitalship holiday" for another six years. Certain battle-ships were to be scrapped by each—Great Britain, 5-U.S.-3. and Japan, 1 so as to bring the three navies nearer to the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio, provided for at the Washington Conference. Moreover, the Treaty provided for the maintenance of the Washington Treaty arrangements concerning the tonnage level of aircraft carries in opposition to a British proposal to modify them. The U. S. received a larger tonnage in large-gun cruisers, and Britain a greater tonnage in smaller-gun cruisers. Thus, the obstacle, which wrecked the Geneva Conference in 1927, was surmounted. Japan was given equality with Britain and the United States in sub-marines. Tokyo, in turn, accepted an unequal position in cruisers and destroyers. Finally, the Treaty contained the so-called "escape clause", by which a signatory power, if it deemed its secutity threatened by the naval construction of a non-signatory power, could give notice of the increase that it would require in its own tonnage.

(4) Second London Conference, 1935

The last, but not the least, important step in the matter of naval disarmament was taken in 1935. After 1930, the international scene had witnessed some very important and unhappy events one after the other. The Great Slump of 1930-31 thrust the finances of several countries into turmoil and led to the

birth of fascism in some of them, The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the League's bankruptcy in taking an action, convinced the dictators that the road to aggression was a bed of roses. Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933 sent a thrill in the chancelleries of Europe. Security was now no longer a matter of discussion round the table but became a need of the hour. The Disarmament Conference of the League at Geneva had failed and the World Economic Conference also had met its doom. The Italian aggression in Ethopia had chilled the political climate. Hitler had started the re-armament of Germany and London had given him open encouragement by signing with Ribbentrop on June 18, 1935, a Naval Agreement.

Despite these inauspicious developments, the representatives of Great Britain, U. S., France, Italy, and Japan met in a Conference in London on December 9, 1935. Neither Germany nor the Soviet Union were invited. Japan proposed a programme that amounted to parity for Japan in naval strength which neither Great Britain nor the U. S. were willing to concede. On January 15, 1936, the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference. Negotiations, however, continued among the four remaining powers and resulted in a treaty, signed on March 25, 1936. Italy refused to sign it in the face of League sanctions and the British naval threats in the Mediterranean.

This treaty, in its provisions, was pale and hollow. It provided neither for reduction nor for quantitative limitation of naval armaments. No limitation remained on the number of battleships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and marines which the nations might build and no mention was made of ratios. The signatories, however, agreed to exchange information regarding the future building programmes.

Whatever agreements were made, were weakened by the numerous 'safeguarding' and 'escape' clauses. Any signatory on grounds of national security requirements, might notify other parties that it would no longer observe the restriction imposed by the treaty. Such a step was taken by Great Britain in September 1939, when she was involved in a war with Germany and when she informed the U. S. that as a consequence of this hostility, she suspended "all of the obligations of the said treaty".

"By the beginning of 1937," as Prof. Schuman has put it, "all treaties imposing quantitative restrictions on the three Great Naval Powers were at end. Britain and Germany had agreed (June 18, 1935) that the German navy should be 35 per cent as large as the British. Anglo-Soviet negotiations for a naval pact came to nothing.....The U.S. proceeded to strengthen the fortifications of its bases in the Western Pacific..... .....By March 1937, the British Government had

announced plans for constructing 238,000 tons of new battleships..... ..The U.S. followed suit, and Japan struggled desperately to keep peace with her wealthier rivals in a naval race which was far more costlier and more dangerous than that which preceded 1914.....Germany armed for the day of glory and her neighbours armed desperately in self-defence. Each power sought safety in matching its potential enemies regiment for regiment, bombing plane for bombing plane, battleship for battleship. In this, there could be no security but only the promise of disaster .....The letters of failure, written large over the portals of successive disarmament conferences during the two decades after Versailles, became letters of impending catastrophe for the Western World".[18]

WHY, AND WHY NOT OF DISARMAMENT

The various attempts at disarmament from 1919 to 1935 failed and the world was again thrust into the war, this time more calamitious and horrible. After the end of it, disarmament again became an important topic of international negotiations. The Charter of the United Nations envisaged disarmament as well as a "regulation of armament". The question naturally arose: why were the nations attempting to limit and reduce armaments? Why so much talk about it? The issues involved were moral, economic and political.

Moral Reasons for Disarmament

Modern weapons of war were so cruel and so widely efficacious in results that untold and lasting sufferings were inflicted upon humanity. They affected not only the combatants, the soldiers, the sailors and the seamen, but the entire civil populations, which included innocent women and children, young and old, poor and rich, pacifists and war-mongers. The cities and towns, houses and huts, farms and mills, were all razed to the ground and humanity was thrust into the throes of hunger and starvation, famines and widespread diseases, economic crises and unemployment. Was it, therefore, not incumbent upon mankind to consider the possibility of abandoning armaments which ultimately led to war? As Salvador de Madariaga told the Geneva Disarmament Conference: 'Weapons are the raw materials of war. As one cannot see without eyes, one cannot wage war without arms. A war between disarmed nations was technically impossible."

This was not the only moral reason. The Allied countries, which fought against the Central Powers during 1914-18, were committed to disarmament. When Germany was forced to

18. Schuman, op. cit., 3rd edition, pp., 431—2.

accept the Versailles Treaty in 1919, she had to agree to give up all armaments beyond what were considered necessary for her self-defence and the maintenance of internal order. When the German delegation declared that they agreed with armament reduction, providing that these were the beginning of a general reduction, they were told that "Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers." But the representatives of the Allied countries, however, added that "the German reductions were to be looked on as a first step and that the League would make general disarmament one of its first duties, since this was one of the most fruitful preventives of war."

Similar undertaking was given by Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Belgium in 1925, when they signed the Locarno Treaty, whereby they agreed "to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to the disarmament already undertaken by the League and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement."

Thus, from the beginning of the post-war years, the powers were committed to a general reduction of their arms and they were morally bound to act unto that direction.

Economic Reasons for Disarmament

The economic reasons for disarmament were fairly clear. In an age of keen competition and active war preparations, the nation's expenditure on defence and arms production or purchase far outweighed their expenditure on education, public health and other social services. And once the war was over, huge armament bills were to be paid. During the years following the first World War, the British expenditure on armaments was £200 a minute, and if the war debt were added to this sum, the amount rose to £1,000 a minute—which was more than half the country's total expenditure. Moreover, it meant the pilling up of the more and more profits in the pockets of the capitalists and the increasing poverty of the people. This was obviously bad and detrimental to the interests of the state itself.

Political Reasons for Disarmament

Even before the Great War, it was urged that the competition between nations to outdo each other in their preparations for war was in itself a cause of war, since it bred suspicion and mistrust. Sir Edward Grey, who was the Britith Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of the war in 1914, has rightly stated in his Memoirs: "The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable" The old saying, 'If you want peace, prepare for war' was no longer held to be true in a world largely composed of independent and equally developed

countries. General disarmament was praised as a means of securing lasting peace".

WHY DISARMAMENT EFFORTS FAILED ?

Any one seriously reflecting over the above reasons for disarmament would surely ask : Had anything been done to remove this incubus which both emptied our pockets and threatened our lives ? We know, little was done or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that except for some limitation of naval armaments at the Washington and London Conferences of 1922 and 1931, nothing concrete had been achieved. This naturally led us to enquire, why ? Why the nations, impelled by several moral, economic and political considerations to disarm, failed to reduce their armaments ? The reason is not one but many.

The first of them was the difference in the attitude of different nations towards life. Some of them were war-minded and glorified an adventurous policy abroad ; others preached the virtue of peace. What could, for example, disarmament mean to a Mussolini or a Hilter who proclaimed the cleansing power of war and its role in producing heroes and rousing peoples to noble and glorious action ?

Secondly, there were peoples who believed that huge armaments were their only defence. Thr war-lords in such countries prevented the people from believing that international problems in the world of today could be resolved by peaceful means.

Another real difficulty lay in the demand made by some countries that security should precede disarmament. France always argued that it was dangerous for any people to lay down their arms until the total police power of the world was sufficient to guarantee the safety of individual countries; "demonstrate security and disarmament will naturally follow". On the other hand, there were governments led by Great Britain who argued : "The presence of great armaments makes the nations feel insecure ; reduce the armaments and you will increase confidence." The less the armaments, the less the damage that could be done ; people could not create such havocs with pick-axes as with bombs. This impasse has been the chief political cause of inaction and led to the failure of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. At the very outset, France proclaimed her plan for a League of Nations fighting force to be directed from Geneva. This, she claimed, would give security and make disarmament possible, for her security chiefly meant security against Germany—her historic enemy. When, therefore, Germany made it clear to the Conference that she was no longer willing to endure the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty and that in any world disarmament treaty, she would demand an equal status with other countries, France only

pulled harder at her own point of view. As the Italian delegate Signor Grandi stated before the Senate on June 3, 1932 : "This Conference has had to deal with two difficult problems : the French Question of Security and the German Question of Equality of Rights. The resulting discussion has, during the past month, brought the Conference to a dead stop."

A much more formidable obstacle was the self-interest of armament firms. Most of the arms in the world were manufactured not in government factories, but by private firms. Obviously these companies were threatened with serious loss if the substantial reduction of armaments, resolved upon by the disarmament conferences; materialised. A good deal of opposition to disarmament, therefore, came from the directors and shareholders of the armament firms, particularly those in France, United Kingdom and the United States. The role of the armament firms in the failure of the various attempt at disarmament could be very well illustrated by the story of Mr. Shearer. This gentleman was sent by the three largest shipbuilding corporations of the U. S. as an observer to the Naval Conference held at Geneva in 1927. He was to do all within his power to wreck the Conference. The Conference failed, and Mr. Shearer claimed the money promised to him. But the companies paid him only $ 51,230 and refused to pay him $ 255,655 which Mr. Shearer declared to be the balance due to him. The matter came to light when he sued the companies.

Another great difficulty had been found in differentiating between aggressive and defensive weapons. As Strausz Hupe and Possony have put it, "Defensive and offensive are relative terms which have no meanings if used in an absolute sense. The same weapens can have offensive character if used against one opponent, and defensive value if used against another. In a war against Italy or Spain, the French army of 1939 would have had offensive character. The same army, however, in its war against Germany proved to be no less than a defensive force.....The Royal Navy, although an offensive force, acted during the critical years of World War II as Britain's main defence, in fact as Britain's 'Maginot Line".[19]

'A similar difficulty arose as to what constituted armaments. Most people would think, perphps, first of battleships and guns and then of tanks and fighting aeroplanes. But the modern wars were totalitarian in character, and armament included everythings with which a nation might fight; not only the weapons but the men who used them, and not only the more obvious armaments like cruisers and armoured cars, but also the war-

19. Ibid., op. cit., See Chapter on 'The Quest for security.'

office staff, chemical compounds in laboratories, and instruments of propaganda and censorship. The more one reflected over the list the wider it became; and included almost everything a nation possessed. Experience of the two wars of the present century has confirmed that a nation fought not only with its professional services, but with all its resources. All advanced nations turned themselves into fighting machines, and on the outbreak of hostilities, the most peaceful industries could be converted to war purposes, and as one writer has put it, "chemical fertilizers being replaced by high explosives, typewriters by rifles and machineguns, ladies underwear by gas masks."

Moreover, the present day democratic system of governments caused frequent changes of cabinets and policy-makers, which in some cases, might bring in persons least interested in disarmament, or in the policies of their predecessors. Thus, international agreements frequently were at the mercy of domestic political instability.

Equally important another difficulty with disarmament was the rapidity of modern inventions. Every day, new and more disastrous weapons of war were brought forth by the scientists everywhere and there was the difficulty of including them in agreements in advance.

The last, but not the least important, difficulty with disarmament was the unwillingness of the nations to disarm. Any actual and concrete reduction of arms must be accompanied by what came to be called "Psychological Disarmament". There was mutual distrust and suspicion, fear and hatred everywhere; the foreigner was a joke in every country; everyone thought whatever he did was right, add what the other did, was wrong. Unless this was done away with, no disarmament could materialise, and hence no peace and security on earth could be established on a permanent basis.

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CHAPTER V

RISE OF TOTALITARIANISM IN EUROPE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF SECURITY

The World Scene in 1930-31

The period of 'pacification' which had been inaugurated by the Dawes Plan in 1924, and the Locarno Treaty in 1925, reached its climax by the years 1930-31. The problem of reparations was believed to have been finally resolved by the adoption of the Young Plan. In the matter of disarmament, a draft convention had been produced, though not by unanimous agreement, which paved the way for the forthcoming disarmament conference in 1932. The three principal maritime powers had agreed to a substantial arms reduction in the naval treaty signed at London in 1930. The Pact of Paris seemed to mark the end of war as a legitimate means of settling international disputes. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had given additional strength to the League system of collective security. The Soviet Union had given up the policy of world Communist revolution ; the fall of Zinoviev and his colleagues and the abandonment of the policy of propagandist interference in the internal affairs of the states, carried on by the 'Third International', resulted in the warming up of relations with the Western Democracies; and the Russians had once again begun to cooperate in international conferences.

Similarly, happy developments were taking place in the New World. In the words of Gathorn-Hardy : "The Kellogg Pact had been forestalled by the Mexican resolution at the Sixth-Pan American Conference of 1928, and supplemented by the Conventions for Conciliation and Arbitration in 1929..... There had been a temporary pacification of the quarrel between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Nicaraguan trouble was settled, and the United States had abandoned the policy of economic imperialism which had aroused misgivings in the earlier portion of the quinquennium. Upto the autumn of 1929, the U.S. had enjoyed an apparently unexamplified prosperity which had enabled them to ease, by lavish and welcome loans, the economic stresses of Europe."[1]

In the Middle East, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty marked the beginning of a new independent state with full membership of the League of Nations. Considerable progress was in sight in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Palestine appeared to emerge out of a long period of turmoil and internal chaos. Trouble between Syria and France subsided with the promulgation of a new constitution. In short, the Holy War against the European

1. Gathorne-Hardy, op. cit. p. 258.

Mandatories seemed to end with the surrender of Faysal-ud Dawish in January 1930.

Almost all over the world thus, there appeared at first sight to be solid material for satisfaction, and it was no wonder that the British Prime Minister could in 1930 announce that the risk of war was "practically nill".

But the foundations of this peace were not laid on really solid ground. The war of 1914-18 had thrust Italy into a state of poverty, discontent and disorder; and Mussolini was preparing the Italian nation to fulfil her historic ambitions. The Treaty of Versailles had inflicted upon the Germans a national humiliation, and Hitler was striving "to undo the harm done in 1919". Japan had agreed to the three treaties at Washington in 1921-22 only reluctantly, and was awaiting an opportunity to penetrate right and left. If Soviet Union had decided in favour of 'Socialism first in one country', it was only a matter of expendiency; she had not given up the cult of world communism. If the peoples in the Middle East had given up their violent activities, it was only to gather strength for more intensive operations. If the peoples of Europe were enjoying "unprecedented prosperity" it was based upon the huge supplies of American loans, So, foundations of the world peace were really unstable.

In the autumn of 1929, there occurred what came to be known as 'crash in the Wall Street', and the revulsions, which followed, soon shook the whole world. If the year 1930 had witnessed the climax of pacification, the year 1931 marked the beginning of anticlimax and the whole of prosperity, prospects of peace, disarmament, and the system of collective security came to naught, and the world was thrust into the economic crisis. While the statesmen of the West were absorbed in its solution, event of far-reaching importance took place in the Far East. This was the invasion of Japan upon Manchuria, a province of China, in September 1931. The details of the event would be discussed in other pages of this volume; but it would be necessary to mention here that Japanese aggression over Manchuria and the impotency of the League's system of collective security convinced the other would-be aggressors that the road to aggression was a bed of roses, and they could act as rapaciously as they liked. One event followed another, and the ultimate result was the second World War in 1939.

RISE OF FASCISM IN ITALY

Italy's attempts to set up an overseas empire during the last quarter of the 19th century and early 20th had been thwarted by her European rivals. She had seen France establishing in Tunisia in Northern Africa, right under her nose (1881); she had suffered humiliating reverses from the Ethiopians (1896); and Libya, seized in 1911, had proved "singularly unprofitable".

Upto the outbreak of the first World War, Italy was a great power only by courtesy—none of the others taking her very seriously. That was largely why she had gone into the war ; but here too, she had been the unfortunate partner in the spoils of victory. She got much less than what she had expected. Peace in Europe was said to have been regained ; but for the Italian patriots, it was lost. The war hit Italy hard. Demobilisation created many problems ; the country faced bankruptcy, unemployment, starvation and inflation ; strikes, lock-outs and riots of the hungry mobs were the order of the day ; the middle classes had been ruined ; and the lower middle classes were impoverished. People wanted peace and bread, and were ready to welcome a Messiah who could relieve them of their distress. In such circumstances Mussolini came forward and put forth a programme which was 'nothing save a poetry of violence'. He was subsidized by the nobles and industrialists, who were anxious to be saved from the "scourge of Bolshevism".

In late October 1922, he ordered his 'Black Shirts' to march on Rome, so as to terrifying the king into appointing him premier. His plan succeeded, and the King invited him to form the government. On October 30, 1922, he formed his Cabinet. His followers, utilising the devices of the Communist Police State, destroyed the trade unions, suppressed the peasants and cowed down all political parties by 1925. The army was ready to welcome a movement dedicated to militarism ; the big business and the estate-owners favoured him as "the enemy of trade unions"; the middle class hailed him as "the giver of peace and bread"; and the radical and liberal elements were paralysed. By 1925, Italy was a fascist state. After 1925, Mussolini devoted his energies to the development of fascism and waited for the proper opportunity when he could strike to attain his objective.

NAZI REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

But Italy's first pupil in the new school of violence was Germany, which adopting fascism to the creed of National Socialism, soon out-stripped limits. After the war, Germany was seething with discontent, because the Treaty of Versailles had "crippled her physically, exhausted her economically, weakened her materially, dwindled her politically and humiliated her emotionally". The slogan of the Germans after 1920 was "down with Versailles". The Weimar Republic, established by the Allies, was looked down upon by every German nationalist as 'the symbol of disgrace'. Germany was burning under the fire of revenge. To add fuel to the fire, the economic condition of Germany was most miserable. All her industries had been paralysed ; factories had stopped working ; there was huge unemployment all round ; hunger and starvation were visible on every face. When the Great Depression of 1929-30 came, Germany was plunged into economic chaos. As Prof. Schuman has

has put it : "Jobless workers flocked to the Communist Party. The impoverished peasantry and Kleinburgertum, terrified at the economic collapse and fearful of communism, flocked to Hitler's Nazis who promised to save them from Bolshevism and the Jews. Industrialists and Junkers perceived an opportunity to use Hitler to destroy the trade unions and the liberal and radical parties. The forces of democracy were paralyzed..... The Nazi Messiah appealed to the masses by combining the vocabulory of socialism with the language of impassioned chauvinism and racial hatred[2].

In 1932, Hitler fought the presidential election and lost it to Hinderburg by 'a slim margin.' But polls were not to decide his fate. Nine months after, Hindenhurg was pursuaded to dismiss the former Chancellor, Schleicher, and appoint Hitler instead on January 30, 1933 to save agriculture from agrarian Bolshevism. Soon after, Hitler dissolved the *Reichstag* (the German Parliament) and ordered fresh election on March 5, 1933. Six days before the balloting, the *Reichstag* building was put to fire by the Nazi secret agents and Hitler at once accused the Communists of the crime. Thousands of Communists and Social Democrats were arrested and the whole electorate put into panic. 44% of the electorate voted for the Nazi candidates ; but it soon secured majority in the *Reichstag* by putting all the Communist Deputies behind prison bars.

Within three months, all organised opposition was smashed and all other parties declared unlawful. The Nazi storm-troopers suppressed all trade unions, arrested their leaders, seized their furds and banned their press. On June 30, 1934, thousands of Socialists were shot for treason and the day came to be known in history as 'bloody Saturday'. On August 2, 1934, Hindenburg died and Hitler himself became the President. Thus was Germany delivered to fascism and another totalitarian state was born on the Continent of Europe.

Factors which Brought the Nazi Revolution in Germany

Hitler's rise to power was one of the most important events in the history of international relations between the two World Wars. Several forces underlay this event. Perhaps first in importance was the Peace Settlement of 1919 itself. Germany could not easily forget the humiliations of 1919 and the dictated character of the Versailles Treaty. As Dr. Langsam has put it : "The continuing hostile attitude of France ; the quarrels over the Ruhr, the Rhineland occupation, the Saar, and reparation ; the wrangling over disarmament—all these fed the anger of many Germans. In such circumstances, the Republic's acceptance of disabilites, its policy of reconciliation and fulfilment, and its apparent inability to assert itself more strongly in inter-

2. Schuman, F. L. op. cit., 4th edition, p. 684.

national affairs rankled in the heart of many, especially the younger war-veterans and the youth that believed itself deprived of a glamorous and secure future by the "treachery and cowardice of the complacent Republican politicians."

A second factor was the resurgence of a militant German nationalism, carefully cultivated by Hitler's exaltation of German racial superiority. Many Germans were weary of the manner in which the republican system of government was functioning and they could recall the day when order and discipline, and unity and strength prevailed in the country. They had no love for parliamentary institutions and preferred prestige and glory to liberty and freedom. They wanted a "strong man" who could bring peace and prosperity to the country, and when such a man was in sight they were not wanting in welcoming him.

Moreover, the desire for a strong man was further increased by the fear of communism which was winning millions of discontented workers into its ranks. After the burning of the *Reichstag* building by alleged Communists, the anti-Communist feeling became more strong among the upper and middle classes who considered the Nazis a fit bulwark against communism.

The strong personality of Hitler was also an important factor in the Nazi's rise to power. He understood the temper of the younger generations, and if the saying 'a political revolution should be preceded by a psychological revolution' were true, the *Mein Kampf* of Hitler brought about a tremendous awakening among the younger Germans who were impatient to avenge the wrong done to them by the victors of 1918. In the words of Benns: "Hitler was an adept psychologist, a clever damagogue, and a master showman; he was a resourceful agitator, a tireless worker, and an able organiser". With the conditions which existed in Germany, it was not difficult for Hitler to exploit them to attain the objectives, the National Socialist party had adopted as early as 1920.

Further material was provided by the Great Slump of 1930-31. During the years 1924 and 1929, Germany was experiencing an economic recovery and Nazism made little headway. But the misery and suffering brought about by the four years of economic depression inevitably caused, in Germany, utter reaction against those who were in power there, and the people hailed the Nazis who promised to regain, for their country, that proud place among the nations of the world which she had held before 1914[3].

Hitler's Aims and Objectives

The Nazi Revolution sent a thrill in the chancelleries of Europe and if the saying 'when France catches cold, the whole

3. Also see page 110 of this book.

Europe sneezes,' were true of France in the nineteenth century, the same was true of Germany in the twentieth. In 1920, the National Socialist Party had adopted the three points of its foreign palicy, They were :—(1) The union of all people of German race by the right of self-determination in one great Germany. (2) The cancellation of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. German. (3) The acquisition of further territory for the support of the people and the settlement of the surplus population.

Later on, in the *Mein Kampf*, Hitler laid down the line of Germany's foreign policy. He wrote :

"The German frontiers are the outcome of chance and are only temporary frontiers that have been established as the result of political struggles which took place at various times.....State frontiers are established by human beings and may be changed by human beings."

"The winning back of the lost territories of a country is, in the first place, the question of winning back the political independence and power of the mother country. To make this possible and to secure it through an adriot policy of alliance is the first task for a vigorous direction of our foreign policy."

He further wrote :

"We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of prewar times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future. But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must principally think of Russia and the border states subject to her.....Today, there are eighty million Germans in Europe, and our foreign policy will be recognised as rightly conducted only when, after barely a hundred years, there will be 250 million Germans living on this Continent, not packed together as the coolies in the factories of another continent but as tillers of the soil and workers whose labour will be a national assurance for their existence."

Hitler also laid dawn :

"Germany within her existing frontiers, could attain only a very limited self-sufficiency in raw materials, and none at all in foodstuffs. The only remedy lay in the acquisition of greater living space.....If then, we accept the security of our food situation as the principal question, the space necessary to insure it can only be sought in Europe, not, as in the liberal capitalist view, in the exploitation of colonies. It is not a matter of acquiring population but of gaining space for agricultural use. Moreover, areas producing raw material can be more usefully

sought in Europe in immediate proximity to the Reich than overseas."[4]

The real goal of German diplomacy lay to the south and the east. Nazi ideology looked upon German control of central and south-eastern Europe as a "national right" and had evolved an elaborate argument to justify German expansion into the area. First, Germany was a state with a growing and virile population which, in the nature of things, was forced to look for new lands into which the German peoples might overflow. This pressure had become more acute, since the loss of German colonies, at the close of the World War, had deprived the *Reich* of the opportunity for colonial expansion after the pattern of Great Britain and France. Eastern Europe was thinly populated and was inhabited by races which German ideology regarded as inferior and as incapable of realising the potentialities of the region. German nation was to play the natural role of conquering and exploiting the inferior stocks. Second, the Nazi argument pointed out that this part of Europe was economically complementary to Germany. The Treaty of Versailles had "Balkanised" central and south-eastern Europe by dividing it into a number of smaller states, not one of which was economically self-sufficient. The area was rich in economic resources, coal, oil, and wheat of the kind which Germany most needed for its own development. But the prevailing political system made the development of the area difficult. No one state was able to profitably exploit the natural resources of Central Europe. Austria had coal but no grain ; Hungary was one vast granary without a factory ; Rumania had ores and invaluable oil without markets. What was needed was a single political and military force powerful enough to compel the union of these resources, so that their potentialities might be realised. Germany, with its industrial techniques, with its factories crying for raw materials and markets, was the only possible state capable of assuming the task. So ran the Nazi argument.

Hitler Prepares to Act Upon His Programme

Soon after coming into power, Hitler proceeded to consolidate his position and to establish fascism on solid grounds. Only an internally strong and well-armed Germany could expand beyond her frontiers, and therefore the years following 1933 were utilised to consolidate the position at home. On July 14, 1933, Hitler's Government declared that the National Socialist Party was the only legal party in Germany and that, the existence or formation of new parties would constitute high treason. Thus, the Communist, Social Democratic and Democratic parties were out-lawed. As in Italy, all political life was centralised

4. For details of Hitler's foreign policy, see Hitler, A. Mein Kampf (London, Hurst, 1924) pp. 522-543.

in and controlled by Mussolini's Fascist Party, so at last, in Germany the political life of the republic was monopolised by the Nazis. The Nazi flag became the official flag of the Third *Reich*, and Hitler announced : "The National Socialist Party is the state". Propaganda to popularise Nazism and forceful suppression of all opposition were the two instruments of Hitler, the former entrusted to Goebbles and the latter, to Goering. All freedoms of speech, expression, communication and press were abolished. Education was entrusted to convinced Nazis ; and officials known to be in opposition to Hitler were dismissed. Thousands of Germans were arrested, shot dead or put in concentration camps.

Hitler did not limit his activities to the political realm alone. Successive steps were taken to put Germany's financial house in order and even the churches were not spared. All the previously existing trade unions were suppressed and all employers' associations were dissolved. Strikes and lock-outs were declared illegal ; and a new organisation, known as German Labour Front, representing both capital and labour, was established. Foreign trade was also regulated in keeping with the general principles of Nazism. In the realm of religion also, Hitler wanted that there should be only one national church with one national bishop at its head and that it should be subordinate to the State. In order to forestall any possible interference by Hitler, the then existing some 29 major Protestant churches created in 1933, an organisation which would bring them all into one German Evangelical Church.

Germany's Rearmament

This was not all. Hitler's real problem was one of building up an overwhelming military force dividing and weakening his prospective enemies, and finding allies. Rearmament was a dangerous proposition, as it meant the violation of treaty obligations, which, in itself, involved the danger of a preventive war by the French bloc before Germany was ready to resist. Here, therefore, Hitler moved gradually and cautiously. In the midst of professions of peace and further pleas for equality, Germany announced her withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933. On March 16, 1935, in open repudiation of Part V of the Versailles Treaty, the "Law for the Reconstruction of the National Defence Forces" was announced and thereby, military conscription was introduced. This led to the Anglo-French-Italian "Stressa Front" of April, and to Germany's condemnation by the League Council on April 17. There were only warnings and protests, but no action except that France signed pacts of Friendship and Non-aggression with Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in May 1935. Whatever unity was left, was further shattered when Britain entered into a pact with Berlin on June 18, 1935, whereby the *Reich* was granted a navy 35 percent of the British strength.

This pact meant the British connivance at Hitler's repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, and this gave further encouragement to Hitler. On October 15, 1935, the German general-staff was re-established with General Ludwig Beck as its chief.

The third important step in the direction of rearmament was taken in 1936 when on March 7, Hitler announced the abrogation of the freely-negotiated Locarno treaties of 1925 and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, alleging that the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 1935 violated the spirit of Locarno. Again protests, warnings and League's condemnation followed but no action was taken. German troops remained in the Rhineland.

On August 24, 1936, German military service was extended from one to two years. In September 1936, before the Party Congress at Nuremberg, Hitler demanded of his followers new sacrifices and promised to make the *Reich* economically self-sufficient within four years. Hitler denounced Russia and the Bolshevist Jews and, in the presence of thousands of troops, he shouted : "We are ready any hour .....I cannot permit ruined states on my doorsteps".

Repercussions in Europe

Such a policy and programme, as laid down in the *Mein Kampf* and such steps as were taken by Hitler's Germany, were bound to result in nervousness, fear, hatred, suspicion and uneasiness in other countries of the Continent in particular and of the world in general. But, since in this part of the discussion we are mainly concerned with Europe, let us analyse the reactions and the striking changes brought about by the Nazi revolution in the political orientation of several of the more important powers.

The effect of the Nazi revolution was of two kinds. In some countries, the predominant feeling was one of moral indignation at the cruelties and atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi dictatorship ; in others, it was one of fear and profound anxiety at this open repudiation of the Peace Settlement of 1919. In United States and Great Britain, where the feeling was one of indignation, not of fear, there was no marked change of policy towards Germany. In France, Soviet Union, Italy and some of the lesser powers, where the governments were greatly moved by the keen apprehensions of the international consequences of Hitler's rise to power, there took place sudden reversal of policy.

1. The Four Power Pact

The first change subsequent to and consequent upon the Nazi revolution was the Four Power Pact between Britain, France, Germany and Italy. In March 1933, the British Prime

Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, on his way home from Geneva, met Mussolini in Rome to discuss the problem of disarmament and suggested to the latter the conclusion of a pact between the Big Powers of Europe.

Motives of Italy behind the Pact :

As one of the revisionist powers, Italy wanted to restore Germany to the position of equality with other Great Powers as soon as possible, so that the peace treaties might soon be revised. Moreover, she wanted to weaken the satellites of France-Poland and the *Little Entente* Powers.

These aims were clearly visible in the draft of the Pact prepared by Italy. It asked the signatories first, to consider the revision of the peace treaties ; secondly, to recognise Germany's right to rearm, in case disarmament conference failed and finally, to undertake to co-ordinate their policy in all extra-European questions as well as in the colonial sphere.

Since the British interests were not going to be very much affected, except in the colonies, she prudently refrained from committing either way and waited for the other powers reactions. Since the interests of France were going to be vitally and considerably affected, she disliked the proposals and in turn made counter-proposals. First, she suggested that the powers should undertake to cooperate, alongwith all others within the framework of the League ; secondly, the powers should reaffirm Artiles 10 and 16 of the League Covenant ; thirdly, in case the disarmament conference failed, the signatories should jointly consider the problem of disarmament. No reference was made to the question of colonies in these proposals.

The proposal appeared to Germany so vague and fruitless that she refused to accept them. But on the insistence of Mussolini, the representatives of the Four Powers met at Rome and signed the Pact on July 15, 1933, whereby the powers agreed to consult one another to promote peace and disarmament.

Effect of the Pact :

The Pact served its desired end, and that was to create estrangemsnt between France and her clients. The latter felt grieved that Italy had attacked their vital interests and that France remained lukewarm in defending them. Moreover, Poland, greatest among the lesser powers, bitterly resented the success of Italy—the least of the great powers, in excluding her from the select committee of the makers of Europe's destiny. The pact, in its own way, paved the way for a thorough-going change in the relationship among the states of Europe.

2. Polish-German Pact

The second fruit of the Nazi revolution was the Polish-

German Pact. Nowhere in Europe, since 1919, the feelings were more bitter than between Poland and Germany. The creation of the Polish Corridor and the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany were the most outstanding grievances of Germany ; and the German minority in Poland had been constantly complaining to the League against the injustices of the Polish Government. A sudden change appeared in the attitude of both the governments and steps were taken towards a rapproache ment in January 1934, and the Polish-German Pact was signed.

Motives of Germany :

Friendship with the West at that stage was not possible because the significance of the Naziregime was not yet clear to them. Soviet Union could not be befriended, as Hitler had started the persecution of the Jews and the Communists, and that was being resented by Moscow. Austria was hostile, because Hitler was penalising the German Social Democrats, the largest political group in Austria. Czechoslovakia in Hitler's eyes was too insignificant to be befriended. Everything thus pointed to a truce with Poland.

Moties of Poland :

Poland had become distrustful of her ally, France, by the latter's attitude in the Locarno Pact (when she had subordinated Polish interests to her own security) and the recent Four Power Pact. A strong Germany in between, French help in time of difficulty would not be of much use. Poland could not incur the displeasure of both. She was to make a choice between Germany and France. She chose the former, as she judged her to be stronger and more reliable. Thus, Poland came out of the French camp.

3. Franco-Soviet Pact

The third reorientation of continental affiliations was the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 1935. Nazi Germany was a common enemy of both France and Soviet Russia. So, both came closer in the face of the common danger. France supported Russia's membership of the League ahd in September 1934, U. S. S. R. joined the League and was elected a permanent member of the Council. The two powers continued their efforts for a still closer understanding, and May on 2, 1935 a five years Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact was signed at the *Quai d' Orsay* whereby each signatory undertook to come to the assistance of the other if attacked by any European power.

Britain had proposed that Germany should also be a party to this Pact. Both France and U. S. S. R. agreed, and prepared the draft of an Eastern Pact under which France and U. S. S. R. would guarantee, not only each other against aggression from

Germany, but would also guarantee Germany against aggression by the other.

The plan in the German eyes was absurd, as she could hardly imagine a circumstance when she would obtain help from France against the U. S. S R. or *vice versa*. The draft was approved by London but rejected by Berlin.

4. Russo-Czechoslovak Pact

As France entered into a Pact with Moscow, so also her ally Czechoslovakia, more or less on the same terms, signed a pact about a fortnight later. This pact displayed the growing rift in the ranks of the *Little Entente*, because Rumania, when invited to conclude a similar pact with Soviet Union, refused the offer, and Yugoslavia was one of the few European states which still refused recognition to Soviet Union.

5. Italo-German Accord over Austria

Soon after coming into power, Hitler began to prepare for war against France and Great Britain. For this, a mighty sword and control of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to protect the German rear was needed. But Mussolini could not tolerate Germany pushing southward toward Bolzano and Trieste. Therefore, he opposed Hitler's designs on Austria. Propaganda from Berlin converted perhaps 40 per cent of the Austrian electrorate to the Nazi faith and to union with Germany during 1933. But in order to check the penetration of Germany, the Austrian conservative chancellor, Dollfuss, established a military organisation *Heimwehr* and utilised it to bolster up a fascist regime. Huge financial assistance was given to the *Heimwehr* by Mussolini, and his influence in Austria was supreme. At the instance of Mussolini and the *Heimwehr* leaders, Dollfuss crushed the Social Democrats in February 1934, and in May, a series of political and economic protocols were signed between Austria on the one side and Italy and Hungary on the other.

This was an eye-sore to Germany. Hitler personally went to confer with Mussolini at Venice on June 15, 1234 ; but no agreement could be reached. Being disappointed to secure control of Austria by peaceful penetration, Hitler subsidized the Austrian Nazis, who resorted to force. On July 25, 1934, they seized the Chancellery building, shot Dollfuss, and made him bleed to death. The event created great stir in Austria, and the Nazi Party, under inspiration from Berlin, was held responsible for the crime. Hitler felt discredited and adopted an attitude of non-interference in Austrian affairs for two years. At last, in July 1936, he agreed to respect Austrian independence and to reopen German trade and travel with Vienna under an Austro-German accord.

In the meantime, the way was paved for an Italo-German accord on October 25. 1936. Italy was preoccupied in her Ethopian adventure. Hitler saw his chance and forced Mussolini to establish a joint Italo-German condominium over Austria. It foreshadowed an alliance between the Fascist Powers, and Austria became a bridge, instead of a barrier, between Germany and Italy.

6. Franco-Italian Agreement

Upto 1933, France and Italy were in hostile camps, France being the leader of the non-revisionist powers, and Italy being in the revisionist camp. But when Hitler threatened and intervened in Austria, and became a common danger to both France and Italy, the two came closer. But they clashed at so many points and before any friendship, it was essantial that those differences were ironed out. Both of them had clients, and they all quarrelled among themselves. Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia were the client, of France ; Hungary and Bulgaria were those of Italy. What were the tangles ?

So far as Poland was concerned, she had already gone over to the German camp. Czechoslovakia did not like that German influence should establish itself in Austria, because that would maximise the chances of German attack any time. Moreover, she stood to lose nothing from the Franco-Italian *entente*. Yugoslavia was, of course, the first enemy of Franco-Italian friendship, because she collided with Italy in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas. She also did not like the Italian domination over Austria, for in that case, she would be encircled by a strengthened Italy. She, therefore, disliked the reconciliation between France and Italy, which was obviously designed to strengthen the latter's hold over Austria.

So far as Rumania was concerned, she was far off to be directly affected, but she was quite concerned to preserve the solidarity of the *Little Entente*.

Now let us turn to the clients of Italy. Since 1919, Italy had been supporting Hungary and Bulgaria against the *Little Entente*. There was hostility between Hungary and Yugoslavia on the one hand and between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other.

In the month of October 1934, it so happened that the Yugoslovian King, Alexandar, while visiting France, was murdered in French territory at Marseilles. A wave of anger swept over Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs suspected that their king could have never been murdered in the territory of a friendly country, except for the conspiracy of Hungary and Italy. So, she decided to protest against Hungary and Italy to the League of Nations.

Now if Yugoslavia, an ally of France, were to complain against Italy, there would be no friendship between France and Italy. So, France pressed Yugoslavia to spare Italy and to direct her charge against Hungary alone. And Italy in turn pressed Hungary not to defend herself, and to accept such measure of penalty as the League might impose, and such measure of censure as might suffice to appease Yugoslavia. Thus, the ground was prepared for a friendship between France and Italy and in the month of January 1935, a series of agreements were signed between the two countries and the long Franco-Italian feud ended.

As regards Germany, the two powers agreed to concert upon the attitude to be adopted in the event of Germany persuing a policy of rearmament.

As regards Central Europe, they agreed to recommend to Austria and all her neighbouring states to enter into a pact undertaking not to intervene in one another's affairs and not to support attempts to destroy the independence or overthrow the political or social regime of their respective countries. In the mean-time, they also agreed to consult together with Austria, and such other of her neighbours as might be willing to a concerted action in the event of a threat to Austrian independence.

As regards Africa, France ceded to Italy, in settlement of her claims under the Treaty of London, a strip of French equatorial Africa adjacent to the Italian province of Libya, and a small triangle of French Somaliland adjoining Eritrea. The status of Italians in Tunis was regulated and France gave Mussolini to understand that France was disinterested in any concession which Italy might obtain in Abyssinia.

Besides these various pacts and alliances, the powers, most likely to be threatened by the aggressive intents of Germany, proceded to strengthen their security by befriending the smaller states between themselves and Germany or round about Germany. The Soviet Union, for example, extended the non-aggression pacts with Poland and the Baltic states to 1945. She established closer relations with Great Britain and Turkey. In February, 1934, Soviet Union was recognised by Hungary and in June, by Rumania and Czechoslovakia. In January 1935, the Soviet vice-Commissar of Defence, Tukhachevsky announced that the Red Army had been increased from 562,000 to 940,000 and that planes, tanks and artillery had been multiplied manyfold. Similarly, in May 1934, following the bloody suppression of the Austrian Social Democrats, Mussolini formed an Italian bloc by concluding a series of political and economic agreements with Hungary and Austria. France also strengthened her position by reasserting her solidarity with Belgium and the *Little Entente*. The French Foreign Minister, M. Barthou, also suggested the conclusion of an Eastern Pact of Mutual Guarantee

on the lines of the Locarno agreements between Soviet Russia, Poland, the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia and Germany, but the proposal was rejected by Germany.

Balkan International Relations and the Impact of the Nazi Revolution Thereupon

The Balkan peninsula, characterised by the writers of the nineteenth century European history as the 'cockpit of Europe' played an important role in the European international politics during the two World Wars. This region had been the meeting place of different races, the Greeks, the Slavs, the Bulgurs, the Serbs and the Albanians. All these races had been struggling for supremacy as well as for the establishment of independent constitutional states. The Ottoman Empire, although weak and impotent,kept them under one common authority for long ; but the Great War of 1914-18, shattered it to pieces and its dependencies were established as several independent states.

During the years following the Peace Settlement, the statesmen of the Balkan countries were busy in seeking external security and internal solidarity. In 1920, Yugoslavia signed a convention with Czechoslovakia in which each agreed to assist the other, in case of an unprovoked attack by Hungary. A convention of the similar nature was signed in April 1921 between Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and the so called *Little Entente* was completed two months later by a Yugoslav-Rumanian alliance in which each agreed to aid the other if attacked by Hungary or Bulgaria.

But, Rumania, in view of the fact that her annexation of Bessabia, though eventually sanctioned by the principal Allies was not recognised as legal by the Russian Government, desired security not only against Bulgaria but against Russia as well. Soon after the first World War, therefore, Rumania opened negotiations with Poland which was also fearful of Soviet Union and in 1921, a Polish-Rumanian Defensive Alliance was signed.

The rise of Hitler to power, the withdrawal of Germany from League of Nations and the subsequent collapse of the Geneva Disarmament Conference had their repercussions in the Balkan peninsula, as they did in Central Europe. Eastern and south-eastern Europe being the targets of Hitler, the states in this region felt nervous and came closer. As the result of negotiations, initiated by Greece and Turkey, a movement was started to create an organisation similar to the *Little Entente* in the Balkan Peninsula. This resulted in the signing of what came to be known as the Balkan *Entente* on February 9, 1934. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece agreed to guarantee one another's Balkan frontiers. The Pact could also be applied

against any Balkan state that might join an outside power that had committed an act of aggression against one of the signatories. Bulgaria refused to sign the Pact as it confirmed frontiers against whose injustice she had been constantly protesting. Albania, in whose affairs Italy continued to play a dominant role, was not invited to join. The Balkan Pact was obviously much more in the nature of a defensive alliance than a mere non-aggression pact.

These were the more important changes that took place in the diplomatic set up of Europe during the two years following the Nazi revolution.

Germany's Search for Allies

The changes in the diplomatic set up of Europe that took place subsequent to and consequent upon the Nazi revolution, left Germany isolated. France, Soviet Russia, and Italy, the three great powers of the Continent, had sought allies ; at least, each one of them had somebody to rely upon. But Germany was friendless and without allies ; her violation of the international agreements and peace treaties, her abandonment of the League, her rearmament programme and lastly, her aggressive intents were liked by none on the Continent. Great Britain alone appeared conciliatory, and particularly after the Anglo-German Naval accord of June 18, 1935 ; but she also did not promise to be a trustworthy ally. An isolated Germany, howsoever strong and powerful, could not afford to wage a war with the whole of Europe aligned against her.

Naturally therefore, Hitler looked around for friendly powers and, when seriously pondered, he found his country surrounded by nothing but unfriendly, untrustworthy and uncompromising peoples. On her west was the historic enemy, France ; on her east was the prospective enemy, Soviet Union ; and on her south was the rival, Italy. Friendship was possible neither with France nor with the Soviet Union. The only possible ally of the future could be Italy. But Mussolini was afraid of Germany, afraid that Hitler would strike to add Austria to the *Reich*, thus bringing German armies to the Brenner Pass. Just south to the Pass, lived a compact group of a quarter million Germans, far too tempting a morsel to be ignored by a powerful dictator with a mighty urge to push out the boundaries of Germany to include all Germans. Moreover, *Anschluss* would extend German influence into or at least towards the Balkans, an area where Mussolini hoped to establish the predominance of Italy.

However, the Ethiopian war fundamentally changed the position of Italy. All her military strength was directed in the African adventure, and she was left with only a meagre strength for

service in Europe. Moreover, it created a sharp wedge between Italy on the one side, and the League powers, France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia, on the other. *Real—politik* dictated friendship with Germany as the only way out of comparative impotence. There was still firmer basis for Italo-German relations. Italy, like Germany, was one of the leading revisionist powers, and Mussolini was committed to undo the Peace Settlement of 1919. Ideological similarity provided the background and international situation served as the bridge between the two dictators. Moreover, Mussolini was sending men and munitions to aid General Franco in his adventure against the Spanish Democracy and this provided to Hitler an opportunity to win over the good-will of Mussolini.

In this background, Berlin and Rome signed an agreement on October 25, 1936, providing for : (1) collaboration of the two states in all matters affecting their "parallel interests" ; (2) the maintenance of Spain's territorial and colonial integrity ; (3) economic co-operation in the Danubian region ; and (4) the defence of European civilisation against communism. In the spirit of this accord, the two governments entered into a trade agreement in December of the same year, whereby Germany extended to the Italian colonies, the same economic privileges which the former enjoyed in Italy. The river and rail traffic of the Danubian states was divided in such a way as to benefit Hamburg and Trieste. Thus was created what came to be known as Rome-Berlin Axis.

This alone did not satisfy Hitler. He had a great enemy in Soviet communism which was stealthily and steadily penetrating into different regions of the world and was a great danger to Germany's international position. Japan, pursuing as she was similar policy, presented herself a good ally, and on November 25, 1936, Germany signed a pact with Tokyo in which each signatory promised : (1) to inform the other concerning the activities of the Comintern ; (2) to consult with the other concerning measures to combat its activity ; and (3) to execute these measures in close co-operation. Directed as it was primarily against Soviet Union, the Pact came to be called Anti-Comintern Pact.

On November 6, 1937, Italy also adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact and thus the fascist triplice or Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was completed.

By the end of 1936, a considerable part of the world could be seen divided into two groups, one led by Germany, Italy and Japan, the other by France and the Soviet Union. This grouping was effected not so much by a common political faith as by the fact that the first group was dissatisfied, for one reason or the other, with the Peace Settlement of 1919 and was therefore in-

terested in revising it ; the other group desired to perpetuate the *status-quo*. It was, in a way, a grouping of the Haves in the one camp and Haves-nots in the other.

For the moment, London refused to commit itself to either group and maintained an attitude of what might be called 'cautions neutrality,' until forced out of it by the disquieting actions of the fascist dictators. The British Government had always been the advocate of balance of power principle on the Continent, and once it was found being threatened, she stepped in to protect it. History, as they say, was repeating itself and as the Triple Alliance of 1882 between Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary had compelled Great Britain, France and Russia to come closer, the Fascist Triplice of 1936 goaded Great Britain and France, and later on Soviet Union, to iron out their erstwhile differences, and face the common danger lurking in the f ace, with concerted efforts. One fascist coup after another was taking place, and the world seemed to march towards destruction. Neither the League of Nations, which was an instrument for the maintenance of world peace, nor the statesmen who had resolved in 1919 "to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war" cared to resist the aggressors with collective force ; and the inevitable happened *viz.*, the second World War. Before the story of the war is related, it would be necessary to study the various mile-stones in the long journey that led to it.

STORY OF AGGRESSION IN EUROPE

1. Germany's Repudiation of her International Obligations

The first country in Europe to break away from its treaty obligations and to flout the collective security system of the League of Nations was obviously Hitler's Germany. On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew herself from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations and began to rearm herself. These steps warned the Western world that Hitler was determined upon aggression and that something must be done. At the beginning of February 1935, the British and French Ministers met in London and issued a statement proposing to the German Government the conclusion of Eastern and Central European Pacts, and supplementing the Locarno Pact of 1925 by an air pact, under which the Locarno Powers should agree to give the assistance of their forces to any one of their members which was attacked by another from the air.

The German Government, not yet well-prepared, welcomed the proposal and suggested a conference with the British representatives to discuss the whole matter. The British Foreign Secretary, Simon and the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, Eden, flew to Berlin.

But before the meeting could take place, much had happened. The British Government had occasion to issue a memorandum explaining to the House of Commons the reasons for its rearmament programme and, in this memorandum, stress was laid, to the exclusion of all other factors, on the threat of German armaments. This caused great indignation in Berlin. On the plea of a slight indisposition, Hitler cancelled the date fixed for the meeting with British Ministers. At the same time, the French Chamber of Deputies was also discussing a rearmament programme. In the meantime, plebiscite was held on January 13, 1935 in the Saar under the supervision of a League Commission, and this resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of the Saar's return to Germany. On January 17, the League, accordingly, awarded the entire Saar basin to Germany and on March 1, 1935, the formal transfer of the district took place. Hitler now decided on a counter stroke and on March 16, 1935, announced that Germany "no longer considered herself bound by the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, that the peace strength of his army would be in future fixed at 36 divisions and that, it would be raised by conscription". Hitler, however, announced Germany's adherence to the Locarno Treaty which was freely negotiated and re-invited the British representative. Protests against Germany's action were made ; the League condemned all her actions ; but no steps were taken by the powers either singly or collectively to compel Germany to observe her treaty obligations. Not only this, Simon and Eden again went to Berlin, thereby agreeing to what had happened in between, *i.e.*, the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty.

The Conference was held on March 25, 1935. Hitler reiterated his welcome of the Air Pact and his dislike of the Eastern as well as the Central European Pacts. He reaffirmed his pacific intentions but declared that the size of the German army was irrevocably fixed. On land, he agreed to any limitation acceptable to other powers ; in the air he claimed parity with France, though the constant increase in the Soviet air force might oblige him to reconsider this ; on the sea, he agreed to 35% of British naval strength in all categories of ships.

The Stressa Conference and After:

In the meantime, France had demanded a special session of the League Council in April 1935 to consider Germany's action and by way of preparation for this session, the French, British and Italian statesmen met in a conference at Stressa. They drafted a resolution for submission to the League Council, condemning Germany's repudiation of her obligations under the Versailles Treaty. The resolution was duly presented to the Council and passed through. It caused a great indignation in Berlin, particularly against London, which had recently condoned Germany's action by sending her Foreign Secretary to Berlin.

In order to conciliate feelings in Berlin, London, soon after the League Council dispersed, sent an air intimation to Berlin saying that she was prepared to accept Hitler's offer to limit German naval strength in all categories of ships to 35% of the British strength and giving Germany the right to equality with the British Empire in respect of submarines and that, they would welcome an agreement on this basis. Hitler welcomed the offer and, on June 18, 1935, the Anglo-German Naval agreement was signed. Thus, on the one hand, England was cooperating with France in condemning Germany's repudiation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty and, on the other, she was openly recognising Germany's right to ignore (up to 35% of British strength) the naval restrictions imposed by the Treaty and to possess all categories of ships including submarines, altogether prohibited by it. This attitude of Britain gave to Hitler further encouragement towards preparedness for the major offensive. The Franco-Soviet Pact of May 1935 was from the first regarded by Germany as a military alliance directed solely against her and therefore killing the spirit of the Locarno. Germany vehemently protested against it and when, early in 1936, it was presented to the French Chamber of Deputies for ratification, the German Government, on March 7, 1936, informed the British, French and Belgian Governments that as the Franco-Soviet Pact was in complete violation of the obligations undertaken by France under the Locarno Treaty, Berlin no longer considered herself bound by it. On the same day, 20,000 German troops reoccupied the Rhineland.

This step caused great alarm in France but no serious proposals were put forth for reprisals or sanctions. In Great Britain, this repudiation of a freely-negotiated treaty shocked public opinion, but, there too, nobody was ready to condemn openly the actions of Hitler. However, the Council of the League met in London and announced that Germany had violated the Versailles Treaty by causing military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarised zone. France, Poland, the Little *Entente* Powers and Soviet Russia proposed economic and financial sanctions against Germany ; but Great Britain opposed. The British Government, however, agreed to conversations with the general staffs of France and Belgium on the steps to be taken in the event of a German attack on their territory. Once again, it was shown that the powers would not agree on collective action to compel a state to observe its treaty obligations.

2. Abyssinian Crisis

In the meantime, the attention of the political world was diverted towards the Abyssinian episode. Right from 1922, Mussolini was bidding time and awaiting the proper opportunity for the fulfilment of his country's long-cherished desires—the

obtaining of "unredeemed Italy". This opportunity came in 1935 when he had strengthened his position by entering into a pact with France, by which he obtained the promise of non-interference from one of the important powers of the Continent. Mussolini decided to give to the Western world a taste of fascism and Abyssinia was chosen as the target. What were the reasons that determined the choice? First, Abyssinia was rich in raw materials and was reputed to possess mineral wealth in the hitherto undeveloped interior; secondly, it could serve as an outlet for her growing population; thirdly, it lay between the existing Italian colonies of Somaliland and Eritrea, and the possesion of Abyssinia would bridge the two sectors of the Italian empire, and finally because, it was the only independent native state left in Africa. Besides, there was another factor also. By the Treaty of Ucciali of 1889, the Italians had come to regard Abyssinia as their protectorate but their claims were denounced by Menelik in 1893, and finally, Italy's defeat at Adowa in 1896 left among the Italians a rankling and vindictive memory.

Beginning of the Crisis.

On December 5,1934, a clash occurred between the Abyssinian troops and a detachment of Italian forces in Somaliland near the village of Walwal[5]. In the skirmish, which followed, a few Italians were killed. The Italian Government demanded an apology and a substantial indemnity from Abyssinia. On December 13, Abyssinia referred the matter to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant.

Attitude of Britain and France

France opposed every attempt at Geneva to act upon this appeal, because she wanted to win over the friendship of Italy against Germany at any cost. On January 7, 1935, France entered into a series of agreements with Italy giving to the latter complete assurances of her dis-interestedness in her Abyssinian adventure. The British Government appointed a Commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Maffey to look into the matter and make recommendation for necessary action. On June 18, the Commission recommended that the British Government should not oppose Italian designs on Abssinia and let the matter go.

From January to March 1935, Italian armies poured into Eritrea and Somaliland and Abyssinia made repeated appeals to the League. Even when Great Britain and France met at Stressa to consider over Germany's repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, they did not discuss the Abyssinian issue though Italy was constantly preparing herself for the adventure This was naturally interpreted by Mussolini as England's and France's go-ahead signal. Not only that London adopted an attitude

5. It has been found that this clash was a pre-conceived Italian plan.

of non-interference, she, rather, came out with openly appeasing the Duce. In June 1935, Eden personally flew to Rome and proposed that Great Britain would cede to Abyssinia the port of Zeib in British Somaliland, and that Abyssinia should, in turn, cede the southern province of Ogaden to Italy. Mussolini rejected the proposal partly because, the offer was too inadequate and partly because, Abyssinia would be further strengthened by obtaining access to the sea.

On August 18, 1935, the statesmen of Britain, France and Italy, as parties to the Agreement of 1906, met in Paris. The British and French delegates came forward with a proposal that Abyssinia should be asked to apply to the League for helping her in the economic development and administrative reorganisation of the country and, that in so doing, the League should take particular account of the special interests of Italy. This too was rejected by Mussolini.

Attitude of the United States

In July 1935, Abyssinia approached the U. S. for help. President Roosevelt only replied: My Government would be loth to believe that either Italy or Abyssinia would resort to other than pacific means as a method of dealing with controversy or would permit any situation to arise which would be inconsistent with the commitments of the pact." (Pact of Paris). On October 5, 1935, two days after the actual invasion by Italy, the President announced that a "state of war existed, and that export of American arms and implements of war to either belligerent was illegal", This meant a penalisation of Abyssinia for being attacked and a clear benefit to the aggressor, Moreover, the Americans vigorously asserted that the Neutrality Resolution passed by Congress in 1935 did not authorise the President to embargo iron, petroleum and steel. A brisk trade developed between Italy and America in goods other than war material because they had not been banned by the U. S. Congress. American exports to Italian Africa rose from a monthly average of $ 25,403 in 1934 to $ 367,789 in October 1935. Export of crude oil to Italy increased by 600% and export to Abyssinia declined.

Attitude of the League of Nations

The actual invasion took place on October 3, 1935 and a week after, the League Council resolved that Italy had resorted to war in disregard of its Covenant under Article 12. Almost three weeks after, on October 19, the Council recommended sanctions. An arms and financial embargo was imposed upon Italy, but oil was wisely omitted from the list. On November 6, the Canadian representative proposed that oil should be also included in the list. Italy declared that she would regard the application of an oil sanction as an "unfriendly act likely to

lead to armed hostilities." For five months, the powers debated the issue and the recommendation was never carried through, because the new French Foreign Minister, Pierre Flandian, persuaded the League Committee on sanctions to make one more attempt at conciliation before resorting to the embargo.

The Abyssinians fought the Italians with a martyr's zeal and inflicted crushing defeats upon them, The Anglo-French statesmen feared Italy's defeat and decided to come to her rescue. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare flew to Paris and in consultation with the French Foreign, Minister, Laval, prepared a plan, known to history as Hoare-Laval Plan, to be presented to the combatants. The Plan proposed to cede to Italy much more Abyssinian territory than had yet been attacked by Italy and Abyssinia to be satisfied by a corridor to the sea through British Somaliland.

The Plan, when disclosed in Britain, caused a good deal of public condemnation ; Hoare was compelled to resign as Foreign Secretary and with him, the Plan also died away. A few weeks later, Laval was also forced to resign.

In March 1936, the Italian army gained ground and, within less than a month, reached near the Abyssinian capital. At the end of April, Emperor Haile Sellasie made a fervent and last appeal to the League, saying : "I must still hold on until my tardy allies appear and if they never come, then I say prophetically and without bitterness, the West must perish". Even this went unheeded.

On May 2, 1936, the Emperor fled away, leaving the people to their fate. The country was doomed ; Addis Ababa fell to the Italian army ; and on May 9, 1936, the King of Italy became the Emperor of Abyssinia and the whole country was soon officially annexed.

Attitude and Interests of the Powers in the Abyssinian Episode

The machinery of the League of Nations was called into action to check the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. The strong collective security forces in England and France, with the support of most of the small nations of Europe, wished to establish the League's authority over international affairs by putting a stop to Italian aggression at the expense of a League member. Moreover, even the power politics faction in England felt Britain's interests to be menaced by the Italian campaign. The head-quarters of the Nile rose in Ethiopia ; these waters, controlled by the great dam at Aswan, watered the entire Nile valley. An Italian army in control of Abyssinia could menace the prosperity of all Egypt. From a strategic point of view, the Italian occupation was also unwelcome since it menaced British control of the Red Sea and endangered communications

with India by the Suez route. It was not surprising therefore, that London urged the League to make a firm stand against Italy.

The League Council imposed limited economic sanctions upon Italy ; the League States agreed to levy an embargo upon the export of arms and certain strategic raw materials to Italy. But the League's attempt at peaceable coercion failed miserably. For one thing, the League carefully refrained from levying a really severe embargo upon the export of raw materials essential to the Italian war machine. Most notably, no embargo upon oil exports to Italy was declared although such an embargo, if enforced, might have compelled Italy to abandon its venture. Military sanctions were never considered. Within less than two years of the conquest, Italy's sovereignty over Abyssinia was recognised by one state after the other and another crushing blow was dealt to the belief in the efficacy of collective action against the aggressor.

Why this Reluctance ?

There were three main factors behind the reluctance to impose effective sanctions against Italy. In the first place, Britain's position in the Mediterranean was extremely vulnerable to Italian naval attack. She did not like that Italy should launch an attack which might mean disastrous naval war in the Mediterranean, for which England was not at the moment well-prepared. Secondly, Great Britain and France did not like to alienate Italy altogether, for they needed its support as part of the Allied bloc against the rising power of Germany. France, in particular, was a reluctant partner in the imposition of sanctions, for she felt that her very future depended upon a military alliance with Italy against Germany. Thirdly and finally, the British Conservatives did not like to humiliate Italy seriously, for the overthrow of Mussolini might mean an internal revolution in Italy, and what the results for Europe of a leftist Italian revolt might be, the British ruling class feared to contemplate. The dread of communism was paralysing the foreign policy of the Western Democracies, and the statesmen in those countries failed to pursue a consistent policy in world affairs. Thus, as Haines and Hoffmann have put it, "while the United States and Germany, both outside the League, discouraged the imposition of sanctions by their uncertain attitude and so must bear some of the guilt, French and British anxiety to avoid war with Italy at almost any cost proved to be the decisive factor".

(3) Spanish Civil War

"Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia" as Palmer and Perkins have remarked "was an Italian adventure, Italian-conceived and Italian-executed, with perhaps an assist to be charged to Britain and France". It was to be the only one of its kind, and the Italo-German collaboration soon appeared in a civil war in

Spain. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia served as a feeler thrown by the fascist powers to test the solidarity of the Western Democracies, but the inaction of the League convinced that the road to aggression was a bed of roses. Event occurred after event and culminated in the second World War.

Backgrounnd of the War

At the end of the first World War, parlimentary institutions in Spain collapsed under the pressure of three opposing forces whose conflict proved to be too great to be contained within the constitutional framework. The forces were: (1) The Republican Socialist Revolutionary Movement; (2) the Separatist Movement in Catalonia ; (3) The Military Committees which enjoyed palace support and were beyond the control of the politicians. The clash of these powerful groups created chaotic conditions in Spain and the prospects of democratic regime became slender. And more so, because the country lacked that strong middle class which was traditionally the back-bone of representative government. The crisis came to a head as a result of the great disaster to the Spanish army in the Spanish zone of North Morocco. In July 1921, ten thousand men were wiped out at the Battle of Anual by the Riff tribes who, for many years, had been resisting Spanish attempts to conquer them.This catastrophe raised a storm of indignation in Spain, and the people suspected King Alfonso XIII responsible for the crime. At this juncture, General Primo de Rivera staged a military *coup d' etat*, and seized power as President of the Military Directorate in close association with the king.

But his rule very soon became unpopular with the people, so that in the municipal elections of April 1931, the Republicans and Socialists won tremendously. The king, Alfonso XIII, abdicated and left the capital on April 14, 1931. Under the presidency of Senov Alcala Zamora, a Provisional Government was established In June 1931, the general elections were held and were fought on the issue of republic versus monarchy. The Republicans gained an overwhelming majority and the Parliament met in July 1931 The new constitution declared Spain a "Democratic Republic of Workers of All Classes," and among other things, announced that local autonomy would be given to Catalonia. So Catalonia agreed to stay on with Spain.

The years following were a period of economic trouble, internal reforms and political upheavals. Spain was hard hit by the economic crisis ; her budget was in constant deficit, particularly because the Republic had inherited a thoroughly unsatisfactory financial situation from the monarchical period. To make matters worse, there was constant conflict between the clergies and anticlericals, between the peasants and the landlords and between the Socialist and Conservative Republicans.

In these circumstances of uncertainty, chaos and confusion, on July 17, 1936, General Franco raised the banner of revolt in Morocco and crossed into Spain. The military garrisons in Spain also revolted and Spain was thrust into the throes of a civil war. In reality this "civil war" at once assumed the form of an Axis invasion of Spain. Italian bombers were at once placed at the disposal of Franco. Nazi agents, technicians and aviators poured into rebel territory. On October 25, 1936, Germany and Italy entered into a secret pact about Spain and on November 18, 1936, both recognized Franco as the ruler of Spain.

Britian and France, in the name of 'non-intervention' and U.S., in the name of 'neutrality', forbade their citizens to sell arms to Spain and thereby, co-operated with the Axis Powers in the murder of Spainish democracy, Almost 100,000 Italian soldiers were operating in Spain and 40,000 had been acknowledged even by Rome itself. On October 2, 1937, the Assembly of the League passed a resolution, declaring that "there are veritable foreign corps on Spanish soil". Both Berlin and Rome refused to heed and the Fascist conquest of Spain continued. On St. Patrick's Day, 1938, the Axis bombers raided the Spanish capital 12 times in 24 hours. Patrick Cardinal Hayes in New York publicly prayed for the success of Franco. On January 26, 1939, Barcelona fell to the rebels, and on Marcd 28, Franco's forces occupied it. On Febrauary 27, 1939, Franco's regime was recognized by Britain and Franco and on April 1, by the U.S.A. These Democratic Powers further tried to appease Franco with loans.

Attitude of the Democracies (Great Britain, France and U. S. A.) towards the Spanish Civij War.

An Attitude of Non-intervention

The outcome of the Spanish civil war was largely determined by the attitude of the major foreign powers. Theoretically, the war, as a purely domestic conflict, was not the concern of the League of Nation and only limited use was in fact made of its machinery in the efforts of the powers to prevent the Spanish conflict from developing into a general European war. Both governments sought to avoid war, because both were headed by pacifists, France by Leon Blum and Edouard Daladier and Britain by Chamberlain and Baldwin. All wished to localise the war in Spain. On the initiative of M. Blum, the British Government readily welcomed the proposal to adopt non-intervention in Spain. The proposal was also welcomed by some thirty countries including Italy, Germany and Soviet Russia. On September 9, 1936, an International Committee was set up in London to discover means of putting into effect the principle of non-intervention agreed upon in earlier August. The League of Nations also took virtually no hand in the Spanish civil war. The Loyalists made several and repeated requests to

it, but the dying League did nothing beyond giving moral support to the non-intervention formula, and laterhelping to supervise the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. The Government of United States also, despite considerable internal criticism, chose non-intervention. When four members of the House of Representatives called upon the Secretary of State on June 2, 1937, to urge that the Neutrality Act should be applied to Germany and Italy, he is said to have answered : "This is not our war. We must be cautious, we must be quiet." This was the attitude of the so-called Western democracies towards the Spanish episode, so-called because they paid lip-service to the ideal of democracy and did practically nothing to save the other democratic regimes on the Continent from destruction. They adopted non-intervention in Spain not because they were inspired by some lofty ideal of international morality but because their vested interests demanded it.

British Interests :

Great Britain, for example, had her vital interests in Gibraltar in the Mediterranean which was now under threat and which London sought to safeguard by appeasing General Franco. And then, the ghost of communism was haunting the British people all the time and London assumed that undemocratic Spain, Germany and Italy would be a fit bulwark against undemocratic Soviet Union ; and if the former could promise to hold the latter in check, all assistance would be expedient.

The United States Interests :

Like London, Washington was also hostile to the prospect of communism. The first World War had made United States one of the richest countries and the communist theory was as repulsive to the American bourgeosie as it was to the vested interests in Europe. They naturally welcomed the creation of as many fascist states in Europe as possible. Moreover, the isolationist sentiment was very strong in the U. S, and the Congress was hostile to any active participation in European affairs.

French Interests :

France was threatened by an interruption of her communications with North Africa by the possible establishment of totalitarian regimes on her South-Western, South Eastern and Eestern frontiers (Spain, Germany and Italy). She was unhappy over the developments but she had been soothing herself with the belief that the fury of fascism would first be directed against Soviet Union. The belief grew stronger due to the recent pronouncements of Hitler that the East, and not the West, was the real field for Germany's adventures. Moreover, Paris, sorely in need of friends, had no choice but to take her cue from Britain. She wanted to win over Italy against Germany and since, Mussolini had cast his lot in favour of General Franco, Paris was left with no alternative than to assume non-interference.

Attitude of the Fascis Powers (Germany and Italy)

From the outset the Fascist Powers paid mere lip service to the principle ot non-intervention. They quickly saw the gains that they might reap from intervention in Spain and very soon Hitler and Mussolini began to pour guns, planes, technicians and "volunteers" into Spain to assist the Nationalists. As an English correspondent put it, "the number of Italian fighting men in Spain was 200,000 with German contribution substantially less but including 3,000 to 5,000 technicians and a small but efficient airforce".

Motives of Italy

Since the first World War, a notion had grown in Europe that a country whose internal organisation was based upon a certain political ideology was expected to assist the triumph of similar ideology in other countries. But it would be wrong to assume that Mussolini was only an ideological crusader. Actually, he wanted to consolidate the position of Italy in the Mediterranean. A friendly Spain offered the prospects of disputing, and later on, eliminating the British and French control of western Mediterranean. In war, Spain also promised to offer bases in Europe, Africa, Spain and the Canaries Islands which would go a long way to neutralise, if not to destroy, the British grip on the straits of Gibraltar and to seriously interfere with the supply of soldiers to France from her North African colonies. The lust for these gains was so strong that, in spite of entering into 'gentlemen's agreement' with Britain and the Non-intervention Committee, Italy continued to pour soldiers in Spain to assist Franco.

Interests of Germany

Preparing as she was for an imperialist war of revenge upon the Western Democracies, Germany saw in the establishment, through Nazi and Fascist assistance, of a protege in power in Spain, the awkward position for France of keeping watch on every important frontier. This would naturally weaken the position of France, as it would mean a division in her military concentration on the Rhine frontier, It would also secure to Germany bases from where she could hamper British fleet in the Atlantic north-east of Spain. Besides these gains, Hitler also found an opportunity for his military leaders to experiment with mechanised and aerial warfare in order to discover the best methods for a future *blitzkrieg* New military tactics had been devised and new weapons of war, like the dive-bombers and and U-boat, had been invented and Hitler wanted to try their effectiveness.

Attitude and Interests of the Soviet Union

Soviet Union was the only country which made efforts to

assist the Loyalists, not because she had become a convert to the democratic ideal, but because the growing might of fascism on Europe threatened her very existence. Her statesmen knew the designs of Hitler and wanted to avert the calamity as far as possible. They also wanted to safeguard the military power of France, with whom they concluded the Mutual Assistance Pact in 1935. Moreover, Soviet Union also wanted to thwart all the strategic advantages which would accrue to Germany and Italy as a result of friendly government in Spain. But her cry was one in wilderness and all warnings against the disastrous effects of Anglo-French appeasement fell on deaf years.

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War.

Some writers have remarked that the World War II began in Spain on July 18, 1936. The comment is not wholly untrue. The war solidified and strengthened the position of the fascists in Europe and weakened that of Britain and France. The episode convinced the dictators that the Western Democracies were paralysed by the fear of communism and war ; they took more and more advantage of this. The League's system of collective security was being inflicted repeated blows, and the Foreign Minister of Spain, Senior Alvarezdel Vayo, was right when he announced before the League Assembly in September 1938, that there had grown up at Geneva "a strange theory according to which the best method of serving the League was to remove from its purview all questions relating to peace and the application of the Covenant".

(4) Austrian Crisis.

"By the close of 1935" as Palmer and Perkins have put it, "the Fascist and Nazi had consolidated their authority at home, they had built powerful war machines, they had entered upon expansionist pragrammes, and by joining hands they had removed each as a possible obstruction to the other. They had moved from one triumph in aggression to another : the rearmament of Germany, the conquest of Abyssinia, the occupation of the Rhineland, and the destruction of Republican Spain. They had reduced the League of Nations to complete impotence, driven Britain and France into frenzied appeasement, and shattered the collective security arrangements of most of the states of Europe."[5] But prior to 1938, no lost provinces had been regained except the Saar district which was restored to Germany on March 1, 1935 following an over-whelming pro-German plebiscite in January. Danzing and the Corridor still remained unrecovered and this necessitated that Poland must be rendered powerless. This, in turn, needed that Czechoslovakia must be overrun, so that the German army might operate against Poland through her. The rendering of Czechoslovakia

5. Palmer and Perkins, op. cit. p. 556.

to helplessness demanded that Austria must first be controlled. So strategy demanded that the first shot must be fired against Austria.

Austria and Germany had been forbidden to join by the peace treaties of 1919, and in 1931, even a proposed customs union had been declared illegal by the World Court. In 1934, Hitler had attempted a *coup d'etat* in Austria through the medium of the Austrian Nazi Party. Although Prime Minister Dollfuss had been assassinated, the *coup* failed. The real security of Austria, however, lay in the fact that Italy regarded the little republic as a buffer state between itself & Germany, and had accordingly guaranteed Austria's independence. But with the formation of the Axis, Italian support of Austria was withdrawn. Moreover, the Spanish episode had demonstrated that the Western Democracies were paralysed and need not be feared. France was passing through a period of ministerial instability and seemed also to be in no position to act effectively. In Great Britain, a majority of members of the Chamberlain Government were in favour of 'appeasement' of Italy and Germany so much so that Anthony Eden was forced to resign on February 20, 1938 as Foreign Secretary, because he opposed 'appeasement'. Hitler also believed that Chamberlain's Government looked with favour upon Germany's seizure of Austria.

In such a background, the first step in Hitler's programme of expansion was taken on February 12, 1938, when he sent for the Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg to meet him at his personal residence at Berchtesgaden. Under threat of invasion, Hitler forced the Chancellor to grant amnesty and full freedom of action to the Austrian Nazis and to admit into his cabinet several leaders of Nazi fifth column in Vienna. In utter desperation, Schuschnigg appointed the Austrian Nazi leader, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Minister of Interior and other Nazis, Minister of Justice and of Foreign Affairs. He also announced, on March 9, that a plebiscite would be held on March 13, on the question of independence versus union with Germany. In order to win over the West, Hitler raised the bogey of fighting against communism and of saving his blood brethern in Austria from utter ruination at the hands of the government there.

Hitler and the Austrian Nazi leaders believed that the interval of four days would be too short for them to mobilise their high pressure speakers and terrorist methods effectively; and they devised that no plebiscite should be held under such conditions. In the morning of March 11, Seyss-Inquart presented Schuschnigg with an ultimatum demanding his resignation and the postponement of the plebiscite, threatening that otherwise German troops, already mobilised on the border, would be put into action against Austria. Faced with this situation and with the possibility of utter destruction of his country, Schus-

chnigg cancelled the plebiscite and resigned, Seyss-Inquart became the Chancellor and head of the new cabinet. He invited Hitler to come and help in saving Austria from internal chaos and disruption. Soon, the German army and air force poured into Austria and on March 14, Hitler himself visited Vienna and was given an enthusiastic reception. "Like sincere widows." as one commentator has put, "the Western Democracies moaned and shouted," but no state, except Soviet Union, raised a hand in defence of Austria's sovereignty.

What did the Annexation of Australia mean to Hitler ?

Soon after the establishment of the Nazi regime in Austria, several thousands of German police poured into the country and arrested all those who were suspected of disployalty to new regime. The Austrian National Bank was taken over by the *Reichbank* which meant that Germany was put in control of some £ 20,000,000 worth of additional gold and foreign exchange. Germany now came in direct contact with Italy at the Brenner Pass and also in direct touch with Hungary and Yugoslavia. As pointed out by Churchill in the House of Commons, "mastery of Vienna gives to Nazi Germany, military and economic control of the whole of the communications of south-eastern Europe by road, by river and by rail." Czechoslovakia was almost isolated, her trade outlets through Germany were at the mercy of the latter and from a military stand-point also, Germany was put in a position from where she could easily outflank the powerful Czechoslovakian defence system along the German frontier.

(5) Munich crisis and the Destruction of Czechoslovakia.

That after the absorption of Austria, Czechoslovakia would be the next victim was quite obvious. The little state of Czechoslovakia on Germany's southern frontier was one of the most successful democracies in Europe ; yet it had its weaknesses. Although, about sixty-five per cent of its population was Czech, there were numerous minorities, among them—Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Ruthenians and Poles. The incorporation of so many nationalities in one single state was a direct violation of the principle of self-determination to which much lip-service had been paid at the close of the World War. The Sudeten Germans, although well treated, were highly conscious of their German nationality in Czechoslovakia. For over five years, the Sudeten Germans formed a working parliamentary group with Czechs and had their representatives in the cabinet. But with in some half a dozen years, their attitude entirely changed, and the majority of them in 1938 appeared to look forward to eventual absorption into Germany. The changed attitude was in part due to the direct political appeal made by a revived German nationalism. The reoccupation of the Saar, of the Rhine Valley the annextion of Austria, all were an extention of German nationalism. The new Germany was displayed to the Sudetens

on films, on the radio, in the pictures and in leaflets. By every form of ingenious suggestion, the racial unity of German blood brethern was brought home to them.

What particularly stimulated Sudeten feeling was the economic condition of the country. The great slump in industry during the year 1929 was felt severely in the world in general and in Czechoslovakia in particular. It was most felt in the Sudeten areas, and even when better days came, conditions did not improve much. Unemployment continued and the Sudeten population began to despair of permanent improvement. The presence of the Sudeten Germans provided to Hitler a pretext to interfere in Czechoslovakian affairs.

Why Hitler wanted to Intervene ?

Strategically, the Sudeten-land was important, because its northern frontier consisted of an almost impregnable mountain range which effectively blocked off German expansion to the south. Were Germany to bring their mountain range under its control, all of central and southern Europe would be helpless before it. The seizure of Czechoslovakia would mean the occupation of a land through which Germans could march to the later conquest of Russia ; her industry, including the great Skoda Arms Works at Pilsen, would be a major asset, to say nothing of the added manpower. Hitler knew that, the annexation of the Sudeten Germans and the natural elimination of the Czech state, would involve serious obstacles. Not only did Czechoslovakia have a strong line of fortifications in the Sudeten mountains defended by some thirty-five well-equipped divisions, but it also was closely allied with France and Russia, Under the Mutual Assistance Treaty with France dating from 1925, the two countries promised to lend each other immediate aid and assistance in case one was attacked. Similar treaties were concluded with France and Soviet Russia in 1935. Czechoslovakia was further reassured by firm statements made in the middle of March 1938 by both France and the Soviet Union that they would honour their treaty commitments.

But the attractions involved in the seizure of Czechoslovakia were so great that these dangers were deemed negligible. Moreover, Hitler was encouraged in his designs by the international situation. France and the Soviet Union had, of course, each promised to defend one another and each had promised to defend Czechoslovakia against attack ; but the Soviet military aid could not be easily obtained due to the "barrier" policy of Poland and Rumania ; and the difficulties of communications involved were very great. By his refortication of the Rhineeland Hitler had made it extremely difficult for France to come effectively to the rescue of Czechoslovakia. Italy was in sympathy with Germany and probably prepared to support her in need. She would certainly have refused to allow French troops to go through her territory. The chances of League intervention

seemed negligible.England was, of course, there ; but she was not pledged to the defence of Czechoslovakia as she was pledged to defend France. On the contrary, not only had she made this point clear in the Locarno Treaty, but Chamberlain had stated on March 29, 1938, that he would not guarantee Czechoslovakia though there might be circumstances in which England would intervene to defend her. Britain was for peace whatever the price.

The Story of action in Czechoslovakia

Germany resorted to much the same tactics as had been so successfully applied in the reduction of Austria. Open sponsorship was lent to a German fascist party among the Sudetens, led by Conrad Henlein and well supplied with German funds and German instructors. After Hitler's success in Austria, Henlein called upon all Germans in Czechoslovakia to join his party and succeeded in forcing various Germans to withdraw from the Czechoslovak ministry. Conscious of powerful support, he raised a cry for complete autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia—a cry which grew more insistent as '1938' ushered in. Mob violence and clashes between Germans and Czechs became the order of the day and the German press was publishing accounts of the horrible atrocities committed against innocent Germans. Tension reached to an extreme in August 1938 when Hitler openly supported the claims of Henlein for complete autonomy.

Before the Nazi Party Congress, Hitler, on September 12, demanded the right of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans and announced that if the latter could not defend themselves, "they will receive help from us" and that the German Nazis "will not remain indifferent for long if these tortured and oppressed creatures cannot defend themselves". Inspired by such pronouncements, the Sudeten Germans began to indulge in violent activities and the situation seemed favourable for the German troops to invade Czchoslovakia in order to protect the "tortured and oppressed" Germans living there.

When fearful events were taking place in Czecheslovakia, Britain continued her appeasement of Germany. As early as March 1938, Chamberlain had already announced that his government would not assume any responsibility if Czechoslovakia were invaded. On June 3, 1938, the London Times opined that, "self-determination for the Sudeten Germans would afford a welcome example of peaceful change".

The Soviet Union proposed a conference with Great Britain, France and the U.S., and expressed her willingness to participate in collective actions, which would be decided upon jointly and which would aim at checking the further development of aggression, and at eliminating the increased danger of a

new world massacre. But the proposal was turned down. The British Government, however, asked Premier Hodza whether his government would accept a British adviser in the dispute with the Sudeten German party. The proposal was welcomed and Lord Runciman was appointed such an adviser. Both Premier Hodza and President Benes expressed their willingness to accept the advice of Lord Runciman provided the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia was protected. On September 7, a plan was presented to Henlein which, according to Lord Runciman, granted practically everything the Sudeten Germans had earlier demanded.

But the offer did not satisfy Henlein and Hitler and the sitnation grew from bad to worse. French and British statesmen were faced with an inescapable dilemma. If they refused to support Czechoslovakia, that little state would crumble before German might, and with it would come crashing down the remnants of French hegemony in Central Europe ; if they decided to support Czechoslovakia, they risked a general war, for Hitler openly threatened to threw his mighty army into action to attain his objective.

In this war of nerves, the Western Democracies collapsed and became nervous. Prime Minister Chamberlain, hoping to prevent war by "appeasing" Hitler, asked the latter for a personal interview and on September 15, he met Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The German leader made it clear that "there was nothing that anybody could do that would prevent the (German) invasion (of Czechoslovakia) unless the right of self-determination was granted to the Sudeten Germans".

Chamberlain returned to London and conferred with M. Daladier and M. Bonnet. They jointly agreed that the only way to avoid a general European war was to concede to the Sudeten Germans the right of self-determination. On September 19, both London and Paris asked Czechoslovakia to agree to the immediate transfer, to the Reich of areas inhabited by a population of more than 50per cent Germans. The Czechoslovakia Government regarded some features of the proposal as 'unworkable' and demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. London and Paris simply replied that either Czechs should accept Anglo-French proposals at once or bear the consequences alone. They, however, promised to guarantee the security of what remained of the Republic.

When faced with this situation, the Czechoslovak Government had no alternative but to give in. The Czech leaders did not like that they should precipitate a general European war. On September 21, Prague conveyed to the government concerned her acceptance of the Anglo-French proposal. But Chamberlain was surprised to find that now Hitler's demand had tremendously

increased to the withdrawal of all Czech armed forces, police, customs officials and frontier guards within ten days, from most of the Sudeten German area and the evacuated territory to be handed over to Germany at once.

On September 24, Czechoslovakia informed Chamberlain that Hitler's demands "in their present form were absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable", as it would involve the complete subjugation of the whole of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France also held the demands unacceptable and on September 26, London seemed to abandon its earlier policy of appeasement. The British Foreign Office announced that Britain and Soviet Union would stand by France if the latter aided Czechoslovakia against Germany.

In the midst of this growing tension, the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt made a "peace by conference" proposal to Hitler to settle the growing controversy. On September 27, Chamberlain repudiated his earlier pronouncement by saying that "we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her (Czechoslovakia) account". On September 28, he informed Hitler that "You can get the essentials without war and without delay". The same day, Mussolini telephoned to Hitler requesting the latter to settle the Sudeten controversy through an international conference. Hitler agreed and on September 29, Daladier, Mussolini and Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler at Munich. No Czech was there to raise a voice in defence of his betrayed homeland and no Russian was there to give backbone to Chamberlain and Daladier.

On the night of September 29-30, 1938, an agreement was concluded by Italy, France, Britain and Germany. It read like a death sentence for Czechoslovakia : "She was to surrender the Sudetenland and other areas of mixed but preponderantly German population ; she was to deliver intact all existing installations in these areas, she was to release all Sudeten Germans from the army, the police force and from political imprisonment and her new borders were to be guaranteed by Italy and Germany only when the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia had been settled".

Thus, the heart of the Czechoslovak lamb was butchered in the gloom of midnight, perhaps by the knife supplied by Chamberlain. Dr. Benes, President of Czechoslovakia recorded : "He had been forced to yield to pressures of which there is no precedent in history and all that was due to the presence of Chamberlain and Daladier". Coming out of the Conference Ribbentrop said about Chamberlain : "The Old man has signed his death warrant and now it is for us to fill the date". "The Munich Pact", as Prof. Schuman has put it, "was the culmination

of appeasement and warrant of death for the Western Democracies. It was the symbol of the collapse of the system of collective security".

Why London and Paris suffered the Munich Disgrace ?

Critics have called the Munich Pact as the 'most shameful' act of the Western Democracies and as Churchill retorted to Chamberlain when the latter landed at the London air port on his return from Munich it, was not a 'peace with honour,' but the herald of a war which was only postponed for an year.

Several explanation may, however, be advanced in favour of their action. In the first place, Hitler had announced that if his demands upon Czechoslovakia were met, he would not indulge in further expansion or aggression. If the shift of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia to the *Reich* could satisfy Hitler, it was a price worth paying for the peace of Europe, nay, the peace of the whole world. Secondly, London and Paris were made to believe that the whole wrath of Hitler would be directed against Soviet Communism which endangered the social systems of the European countries. The feeling had developed that undemocratic Germany, Italy and Spain would be a fit bulwark against undemocratic Russia and it was worth while to strengthen Nazism even at some price. In the third place, it could be said that in the countries of the West, there was an acute longing for peace. Both Britain and France were not yet strong enough to face the much-advertised German Luftwaffe, and feared the destruction which it might bring to their people. The horrors of the first World War were fresh in the memories of those who still survived and the very idea of a war with Germany was a nightmare to them. And lastly, there were large and influential groups of people both in England and France,who could little foresee the wisdom of a general European war on Czechoslovakia's account.[6] They felt that the creation of Czechoslovakia in the Peace Settlement of 1919 and its continuance in the heart of Europe

6. Here it could be asserted that the Anglo-French statesmen miserably failed in their estimation of Hitler's programme of expansion.

Time Magazine, (Pacific Edition) June 15, 1959 p. 20.

Sir Ivone Kirk Patrick, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office giving an eye witness account of the momentous meeting at Munich, wrote in his book 'The Inner Circle'.

"Gathering in Munich to sign away the life of Zechoslovakia were "the Italians, clearly terrified of being landed by Hitler into a European war, the French, including (Premier) Dalader resolved to reach agreement at any cost", and "so on edge that from time to time they gave the impression that Czechoslovakia was to be blamed for having brought all this trouble upon us. In this atmosphere, Hitler had little dfficulty in getting his way". Sir Ivone further recorded that at Munich "we were not ready either militarily or psychologically." And later documents, he says, "show conclusively that there is no ground for the belief that Hitler was bluffing and that firmness would have caused him to climb down. On the contrary, he was not only resolved on war but looking forward to it".

was a great wrong and should be righted. Much against the well-proclaimed principle of self-determination, several minorities had been huddled together; they were clamouring for an independent aud autonomous existance and until it was done, no permanent peace in the area could be possible.

MUNICH AND AFTER

Whatever might have been said to explain the conduct of Chamberlain and Daladier, the Munich Pact was a great wrong and fruitful of evil consequences. Early on the morning of October 1, German troops crossed into the Sudetenland and two days after, Hitler himself visited the Eger—the unofficial capital of the Sudeten Germans. This was not all and the territorial losses to Germany were not the only ones suffered by Czechoslovakia. On the some day, Poland laid claims to the Poles-inhabited area about Teschen and an army of 200,000 men strong was mobilised along the Czechoslovakia frontier. The Government at Prague had to surrender to the demand and another area of 400 square miles with a population of 240,000 was lost to her. The Hungarians also made claims on parts of Slovakia, inhabited by Magyars and on November 2, these were adjusted by Italo-German arbitration, and approximately 4,800 square miles of Czech territory with a population of about one million was awarded to Hungary.

Hitler's Seizure of the Rump Republic of Czechoslovakia

The Munich Powers had jointly agreed to guarantee the security of what was left of the Czech Republic and Hitler had also asserted that with the acquisition of the Sudetenland, his territorial ambitions in Europe would be satisfied. But events soon proved their insincerity. When the Munich Pact was signed, a joint declaration, signed by Hitler and Chamberlain, was also issued on the morning of September 30, stating that they recognised the first importance of Anglo German relations and the desire of the two peoples never again to go to war with one another and resolved that the "method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries". A joint declaration of the similar nature was signed between the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Von Ribben-trop, on December 6, 1938. But the insincerity of these pronouncements became clear by the later speeches and declarations of Germany. Hitler, for example, in his speech before the *Reichstag* on April 28, 1939, declared that "the agreement reached between Chamberlain and myself did not apply to such problems as the future of the Czechoslovak State but exclusively to questions which refer to the mutual relationship between England and Germany." Similarly, in a personal letter to the French Foreign Minister on July 31, Ribbentrop openly said: 'The Franco-German declarations of December 6 meant that

Eastern Europe was not the concern of France." The logic of the Munich Pact was thus in German eyes that Britain and France would no longer intervene in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe.

In keeping with this logic, Hitler began to make claims upon the remnant of Czechoslovakia. He utilised his well practised tactics, and began to sow the seeds of dissension among the people in Slovakia. He extended support to the leader of the Slovak Popular Party, Joseph Tiso, who was seeking complete independence for Slovakia. After a conference with Hitler, the governments of both Slovakia and Ruthenia declared their independence on 14, 1939. On the same day, Hitler called Dr. Hacha, who had succeeded President Benes upon the latter's resignation in October, 1938, to meet him in Berlin. In the conference that followed, Dr. Hacha was called upon to sign a document placing "the fate of the Czech people and the land trustingly in the hands of *Fuhrer* of the German *Reich*." He was surrounded by Hitler's military leaders. Goering came forward with the threat that in case of refusal to do so, Prague would be destroyed within a few hours. Dr. Hacha, it is said, fainted and was revived by injections. With no alternative in sight, he put down his signatures on the document at 4-30 P.M. on March 14. In the early morning of March 15, Nazi troops occupied western Czechoslovakia. On March 16, Hitler announced that thereafter, Czechia belonged to the territory of the German *Reich* and would be known as the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia." Soon after, Hitler was invited by Tiso to become the protector of Slovakia also. The request was readily granted and Hitler proceeded to Prague and issued a formal proclamtion of the Republic's union with the *Reich*. The Gestapo at once set to work and a concentration camp for the disloyal citizens was established at Milovice.

Consequences of the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia on the International Situation

The destruction of Czchoslovakia had immense effect on the international situation in Europe. The Anglo-French surrender at Munich convinced the Soviet Government that the West was definitely bolstering up Germany against her. Unofficial statements began to come from Moscow that the Soviet Government considered her alliance with France as ended. The system of security, which France had constructed so assiduously, collapsed. Yugoslavia and Rumania, so closely linked with France since 1920 21, began to question the value of collective security in general and of French guarantees in particular. Chamberlain, who had so far believed that once Germany's ambitions to unify all the German-speaking peoples of Central Europe were fulfilled Hitler would be satisfied, was shocked profoundly, when the latter seized the rest of Czechoslovakia

in March, 1939 and thus revealed in an incontestable fashion his aim of dominating Europe. It now became clear that the very existence of all the free states of Europe, including Erance and Britain, was at stake. Chamberlain voiced the general revulsion of feeling in a speech on March 17 at Birmingham, when he pointed out : "Public opinion in the world has received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it, even by the present regime in Germany.....Hitler had violated his own declared principles by including in the *Reich* a people of non-German race. He had manifestly departed both from his assurances at Munich, as to the extent and nature of his claims and from his undertaking to deal with any further questions in consultation with Great Britain". In his statement before the House of Commons on March 23, he openly said : "The possible aim of the German Government is the domination of the whole of Europe."

The projected visit of the President of the British Board of Trade and the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade to Berlin was cancelled and the policy of appeasement changed to one of resistance to further aggression. Consultation immediately began between Britain, France, Russia, Poland and some other states of Eastern Europe regarding measures to be taken in case of such an eventuality. On March 31, London and Paris announced: "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, they would at once lend Poland all support in their power."

Hitler's Deal with Memel and Rumania

The Anglo-French protests and pronouncements had little effect upon the German *Fuhrer* and he continued his expansionist programme. Europeans had hardly recovered from the shock of the Czech annexation, when their attention was turned to the Baltic. In response to a German ultimatum, the Foreign Minister of Lithuania met Ribbentrop on March 20, and the next day, signed an agreement ceding the Memelland to Germany. On March 23, a trade agreement was signed between Germany and Rumania, whereby the economic life of the latter came under the virtual control of Germany.

Seizure of Albania

Hitler's partner in aggression, Mussolini, also found his opportunity and on Good Friday, the 7th April, Italian troops suddenly invaded Albania. King Zog fled from the country ; Scutari surrendered, and on April 12, a constituent assembly offered the Albanian crown to King Victor Emmanuel.

The conquest of Albania was in clear violation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1937 and 1938, as to respecting the *status-quo* in the Mediterranean area." Moreover, it put Italy on the threshold of the Balkan peninsula and the independence of every country in that region was seriously affected.

Fascist Aggression and Repercussion on the West

The cumulative menace represented by the successive aggressions of Hitler and Mussolini convinced the statesmen everywhere that the conflagration started by Italy and Germany would soon overtake the whole of Europe, unless stopped in time by the combined strength of the powers still outside the Italo-German orbit. On April 13, Britain and France issued declarations extending to Greece and Rumania assurances of "all the support in their power" in case of unprovoked attack either by Germany or by Italy. On April 15, President Roosevelt addressed a note to the two dictators, asking them to give assurances that the twenty-nine independent nations, great and small, extending from Finland to Iran, would not be the object of aggression by their armed forces for a minimum period of ten years or preferably twenty-five. He promised, in the event of a favourable reply, to hold out the cooperation of the United States in the peaceful discussion of two essential problems—the relief from the burden of armaments and the opening of avenues of international trade.

The American communication was received with a chorus of abuse and derision by the controlled press of Italy and Germany. Hitler, in his speech before the *Reichstag* on April 28, made only a passing reference to it in the end, emphasizing all the time Germany's right on the city of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.

On April 26, Chamberlain spoke of the "new liabilities" which Britain was accepting in Europe and announced his intention to introduce a Bill for compulsory military service, in the Parliament. (The Military Training Bill actually passed both the Houses of Parliament in May). On May 12, Britain and Turkey issued a declaration pledging mutual aid and co-operation in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area. A similar declaration of mutual assistance was signed between France and Turkey in June. In order to counteract the growing *entente* between London and Paris, Italy and Germany signed on May 22, 1939, a military alliance and soon implemented it by conferences between the military leaders of the two countries.

ANGLO SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR FAILURE

The seizure of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel did not satisfy Hitler. Danzig and the Polish Corridor were still outside the control of Germany. Soon after the annexation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler had begun to make claims to the Polish Corridor

and Danzig in Central Europe. The German press had begun, in March, reporting attacks upon Germans in the Polish Corridor and denouncing the atrocities perpetrated by the Polish Government upon the German minority. That such pronouncements were a prelude to Hitler's execution of some new stroke was clear to all everywhere. In the case of Poland, the Western Democracies pursued a threefold policy. First, they made efforts to induce Poland and Germany to reconcile their controversy peacefully, and some favourable developments took place. A measure of agreement was reached as to the position of the Polish Jews expelled from Germany and the two countries agreed to suspend expulsion on either side of the frontier, and to examine together the plight of those who had been living precariously on the borders. In his speech on January 30, before the *Reichstag*, Hitler openly spoke of Polish-German friendship as "one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe". But the improved relations did not last for long and once the *Fuhrer* was free from his Czechoslovakian campaign, he began the denunciation of Poland on a large scale.

In such an event Great Britain and France came forward with assurance of support to Poland, and warned Hitler that the use of force against Poland would lead to a general war. This was done on March 31, 1939 All these warnings and threats fell on deaf ears in Berlin and Hitler continued his activities preparatory to a full-fledged invasion of Poland. Here came in the third stroke of Anglo-French policy, and this was a bargain with Moscow in an effort to bring Russia into a coalition designed to stop Germany. On the advice of Paris, the British Government started negotiations for a mutual assistance pact with Moscow on the lines of the Franco-Soviet Pact of May, 1935.

As early as March 18, the Soviet Government had proposed a conference of Britain, France, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the Soviet Union to devise means of resistance to the futher aggression of Germany and Italy. But London, then, had simply replied that the proposal was premature, and had suggested that the Soviet Union should declare its adherence with Britain, France and Poland for immediate consultation in case of aggression against either of them, Moscow did not like the proposal as of considerable value but even then, she agreed to it. But the proposal was dropped as Poland was not willing to enter into any kind of commitment with Moscow. The British Government did not bring any pressure to bear upon Poland although she did press Czechoslovakia to concede to the demands of Hitler an year earlier.

The political atmosphere by and by began to deteriorate and Hitler's invasion of Poland became almost a certainty. In the parliamentary debate of April 3, a number of speakers not-

ably Lloyd George urged the importance of securing the adhesion of the Soviet Union. The Chamberlain Government acknowledged the desirability of such a proposal but certain elements in his government looked upon Soviet communism with suspicion and distrust. However, the negotiations with Moscow were opened in the middle of April and when on April 13, London and Paris extended guarantee of security against German aggression to Greece and Rumania, Moscow was called upon to extend similar guarantees to them unilaterally (this amounting to the suggestion that Moscow should commit herself to the defence of a country which was sure to be invaded by Germany in the near future).

This was naturally rejected by Moscow which, however, made a counter-proposal on April 17, that the guarantee against aggression should be extended jointly by Britain, France and U. S. S. R., and that it should be not to Poland alone but to all the countries from Baltic to the Black Sea, and that, such a guarantee must be reinforced by a military convention. For three weeks (when every single day was fateful),no reply to these proposals was given by London. Nay, further encouragement was given to Hitler through 'The Times' of April 18, 1939, and the British Ambassador, who had been recalled from Berlin as protest against Germany's seizure of Czechoslovakia, was sent back on April 24, According to 'The Times,' "the decision took even Berlin by surprise." This was followed by Hitler's denunciation of the Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935 and the Polish-German Non Aggression Pact of 1934 on April 26, 1939. But even now the British Government did not move and make any reply to the Russian proposals of April 17. Only on May 9, the British Government awoke from its deep slumbers; reiterated her old proposal that Russia alone should guarantee Poland and Rumania against aggression. But the Soviet Government did not like the idea and, on May 14, repeated its old proposals of April 17.

On May 27, the British and French Governments agreed, on the initiative of M. Molotov of Russia, to discuss the whole situation in a tripartite conference and thus ten vital weeks were allowed to lapse for nothing. Moscow suggested that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, should personally visit Moscow to bring the negotiations to a successful and speedy end. But he refused to go. On June 12, William Strang, reputed for his hostility to the Soviet Union and a minor official in the Foreign Office, was sent to conduct the negotiations. No particular authority was given to him and constantly and continuously he had to refer every development to London for instructions. Public opinion in Britain was very much disgusted over the progress of negotiations. This was expressed by Lloyd George in a bye-election campaign on July 29, whenhe said : "Negotiations have been going on for four months with Russia and no one

knows how things stand today.....You are dealing with the greatest military power in the world ; you are asking them to come to your help ; you are not negotiating terms with an enemy but with a friendly power, whose aid you want. Mr. Chamberlain negotiated directly with Hitler : he went to Berlin to see him ; he and Lord Halifax made visits to Rome. But whom have they sent to Russia ? They have not sent even the lowest in rank of a Cabinet Minister. They have sent a clerk in the Foreign Office. It is an insult. Yet the government want the help of their gigantic army and air force."

On July 23, the Moscow Government asked London to send a military mission to begin and finalise talks promptly. The proposal was acknowledged by London after two days (when every single minute was important). The mission was actually sent eleven days after ; and they did not travel by air, not even by a fast vessel. A special vessel, which was lying out of use, was supplied to them, and they reached Moscow after a week of their departure while the whole journey could be covered up in a day by air. This mission too was not entrusted with any specific authority and had constantly to refer the issue back to London.

In the meantime, the news leaked out that negotiations were taking place between Britain and Germany, and they related to the reinforcement of Germany and the advancing of a loan of £ 500,000,000, This leakage worsened the spirit of negotiations still further, and marred the progress of the conference. The Soviet Government demanded that since she had no common frontier with Germany, she must be given the right to pass her troops through Polish territory, so as to meet the German troops on the Polish-German frontier. But the British and French statesmen expressed their inability to concede to such a demand, as it would be unpleasant to Poland, which, as they contended, would not agree to it in any way. This reply declared the breakdown of the negotiations, and Strang was called back to London, this time by air.

Why Anglo-Soviet Negotiations Failed ?

That, the negotiations conducted by London and Paris with Moscow with so much of indifference that they resulted in failure, appeared to be a great lack of diplomatic skill on the part of the Anglo-French statesmen. But the fault was not wholly theirs. The attitude of Poland greatly determined the course of negotiations. The Warsaw Government, fearful as she was of the Soviet Union, was not willing to accept any of the numerous proposals put forward as a basis for assuring effective Polish-Soviet cooperation in case of a German attack on Poland. The Poles were so distrustful of the Russians that they did not like any understanding with the latter. Moreover, there was the

problem of the Baltic states. Finland, Esthonia and Latvia in several communications, had stated to Chamberlain that they wanted to maintain strict neutrality, and that they did not like to be included in any guarantee pact. Early in June 1939, Latvia and Esthonia had signed non-aggression pacts with Berlin.

Whatever the explanation, the failure of negotiations with Moscow substantially contributed to the worsening of the diplomatic situation in Europe on the eve of the Polish-German crisis.

THE RUSSO-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

While the Soviet Union had been negotiating with the Western democracies, she was little hopeful of a successful conclusion of negotiations and had, therefore, been conducting simultaneous negotiations with Berlin. A complete change came in the Soviet diplomacy after the failure of these negotiations. On May 20, Moscow had already proposed a non-aggression pact to Berlin, but it was not welcomed by Hitler, and negotiations dragged on until August when he began to push the matter urgently. By August 16, it was agreed that a non-aggression pact would be signed between the two countries. A week later, Ribbentrop flew to Moscow and signed a Ten Year Pact of Non-aggression and Neutrality and an accompanying secret protocol on August 23. By the terms of the Pact, the signatories agreed to refrain from any act of aggression against each other and to remain neutral, should the other become "the object of warlike actions on the part of a third power". By the secret protocol, Europe was divided into Russian and German spheres of influence the dividing line running from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Circumstances Leading to the Russo-German Pact

That Russia and Germany should come closer and sign a non-aggression pact appeared to be very strange. With what aims the two countries were actually motivated was not very clear. Perhaps, because Hitler had decided to destroy the West first, he wanted to be assured that Germany was not stabbed in the back from the East. He knew the might of the Soviet Union, and found it a hard nut to crack without first destroying France and Britain and thereby enlisting reinforcements from there. Perhaps Hitler also hoped that the Russo-German Pact would cause London and Paris to repudiate their pledges to Warsaw as they had done a year earlier in the case of Czechoslovakia. In such an event, he would be able to annex Poland without going to war, or at least, a major war. On the other hand, the oscillating attitude of the Anglo-French diplomats had convinced Stalin of their insincerity in case Russia was attacked by Germany. On August 31, when the Russo-German pact was submitted to the Supreme Soviet for ratification, M. Molotov stated that the

"Western Powers had plotted to involve us in war with Germany without being willing to see the Soviet Union strengthened". Moreover, Moscow also believed that if Germany were first involved in a long and costly war with the Western Powers, she should be left enough time to strengthen her own military and industrial position to meet the eventual conflict with Germany which was inevitable. Stalin might also have thought that the war between Germany and Italy on the one side and Britain and France on the other, would exhaust them and leave the Soviet Union in a dominant position on the European continent.

REASONS FOR THE ASCENDANCY OF FASCISM

Whatever the reasons, the Russo-German pact set the stage ready for the debacle of Poland, and consequently of the second World War. But before this story is related, it would be useful to discuss the factors which were responsible for the ascendancy of Fascism in Europe. In 1933, Germany was a state disarmed and defeated without any significant influence. In 1939, she was the colossus of Europe. By the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel, the territorial holdings of the Third *Reich* became more extensive than those of the German Empire in 1914. Outside Russia, Germany had the largest army in Europe, and had military alliances or friendly understandings with Italy, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Spain and Japan. In addition Berlin exerted a greater influence in the affairs of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Scandinavian countries.

Naturally, the question was asked : what it was all due to ? The reasons were not one but several. First, Germany and its Fascist ally, Italy, were dominated by an ideology which glorified war as the real life of a nation and an ideal condition of society. War, they thought, was the only means of attaining their objectives. On the other hand, the peoples of post-war Europe and Britain were dominated by a pacifist temper which regarded war as the most horrible of all social catastrophies. It was, in part, a knowledge of this fundamental fact which enabled Hitler and Mussolini to stage their repeated *coups d'etat* between 1934 and 1939. Secondly, the success of Fascism was due to the efficient organisation of the state as an instrument for the control of foreign policy. In spite of all the talk about 'open diplomacy' on the Continent of Europe, the German Foreign Office still functioned in camera and nearly all phases of German foreign policy were controlled with an eye to their effect upon the *Reich's* diplomatic position. Monetary problems, foreign trade, debts, labour unions, production, agriculture—all were considered in the light of their contribution to Germany's war potential. Moreover, the army, both in Italy and Germany, was completely subservient

to the state and was regarded as the main instrument of foreign policy. Under the republic, the army had suffered some decline of prestige but Hitler immediately restored it to a position of power and prestige. By 1938, the army, like every other arm of the State, was completely at the service of Nazi foreign policy.

Most important of all, the ascendancy of fascism in Europe was due to an appeasement policy pursued by Britain and France towards Germany and Italy. Britain, in particular, had deliberately adopted a policy of appeasement which allowed Germany to assume a position of influence and power in Central Europe. Its statesmen had acted on the assumption that Germany could be won to a policy of moderation merely by granting the *Reich* a few diplomatic victories. Once Germany had retrieved for itself a position of prestige, this theory held, the *Reich* would become conservative in its diplomacy and, as a satiated state, would seek merely to protect its position.

There was a second reason for appeasement. Since 1939, the economy of the Western Democracies had become involved in the Great Depression. The problems of unemployment, financial crisis and bankruptcy gave warning that the traditional capitalist economy of private property and profits was desperately sick and needed a long period of reconstruction and rest. It was the studied conviction of most statesmen that capitalism could not survive a protracted European war between the Great Powers. Hence, Hitler must be appeased to avert the domestic catastrophe certain to follow in the wake of any attempt to check the *Reich* by force.

There was still another factor for appeasement: the irrational fear of communism. The British and French statesmen thought that undemocratic Germany and Italy would be a fit bulwark against undemocratic Soviet Union. If Hitler and Fascism were destroyed, they thought, the resultant social revolutions that seemed certain to occur would bring Bolshevism to the frontier of France. Better to suffer in silence the inconvenience of insolent German power than to admit communism to the West.

Closely coupled with this attitude was another motive. If Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Union on the other were likely to checkmate one another and ultimately engage in a death grapple, Britain could well afford to stand aloof and to protect itself from involvement by pressing France to abandon the allies which stood in the way of the German "drive to the East."

Moreover, if the Fascists should attack and conquer the Soviet Union, they might, to be sure, become a danger to the West's imperial interests. But this danger was envisaged as

negligible in comparison with the danger of an extension of communism beyond the Russian frontiers or any major enhancement of the power of the Soviet State. Hence the wisdom of appeasement.[8]

Then, there were other factors. The myopia of the upper classes and of the sons of riches who came from the "public schools" was far more responsible for what befell the realm than the ignorance or provincialism of the masses. Chamberlain was the son of a screw bussinessman of Brimingham. His ministry included such reactionaries as Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden. The Dominions, except for the Labour Government of New Zealand, shared the views of the British Prime Minister. The French Premier, Daladier, was no less conservative.

Another argument was that appeasement meant a way out of war. War has had a bad ending; let peaceful methods be tried. Still another argument was that Germany was wronged by the Treaty of Versailles; let those wrongs be righted.

Besides this lengthy logic, the policy of appeasement was suicidal in consequences and mad or muddled in its motivation. When utimately by 1938, it became apparent that the German programme was one of the dynamic expansion aimed at the complete domination of Europe, France and Great Britain were caught completely off guard; and at Munich, Hitler could threaten them with a gigantic air fleet.

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8. Communism to the West was a deadly enemy, aimed at over-throwing all they held sacred and dear. As early as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd George had, in his confidential Memorandum to the Big Four, pointed out the need of utilizing the machinery of the League as "an alternative to Bolshevism,"

Again on September 22, 1933, he declared: "If the powers succeeded in over throwing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a conservative, socialist or liberal regime, but extreme communism. Surely that could not be their objective. A Communist Germany would be infinitely more formidable than a Communist Russia. The Germans would know how to run their communism effectively". On November 28, 1934, he declared in the House of Commons; "In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend,"

In 1934, L. Lawton wrote in *The Fortnight'y Review*;

"Whereas formerly German statesmen looked both to the East and the West, Hitler at present looks to the East only". And on the east lay Soviet Russia L. S. Amery, former Colonial Minister, writing in *The Forward View* (1935), said:

"The first condition of European peace today is the frank acknowledgement that Germany's armaments are now her own affair and nobody else's,"

The Marquess of Londonderry, owner of many mines and large estates, said: "I was at a loss to understand why we could not make common ground in some way or other, with Germany in opposition to Communism, . . The anti-Communist platform was (and still is) invaluable".

Events Preceding the Destruction of Poland

After the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Poland was the obvious target. Tension was constantly increasing between Warsaw and Berlin. After the Munich Pact and rather inspired by it, Germany had demanded from Poland the city of Danzig and the creation of a German highway across the Corridor. But this was rejected. In the month of January 1939, Ribbentrop personally went to Warsaw but to no result. The proposal was again repeated on March 26 but Poland would not yield.[9]

Hitler's patience was getting exhausted. He raised the cry that German minority was being mercilessly persecuted by the Polish Government and that it was his right and duty to go to their rescue. In the shadows of an impending war, Chamberlain sent a personal letter to Hitler on August 22, 1939, writing that "no greater mistake could be made and that Britain would fight if Poland were attacked."

Hitler told Henderson that "he was fifty years old; he preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60 and that, he was really an artist and wanted to retire in peace to his studio." In his reply to Chamberlain, he insisted that 'Danzig and the Corridor' must be returned to Germany, and if that forces Germany to wage a war, the responsibility would be not of his but of Britain."

On August 25, Henderson conveyed to Berlin His Majesty Government's desire to settle Germany's claims over Poland peacefully. Four days after, the reply was given that Germany was ready for negotiations if the Polish representative reached Berlin within 24 hours. The British Government complained that it "sounded like an ultimatum", and it was not possible to send a representative within so short a period[10]. At midnight of August 30, Henderson met Ribbentrop to make the last effort for peaceful settlement; but Ribbentrop simply replied that it was too late for negotiations as the time limit had already passed. However, to show to the world outside the goodwill of Germany, he read hurriedly a 16-point proposal including the immediate cession of Danzig to Germany. But when Henderson asked for a copy of the proposals, he was contemptously replied that it was of no use now, as the Polish plenipotentiary did not come in time. Neither were the proposals transmitted to London nor to Warsaw. However, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski,

9. Poland was adopting such a strong attitude on the basis of the Anglo-French guarantee which they extended to her on March 31.

10. This was because, the Foreign Minister of Poland, Beck, recalling the fate of Schuschnigg and Dr. Hacha, had refused to go.

saw Ribbentrop in the evening of August 31 and told him that the Warsaw Government was considering direct negotiations with Germany and that a reply might soon come. When a few hours later, he tried to contact his government, he found the telephone wires cut. At 9 P. M.. the 16 points were broadcast on the Berlin radio. In the early hours of the morning of September 1, the British Foreign Secretary wired to Berlin that Poland would meet the proposals in case they were not followed by an ultimatum. But it was of no use now, for Poland had already been attacked by Germany. Next day, France asked Germany to accept the 'Peace by Conference' proposal and in case of failure to do so, to consider herself at war with France. Similarly, the British Government also informed Germany that if the neutrality of Belgium were violated, the former would be at war with the latter. Both these warnings were contemptuously disregarded by Ribbentrop and so, on September 3, 1939, both France and Britain declared war upon Germany. Soon, the war became a global conflict and, one after the other, almost all the nations were involved in the conflagration.

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CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

When after the Munich Conference Chamberlain reached the London airport, he, while alighting his plane, waved the historic sentence: "I bring you peace with honour." Churchill, who was present there, retorted: "Britain and France had to choose between dishonour and war. They chose dishonour; they will have war." The world knew Churchill only as a far-sighted statesman and a shrewd diplomat, but he proved a prophet too. The people, who were promised in 1919 "a new world where the mistakes of the past would not be repeated and where brute force would not be allowed to sit on the throne of justice" were sadly disappointed. After a short period of twenty years, they again found themselves faced with the horrible prospect of another world conlict. The ingenuity of mankind had in 1919 devised a machinery and a method "to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war", but the human nature as it was, the world could not escape war for long, and only after two decades mankind was faced with another calamity. Before this tragic story was related, it would be wise to analyse the factors which made its occurrence inevitable. These factors were as complex and varied as those which had brought the war in 1914.

CAUSES OF THE WAR IN 1939

1. Economic Needs and Material Interests of the Nation-States

The most important and root cause of the outbreak of hostilties in 1939 was the economic needs and material interests of the European nations. The struggle for raw materials, markets for exports and colonies for increasing population, which had caused the first world conflict, did not end in 1919; rather it became more acute Germany and Italy were the countries, struggling hard to acquire colonies for raw materials and markets for surplus goods. Both were equallydissatisfied after the war. The Germans were wholly deprived of what little they had and Itly felt duped at Paris as she thought she should have obtained what she had been promised in the secret Treaty of London of 1915, and rather much more. The third ambitious nation, nursing imperialist ambitions, was Japan. The three countries in relation to the extent of their indusrialisation and rate of increase of their population. were poorest in natural resources. The bulk of the so-called undeveloped and under-developed regions of the world had been occupied by the U.S., Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. Out of twenty-five essential raw materials and minerals, there were, in the British Empire, adequate supplies of eighteen while Germany possessed only four. Italy's condition was still worse;

saw Ribbentrop in the evening of August 31 and told him that the Warsaw Government was considering direct negotiations with Germany and that a reply might soon come. When a few hours later, he tried to contact his government, he found the telephone wires cut. At 9 P. M.. the 16 points were broadcast on the Berlin radio. In the early hours of the morning of September 1, the British Foreign Secretary wired to Berlin that Poland would meet the proposals in case they were not followed by an ultimatum. But it was of no use now, for Poland had already been attacked by Germany. Next day, France asked Germany to accept the 'Peace by Conference' proposal and in case of failure to do so, to consider herself at war with France. Similarly, the British Government also informed Germany that if the neutrality of Belgium were violated, the former would be at war with the latter. Both these warnings were contemptuously disregarded by Ribbentrop and so, on September 3, 1939, both France and Britain declared war upon Germany. Soon, the war became a global conflict and, one after the other, almost all the nations were involved in the conflagration.

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she had virtually no coal, little oil, and only small iron resources. Similar was the condition of Japan ; she too had no resources in oil, insufficient coal and iron and no areas of land to rehabilitate her constantly-increasing population. The control of more and more land was her urgent and pressing need.[1]

During the period of 'pacification' (1925-1929), these nations found markets for their finished goods and also could obtain raw materials. But the economic crisis of 1929-30 changed the situation. Almost all the countries resorted to high protective tariffs to save their own industries ; and everywhere the cry was raised "But-at-home." The international trade came to a standstill ; Germany, Italy, Japan, and others suffered acutely. High tariff walls, quotas and embargoes caused widespread distress, particularly in the countries which did not possess raw materials that were vital to their industries. The inability to sell manufactured goods and buy raw materials caused a sense of economic suffocation. The imperialists, in these nations, began to question : Why should a few states possess so large a share of the riches of the earth and all the rest so little ? They insisted that they had a right to a fair share of the earth's natural resources. When nothing could be obtained by peaceful means, the starving and ambitious nations decided to get by force. Japan, Italy and Germany came closer and started on a course of aggression. Japan invaded Manchuria, Italy sacked Ethiopia and Germany started on a long course of expansion which culminated in the second World War.

2. Resentment against Versailles Treaty

The second cause of the war was the resentment against the Versailles Treaty. If the Treaty removed some of the old injustices, it created new ones. The whole spirit and intention of President Wilson, embodied in his Fourteen Points, was violated. "In depriving Germany," as Robert Ergang put it "of every scrap of colonial empire, in creating the Polish Corridor which severed East Prussia from the rest of the *Reich*, and in cutting Danzig away from Germany, the settlement created a burning sense of injustice. More than this, in including the 'war guilt' clause (Article 231) whereby Germany accepted full responsibility for the war, the peace-makers inflicted a bitter humiliation upon the German people. Signor Nitti, the Prime Minister of Italy said in 1922 : "It will remain for ever a terrible precedent in modern history that against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions the representatives of Germany were never even heard."[2]

The Germans had accepted the Versailles arrangements with the bitterest of feelings and never regarded them as binding

1 The artificial methods of birth control were not popular in Japan and the government was faced with the terrible problem of constantly increasing population.

2. Ergang, R. Europe in Our Time
(New York, Heath and Co., 1948) p. 478.

either morally or legally. Article 19 of the League Covenant provided "for the reconsideration of treaties which had become unfair and for the adjustment of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." But the League Members never made use of the provision. On the one hand, there was France who always insisted that "not a jot or title of the Treaty could be either expunged or altered"; on the other, there was Germany which regarded the Treaty as the chief cause of all her post-war troubles. The period of stability brought some confidence and prosperity to the Germans, but the economic crisis of 1929-30 shattered it for good. The economic conditions deteriorated almost to a bursting point and Hitler made the most of it. No sooner was he in power than he began to prepare the country to demolish the Settlement of 1919. He discarded Stresemann's hope of revising the Treaty by "international negotiations" and pursued the course he had laid down in his *Mein Kampf*.[3]

3. The Failure of the League of Nations as an Instrument of World Peace

The failure of the League of Nations, which was established to perpetuate the peace, was another factor which brought the war. The League was organised to serve as an instrument for subordinating the national policies to international order. But the high hopes, on which the international organisation was based, were soon foundered, when the U.S. denied the League at its very birth and left it on Europe's "doorstep". Germany and other defeated nations were at first excluded from it; Soviet Union was not invited to become its member. Consequently, therefore, a distrust against the League developed and the feeling became strong that the League was a "committee of the conquerors whose prime purpose was to uphold the Paris Settlement".

During the first decade of its existence, the League functioned well. Most of the problems, presented to it, were solved with considerable success. A good deal of work had been done in the sphere of relief and reconstruction of the nations' economy. In 1925, Germany was admitted in the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties were adopted. Britain, France and Germany discussed international affairs on a basis of equality. By 1927, its membership increased to fifty-six nations.

But after 1929, the conditions began to deteriorate. It became increasingly apparent that the League could not cope successfully with the burdens laid upon it, and that the League would not be a strong instrument to meet the critical moments

3. Hitler wrote: "The reconquest of lost territories cannot be achieved by solemn appeals to Almighty God or pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by armed force."

in international relations. With Japan's invasion over Manchuria, the story of aggression began and one event followed the other. The League could do nothing except passing pious resolutions and quieting down with a jitter. The withdrawal of the U.S from the beginning deprived the League of a strong member which might have spoken most freely in the Council. Moreover, by making its membership optional, the Covenant encouraged various nations to use threats of resignation as a means of achieving their aims.

Besides these drawbacks, the League suffered from still other weakness. The will to succeed and work sincerely was lacking. If the proper and just support would have been forthcoming, perhaps most of the organisational and other defects would have not obstructed its work. Prime Minister Lloyd George wanted to utilise the League as an "alternative to Bolshevism" ; for Clemenceau its fittest use was as "an instrument for perpetuating the Peace Settlement" ; to Germany, the League was a "grouping of the victor imperialist powers and of secondary states assembled to preserve the fruits of their victory and maintain the *status quo*" ; to Russia, the League was "a forum of the imperialists assembled to thwart her new civilisation". In the words of Gaetano Salvemini : "The history of the League of Nations between World War I and World War II was the history of the devices, ruses, deceptions, frauds, tricks and trappings by means of which the very diplomats who were pledged to operate the Covenant of the League, managed to circumvent and stultify it. They were its most effective foes, since they were under-mining it from within, while nationalists, militarists and fascists were attacking it openly from without in all lands".[4]

4. The Failure of the Disarmament Efforts

In the Treaty of Versallies the victorious nations, while disarming Germany, had pledged themselves eventually "to apply the same measure to themselves and to open negotiations immediately with a view to the adoption eventually of a scheme of general reduction." During the years following the Peace of Paris, there was a plethora of conversations, conferences and agreements both inside and outside the League ; but no substantial reduction emerged from either of them. Nothing really effective was accomplished because the nations did not want to disarm. Several times, the German Government called upon the Big Powers to apply to themselves the same measure of disarmament that had been imposed on Germany. But nothing, except some reductions at Washington Conference of 1922, took place. France always came forward with the slogan, "security first ; disarmament afterwards." Security was not to be had

4. Quoted by Ergang, op. cit., p. 474.

because of the contradictory interests of Britain and France and so, disarmament too was not to be. In 1927, Lloyd George himself stated that, "the nations which had pledged themselves to disarmament had not reduced their armaments by a single division, flight of aeroplanes, or battery of guns." The refusal of the Great Powers to disarm facilitated Hitler to propagate that "re-armament was the only road to power and national achievement." The Japanese conquest of Manchuria convinced the nations that another world war was coming and each one of them began to spend the maximum of its budget on defence programmes, with the result that by the year 1936, Europe looked like a huge heap of powder magazine which could be set ablaze any time by a single match.

5. The Dissatisfaction of National Minorities

During the first World War, the Allied nations had committed themselves to the principle of 'self-determination.' But when the time came, the principle was thrown to the winds. "Its application," as Robert Engang has put it, "was conditioned by such factors as economic necessity, military defence, religious and political traditions and punishment of the defeated nations."[5] In some areas of central Europe, the principle could not be applied due to the fact that the national minorities were intermixed in such a way that the drawing of clear-cut frontiers was not possible. The result was that members of one nationality were included within the boundaries of other states in which they were in minority. These minority groups became hot-beds of discontent, ferment and dissatisfaction. Encouraged by propaganda from home, they demanded reunion with their mother country or full autonomy within the state to which they had been assigned by the peace treaties. "If it is true," they began to ask, "that World War I was fought for the self-determination of nationalities, why was Austria forbidden to unite with Germany? And why were a large number of Germans put under foreign rule?" Germany, by every means possible, tried to create dis-satisfaction among the Germans under foreign rule, raised the alarm that Germans were being mercilessly persecuted there, and that Germany had every right to liberate them from foreign atrocities. This served as a convenient pretext for annexing Austria, Sudetenland, and subsequently Poland, which kindled the fires of World War II."

6. Staunch Nationalism

During the decades immediately preceding 1914, the nationalist psychology dominated every department of human life and reached its climax in the first World War. But during the war, it lost much of its glamour. The horrors and destruction of the war convinced the people, the statesmen and soldiers alike that if another calamity of a similar nature was to be

5. Ibid. p. 477.

averted, conflicting national ambitions would have to give way to a system of international control. This feeling was further reinforced by the speeches of President Wilson and others who advocated a pacific internationalism based upon cooperation and the promotion of common interests. The League of Nations was created as an instrument of internationalism and its one objective was to create an international psychology which still was not there.

But the dream could not be realised. The Peace Settlement was made primarily along national interests and the "New Europe" was reconstructed on strictly national lines. The victorious nations were guided by nothing than their own interests ; the vanquished also ridiculed internationalism as being "sickly and wishy-washy." In a number of cases, the nationalism henceforth was more intolerant than before. In Germany and Italy, its votaries worshipped the state as an end in itself and its expansion as their only motive. In several cases "the dictators rode to power on a wave of popular nationalist enthusiasm. To retain themselves in power, it was necessary that enthusiasm must be sustained and to do this, they resorted to aggression against other countries. The people in the dependencies and colonies also made common cause with one or the other of the Big Powers and helped precipitate the war which they thought would weaken the Big Powers and help them in obtaining their own independence."

7. Contradictions of Imperialism, and the Policy of Appeasement

Great Britain and France, which had jointly won the war, became sharply divided in their attitudes on international problems during the post-war years. This contradiction was visible in all the issues of contemporary international politics—the problem of reparations, the future of Germany, the League of Nations and its system of collective security, the problem of disarmament and so on. Britain had always been the advocate of the principle of balance of power on the Continent and once it was disturbed by the emergence of a strong France, subsquent to and consquent upon a weak Germany after 1919-20, London pursued a policy designed to uphold this balance. This was the policy of appeasement, which meant that Germany should be strengthened so as to act as a bulwark against the predominant position of France. A strong Germany promised, not only to checkmate the growing power of France, but to 'contain' the expansion of communism in eastern and central Europe, Hence the wisdom of appeasement which demanded that Germany should be allowed to strengthen herself. Hence the British connivance at Hitler's repudiation of Germany's international covenants ; hence the British approval of Germany's seizure of Austria ; hence the Munich Pact and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. Once Hitler was

allowed to grab his smaller neighbours, his appetite became insatiable and the whole of Europe stood the chance of being devoured up.

HISTORY OF WAR

The story of the second World War may be studied in its two aspects : millitary and diplomatic Both of them went hand in hand , major decisions of the Great Powers were taken in diplomatic conferences and were executed on battlefields. In many cases, the generals acted as diplomats and improvised decisions of great importance.

Military Aspect of the War

The military history of the war could be divided into five important phases : first phase from September 1, 1939 to June 21, 1941 ; second phase from June 22, 1941 to December 7, 1941 ; third phase from December 8, 1941 to 1942 ; fourth phase from 1942 to June 1944 and the fifth phase, from June 1944 to August 14, 1945.

FIRST PHASE

Invasion of Poland

The first phase of the war began on September 1, 1909, when Hitler invaded Poland and continued till June 22, 1941 when he invaded Soviet Russia. Without a declaration of war, the German planes bombarded Poland in the early hours of September 1. The next day, Hitler justified his action by accusing the Poles for violating the frontiers. On September 2, Mussolini proposed a conference for peaceful settlement of the dispute. Britain and France offered to participate if German troops were withdrawn from Poland. But no reply came to this proposal from Berlin.On September 3, a joint Anglo-French ultimatum was given to Germany, stating that unless the German troops were withdrawn from Poland, a state of war existed between them and the latter Ribbentrop simply accused Britain and France as responsible for war. The ultimatum expiring, both London and Paris declared war upon Germany. Poland hoped that aid from Britain and France would come but she was sorely disappointed. The British steamship, *Athenia*, carrying several hundred U S. citizens and a thousand others. was torpeded about 250 miles off the north-east coast of Ireland by Germany without warning on September 4 but this did not awaken the Anglo-French statesmen. The Polish infantry and cavalry were no match for Hitler's army and within a fortnight, most of Poland's western provinces were occupied and Warsaw was virtually surrounded To make matters worse, the Red Army of the Soviet Union poured into eastern Poland on September 17, ostensibly to protect the Ukrainians and White Russian minorities living there. Ultimately, the defenders surrendered on September 27. The next day, Poland was partitioned between Germany and Soviet-Union—Germany taking the Polish-speaking

industrial areas of the west and Soviet Russia occupying agrarian Byelorussia and Ukrania in the east.

The Expansion of Russia

The occupation of Eastern Poland marked only the beginning of Moscow's policy of erecting buffers between herself and Germany. On September 29, Moscow singed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Esthonia. Within less than two weeks, similar pacts were signed with Latvia and Lithuania. To ensure greater alround safety, the Soviet Union acquired the right to maintain naval bases and aerodromes in each of the Baltic Republics. In all the three cases, Moscow promised that "nothing would be done to impair the sovereignty, or interfere with the political, economic, or social systems of the Baltic States." But keeping pace with the German victories and gains, Moscow presented to the Government of Lithuania an ultimatum on June 14, 1940, the day when Nazi soldiers occupied Paris. The document accused Lithuania of kidnapping some Red soldiers and demanded free passage for the Soviet troops and the replacement of the government by one "enjoying the confidence of Moscow". No satisfactory reply forthcoming, the Red Army occupied Lithuania the next day. On June 16, similar ultimatums were dispatched to the other two Baltic Powers—Esthonia and Latvia and soon their territories were also occupied by the Red Army.

Moscow Threatens Rumania

The international situation being favourable and the things appearing easy of accomplishment, Moscow presented an ultimatum to Rumania. On June 26, 1940, Soviet Union, in the name of justice, demanded that the province of Bessarbia, which had been taken from her in 1918, should be returned to their racial brethern of Ukrainia in the U.S.S.R., and in compensation for the loss which Soviet Union suffered during the 22 years when Bessarbia remained under the control of Rumania, northern Bukovina should also be given to her. The Government of Rumania appealed to Berlin and Rome for advice and apparently were told to meet the Soviet demands lest the war should spread to the Balkans. Accordingly, on June 27, 1940, Soviet troops began to occupy Bessarbia and northern Bukovina.

Russian Penetration in Finland

Although the Soviet Union had strengthened her defences in the Baltic Sea, she was worried about the land and sea approaches to Leningrad *via* Finland, which were still in foreign hands. Moscow adopted the same tactics *vis-a-vis* Finland that she was so successfully pursuing with the other Baltic States. In October 1939, Russia demanded of Finland the territory which would strengthen the position of Leningrad. Negotiations failed to

serve the purpose and towards the end of November 1939, Finland was attacked. After five weeks of fighting, the Finnish defences collapsed. An armistice was signed on March 12, 1940, and Russia obtained more territory than what she originally demanded to strengthen her strategic position in north-eastern Europe. All these activities of the Soviet Union created great misgivings in the diplomatic quarters of the West and in the middle of December 1940, the League of Nations met and expelled her from its membership. Moscow, however, greatly strengthened her strategic position as a result of the territorial changes in Poland and the Baltic. She now controlled most of the territories which she deemed essential for its military security.

HITLER AFTER POLISH CONQUEST

The Sitzkrieg (the sitting war)

After his Polish campaign, no military action was taken by Hitler for eight months in Western Europe. This period was called by some persons as the "period of phony war", by Chamberlain as the "twilight-war", and by the German press as "sitting war", *Sitzkrieg*. This period was, however, utilised by both the sides to strengthen their position military as well as strategic. Production of armaments of all types was speeded up; the procurement of essential materials was taken up in right earnest, and the recruitment and mobilisation of fighting men was hastened. During the first six months of the war, Britain had lost some 340,000 tons of shipping and almost half of this loss was made up by current building. During the same period, Germany had lost 16 submarines and constructed 9 new ones. Britain and France strengthened their diplomatic position by concluding on October 19, a Mutual Assistance pact with Turkey.

During this period, the other states of Europe observed an attitude of neutrality. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Greece and Egypt, although leaning to this side or to that, remained neutral. Japan was openly making pro-Fascist overtures while the United States was offering to accept the obligations of serving as the "arsenal of Democracy". Within a week of the British declaration of war against Germany, the Dominions—Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa declared war upon Germany.

Aggression in the West

The "phony war" came to an end when, all of a sudden in the early hours of April 9, 1940, the Nazis started the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Hitler stating to the Danish Government that Berlin had "indubitable evidence", of Allied plans to use the Scandinavian territories as a battle-ground. To forestall such an action, Germany intended to protect these regions, for they

obviously could not defend themselves. Within a day, Denmark was occupied and the government capitulated to the Germans.

Then Germany attacked Norway, partly to break the effectiveness of the British blockade and partly to secure air and submarine bases against Britain. Here, the military offensive was preceded by propaganda and by the employment of a fifth-column led by Quisling. Britain planned to land an expeditionary force in Norway to assist the Norwegian army and destroy the German landing armies. But within a few days, the main cities of Norway were occupied and Germany obtained control of almost all communication lines. By June 10, Germany obtained control of the whole of Norway and the fighting stopped with the flight of King Haakon and his Government to London.

The occupation of the Scandinavian countries gave to Germany several advantages : she no longer had to worry about the possibility of attack through the northern countries ; (2) she now had actual and potential air, naval and submarine bases, some of them closer to northern Britain than any she had had before ; (3) she acquired a large portion of the gold reserves of Denmark and Norway and large quantities of oil, munitions and foodstuffs.

The Low-lands Campaign

Encouraged by his successess in the Scandinavian adventure, Hitler started offensive against Luxemberg, Belgium and Holland on May 10, 1940. His strategy was based on the *Schlieffen* Plan of the first World War which proposed passing through the Lowlands and avoiding the heavily-fortified *Maginot* Line. Before dawn, German forces occupied Luxemberg without resistance and the German bombers then raided Holland, Belgium and northern France, striking aerodromes and dropping parachute troops to cooperate with spies, traitors, fifth columnists and German 'tourists'. Within five days, Holland was subjugated, the forces surrendered, the government fled to London and the Hague fell to the Nazi army.

Belgium also suffered a like fate. Crossing into her territory at the same time when the German army entered Holland, the Germans rushed ahead taking bridges, forts and canals, investing cities and driving a wedge between the Belgians and their Allied reinforcements. Within a week, the districts of Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet were occupied by the Nazis and on May 28, Belgium finally capitulated.

Battle of France

Now Britain was directly exposed to the German attack. But to the good fortune of England, the German High Command

decided to destroy France rather than attack Britain first.[6] Two days after the fall of Dunkirk, the battle for France was fought on June 5, 1940. The right moment for Italy had come, and realising the weak position of France, she entered the war on the German side on June 10, 1940. In spite of the heroic defence of the French army, German mechanised divisions broke through the French line of resistance. The French were forced to withdraw and Paris fell to the Nazis on June 14. Premier Reynaud resigned and was replaced by Marshall Petain. Realising the futility of further resistance, Petain asked for the terms of armistice. In the same railway coach at Campiegne in which M. Fock and Weygand had accepted the German capitulation in 1918, Hitler, Goering, and Ribbentrop received the French armistice delegation on June 21, 1940. At 6-50 P. M. on June 22, the document was signed. Two days later, the Italo-French armistice convention was also signed.

The terms of the German-Italian armistice with France were designed to destroy completely the military and political power of Paris. More than half of the French territory was occupied and the people were forced to pay for the cost of occupation. French naval bases and certain colonial areas were demilitarised. French trade and merchant marine were placed under Axis control. Germany declared that she had no intention of using the fleet against England or of keeping it after the conclusion of peace. All German prisoners of war were to be released ; all French prisoners-of-war were to remain in German hands.

The Italian terms were mild. They provided for demilitarisation of specified zones in southern France, in Tunis, Algeria and French Somaliland and provided that Italy was to have full rights over the port of Jibuti and that the equipment of French forces on the Italian port was to be surrendered.

France after Armistice

With the signing of the armistice, the third Republic of France came to an end. An independent government was established at Vichy under the leadership of Marshall Petain to administer the unoccupied French territory. The independence left to this government was only nominal. On July 9, 1940, the two Houses of the French Parliament met and voted a resolution conferring full powers upon Petain. On July 11, Petain issued three constitutional decrees. By the first, the position of the President of France was abolished and he himself became the Chief of the French State. The second decree conferred upon this Chief the full legislative and executive powers. By

6. This, it was later on proved, was a blunder of Hitler. Britain at this time was in a desperate position and a war upon her would have put Germany in an advantageous position

the third decree, Petain adjourned both the Chambers of Parliament *sine die*, to be convened later on only by the Chief of the State. On July 12, Laval, who favoured French 'collaboration' with the Nazis, was appointed vice-Premier, and a strongly fascist cabinet was established to assist him. Another decree obliged all the French high officials to swear loyalty to Petain's person, and the Chief of the State was authorised to punish any person suspected of disloyalty or who betrayed his duties. As a result of all these contitutional decrees, France became a dictatorial state under Petain.

The French people did not like the actions and policies of Marshall Petain. Soon a group of Frenchmen under General Charles de Gaulle rose up to oppose the Petain regime and to offer resistance to the Nazi control of their land. Those, who favoured continued struggle against Germany, called themselves "Free French" and General de Gaulle, along with some of his colleagues, fled to London and set up a Provisional French National Committee to conduct the movement for the liberation of France. He gave a stirring call to Frenchmen everywhere, soldiers, sailors, engineers and workers, to join him and continue the fight against Hitler. Several other Frenchmen built up an effective "underground" to harass the Nazis and all their works

Thus, there came into existence the dual system which was to last until the end of war, of two French Governments, one in France-the Government at Vichy, and the other in exile-the Government of the 'Free French.'

A year passed between the fall of France on June 14, 1940 and the German attack of Russia on June 22, 1941. During this period, three important events took place, the battle of Britain, the spread of the war in Balkans, and military activities in the Middle East.

The Battle of Britain

That after the fall of France, Britain would be the next target of Garman attack, was not a matter of doubt and hardly a keen observer could think of the contrary On June 18, 1940, Winston Churchill spoke : "The battle of France is over ; the Battle of Britain is about to b. gin. Let us therefore address ourselves to our duty, so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years men will still say 'this was their finest hour'. With the failure of the Allies in Norway, the destruction of the British weapons at Dunkirk and the collapse of France and the Low Countries made the British position at sea a critical one in the summer of 1940. Moreover, the defeat of France shattered all the Allied influence in eastern Europe. Between 1937 and 1940, Hitler had obtained complete control of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had become the German

spheres of influence. Greece, Finland and Yugoslavia had also joined the German coalition. Thus, Hitler was now in full control of the land between the Baltic and the Adriatic seas.

When the Germans looked towards Britain, they faced a disappointing situation. Germany had an army of approximately 3,500,000 men, all well-trained and fully armed and equipped. Had Britain been merely another country on the Continent, adjacent to France, she would have been invaded, overrun and conquered by the Germans. But most of the advantages were lost because, despite Hitler's declaration that there were "no more islands", Britain was an island separated from the Continent by the English Channel which was a formidable barrier to mechanised land units. To cross it and launch a successful invasion of England, Germany needed thousands of suitable landing crafts ; and unfortunately Hitler did not have them. And then, the British navy, though in a desperate plight, was still more powerful than the combined strength of Italy and Germany. Moreover, Churchill, who had become the Prime Minister of England on the resignation of Chamberlain on May 10, 1940, had been preparing the English nation against all eventuality. In his speech before the Parliament on May 13, Churchill apprised his countrymen of the heavy ordreal ahead when he said : "I have nothing to offer but blood, toils, tears and sweat. My only policy is to wage war, by sea, land and air and my only aim is victory in spite of all terror, for without victory, there is no survival." Similarly, on July 14, 1940, Churchill declared "Conscious that we serve an unfolding purpose, we are ready to defend our native land against the invasion by which it is threatened. We are fighting by ourselves alone. But we are not fighting for ourselves alone. Should the invader come to Britain, there will be no placid lying down of the people in submission before him.... .We shall defend every village, every town and every city We would rather see London in ruins and ashes than that it should be tamely and abjectly enslaved."

All these circumstances and pronouncements, however, failed to deter Hilter from his resolve. If the German navy was weak, there was enough confidence in her air force. Hitler finally decided that this weapon alone could be relied on to bring Britain to its knees. Moreover, the conquest of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France gave German planes admirable bases for attacking the southern coasts of Britain. As a result, the latter was geographically and industrially much more vulnerable to air attack than Germany. So, the Nazis began the long awaited air warfare with Britain, and on the night of June 18, 1940, the German bombers inaugurated a system of daily air raids over the British territory. The British war machine retaliated immediately and sent fighting planes to disperse the German bombers. Britain went a phenomenal

change ; almost overnight, the British people prepared for the eventual fight ; factories began to produce war material at an unprecedented rate ; and the morale of the people improved considerably.

End of American of Isolation and Neutrality

From 1920 onwards, the U. S. was pursuing a policy of isolationism in world affairs and when Hitler came into power in 1933 and the world began to move towards a catastrophe, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts in 1935 and 1936 The isolationism of Americans, as Palmer and Perkins have pointed out "grew from the feeling that their earlier venture in world-saving had been both futile and unappreciated, that the war debts had been thanklessly ignored, that the League of Nations had been the tool of Britain and France, that wars were often engineered by munition-makers for personal profit, that government morals were shelved in times of crisis, that European states were committed by tradition and preference to wily diplomacy and forcible measures for the solution of their problems, and that all things considered, Americans would do right by keeping Virtue, and the High Standard of Living undefiled in one land rather than by inviting adulteration of both through embroilment in the concerns of Europe."[7]

But unhappy developments were taking place abroad and the growing power of Hitler convinced the Americans that thier own security was linked to Allied war fortunes and that, Hitler in full control of Europe, would proceed to the conquest of the New World As early as November 1939, Congress amended the Neutrality Act to end the embargo on arms and munitions and to make other changes. In September 1940, the President concluded an 'executive agreement' with Britain, the famous "Destroyer Base Deal" by which the United States turned over fifty average destroyers and in return received ninety-nine years leases on six British bases in the Western Hemisphere. On September 16, 1940, Congress passed the Compulsory Military Service and Training Law, whereby conscription was introduced for the first time during 'peace' in the history of the Republic. The Two Ocean Navy Bill of July 19, 1940, authorised 70% increase in sea forces ; and before the close of 1940, Congress approved an expenditure of $ 12,000,000,000 for defence.

On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt, delivered a fervent speech before the Congress, enuntiating the 'Four Freedoms' and requesting her to take necessary steps "to save democracy from annihilation". The Administration followed this appeal by the introduction of a "British Aid Bill" giving the President emergency powers to make America the "arsenal of Democracy" and "to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or other-

7. Palmer and Perkens op. cit, p. 580.

wise dispose of, or cause to be manufactured defence materials for the government of any country whose defence the President deemed vital to the defence of the U.S.A." The Bill received the assent of the President on March 11, 1941, and came to be called the Lend-Lease Act.

Although this Act did not signify America's entry into the war, it was quite incompatible with the obligations of "neutrality". It could, however, be justified legally by reference to the Pact of Paris and strategically by the prospect of the Fascist powers dominating the whole world. In pursuance of the spirit of this Act, several other steps were also taken by the U. S. Administration. In July 1941, all Japanese assets were frozen and all trade between the two countries was stopped. On August 14, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill jointly issued a statement of their war aims and of the principles of democracy ; it came to be known as the Atlantic Charter. They declared :

(1) "Their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other. (2) "They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned. (3) They respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. (4) "They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. (5) "They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security. (6) "After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. (7) "Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance. (8) "They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten, for peace-loving peoples, the crushing burdens of armaments".

In October of the same year, Congress repealed three provisions of the Neutrality Act, thus permitting the arming of merchantmen and their sailing into combat zones and entering belligerent ports. All German and Italian ships and financial assets in the United States were taken over. The production of war materials was speeded up and the army, navy and air forces were enlarged. All these steps meant the virtual, though not the formal, end of American neutrality from the war. Still she refrained from a "shooting war," and did not become a combatant until her own interests in the Hawaiian Islands were subjected to air raids by Japan in December, 1941.

Break in the Anglo-German Hostilities

The Anglo-German air warfare continued for some months but with no final result. Since the Germans did not begin their really large scale air attacks upon Britain until the second weak of August 1940,the British recovered their position to a great extent, and the time was utilised to speed up military production, training and defensive measures. The year '1941' opened with four million Britons under arms ready to meet any invader. Hitler found Britain a hard nut to crack, and he succeeded neither in destroying British morale nor in eliminating the British Air Force. Although the cities of Bristol, London, Liverpool, Birmingham and Coventry had been subjected to heavy losses of property, they could not be 'erased' and in utter disgust, Hitler shifted the theatre of war to the Balkans.

The failure of the German attempt to beat Britain to surrender upset Hitler's timetable for the first time and he decided to start other offensive, with Britain still undefeated. The air-warfare with Britain, however, continued and a second front was opened in the Balkans.

Spread of the War in Balkan Peninsula

Here the Soviet Union had already struck. That she obtained from Rumania, Bessarbia and Northern Bukovina in June 1940, has already been mentioned. Hungary and Bulgaria also expressed their determination to regain the territories which Rumania had taken from them in 1919-20. Both the countries rushed their troops to the frontiers and another Balkan war seemed imminent. But neither Germany nor Italy liked a war there at that moment, and conferences of the leaders of the three countries—Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania – were called to decide the issue. This resulted in further partition of Rumania. Bulgaria received that part of the Dobrudja which Rumania had taken from her in 1913 and Hungary obtained the northern half of the province of Transylvania, all of which had been given to Rumania by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920.

In the inside of Rumania, a Fascist organisation of the peasants, Iron Guard, took advantage of the weak position of King Carol, deposed him from the throne and established a totalitarian regime under the premiership of one of its favourite General, Ion Antonescu. Taking advantage of the chaotic conditions in the country and in collaboration with Antonescu, the German troops entered Rumania and began the occupation of that country. Thus, a long-cherished ambition of Hitler, outlined in *Mein Kampf, viz.*, access to Black Sea, was realised.

Another aggressive step in the Balkans was taken by Mussolini when, on October 28, 1940, he ordered his troops in Albania to attack Greece in the hope of winning a rapid victory in conjuction with his African campaign. But his hopes were dashed to the ground when the Greek armies drove the Italians back into Albania, and by, the spring of 1941, the Italian invasion was turned into a rout.

In the meantime, Hitler had started to win over the states of Central Europe and the Balkans by diplomacy to support his plans. In November 1940, Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia had joined the Tripartite Agreement of September 27, 1940, which Germany, Italy and Japan had arranged to facilitate the establishment of "a New Order in Europe and Greater East Asia." During the opening days of 1941, a large number of Nazi troops were sent to Rumania and concentrated on the frontiers of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the hope that they might be frightened to join the Axis Powers and thereby help in controlling the whole of the Balkans. Hitler was for long planning an invasion of the Soviet Union and, for this, control over the Balkans was quite essential. On March 1941, Bulgaria actually joined the Axis Powers by signing an agreement with Germany and Italy and very soon, the capital was swamped by Nazi troops.

Bulgaria thus having succumbed to Hitler's pressure, there was no safety for Yugoslavia. Defiance of Hitler and a war with Germany might have destroyed Yugoslavia altogether; and therefore the government wisely signed a Tripartite Pact on March 25 1941, on the lines Bulgaria had done three weeks earlier. This caused great resentment among the people and a bloodless *coup d'etat* was effected in the early hours of March 27. The new government, which was soon organised, declared a policy of strict neutrality from the European war. It, however, began to mobilise troops along its frontiers.

But before the Yugoslav Government had completed their mobilisation, Hitler began the invasion of the country. On April 6, 1941, German aeroplanes bombarded both Yugoslavia and Greece. The Yugoslav army was no match for the German mechanised equipment and air force and after twelve days of fighting, it surrendered unconditionally.

In the meantime, the fate of Greece was also sealed. With the help of 60,000 British, Australian and New Zealand troops Greek armies made some headway. But three days after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Greek Government gave up the struggle "to avoid the useless massacre of its people." On April 27, 1941, the Nazis occupied Athens and King George II and his government fled to the island of Crete.

The Conquest of Crete

Having completed the conquest of the Balkans, Germany launched an invasion against the strategic British-occupied Greek island of Crete. The gliders, parachutes and transport planes dropped thousands of German soldiers on the Crete soil but the resistance of the British troops made conquest impossible. Once again, Hitler resorted to air warfare and hundreds of aeroplanes compelled the withdrawal of the British navy. By the first day of June 1941, Crete capitulated. Germany was now in possession of a valuable base of operations against the British Mediterranean fleet. Its loss also lessened Britain's prestige in Turkey.

Developments in Middle East

If the war in the Balkans put Germany and Italy in a dominant position there, British gained some success in Middle East. After the conquest of the Balkans, Syria and Iraqi seemed to be the next targets of Hitler's attack. In Syria, the French High Commissioner seemed to favour the Vichy Government's policy of collaboration with the Nazis. In Iraq, the pro-British Goernment had been ousted by the pro-Axis Rashid Ali Beg Gailani on April 4, 1940. Both the countries offered the prospects of controlling the rich oil fields of Mosul and a military base for an advance on the Suez Canal. In order to forestall the Nazi action, Britain began to land troops at the Irqi port, Basra on the Persian Gulf on April 19. Rashid Ali took serious objection, attacked the British air base at Habbania and appealed Hitler for help. But as the latter was planning an invasion of Crete, he could not send sufficient aid to enable Rashid Ali to defeat the British troops. Rather, Rashid Ali's troops had to surrender, his government collapsed and on June 11, all fighting ended. The pro-British Government returned to power and the three important towns, Basra, Bagdad and Mosul, fell in British hands. Soon after, the British troops launched an invasion of Syria and succeded in occupying that country without much trouble. Thus, with Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan in their control, the British exercised a dominant position in the Middle East.

Cooling down of Russo-German Relations

After completing the conquest of Crete, Germany was now in full control of the Balkan peninsula and could freely undertake campaigns against the Soviet Union. Although a non-aggression pact had been signed between Moscow and Berlin in August 1939, both were suspicious of each other and the pact was of little use in minimising the suspicions. The conflict between Germany's long-standing desire for a drive into the Balkans and Russia's equally long-standing ambition to control that region was further widened by the expansionist move of each. Hitler disliked the Russian annexation of northern Bukovina, which had not been mentioned in the secret protocol of 1939; Stalin resented the German occupation of Rumania and the Axis guarantee to that country which he considered as contrary to the Russian interest. Matters came to a head when, after the air blitz against Britain had failed, Hitler proposed to the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, on November 12, 1940, that Russia should sign a four-power treaty with Germany, Italy and Japan, leaving Germany dominant in the Balkans and Russia to centre her territorial aspirations in the region south of the Soviet Union "in the direction of the Indian Ocean". Russia presented her own conditions to sign such a treaty, but they were not acceptable to Hitler and the result was a complete breakdown of friendly relations.Clashes in policy soon developed between the two states. On January 17, 1941, Russia warned that the entry of the Nazi troops into Bulgaria would be considered "as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S R". But Germany did not heed the warning and occupied Bulgaria in March.On April4,the Russian Foreign Minister sent another note to Berlin, informing Hitler that Russia was proposing to sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Yugoslavia and that Russia hoped that the German Government would do everything to maintain peaceful relations with that country. But this note too fell on deaf ears in Germany ; and two days after, Yugoslavia was invaded by the Nazis troops.

All these events confirmed the view that Russian confidence in Germany had been exhausted. From the spring of 1941 onwards a series of border incidents took place, and complaints were made by each of the two countries that the other was trespassing over the frontier.

SECOND PHASE

German Invasion of Russia

Although Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a Non-aggression Pact in August 1939, neither of the parties expected a lasting peace as between them. As Palmer and Perkins have put it : "Hitler was buying Russian acquiescence in the spoliation of Poland as well as a measure of security in his rear

while striking at Britain and France. Russia was buying peace for the moment, time to re-arm, a buffer area in Poland and a good chance that the Nazis and Allies would exhaust themselves against each other, leaving Soviet power supreme in Europe[8].

Germany had smashed Poland, conquered the Scandinavian countries, occupied the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemberg, defeated France, and had tried her might with Britain. The Balkan countries lay at Hitler's feet and the occupation of Crete gave him the key to the Mediterranean. Now Hitler decided to launch an invasion of the Soviet Union.

Why Invasion of Russia ?

Writers of text books on international affairs have called it the great folly and blunder of Hitler that he opened a second front in the East without first completely smashing the West. But it defence of Hitler, three arguments which heavily weighed in his mind, could be put forth. First, the easy conquest of Poland and France led him to believe that the conquest of Russia would also be easily achieved, and the Russians would not be able to offer any formidable resistance. Secondly, a trial of arms with Britain and the failure of the German superior air force to break the might of the latter convinced Hitler that unless Germany was absolutely secure in the east, she could not unleash, on the British Isles, the armed strength sufficient to do the job. Thirdly, Hitler also became doubtful of the Russian expansion in the Balkans and the Baltic Sea coast states. The Russians, Hitler thought, might become so powerful as to prove invincible and so, it was wise to strike before it was too late. Perhaps Hitler's resolve to open hostilities against Russia was also based upon the possibility of evoking a resumption of British appeasement in the name of a "world crusade against communism".

With all these considerations in mind, Hitler began to concentrate troops on the eastern front. Before dawn on Sunday, June 22, 1941, the blow fell. Nazi bombers struck at the Soviet air-fields and three gigantic German armies crossed the Russian frontier, one aiming at Leningrad, the other at Moscow, and the third at the Caucasus area.

This invasion had its immediate effect on other countries. Italy and Finland joined Hitler at once, along with the captive States of Rumania and Slovakia; Denmark and Vichy France broke off relations with Russia. Premier Churchill proclaimed support of Russia, announcing that, "though he had not changed his views on communism, any man or state who fights against Nazism will have our aid". Only July 12, an Anglo-Russian

8. Ibid., p. 577.

agreement was signed in Moscow, an agreement for mutual aid in the war against Germany. President Roosevelt declared that "the United States would send all material help to Russia, subject to the prior needs of Great Britain", and American supplies in increasing quantity were dispatched to Europe.

Hitler's enterprise in Russia proved to be the bloodiest and most colossal military operation in history. The Russians offered stubborn resistance, fought with superlative valour and endured staggering losses in men and material. But the Nazi troops advanced like a whirlwind and, within six months, by December 1941, they were in possession of 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory,including all the regions annexed by Moscow in 1939-40 and most of the rich Ukraine. By October 17, the Germans were within 31 miles of Moscow, and had captured Odessa and Kharkov. In June, 1941, the Nazis also attacked the Caucasus to obtain possession of its huge oil reserves and reached Stalingrad. The fighting took place street by street, and house by house, and most of the city was captured. But the Russian resistance, under General M. Zhukov, made possible by the Russian factories to send an ever-swelling stream of fighting weapons to the front, averted the final collapse and the invaders were thrown back. Unmindful of the severity of the Russian winter, Hitler ordered a second offensive on November 16, and this time the Nazi soldiers reached within fifteen miles of Moscow. The bitter cold of Russia and the martyr's zeal of the Russians made victory impossible and in December, the Germans retreated with heavy losses in men and material.

The Germans failed in their three objectives. Dr. Langsam has rightly stated : "They had surrounded, but had not captured Leningrad ; they had come within 31 miles of but had not taken Moscow ; and they had not 'annihilated' the Russian armies."

Why Germany Failed to Conquer Russia ?

A number of factors were responsible for the failure of the Nazis to overwhelm the Soviet Union with the same promptness as they had done in Poland, France, the Scandinavian and the Low Land countries. The most important of them was that the Russians had a long frontier of 2,000 miles from the White Sea to the Black Sea, and Hitler did the folly of spreading his soldiers all along the frontier instead of concentrating them on a few vital points. They had to face not only the Russian armies and their spirit but also the Russian spaces and distances.

Besides the factor of space, there was the factor of time and weather also. With the coming of the winter of 1941-42, the Russians were put in a clear advantage. They knew the severity of their winters, and had taken the steps necessary "to keep their fuel fluid and their wheels turning despite the icy mud." The Germans, unaccustomed to the sub-zero tempera-

tures which persisted for long, expected that the fighting would cease before winter set in and therefore took no such steps. The Russian, taking advantage of the deplorable plight of the German army, started the offensive and drove the Germans back at several places.

Russian foresight also contributed to prevent the decisive victory which the Germans sought. They had been been, for long, preparing for a war against any western enemy. They knew their hostility with the capitalist world, and had made provision for the rapid increase in the country's military strength in the successive five-year plans. They had established most of their new plants in eastern Russia, and even east of Urals, with the result that when the Germans had conquered most of European Russia, the mechanised war went on with the huge quantities of arms-supply from those factories.

The millitary skill of the Russians was also, in no way, inferior to that of the Germans. The mechanised warfare, of which the Germans were experts, was also not new to the Russians. They knew fully well the use of recent military weapons like the tank-carrying airplanes, motorised units, giant tanks, and parachute troops. The "scorched earth" policy and guerrilla tactics of the Russians were also a great military advantage. The farther the Germans advanced, the farther the Russians retreated, and while doing so, they destroyed most of the economic resources of the area, with the result that the strain on German supply lines went on increasing. Here, the Russian guerrillas behind the invading armies menaced the German lines of communications, and the German armies were made to suffer from hunger and starvation. Thus, as Benns has put it, "space, time, weather, and Russian foresight and millitary skill—all contributed to prevent the decisive victory which the Germans sought. In 1941, the Soviet armies punctured the myth of Nazi military invincibility."

THIRD PHASE

Out break of War in the Far East

As has already been mentioned, the attitude of U. S. had been slowly changing since the outbreak of war. In 1939, President Roosevelt bad placed an embargo upon the shipment of arms to the belligerents in accordance with the Neutrality Act. But these restrictions proved disadvantageous to Britain and France; they were not as well prepared for war as Germany. Roosevelt, who was clearly sympathetic towards the European Democracies, urged the amendment of the Neutrality-Act to permit the sale of arms. The 'cash and carry' system was instituted, permitting the Americans to sell arms to the belligerents on strictly cash terms and provided that they were not carried in American vessels. This was the extent to which the

American public opinion was ready to go at that time. With the fall of France and the likely invasion of Britain, the Americans had begun to realise that neutrality alone was no safeguard against aggression ; rather, substantial help needed to be given to protect Britain from annihilation. In the meantime, Britain's dollar and gold reserves were fast exhausting and purchase of arms on the 'cash and carry' basis was no longer possible. Hence a departure was necessary and the Lend-Lease Act was passed and huge quantities of war materials, food and equipment of all kinds were transported to the Allies.

Although she had ranged on the side of the Allies, the U. S. was formally and legally neutral when the Land-Lease Act was passed. But in view of the military developments in Europe, it was impossible for Washington to keep aloof from the conflict for long. In December 1941, her own interests, were threatened in the Far East and she was compelled to enter the war.

Circumstances Leading to U. S. Entry into War

The immediate cause of her entry into the war could be found in events in the Far East and, in particular, in her relations with Japan. As early as the last decade of the 19th century, Japan had begun to have dreams of an empire on the Asiatic mainland and, by the year 1939, she had succeeded in annexing Korea, in establishing a puppet regime in Manchuria and in having a predominant position in China. She had captured several of the important cities of China like Hankow, Canton, Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping and Tientsin; and had gained control of most of the main railway lines of that country. In order to create a serious rift among the Chinese, Tokyo on March 30, 1940. recognised a puppet 'Chinese National Government' set up at Nanking under the nominal leadership of Wang Ching-we, who had been recently expelled from the Chinese Nationalist Party as an advocate of appeasement. But the non-Axis Powers continued to have relations with the regularly-constituted Chungking Government. Their own spirit and heroic actions, supported by material help from Britain, America and Russia, enabled the Chinese to check the Japanese from further penetration.

The 'losing of face' in China resulted in unpleasantness at home. The mounting expenses and tension of prolonged war, the loss of overseas markets, the U. S. embargo on essential commodities, and the increasing authoritarian orientation of domestic policies—all stimulated great dissatisfaction at home. To satisfy the public opinion, the Tokyo Government, in 1940, decided to turn its attention to the south eastern area which was reputed to be rich in rubber, oil, rice and tin. With France in collapse and Britain fighting with Germany, the chief obstacle in the way of fulfilment of this ambition was, aside from China

herself, the Soviet Union and United States. In Japan, there was a traditional distrust of the Soviet Union, especially because the Bolsheviks had been openly assisting China in her fight against the 'New Order' which Japan was designing to create in the Far East. Besides, the United States, through the speeches of its Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the concentration of naval forces in the Pacific, had made it clear that she was vitally interested in preventing any violent change in the political relations of south eastern Asia.

But, in spite of all these pronouncements and warnings, Japan continued to increase her influence in that region. During the first half of 1939, Japan occupied the Chinese Island of Hainan and annexed the Spratley Islands. In June 1940, when Marshall Petain was seeking an armistice with Germany, Japan forced France to agree that Japanese inspectors might be stationed at key point in Indo-China with power to supervise and control all traffic through that French colony. During July 1940, Japan exerted pressure on France and eventually, on September 22, the latter agreed to permit the Japanese to maintain limited number of troops at Haiphong and use some airfields in northern Indo-China.

This and similar other activities of Japan brought her relations with the United States to a breaking point. On July 26, 1940, in order to exert economic pressure upon Japan, and, if necessary, to retard Japan's plan for the 'New Order in East Asia,' the State Department gave a six month's notice, necessary to abrogate the existing Japanese-American commercial treaty. But it failed to cow down Japan. On September 26, four days after the French had been forced to admit the Japanese armed forces into Indo-China, Roosevelt placed an embargo upon the export of all scrap steel and iron except to Britain and the Western hemisphere.

This step caused great resentment in Tokyo and war with America seemed inevitable. The very next day, on September 27, 1940, Tokyo signed a Ten-year Military Alliance with Germany and Italy which "shared the views and aspirations" of the Japanese people, and thus the Triple Alliance was formed. It had six provisions.[9]

9. 1. "Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establisoment of a 'New Order in Europe.
2. "Germany, and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a 'New Order in Greater East Asia.
3. "Germany, Italy and 'Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.
4. "With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members of which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, I aly and Japan will meet without delay.

Six months later, on April 13, 1941, Tokyo signed a Five-Year Pact of Non-aggression and Neutrality with Moscow. Following these treaties, Japan exerted pressure upon France ; and in July, 1941, forced the latter to sign military agreements which put Japan in a dominant position in Indo-China.

All these steps taken by Japan greatly prejudiced the interest of America in the Far East. Washington had been continuously protesting to the war-like moves of Tokyo. This time the protest was backed up by acts. On July 25, 1941, London and Washington declared Japanese assets frozen, and thereby ended any important trade with Japan. London expressed its intention to cancel the existing trade treaties between Japan on the one side, and Britain, India and Burma on the other. On August 1, the United States placed an embargo upon the export of aviation oil and gasoline, thus cutting off Japan from her oil supply in the United States. The same month, Washington announced that "any Japanese action against Thailand would cause her great concern".

U. S.-Japanese Negotiations

Relations between Japan and the United States had been growing from bad to worse. Efforts were made for a peaceful settlement of the contentious issues as early as March 1941. Japan had been demanding the recognition of her conquests in China ; while American, stood for "the territorial and political integrity of China" and the restoration of normal trade relations. No compromise between the conflicting demands could be made; and the 'peace talks' came to an end in July 1941. In August, the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, urged the resumption of the Japanese-American negotiations. Throughout September, Tokyo unsuccessfuly tried to induce the American President to meet Premier Konoye somewhere in the Pacific to iron out the differences of the two peoples. Japan refused to withdraw from the stand (she had taken) and change her policy regarding Asia ; the United State refused to recognise changes brought about by force or in violation of the treaty rights.

The Japanese militarists were getting impatient, pressed for action and forced the resignation of Premier Konoye on October 16. An advocate of 'positive action,' General Tojo, became the

5. "Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.
6. "The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper time before expiration of said term, the High Contracting Parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal".

Prime Minister. The Japanese Diet was called into a special session to approve the expansionist policy of the government and to vote additional expenditure amounting to millions of yen. Apparently as a manouver to gain time, a special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, was sent to Washington on November 5, 1941. He went ostensibly to help the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, iron out the differences with the U. S. Government; but actually his mission was to cover up preparations for the imminent Japanese attack on United States' possessions in the Far East[10]. After preliminary negotiations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu presented on November 20, a new set of proposals indicating the extent of the concessions which Tokyo was willing to make. The United States would: (1) cease all aid to China; (2) cancel the order freezing Japanese assets and abandon all restrictions on trade with Japan; and (3) supply Japan with as much oil as she desired and bring pressure on the Netherland's East Indies to do the same. Japan would in turn: (1) promise not to make any new moves beyond Indo-China; (2) evacuate southern Indo-China upon the signing of the agreement; and (3) evacute all Indo-China when Peace with China had been attained.

The State Department felt that the proposals, if accepted, would "assure Japan's domination of the Pacific, placing us in serious danger for decades to come." The proposals were rejected; and on November 26, counter-proposals were submitted. Japan would: (1) recognise the integrity of Indo-China; (2) withdraw her forces from that country and from China; and (3) abandon the puppet government of Wang Ching-we and recognise that of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States would in turn: (1) remove the restrictions on American exports to Japan; (2) assist Japan in the stabilisation of her currency; and (3) offer a favourable trade agreement. The U. S. also proposed a joint declaration recognising "the principles of non-aggression, international co-operation and equality of opportunity in the Pacific."

These proposals fell on deaf ears in Tokyo, By the close of November, strong Japanese naval forces were concentrated in the vicinity of the Japanese mandated islands. On December 6, President Roosevelt addressed a personal plea to Emperor Hirohito to help him maintain peace, assuring that "the United States had no intention of attacking Indo-China and undertaking "to secure similar assurance from China, Thailand, Malaya and the

10. Secretary Hull learned, from an intercepted dispatch from Tojo to Nomuru, that Japan had set November 25, as the final date for the acceptance of her demands. On November 9, Premier Churchill, in keeping with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, declared in a public address that if the United States got into the war with Japan, Britain's declaration of war "will follow within an hour".

Netherland East Indies, if the Japanese forces were withdrawn." Kurusu requested a conference with secretary Hull, so that he might transmit the official reply to the Washington proposal of November 26th. But before the formal reply was presented to Hull, Roosevelt telephoned him that Pearl Harbour, U.S. stronghold in the Hawaii Island had been bombarded by Japanese planes A few hours after the attack, Japan declared war on the U. S., and the British Empire.

Reaction to Japans' Action

The first official reaction to the Japanese attack came from the tiny republic of Latin-America, Costa Rica, and within ten hours, she declared war upon Japan. The U. S. Congress took thirty-two hours to declare war upon Japan. Declarations of war upon Japan also came from other eight Latin-American States. On December 8, Britain and Canada also entered the Far Eastern war on the side of United States. China issued declarations against Germany and Italy as well as Japan. Within a few days, the exiled government of Greece, Yugoslavia and the Free French, as well as Australia and new Zealand also entered the conflict. On December 11, the allies of Japan, Germany and Italy, declared was on the United States ; Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria followed on December 12. The three Axix aggressors also agreed to carry on war "in common and jointly", not to conclude either an armistice or a peace separately and after the conclusion of the war "to collaborate closely in order to realise and establish an equitable New Order in the world."

With the involvement of the United States, Japan, Latin-America and China, the war became a global conflict. The world was divided into two warring groups. On the one side, there were China, Baitain, Soviet Union, the United States and a large number of smaller states ; on the other, there were the three great Axis powers with the puppet regimes in a number of "occupied states."

Developement of the War in the Far East

The American military and naval commanders at Pearl Harbour were taken unawares and half the capital ships of the U.S. navy were put out of action. For the next months, one disaster succeeeded another and the Allies suffered heavily in naval operations. On December 10, two British warships, the 'Prince of Wales' and the 'Republic' were sunk by Japanese air attack off the coast of Malaya. Within a few months, Japan swept over Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Stiam, Malaya Singapore and the Dutch Indies like a whirlwindi. After consolidating their position in Malaya, the Japanese troops invaded Burma, and on March 7, 1942, Rangoon fell in their hands. The Allied control of the Burma Road, through which supplies were sent to China, was endangered. By May, Japan succeeded in occupying Burma and the British were compealed to retreat to India. Quite a vast area of land and sea, comprising well over 500.000,000

people, passed under the control of Japan. The expected invasion of India did not, however, take place. The force of the Japanese on slaught was stopped, mainly by the monsoon and by the necessity of consolidating the gains of five months' fighting. For a time, it was also feared that the Japanese might next invade Australia for, Japan was already in possession of the outer defences of that great island Continent—Timor to the west, Solomon Islands to the east and Rabaul and northern New Guinea. The Australians were very much perturbed and Prime Minister John Curtin appealed to the United States for help. American troops and supplies were rushed to the Fiji Islane, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides and New Zealand to guard the routes to Australia and an American expeditionary force was dispatched to the latter itself.

After Japan had started the war in the Far East, the great problem before the Allies, particularly U. K. and the U. S., was whether the major effort should be directed against the Axis in Europe or against Japan, or attempt to co-ordinate efforts of something like equal strength against both. It was, however, deemed necessary that Britain and Russia should be given immediate relief and that Hitler should not be allowed to exploit the industrial and manpower potential of Europe a day longer than was avoidable. It was also believed that while Germany and Italy were being disposed of, Japan could be kept in check from further expansion in the western Pacific. But Hitler could hardly be held in check while Japan was being eliminated. The Australians, Chinese, New Zealanders and west coast Americans urged Japanese priority ; the Britons and the Russian s emphasised action against Hitler and Mussolini. President Roosevelt cast his weight in favour of Britain and Russia, while he also decided to take a vigorous concurrent action against Jopan.

FOURTH PHASE

Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

Upto the autumn of 1942, Hitler's armies continued their forward march, almost without interruption, for the conquest of Europe. But in the closing months of that year, the German armies were halted and in the succeeding years, they were driven out of the conquered lands and were utimately made to surrender before the combined strength of the United Nations—a combination of twenty-six states which put down their signatures on a declaration on January 1, 1942, promising to employ their full resources, military or economic, against the Axis powers.

The story of the bloody struggle may be studied under the following headings : The rout of the Axis in Africa ; Allied invasion of Italy and its collapse ; the Great Russian Offensives and the retreat of Germany ; the Liberation of France and other satellite States of Germany : the Battle against Germany and her ultimate collapse.

Rout of the Axis in Africa

After the fall of France, Germany had started air warfare against Britain. But after three months of operations, Hitler had realised that it would be difficult to win victory over Britain without first breaking her power in other parts of the world. Because of the superiority of her fleet, Britian could not have been defeated on the sea. There were chances of success in the air, but they too were marred by the timely reinforcement from Washington under the Lend-Lease Programme. So the Nazis made North Africa the theatre of war.

The defeat of France left Britain in a precarious position in the Mediterranean and Eastern Africa. Italy found a proper opportunity to invade the British colonies, as the latter had been deprived of all support from French North Africa, French Somaliland and Syria. For several weeks after Italy's entry into the war on June 10, 1940, the Anglo-Italian hostilities were mostly confined to air raids : the British bombarding Italian industrial centres, and the island base of Rhodes, and the Italians attacking the British bases in the Mediterranean, Gibralter, Malta, and Alexandria. In August 1940, the Italian forces penetrated British territory and rounded out her east African empire. But it meant little gain to her; rather Italian East Africa was cut off except by air, from any contact with the mother country or her other possessions. In order to improve upon this situation and to wrest from Britain the control of the Mediterranean Sea, Mussolini turned his attention toward Egypt and the Suez Canal. In September 1940, the large but ill-equipped and unenthusiastic Italian forces drove the British into Egypt. But here the attack halted. The Italian commander presumably decided to consolidate his gains, and accumulate fresh supplies. Similarly, the British troops also received fresh supplies of men and material from home. In December 1940, Wavell began a well-planned counter attack. Within five days, the Italians were pushed back into Libya and by March 1941, most of the Italian out-posts in Cyrenaica fell.

In April 1941, the Italians, reinforced by German divisions and commanded by the German General Rommel, struck with superior force and, within a few days, were once more back within Egypt and shortly after, the Alies were also ousted from Libya. Seven months later, the tables again began to turn and

in November 1941, Auchinleck, reinforced by a new armoured division, assumed the counter offensive and by the end of the year, the British troops were back at El Agheila.

Thrusts and counter thrusts by the opposing forces continued till October 1942, when, on the night of October 23, a full scale invasion was launched by the 8th Army under General Montgomery, designed to drive Rommel not only out of Egypt but out of Libya as well. It penetrated the main defences of the German forces, beat off a counter attack, and on November 12, entered Tobruk. In a little over three weeks, Rommel was driven back and on November 3, a general Axis retreat began and within four days, Rommel's forces were driven back across the Egyptian frontier. On November 20, the 8th Army entered Bengasi. Rommel tried to recover his position, but Montgomery, aided by his heavy guns, prepared for a second devastating barrage. On January 23, 1943. his forces entered the city of Tripoli. The final battle for Egypt was over; Rommel's armies were pushed 1,300 miles westward in three months. The Italian empire in Africa was lost.

While Montgomery's offensive was intended to drive the Axis out of east Africa, the American troops under Gen. Eisenhower undertook the enterprise to oust them from the West. Early in November 1942, the army had been landed at selected points in Vichy-controlled French North and West Africa. It had been hoped that the French garrisons in North Africa totaling some 100,000 men would welcome and not oppose the Allied landings. President Roosevelt and "Fighting French" General de Gaulle made appeals to the French forces to co-operate. But the appeals were not anywhere heeded and resistance was serious in certain cases. Here Eisenhower proceeded in close collaboration with Admiral Darlan who had earlier served under Petain at Vichy and now represented that regime in North Africa. In order to facilitate the occupation of North Africa, Eisenhower recognised Darlan as head of the civil administration. Darlan was assassinated three weeks later by an anti-Vichy Frenchman and was replaced by General Giraud who had recently escaped from a German prison camp. The French collaboration with the allies was resented in Germany and orders were issued for the occupation of hitherto "unoccupied France." Arrangements were also made to send supplies and re-inforcements to Rommel by air. Inadequate preparations and inclement weather prevented the Anglo-American forces in the West from making much headway against the Germans before the end of the winter. But in March 1943, after initial reverses, the Allied forces attacked vigorously from the west and south-east. Most of the Axis troops suffered heavily and on May 12, 250,000 Germans and Italians surrendered. Africa was lost to the Axis forces.

Significance of the Allied Victory

Allied victory in North Africa was very significant. It broke the spirit and fighting strength of Italy and was the prelude to the collapse of Mussolini's regime. It led to the establishment of a provisional Free French administration on French soil and marked the beginning of the revival of French military prestige. It strengthened the ties of Anglo-American co-operation which finally led to the rout of the Fascist Triplice.

Allied Invasion of Italy

Even before the conquest of North Africa had been completed, Premier Churchill and President Roosevelt met at Casablanca in January 1943, and decided to invade Sicily and the other Mediterranean islands, so that they might be utilised as bases for operation against Italy. Early in June 1943, the assault on the Mediterranean began with the capture of the small but heavily fortified islands of Lampedusa and Pantellaria. In July, British and American forces landed in Sicily and the strong German and Italian forces under Field Marshal Kesselring were steadily pushed back until the last Axis troops fled across the straits of Messina to the Italian mainland on August 18.

While the fighting in Sicily was still going on, the Allies started the invasion of Italy. The first air attack occurred on July 18. Mussolini requested Hitler for hlep, but was only told that the Axis must withdraw to northern Italy. The Italians, who were already very much disturbed by the Allied air attack, were greatly enraged over the failure of Mussolini to secure help from Hitler, their comrade-in arms. On July 24, the Fascist Grand Council demanded Mussolini's resignation. Next day, he was called to the palace by the King, was dismissed and arrested as he left. Badoglio, the victor of Ethiopia, was appointed as premier, and he at once issued a decree dissolving the Fascist Party.

For a time, the Allies stopped air attacks upon Italy in the hope that Badoglio might open negotiations. But they were soon disappointed when he declared that the war against the Allies would continue. On August 1, the air attacks were resumed and the air and naval forces began to prepare the way for a landing in Italy. Several important cities like Naples, Taranto Foggia and Salerno were bombarded and made to suffer heavily. On August 13, Rome was also raided for the second time. Seeing the futility of continuing the fight, Badoglio opened secret negotiations for peace with the Allies and on September 3, 1943, Italy surrendered unconditionally. On the same day, the Germans took over Rome, and the Allies crossed from Sicily to the mainland of southern Italy. A week later, they landed behind the German lines at Salerno. Continuously handicapped by a

shortage of landing craft, the Anglo-American troops slowly but steadily pushed the Germans back until they reached Naples on October 1, 1943. On October 13, the Badoglio Government formally declared war upon Germany. After a long and expensive winter campaign, the Allied forces entered Rome on June 4, 1944, and thus the Eternal City became the first of Europe's capitals to be liberated from the Nazis.

Thereafter, while some of the best troops were withdrawn in preparation for the invasion of France, the remainder proceeded to complete the work of Italy's conquest. The German resistance had been broken, and one Allied victory followed an other. The final phase of the war in Italy opened on April 10, 1945, with attacks on both sides of the Peninsula. Bologna was taken, then Spezia and Genoa. By this time, the German defence had completely collapsed and Nazi troops surrendered in large numbers, On April 29, two German officers signed a convention at Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters, providing for the unconditional surrender of the German armies in Italy. In accordance with the provisions of this convention, the whole German troops in Italy laid down their arms on May 2, 1945.

The Great Russian Offensive and the Retreat of Germany

It has already been mentioned that the second offensive launched by Hitler against Moscow in November 1941 had been repulsed with heavy losses on the Nazi's side. Soon after, the Soviet army organised numerous counter attacks which threw the enemy back at crucial moments. But all these served primarily a defensive purpose. While the Anglo-American forces were conducting operations in North Africa, the Russians made preliminary preparations, and in November 1942, launched a great counteroffensive both north and south of Stalingrad. On February 3, 1943, the starving German troops surrendered and the losses they suffered at Stalingrad were far greater than the Allies had suffered at Dunkirk. The Russian forces had driven more than 400 miles westward from Stalingrad and had cleared the Germans out of some 185,000 square miles of Russian territory.

In the summer campaign, the Germans tried to recover their position but to no result. The Russian's forward march began. The central part of the German line was attacked by armies under Sokolovsky while further to the South, Konev and Malinovsky were in command. Very soon, the key cities of Orel and Kharkov came in Russian hands and when their summer offensive closed at the beginning of November 1943, they had recaptured Kiev and were on the Dnieper river where the Germans were strongly entrenched. The Dnieper was crossed at several points in October 1943 and by the close of the year,

the Russian army succeeded in liberating two-thirds of the occupied territory.

In January, 1944, the Russians switched their main offensive to the north and south. During the winter, Leningrad and Novgorod were freed and the German army was driven back from positions which they hed held since 1941. In May 1944, the Crimean Peninsula was also taken back from the Germans. In the meantime, on April 10, the Black Sea port of Odessa also fell to the Russians. Thus, by the late spring of 1944, the Russian troops were quite near to German territory and to the German satellite countries in the Balkans.

"Thanks to the fighting prowess of the Russian soldiers", in the words of Benns, "the strategic ability of the Soviet high command, the efficiency of the Red railway battalions in restoring lines of communications, the ability of Soviet factories to provide military equipment, and the great assistance of lendlease supplies, which during 1943 had increased 'from a trickle to a torrent', the German armies had been driven almost entirely out of the Soviet Union."

Battle for the Liberation of France

As early as 1942, the Soviet Government and its adherents in the Allied countries had been conducting a vigorous campaign for starting a 'second front' in the west, so that a substantial body of German troops would be attracted away from the eastern front by an Allied landing in France and the Russian position would be eased. But the feeling among the Allies was that no one single partner should alone bear more than its share of the burden of the fighting and if the British were left alone to fight in 1940, it was the turn of the Russians in 1943. Now that Russia had been over-run and made to suffer heavily by the German attacks, the opening of a second front would not be inadvisable. Moreover, in addition to the British war production between May 1940 and September 1943, huge quantities of war material, arms and ammuntion had come from United States under the Lend-Lease programme. During the same period, America had also prepared itself well with 13,000 landing craft and 2,380 fighting ships at its disposal.

The Big Three, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and their military staffs, met in a Conference at Tehran from November 28 to December 1943, and prepared plans for a concerted attack on Hitler's 'Fortress Europe' which the latter had declared as 'impregnable' during 1944.

During the following months, the Allies prepared themselves for the final combat. On June 6, 1944, British, Canadian and American troops landed on the north coast of France between Cherbourg and Le Havre ; and three divisions of Allied

troops were dropped by parachutes and gliders. The Allies had two great assets—air and sea superiority. Their air superiority enabled them to disrupt the enemy's supply and communication lines ; and their naval superiority made it possible to keep their own armies supplied and reinforced. Within two weeks of the landing, the Allies were in possession of the two main ports of Normandy, Cherbourg on June 26, and Caen on July 9.

In July 1944, an American army under General Patton broke through the German lines capturing St. Lo and Avranches. Nantes was occupied on August 10, and a week later Patton's troops liberated Orleans, Chateaudun and Chartes and reached Dreux.

While thus the Allies were proceeding for the reconquest of northern France, the American Seventh Army, consisting of British, French and American forces, landed from the sea and from the air along a 100 miles stretch of the Mediterranean coast of France on August 15. Within two weeks, it succeeded in capturing the two important ports of Toulon and Marseilles. If the Allied troops pressed the German forces from the south and the north, the Frenchmen sabotaged the German defences from within ; their lines of communication had been disrupted, troops ambushed, villages and towns revolted and munition dumps were blown up. The German troops were demoralised and lost allohopes of success. The Allied troops were marching towards Paris and its fall was imminent. On August 23, the German Commander in the capital sought an armistice and on August 25, Paris fell to the Allies. Thus, after four years of Nazi occupation, the French capital was liberated and the same day, General de Gaulle returned to Paris.

Fight for the Liberation of Germany's Satellite States

The re-occupation of France by the Allies did not however complete their task. A number of states in central Europe, in the Scandinavian peninsula, and in the Lowlands were still under the control of Germany. The advance of the Allied forces continued for their liberation. On September 3, 1944, Brussels was occupied and a few hours later, the important port of Antwerp also fell into Allied hands. By the middle of September, the Anglo-American troops reached the German frontier in Belgium and Luxemberg. On September 17, a large number of Allied troops were dropped on the Netherlands flank of the Siegfried Line. The operation achieved only a partial success. The Germans offered a strong opposition, and on the night of September 25 and 26, the troops had to be withdrawn. The Allies were left with no alternative but to blast the "heavily-defended and skillfully-constructed *Siegfried* Line". This operation was a part of the battle against Germany and therefore could be discussed at a later stage.

If the Anglo-American forces were fighting the battle in the West, the Russians had been completing the liberation of the east European States. On June 10, they launched the invasion of Finland and very soon, the Germans were stopped from sending aid to the Finns. The pro-Axis President, Ryti, was forced to resign and Mannerheim, who succeeded him, broke all relations with Germany, demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Finnish soil and signed an armistice with the Allies on September 19. The war on this front came to an end.

Parallel with this, an offensive was launched on the White Russian front before the end of June 1944. Vitebsk fell on June 26 and five German divisions were either killed or forced to surrender. The Russians also made a powerful attack in the sector to the south in the direction of central Poland. The important towns of Poland, Lublin, Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk, were captured one after another, and the Russians reached the Vistula, and at one point, were within ten miles of Warsaw. Here the advance of the Russians was checked by the Polish under-ground forces, who had a great dislike for the Soviet regime. But soon their resistance was broken and Warsaw fell to the liberators.

To the north of Poland, in the Baltic States, the Russians made great strides; and by the close of 1944, the Germans had been expelled from Latvia, from Esthonia except for the Windan Peninsula between the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic, and from Lithuania except for the district of Memel.

The fourth major offensive was launched by Russia in the Balkans in August 1944. On September 13, Rumania broke away from the Axis camp and accepted the armistice terms offered by Russia, and two days later, declared war on Germany. Bulgaria followed Rumania's example, declared war on Germany and asked Russia for an armistice. Yugoslavia also followed in the footsteps of Bulgaria and Rumania and her troops under Marshal Tito cooperated with the Allies in turning the German troops out of the Balkans. Only Hungary remained to the Germans in eastern Europe. But after the defection of Rumania, her position became weak. Early in October, the Russians crossed into Hungary and reached within 65 miles of Budapest. German and Hungarian troops put up a stubborn resistance, but it was now too late. Ultimately on January 20, 1945, Hungary also surrendered and signed the armistice term. By the end of 1944, the whole of Greece was also liberated. The liberation of Czechoslovakia was begun and as early as September 1944, Soviet forces crossed into Slovakia and Ruthenia. By the end of October, Kuthenia was liberated and the Russian troops moved into Slovakia. On April 4, 1945, the capital of Slovakia, Bratislava, was captured by the Russians and with that, the last and weakest of Germany's satellite was put out of her hands.

Battle against Germany

By the end of 1944, the German armies had been forced back relentlessly within the boundaries of the German State. In both the east and the west, superior forces of the enemy were lined on Germany's frontiers and were girding up their loins for a final onslaught in the spring of 1945. The German forces in the south in Italy were being steadily pushed back. Demoralisation had spread in the Nazi army, and signs of serious rift, quite natural in such a situation, were visible everywhere. Allied victory seemed imminent. Under such circumstances, any leader less fanatical than Hitler would have sued for peace, but Hitler decided to make one more attempt to frustrate his enemies. On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched a heavy counter offensive in the Ardennes, and succeeded in checking the American advance toward Cologne, and penetrated the American positions to a depth of 44 miles. It was a very serious attack, designed to take possession of the huge supplies the Allies had accumulated at Liege in preparation for the next major offensive. But early in January 1945, the attack had been repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. Thus was the last and desperate gamble of Hitler and it miserably failed.

On January 12, 1945, the Russians launched a new invasion of Germany, characterised by the Germans as the "greatest of all time", and some 3,000,000 Russians penetrated far deeper into the German territory. In February, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met in a Conference at Yalta and prepared a general plan for the destruction of Germany. Soon, the final campaigns were launched on all fronts. In the west, Cologne fell on March 7, and by the middle of April, the Ruhr industrial area was encircled. In the east, the Russians also advanced like a whirlwind. Starting in January, they rapidly moved across Poland and crossed river Oder on March 1. By April, 1945, the Red Army had captured all the Baltic States and had conquered the whole of Poland. Russian forces also overran East Prussia and came within the striking distance of Berlin. Simultaneously, the Allied forces captured all cities west of the Rhine River without much opposition from the Nazi army. Thus, sandwiched from both the sides, the position of Germany became very deplorable, and the Nazis began to realise that the end was near. On April 24, Himmler offered to surrender on the western front to Britain and the United States. But on April 26, he was told that the only acceptable terms were unconditional surrender on all fronts to the three Allied Governments. On April 29, the German armies in Italy and Austria surrendered. Mussolini was captured and killed the same day. On April 30, Hitler was reported to have committed suicide after naming Admiral Doenitz as his successor and the latter immediately proceeded to arrange for the surrender of all the German armies,

On May 2, the Red Army captured Berlin. On May 4, the German armies in Holland, Denmark and north Germany yielded to Montgomery. On May 7, at 2. 41 A.M., Admiral Doenitz signed a simple document of unconditional surrender in the presence of American, Russian, French and British military authorities. On May 8, war in Europe was formally over and the victory of the United Nations' forces was celebrated.

FIFTH PHASE

Defeat of Japan

As early as December 1941, President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill had decided in Washington that the full weight of the Allied strength should be directed against the Axis in Europe and that, after defeating them, the full resources of America and Britain should be concentrated against Japan in the Far East. In 1943, the major Japanese offensive had been checked and Japan's economic and strategic position steadily deteriorated after 1943. But Japan still possessed a vast empire in Asia and in the Pacific. The Japanese-dominated areas were even times as large as the United States. About four hundred million people were under her sway. The areas under Japanese control produced 95% of the world's rubber and 70% of the world's tin. This area also produced oil and contained almost every raw material needed for the successful waging of a modern war. But the Japanese had failed to conquer Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand and Australia.

In the latter half of 1943, the United States made rapid preparations to launch a major offensive against the Japanese strong holds. Early in September, General MacArthur attacked New Guinea ; in November, Admiral Nimitz's forces invaded and occupied the Gilbert Islands, which provided to the United States valuable strategic bases. Early in 1944, Marshall and Admiratly Islands were invaded. In the middle of 1944, the Marianas were conquered. By the end of October, General Mac Arthur launched a full scale invasion of Philippines On February 4, 1945, American troops entered the capital city of Manila and the next day, MacArther could announce the complete liberation of the Philippines.

In the meantime, the British troops had launched an invasion of Burma in August 1944, and the Australian and Dutch troops had invaded Borneo. The war was progressing very unfavourably for Japan on all fronts and the Japanese were entirely on the defensive. To add to the misfortunes of Japan, the Soviet Union had secretly agreed at Yalta to declare war on Japan three months after the capitulation of the *Reich*. On April 5, 1945, Moscow informed the Japanese ambassador there, Naotake Sato, that she was denouncing the Neutrality Pact of 1941, as "Japan had

aided Germany against the Soviet Union, and was fighting the United States and Britain which were the allies of Russia." Tokyo tried to strike a bargain with Russia, and offered to evacuate north China and Manchuria ; she also tried to use Moscow as a mediator between herself and the Allies, but to no result

In the meantime, the atom bomb had been successfully exploded in New Mexico, and Roosevelt and Churchill promptly authorised its use against Japan. But before resort to atomic bombs, one last diplomatic effort was made by the Allies to seccure an end of the hostilities. On July 26, 1945, America Britain and China issued a declaration from Potsdam, where an Allied Conference was being held, setting out the terms on which they were prepared to make peace. The term were :

1. Japanese sovereignty would be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and minor islands. 2. Points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies would be occupied by Allied forces to secure the achievement of civil liberties and democratic government in Japan. 3. The Government of Japan would proclaim the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. 4. Japanese forces would be disarmed.

The terms offered were in the form of an ultimatum "either accept them *intoto* or get ready to face prompt and utter destruction." The Japanese ignored the ultimatum and on July 29, Tokyo announced that the terms were unacceptable to her. Soon they learned that the ultimatum was no empty one. On August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The destruction was incalculable but the Japanese would not surrender.

On August 8, Russia also declared war against Japan[11]. "Next day, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki again with devastating effect. The sufferings were untold and the entire Japanese nation was demoralised. The Japanese warlords feared that if they continued the war, the entire country would be wiped out by atomic bombs. On August 10, Tokyo offered to accept the terms of July 26, provted that "the prerogatives of the Emperor would not be impaired." The Allies replied that the Emperor would, of course, be retained, but would be subject to the control of the Allied Supreme Commander, General Mac Arhur. On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally and accepted the Allied terms. The war in the Far East came to an end. On September 2, the Japanese Foreign Minister signed the

11. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin had promised Roosevelt and Churchill that Russia would enter the Far Eastern war three months after the defeat of Germany. But now, when Moscow did so, her participation was not needed. Stalin took that step to advance the claims of Russia in the Far East, And soon after, Soviet troops in large numbers began to enter into Manchuria, and establish their control over factories, established by the Japanese there,

instrument of surrender on board the U.S. battleship 'Missouri' in Tokyo Bay in the presence of the British, French, American, Russian and Chinese officers.

POTSDAM AGREEMENT

Principles of Peace Settlement with Germany

The war in Europe had ended with the signing of the armistice on May 7, 1945, by the German General, Jodl. On June 5, 1945, Washington, London, Paris and Moscow announced that they "hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany including the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal or local Government authority." At the same time, they also confirmed that Germany, as it existed on December 31, 1937, should be divided into four zones whereby the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S.A., each was allotted 40,000 square miles and France 20,000. Berlin was also divided into four urban zones to be occupied in sectors or zones by the forces of the Four Powers and administered by an Inter-Allied Governing Authority. An Allied Control Council, consisting of the four Commanders-in-Chief, was established to exercise supreme authority in Germany as a whole. The Four Powers announced their intention to consult with the Governments of the other Members of the United Nations about the exercise of the supreme authority which they had assumed in Germany.

From July 17 to August 2, 1945, President Truman, Premier Churchill (later on Attlee), Prime Minister Stalin and their Foreign Ministers met in a Conference at Berlin to consider provisional German settlement procedures of peace-making and other matters. Since the statesmen conferred at Cecilienhof near Postdam, their meeting came to be called the Potsdam Conference. The powers agreed on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlement.

The Council consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Five countries—U K , U.K., U.S.S.R., France and China, andwas authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the U.N., treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria. Hungary and Finland. The Council was also to be jutilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose was established. The Council was empowered to propose settlement of outstanding territorial questions in Europe. Certain political and economic principles were agreed upon to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.

Political Principles

(1) "So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout

Germany.

(2) "Germany shall be disarmed and demilitarized, de-Nazified and German political structure shall be based upon democratic principle. All Nazi laws to be abrogated and freedom of speech, press and religion established.

(3) "All active Nazis from public offices were to be removed and leading war criminals to be tried.

(4) "All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed.

(5) "German education to be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

(6) "Judicial system to be recognised in accordance with the principles of democracy, and justice, and of equal rights for all citizens, without distinction of race, religion or nationality.

(7) "The administration in Germany shall be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility".

Economic Principles

(1) "In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of air-craft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited.

(2) "The German economy shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified, in particular, by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

(3) "In organising the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

(4) "During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end, common policies shall be established in regard to (*a*) mining and industrial production ; (*b*) agriculture, forestry and fishing ; (*c*) wages, prices and rationing ; (*d*) currency and banking ; (*e*) import and export programme for Germany as a whole ; (*f*) transportation and communication".

Reparations from Germany

It was also agreed that "Germany shall pay reparations in the form of removal of industrial plants : Russia to realize its share from the zone of Germany under her own occupation, and from appropriate German external assets. The U.S., U.K, and other countries entitled to reparations, to realise their share from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets". The U.S.S.R., further undertook to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine

(1) "The total strength of the German surface navy including ships under construction or repair were to be divided equally among Britain, United States and Russia.

(2) The larger part of the German submarine fleet was to be sunk. Not more than thirty were to be preserved and divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S. for experimental and technical purposes.

(3) "The German Merchant Marines were to be surrendered to the three Powers and wherever located, to be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.S., and U.K."

War Criminals :

Provision was also made for the trial of war criminals and the three governments reaffirmed their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. An International Military Tribunal was established by the "Big Four" and by October 18, 1945, twenty-four German leaders had been indicted with participating in a plot against humanity and world peace by Hitler. The trials were held at Nuremberg for several months and eventually in the autumn of 1946, twelve persons were sentenced to death, three to imprisonment for life and four to prison terms from ten to twenty years.

Austria

As early as October 1943, the "Big Three" had agreed that Austria should be established as a free and independent State and that an Allied Commission should be entrusted with the task of recreating a central administration for Austria as quickly as possible after the country's resumption of normal political activities. In May, the country was liberated and the Potsdam Conference approved the decisions of October 1943. On September 11, 1945, the Allied Council officially sanctioned the resumption of political activities by the Communists, Socialists, and Peoples' parties.

Poland

Decisions were also made regarding Poland. As regards its western frontier, it was agreed that pending the final peace settlement with Germany, three areas should be placed under Polish administration : the large area in Germany lying to the east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, the area of the former free City of Danzing and the southern portion of East Prussia. The British and United States Governments recognised the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and established diplomatic relations with the same. This government was to hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot" in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties were permitted to participate.

Apart from these decisions, the statesmen made little headway at Potsdam in dealing with the many lesser issues which arose in connection with the peace settlement in Eastern Europe. They, however, agreed to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers entrusted with the task of drafting the terms of the peace treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Italy and Finland.

Principles of Peace Settlement in the Far East

Unlike Germany, victory against Japan was achieved by one great Power alone, *viz.* the United States and therefore the problem of peace-making with the Far Eastern enemy was comparatively much simpler. The U. S. Government adopted three general principles to provide a starting point for the elaboration of a final and permanent settlement : (1) The Japanese Empire should be dismembered ; (2) the resulting Japanese state should be demilitarised and democratised ; (3) the American occupation policy should be as free as possible from interference by the other Allies. She invited the powers directly interested in the peace settlement with Japan to appoint their representatives on a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Russia did not like this U. S attitude and refused the invitation. On further negotiations, however, the Foreign Ministers of the BigThree met in a conference at Moscow from December 16 to 26, 1945, and reached a compromise which provided for a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for Japan.

The Far Eastern Commission was composed of eleven states, the U.S.S,R., U.K., U.S.A, France, China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, the Netherlands and Canada and was entrusted to formulate policies on the fulfilment of surrender terms, to review directives issued to the supreme commander if requested by any member and to consider such other matters as might be referred to it by agreement of the participating powers.

The Allied Council of Four, U.S S.R., United States, Great Britain and China, was established under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Mac Arthur, for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and for the purpose of exercising the control authority. Great Britain, United States and China had outlined their general aims for Japan at Potsdam in July 1945, and the same were later on accepted by Russia. The Japanese State was allowed to continue but the Emperor and government were to be subject to Mac Arthur. Japan was to be disarmed and demilitarised and her war production was to cease. The large industrial and banking combinations, which had controlled a great part of the the country's trade and industry, were to be dissolved. Democratic organisations in labour, industry and agriculture were to be encouraged. Political prisoners were to be freed; ultranationalists were to be purged; civil rights were to be guaranted, and the schools, laws and government were to be reformed. Except for the decision to operate through the existing government, the conditions were much the same as earlier determined for Germany.

With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, there was to be set up a provisional Korean Democratic Government and in order to assist the formation of this government, there was established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the U.S. Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. The recommendations of the Joint Commission were to be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K., and the U.S. prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

The three powers agreed on the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government and on the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. They also agreed to withdraw the American and Soviet forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.

At the Moscow Conference, it was also decided that upon the completion of the draft treaties, a general peace conference consisting of the representatives of the five Big Powers and of the sixteen other States, which had actively waged war against the Axis Powers was to be convened to consider the treaties and to make recommendations on the basis of which the final texts of the treaties would be prepared.

During the first seven months of 1946, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and France carried on

negotiations in an attempt to reach agreement on the terms of the treaties to be presented to the future peace conference. But very soon, they were caught in the vicious circle of fear and distrust on the one hand—'fear of communism with its threat of World Revolution,"; on the other, fear of "capitalistic imperialism" with its threat of "encirclement." The result was a deadlock in the meetings, and a complete failure to reach agreement as to the terms of the peace treaties. The independent search for security on the part of one intensified suspicions on the part of the others.

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CHAPTER VII

THE UNITED NATIONS

With the surrender of Germany, the war had ended in Europe; with the surrender of Japan, it ended in the world. Victory on the European-Africa-Russian fronts was made possible by the close co-operation of Russia, America, Britain and France; victory in the Far East came as a result of close cooperation between America, Britain, China and the Dutch East-Indies. The emergence of the U.S. during World War II from its cobweb of "isolationism" was a very important development. The American people realised that the collapse of the European state system would mean an acute danger to their own security. Hence the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, authorising the President "to transfer or sell arms to any country whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the U.S.A." Such a policy in 1936 would have most probably averted the second World War, but the American foreign policy has always been one of "always lock the barn door after the horse is stolen" or "a penny wasted is a penny saved". And the result was the Triplice attack on her own strongholds. Once they were engufed in the war, the Americans began to realise that by their own abandonment of the League in 1919-20, they had been partly responsible for the break-down of the collective security system. Now they also realised that the 'world was growing smaller and the third war, if and when started, would involve the United States even more quickly and more disastrously than had the wars of 1914 and 1939. By August 1941, America was giving all-out aid 'short of war' to Britain, Russia and China against Germany, Italy and Japan.

While the Allied Commanders and generals marshalled their power to defeat the enemy, the diplomats were busy examining the weaknesses of the existing system of international relations and how could it be corrected. Secretary Hull, in his *Memors*, has stated: "From the moment when Hitler's invasion of Poland revealed the bankruptcy of all existing methods to preserve the peace, it became evident to us in the State Department that we must begin almost immediately to plan the creation of a new system".[1] The statesmen of the West everywhere began to realise that there was something fundamentally wrong with the existing system of international relations and international organisation, and that the bitter fruits of the two World Wars, the world wide economic depression, mass extermination on a scale unknown to history, and extinction of human freedom everywhere should, if not out of wisdom, at least out of necessity,

1. Hull, C. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), For the birth of the U. N. O. see. pp. 1292-1307.

lead to the establishment of a stronger and more equitable international order after the war.

The Atlantic Charter

The first step in this direction was taken on August 14, 1941 when President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill met aboard an American cruiser in mid-Atlantic Ocean, and issued a declaration of international principles, they called the 'Atlantic Charter.' They pledged themseives to "seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other ; seek no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live ; endeavour to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity ; bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field; after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, to see established a peace in which all people will live free from fear and want, abandon the use of force, and seek universal disarmament."

The U. N. Declarations

On January 1, 1942, representatives of twenty-six governments in Washington signed a "Declaration by United Nations and pledged solidarity against the enemy and declared that :

(1) "Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic for the destruction of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact and the adherents thereto.

(2) "Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

(3) "Each Government pledges itself to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter".[2]

Casablanca Conference

In January 1943, (14-26th January), Roosevelt and aides conferred with Churchill, Giraud and General de Gaulle at the newly-conquerd Casablanca in North Africa to decide the next step. Here they decided that the next military move should be the invasion of Sicily and then Italy proper. They also talked over terms of peace and discussed the role of their countries in the post-war period. On the closing day of the Conference, January 26, President Roosevelt declared that they would make peace only on the basis of "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers.

2. By April, 1945, forty-seven nations had signed the document.

Hot Springs (Virginia) Conference

On May 15, 1943, forty-four members of the U. N. met at Hot Srings on the invitation of the U. S. to study the food and agricultural problems of the world and to make recommendations for action. The Conference gathered information and prepared the ground for the establishment of the Food and Agricultural organisation of the U. N. The F. A. O. was to be concerned with raising the standard of living and increasing the efficiency of agriculture the world over and adopting the appropriate international policies to improving the processing, marketing and distribution of agricultural products.

Moscow Conference

Another highly significant conference was held in Moscow during October 1943, (19-30 October), and was attended by the U. S. Secretary of State, Hull, British Foreign Secretary, Eden, and the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Molotov. After eleven days of discussions, the powers issued a joint declaration, Moscow Declaration, on November 1, 1943, pledging "unremitting prosecution of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy was achieved and favouring the establishment of a world organisation as soon as possible". Along with this, the three Secretaries released a declaration regarding Italy, guaranteeing the Italians the right to choose a democratic government; a declaration regarding Austria, disclaiming its annexation by Germany and promising the Austrians a post-war settlement that would depend on her efforts to cast off the German yoke; and a declaration of German atrocities, promising retribution for crimes committed by the Nazis against Allied personnel or in occupied countries.

Cairo Conference

Within less than a month, from November 22 to 25, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill again met Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo in Egypt to plan the defeat of Japan. They issued a joint communique, demanding the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, renouncing all imperialist aims, declaring that Japan would be stripped of all her territories seized by her during the two World Wars, and Chinese territories restored to her. They also promised independence to Korea "in due course."

Teheran Conference

From Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill went to Teheran, the capital city of Iran, and met the Russian Premier Stalin there from November 28 to December 1, 1943. They and their chiefs of staff drew up joint plans for the final victory over Germany, reached secret military accord, pledged independence, sovereign-

ty and integrity of Iran and promised to work together in peace as they had been doing during the war. In a joint statement, they promised that "large and small nations would be invited to join a world organisation,"

Bretton Woods Conference

In July 1944, forty-four countries met at Bretton Woods in U. S. to prepare plans for uniting the world economically through free trade and international facilities for exchange of currencies. The International Monetary Fund was created to ease bottlenecks in international exchange and thus clear international trade balances. International Bank of Reconstruction and Development was established to lend money to national projects for reconstruction. Both the agencies were largely financed by the United States.

Dumbarton Oaks Conference

Representatives of U. S , U. S. S. R., U. K. and China met at Dumbartan Oaks, Washington from August 21 to October 7, 1944, and laid the foundations of the entire structure of the United Nations. The discussions were mostly informal and indecisive. The Soviet Union suggested that a separate organisation be established to consider economic and social matters and that the general organisation be concerned solely with the problems of security. The U. K. and U. S. did not agree with this view and their position prevailed. The U. S. favoured a permanant seat for Brazil on the Security Council but Britain and Russia succeeded in defeating the proposal. The Soviet Uuion suggested that the sixteen republics of the U. S. S. R. be included among the initial members. But this suggestion was opposed by the U. S. and Great Britain. The Soviet Union proposed the creation of an international air force by the U. N. to be commanded by the Security Council. The U. K.—U. S. view prevailed that national air force contingents should be placed at the disposal of the Security Council on the basis of agreements.

Voting in the Security Council was the most serious issue. The U. S. proposed that the permanent members would have a veto power but would not be able to vote at all in disputes in which they were directly involved. This was also the view of Great Britain. The Soviet Union vigorously opposed this proposal and rejected any limitations on the veto power. The question was left open for further negotiations among the heads of the three States.

These Dumbarton Oaks proposals served as the basis for the draft of the Charter of the United Nations. The Big Three at Dumbarton Oaks had agreed that a Conference of the United Nations be called to meet at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare the final charter of the general international organisa-

tion along the lines proposed at Dumbarton Oaks.

Yalta Conference

In February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at Yalta in Crimea for the last of their war-time conferences. Several of the disputed points were decided, and a report of agreement, embodying thefollowing points, was prepared : (1) accord in destroying Nazi Germany ; (2) agreement on the terms to be imposed upon Germany after her unconditional surrender ; (3) establishment of a Central Control Commission to coordinate the administration of the whole country ; (4) a series of reforms for Germany including the disestablishment of the German General Staff, punishment of Nazi criminals and the removal of all Nazi influence in society and law ; (5) the establishment of a commision in Moscow to evaluate the amount of damage done by Germany to the Allied nations and the payment of reparation by Germany ; (6) the calling of a conference of the United Nations at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare a charter of the world organisation ; (7) agreement on the voting procedure in the U.N. ; (8) guarantees of peace, order and representative government for all belligerent nations of Europe ; (9) a resolve to continue Allied unity in peace as in war with periodic meetings of the Foreign Secretaries of the signatories.[3]

San Francisco Conference

In accordance with the Yalta schedule, the Conference of the U.N. met at San Franciso on April 25, 1945, and was attended by forty-six governments. Four additional governments were invited subsequently. The dominating influence was exercised by the Big Four who were joined by France and thereby became the 'Big Five'. However, the smaller powers made their influence felt and succeeded in broadening and democratizing the Charter. A number of changes and additions were made in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. After a good deal of controversies and compromises, the Conference ended on June 26—the day on which the Charter was signed by all the fifty delegations. Poland signed the Charter on October 15, 1945, and thereby the number of original members rose to fifty-one. The Charter became effective only on October 24, 1945, when the requisite number of twenty-nine ratifications had been received.

The League Handed over to the U.N.

When the U.N. came formally into existence, the League of Nations was also in existence at least in form and law. The

3. The Yalta Conference was very important and several decisions, which shaped the postwar international relations, were taken concerning the Far East also. For details, see Yalta Papers, 1945, published by the State Department.

buildings and libraries of the Permanent Court of International Justice were available at Geneva and the Hague; some of the judges still occupied their posts though only technically; the International Labour Organisation was functioning at Geneva and Montreal; and some of the social and economic activities of the League were going on at Washington, London, Geneva and Princeton. The problem was: How the League should be dissolved? How its buildings, libraries and other assets to be disposed off? What about the liquidation of its pensions and other obligations? After a good deal of negotiations between the United Nations and the League, the matter was finally settled and the U.N. took over most of the economic and social activities of the League and acquired its buildings and other physical assests. On April 8, 1946, the Assembly of the League met for the last time, and passed a resolution declaring its own demise.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Its Aims and Objectives

The specific aims of the U. N., as stated in Article 1 of the Charter, are as follows :—

(1) "to maintain peace by pacific settlement of international disputes and by suppressing aggression;

(2) "to develop friendly relations among nations based on the principles of self-determination and equal rights;

(3) "to achieve international cooperation in solving international economic, social and cultural problems and to promote respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all; and

(4) "to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

Organisation and Structure of the U.N.

These aims are to be realised through the following agencies of the U.N.—the General Assembly; the Security Council; the Economic and Social Council; the Trusteeship Council; the Secretariat; the International Court of Justice. In addition, there are specialized agencies attached to the Economic and Social Council.

(1) The General Assembly

The General Assembly consists of all the Members of the U.N. Each Member has not more than five representatives. The Assembly must meet once a year in September, and in such special sessions as may be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the U.N. At every session, a President and seven vice-Presidents are elected who remain in office for the duration

of the session. At each meeting, it sets up six working committees: (1) political and security; (2) economic and financial; (3) social, humanitarian and cultural; (4) trusteeship; (5) administrative and budgetary; and (6) legal. In addition, it had two procedural committees, two standing committees and five special committees.

Voting

Each Member of the General Assembly has one vote but no veto. On important matters, a majority of two-third present and voting is needed for a decision. Such matters include: (1) questions relating to peace and security; (2) elections to other bodies of the U.N.; (3) admission, suspension or expulsion of Member States; (4) budgetary matters; and (5) the operation of the Trusteeship System.

Other matters including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-third majority are made by the simple majority of the Members present and voting.

Functions and Powers

The General Assembly may discuss any question or matter within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any of its organs.

(1) It may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security; and may make recommendation with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

(2) It may discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Members of the U.N. or by the Security Council or by a state which is not a member of the U.N. in accordance with Article 35. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

(3) It may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

(4) It may initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields.

(5) It shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council which shall include an account of the measures that the latter has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

(6) It shall also receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

(7) It shall receive and consider the budget of the Organisation, as well as of the Specialised Agencies referred to in Article 57.

(8) It shall perform such functions with respect to the international Trusteeship System as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII.

(9) It shall have the right to propose amendments to the Charter which must be adopted by a two thirds vote and then ratified bp a similar vote of the Security Council which must include the 'Big Five.'

(10) It shall elect all the members of the Economic and Social Council, some members of the Trusteeship Council and the six non-permanent members of the Security Council. Together with the Security Council, it shall elect fifteen judges of the International Court of Justice. The Secretary General of the U N. is also appointed by the Assembly on the nomination of the Security Council.

(2) The Security Council

The Security Council consists of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, U.S.S.R:, U.K., and U.S. are the permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly elects six Members of the U.N. to be non-permanent members of the Security Council for a term of two years, due regard being paid to the contribution of the Members of the U.N. to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to other purposes of the Organisation and also to equitable geographical distribution. Each member of the Security Council has one representative on the Council.

Voting and Procedure

Each member has one vote but the voting procedure differs on various questions. On all procedural matters, decisions can be made by a majority of seven votes. In questions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the majority of seven must include the votes of the Big Five. But if a member of the Security Council is a party to the dispute, it is not entitled to vote. If a vote is taken to impose sanctions upon an aggressor, either economic or military, the majority of seven must include all the 'Big Five' even if one of them is a party to the dispute. Thus, any of the 'Big Five' can vote any decision of the Security Council in such cases. This in effect means that the Council cannot apply sanctions if any of the Big Five wants to commit an act of aggression. If the Council fails to act,

however, the General Assembly can consider the cases and make recommendations to its members by a two-thirds majority. Any Member of the U.N. who is not a member of the Security Council may participate without voting in the discussion of any question before the Security Council, whenever the latter considers its interests are specially affected. Any such member, who is not on the Security Council or is not a member of the U.N, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration of the Security Council, shall be invited to participate without voting in the deliberations.

Powers and Functions

The Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. (1) In order to promote the establishment of international peace, the Security Council formulates, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee; plans to be submitted to the Members of the U.N. for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. (2) It may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction. (3) It may, at any stage of a dispute, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. (4) In case the parties fail to adjust their differences, it may decide what measures must be taken to maintain or restore international peace. (5) It may decide upon measures not involving the use of armed force to give effect to its decisions, these may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, means of communication, and the severence of diplomatic relation. (6) If it feels that the measures provided in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. In order to enable the U.N. to take urgent military measures, the members shall immediately provide their air force contigents and military, and the Security Council shall plan the application of the armed force with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. (7) It shall encourage the settlement of local disputes through 'regional agencies' and shall keep itself informed of all the activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security. (8) It shall exercise all the functions of the U. N. relating to strategic areas including the approval of the terms of the Trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment. It shall avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform these functions of the U. N. under the Trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social and educational matters in the strategic areas.

(3) Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council is comprised of eighteen

members elected by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, six each year for three years term. No special provision for the Big Five has been made here ; there are no permanent seats and no veto. This is due to the recognition of the fact that their cooperation in this field is so essential that no special privileges were considered necessary for them. No criteria are set for their choice ; the Assembly is entirely free in selecting them.

Voting and Procedure

As in other organs, each member is allowed one representative on the Council. All decisions are made by a majority of the members present and voting. The Council is required to invite to participate, without voting any member, not represented on the Council for discussion of any matter "of particular concern" to that member. Arrangements are to be made with non-governmental organisations either national or international for consultations but not participation. The Council has thus been equipped to obtain expert information from wide sources and to disseminate information concerning its own activities through various agencies.

The Council chooses its own President for a one-year term. Ordinarily, the Council meets at the headquarters of the U. N. but it is wholly free as to the date and place of its meetings except with the provision that a meeting must be held upon request by a majority of its members.

Powers and Functions

(1) The Council has been designated to prepare the agreements by which the specialised agencies are to be brought into relationship with the U.N. Since the relationship of the specialised agencies is with the entire Organisation and since the agreements must be approved by the General Assembly, it may be said that the Council acts as the 'negotiating agent', and does not acquire a special relationship of its own with the specialised agencies. (2) Another main function is to assist the Security Council, when requested by the latter to do so, in the direction of imposing economic sanctions upon the aggressor. (3) It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialised agencies through consultation with and recommendation to the agencies and the General Assembly and to the members of the United Nations. (4) It may investigate any issue within its jurisdiction and make reports and recommendations to the General Assembly. (5) It may call international conferences on any subject within its jurisdiction. (6) Upon request, it may provide technical assistance and advice to member nations. (7) Upon request, it may assist the General Assembly, Security Council, and the Trusteeship Council and supply information to them. (8) It may work to promote the observance of fundamental freedom and human rights.

The powers of the Council are essentially those of study, investigation and recommendation. Its function is to facilitate voluntary cooperation. The Members of the U. N. have pledged themselves under the Charter to act according to its recommendations jointly and separately for the economic and social progress, higher standards of living and full employment, cultural and educational cooperation and observance of human rights and freedoms.

Commission of the Council

In order to facilitate its work, the Council has set up eleven Commissions : (1) Economic and Employment Commission, (2) Transport and Communications Commission ; (3) Statistical Commission ; (4) Commission on the Status of Women ; (5) Social Commission ; (6) Commission on Human Rights ; (7) Commission on Narcotic drugs ; (8) Fiscal Commission ; (9) Population Commission ; (10) Economic Commission for Europe ; (11) Economic Commission for Asia and the and the Far East. These commissions are composed of representatives appointed by designated Members of the U. N. Their function is "to study matters within their field, to make recommendations to the Economic and Social Council and to assist the same in the execution of these recommendations and plans".

(4) Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council is composed of countries administering trust territories, of other permanent members of the Security Council whether they administer such territory or not and an equal number of non-administering states for a term of three years elected by the General Assembly. Each member has one vote and decisions are made by simple majority. The international Trusteeship System is charged with the administration and supervision of three kinds of territories held under mandate at the time of the San Francisco Conference ; (2) territories detached from enemy states as a result of Second World War ; and (3) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

Thus, in theory, the system is applicable to all colonial areas. In practice, however, only territories in the first two categories became trust territories. Such territories are divided into strategic and non-strategic areas ; the former are under the control of the Security Council ; the latter are under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. In the administration of such territories a single state or a group or the U N. itself may be designated as the trustee. The Trusteeship Council, although it is a principal organ of the U. N., does not have independent authority but acts rather under the authority of the General Assembly and, in the case of strategic areas, of the Security Council.

The General Assembly (for strategic areas, the Security Council) must approve the terms of all Trusteeship agreements and any modifications or alterations of them, thereby ensuring that the Trusteeship agreements conform to the terms of the Charter.

Functions of the Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council exercises supervision over the administration of trust territories in several ways : (1) through reports from the administering authorities ; (2) through petitions from the people of trust territories ; and (3) through periodic visits to the territories.

Reports

By Article 88 of the Chapter, each administering authority is required to submit the annual report for each territory under its jurisdiction. Such reports are submitted on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by the Trusteeship Council. This questionnaire is a truly remarkable document and constitutes a most thorough analysis of the problems of administering a trust territory and place the administering authorities under a serious obligation to analyse and interpret their administrative practices.

Petitions

The annual reports are defective in one way, *i. e.*, they contain only information supplied by the administering authorities, and may not suffice to allow the Council to reach an objective conclusion concerning the state of affairs in the trust territories. To remedy this defect, the Trusteeship Council is authorised to accept petitions from the inhabitants directly and not through the administering authority as under the League's Mandates System, which had the right to attach its own comments while submitting them to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Periodic Visits

The Trusteeship Council has worked out a scheme of rotation under which each trust territory is visited every third year. It avoids sending on such a mission the representatives in the Council of those states who administer the territories to be visited. Such missions criticise the policies of the administering governments with regard to the advancement towards self-government, economic development, educational levels, labour practices, social abuses and land policy, etc. In many cases, they make recommendations as to the measures that might help in the elimination of some of the shortcomings which it found there.

(5) The International Court of Justice

The Court consists of fifteen judges, representing the major legal systems of the world, elected jointly by the General Assembly and the Security Council for nine-year term on the basis of nominations by panels of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Judges are prohibited from engaging in any other occupation while they are members of the Court. The Court elects its own President and vice-President and appoint its Registrar. It also adopts its own rules of procedure. Its seat is at the Hague. In addition to the members of the Court, the Statute provides for *ad hoc* judges to be appointed by parties to a dispute before the Court whenever any of their nationals is not a member of the Court. An *ad hoc* judge serves only during the case for which he is appointed.

Access to the Court

States which may use the International Court of Justice fall into three catagories:

(1) All states which have signed the Charter are automatically parties to the Statute of the Court, and can use its facilities. (2) States which did not sign the Chater but nevertheless desire to become parties to the Statute, may do so on the basis of conditions laid down by the General Assembly as recommended by the Security Council. (3) States which are not parties to the Statute can also have recourse to the Court, provided that they accept the conditions laid down by the Security Council for the dispute being referred to the Court.

Jurisdiction of the Court

Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the U. N. or in treaties and conventions in force. The Court has authority to consider disputes referred to it by the parties in one of three ways :

(1) the parties may agree to submit their dispute to the court; (2) if both parties have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, one of the parties may call upon the Court to hear the case ; (3) if the parties are signatories to a treaty which calls for reference to the Court of differences concerning the appli-tion of a treaty, one party alone may refer the dispute to the Court.

Thus consent of the disputants is necessary for the extension of the Court's jurisdiction, this being expressed either before or after the dispute occurs.

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply :

(*a*) International conventions, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states ; (*b*) international customs as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ; (*c*) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations ; (*d*) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Advisory Opinions

In addition to its jurisdiction in contentious cases, that is, cases involving disputes between states, the Court has jurisdiction on matters reffered to it for advisory opinions. The Charter authorised the General Assembly and the Security Council to request "an advisory opinion on any legal question." The other organs of the U.N. and the specialised agencies may request advisory opinions only when authorised to do so by the General Assembly. These would be confined to "legal questions arising within the scope of their activites."

(6) The Secretariat

The Secretariat of the U.N. is comprised of the Secretary-General and the subordinate staff. He is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He is the chief administrative officer of the Organisation.

The Secretary-General acts in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council ; and perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. He makes a general annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organisation. He may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The staff provided to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and to other organs of the Secretariat enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organisation in the territory of each of its Members.

The Secretariat is divided into eight departments, each headed by a separate Assistant Secretary-General. They are : (1) The Department of Security Council Affairs ; (2) Administrative and Financial Services ; (3) Conference and General Services ; (4) Department of Economic Affairs , (5) Department

of Social Affairs; (6) Legal Department; (7) Department of Public Information; (8) Department of Trusteeship and Information from non-self governing Territories.

The members of the Secretariat staff are required to take an oath of allegiance stating that their first loyalty is to the United Nations. They are enjoined from seeking or receiving instructions from any state or from any authority "external to the Organisation." More than two-thirds of the U. N. budget is spent on the Secretariat.

(7) Amendments to the Charter

Provisions for amending and revising the Charter are incorporated in Articles 108 and 109. The charter can be amended only by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, which must then be ratified by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all of the permanent members of the Security Council A general conference for reviewing the Charter may be called at any time by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council, and such a conference must be called at the end of ten years if so decided through the same procedure, except that in the General Assembly a simple majority shall be sufficient.

U. N. AN IMPROVEMENT UPON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

On April 18, 1946, the Assembly of the League adjourned after taking the necessary steps to terminate the existence of the League and transfer its assets and properties to the U. N. Thus, an important and promising experience in international co-operation formally came to an end. (Within the counsels of the U. N., there was an apparent readiness to write the old League off as a failure, and to regard the new organisation as something unique, representing a fresh approach to the world problems of peace and security.

But a good deal of controversy arose as to the nature and character of the new system as compared with the League. Some said that the U. N. is the League in a new guise, while others maintained that the Charter is definitely an improvement upon the Covenant. There is no doubt that the U. N. is not a perfect mechanism and there are numerous shortcomings in it. But this cannot be denied that the U. N. is much better than its predecessor both in respect of its organisation and functions as an instrument of security.

(1) The name 'United Nations' suggests something more organic than a League of Nations.) Of course, the term does not

mean what is connoted by the term 'United States' because the principle of sovereignty of states has been retained in the Charter. But it is quite likely that it may later become a genuine United Nations by closer harmony and clear understanding among nations.

(2) The opening words of the Preamble of the Charter "We the peoples of the United Nations....." are also very significant. It may be that in the years to come these words serve a useful purpose in the event that the United Nations becomes stronger and the Charter has to be interpreted to ascertain whether in a given situation, authority exists for stronger international action. These words may be invoked to urge the primacy of the world community as against the claims of sovereignty of one or more of the respective member states.

(3) The United Nations has a great advantage over the League of Nations in that the League Covenant was incorporated into the ill-fated peace treaties at the end of the first World War, while the Charter is not a part of post-war treaties. Such separation reduces complications and may remove from it the criticism, justified or unjustified, levelled against the League of Nations, that it was not a League of Nations but a grouping of the victors assembled to perpetuate the fruits of their victory in 1918. Such charges as "the League of Nations was the disputed daughter of a dishonourable mother" cannot be levelled against the United Nations. There is a definite advantage in separating an international instrument of future world peace from an instrument designed to terminate a war.

(4) The Charter is an advancement upon the Covenant in that it provides that each member of the Security Council shall be permanently represented at the Capital of the United Nations. It is just possible, the League would have functioned better if its Council had been in continuous session. No system of world organisation can function successfully unless there is continuous organised debate and policymaking on a world level. Nations realise the need of having legislatures in session for extended periods for the purpose of carrying out necessary national business. If it is true of nations, it should be still more true of United Nations.

(5) The League of Nations had as its aims the promotion of international peace and security. But the purpose of the establishment of the U.N. are set forth in Article 1 of the Charter. They are : (1) to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law adjustment or settlement of international dispute; (2) to develop friendly relations among

nations based on the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples ; (3) to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature ; and (4) to harmonise the actions of nations in the attainment of these objects.

✓ (6) The League of Nations had three principal organs, *viz.*, an Assembly. a Security Council and Secretariat, though the Permanent Court of International Justice and International Labour Organization were also attached to it. But the U. N, has not only a General Assembly, a Security Council and a Secretariat but also an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Trusteeship Council and the U.N.E.S.C.O. are not wholly new; rather they have replaced the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League respectively. The Economic and Social Council is an entirely new organisation, and is the result of the realisation of the fact that peace in the world cannot be maintained unless it is based upon social and economic justice, and it is for the promotion of this economic and social betterment of the peoples residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the various member states that the new organisation has been primarily directed. Thus the U.N. has gone one step farther than the League, in that it aims at preparing a more solid ground on which international relations are to be based. Moreover, the U.N.E.S.C.O, which is a definite improvement upon League's Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, aims at creating a psychological basis for world peace and stability.

(7) The League started with some initial drawbacks and shortcomings. The country (U S) whose President played the dominant role in its formation, did not join it when it actually came into existence. The U.S. Congress chose to go into her 'cobweb of isolation, and refrained from participation in European affairs after 1920, with the result that the country whose presence would have acted as a soothing and impartial influence in the prejudiced counsels of the League, was not there. Germany joined the League in 1926 and the Soviet Union came in only in 1934. Thus, for long, the League suffered from incompleteness and un-universality.

This time all the Big Powers, who sponsored the idea, are the members of the U. N. It is fortunate in having within its fold the leaders of the two powers-blocs, the U. S. and the U. S. S R. which, though peursuing different lines of policy, meet very often on a common plateform to discuss the problems of peace and war.[4]

4. The admission of some sixteen contries to the membership of the U.N. on December 14, 1955 augurs well for the future of the world organization.

(8) Under the League, the membership was voluntary and any country could withdraw after a two years's notice. This is what actually happenad. Japan, Germany and Italy, when they thought the hour of action had come, withdrew from its obligations, and rhe League failed to take any action. But the Charter makes no such provision for withdrawal of membership. It can, therefore, be argued that legally a withdrawal is not permissible, although it is difficult to predict what action the U. N. would take if such a case happened.

✓ (9) In the League, both the Assembly and the Council acted on the principle of unanimity, i. e., decision was not binding upon the Members if it was taken by a simple majority. (although there were certain exceptions, for example, in the matter of procedure, or admitting a new member to the League, or amending the Covenant, though the amendment was not valid unless ratified by all the members of the Council and a majority of Members of the League). The U. N, has discarded the rule of unanimity of all members, at least, in the General Assembly. The unanimity rule has been retained in the Security Council and there too, on substantial issues.

(10) The League could not take the initiative in the problems of peace and war ; it could discuss a given situation only when brought to its notice by any one of the Members. But this weakness too has been removed in the new system. Now, the Security Council itself can take the initiative in such matters as adversely affect world peace. In fact, it is now the responsibility of the Secretary-General "to bring to the attention of the Security Council any such matter as he thinks, is likely to threaten international peace and security." Thus, the new organisation is no longer on the mercy of the disputants.

(11) The U.N. is also an improvement upon the League as regards the sanctions and enforcement action. Under the present system, the primary sanctions are no doubt economic, but the Security Council may "take any action by air, sea or land forces, if it feels that the economic sanctions would be inadequate." In such an eventuality, the Security Council may call upon the member states to contribute military forces, and may be assisted by a Military Staff Committee in conducting the campaign. The action of the U.N. in helping Korea when she became an object of aggression by North Korea on June 25, 1950, contritutes a land-mark in the development of international organisation.

It is the first instance in the history of international relations of a collective action by the peace-loving states against the peace-breaking state. No doubt, it was taken because the U. S. controlling the large majority of States in the U.N., was intere-

sted in the episode but the very fact that such an action was taken under the auspices of the U. N., is assuring of its utility. Moreover, the attempt that was subsequently made by some of the States, under the leadership of the U. S. ; to provide that in case, the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and prevention of aggression, is paralysed by the exercise of the veto power and is prevented from taking action, the General Assembly should be called into session at twenty-four hour's notice to discuss the matter and take suitable effective action, is a happy and healthy development. Such an emergency session of the General Assembly would be called, if the Security Council so decides by a majority of seven votes, not necessarily including the Big Five.[6] On October 18, 1950, the Political Committee of the U.N. passed a resolution to this effect, and the General Assembly set up a 'Collective Measures Committee' to study the measures which would be taken, including the contribution of armed forces, by the various member States. On January 8, 1952, the Political Committee of the U,N, passed another resolution calling on the Member states to help in the formation of a 'shadowy army' which would be ready to fight aggression in any part of the world. Under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to establish an international army, but the U.S., Foreign Secretary, John Foster Dulles remarked at the fifth session of the General Assembly ; "The Security Council, of course, should have its chance to exercise its primary responsibility to international peace and security. But if it fails, then the General Assembly has a duty promptly to consider the situation."

(12) The League system stressed the reduction of armaments, the control of private producers of war materials and exchange of information on armaments ; but no progress was actually made in any of these spheres. The Charter, though encouraging the reduction of armaments, sought to regulate the national armaments "in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security". The General Assembly has been authorised to make recommendations on general principles "governing disarmaments and the regulation of armaments" and the Security Council has been made responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for regulating armaments.

From this analysis of the U.N. Charter, it cannot, however. be asserted that the U.N. is the perfect mechanism of world peace or that, it is something wholly new. Rather, the organisation of the United Nations owes much to the League of Nations and the origins of its aims and basic principles are to be found

6 This was done under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, passed by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950. For its provisions see Palmer and Perkins ,p. 1104.

even further back in the thought and ideas of the nineteenth century. There are certain apparent weaknesses in the system which, if not promptly removed, will eat into the vitals of the international body and make it a dead letter.

(1) Like the League, the U.N. is also suffering from incompleteness. Germany and Japan are not its members; the admission of Red China has become an obsession with some people; some of the other smaller states too have not yet been admitted into the U.N.[7] This is a very unhappy phenomenon, and the sooner it is done away with, the better for the safety of the system itself and the world peace. The organisation of the new system represents triumph, though temporary, for the Big Powers. Under the League new members were to be admitted by vote of the Assembly; under the Charter, the Security Council's consent must be obtained and, while doing so, the Great Powers look upon the issue from the point of view of their own national interests and not from that of the solidarity of the U.N. system.

(2) The system of world government cannot be successful, unless member States give up their national sovereignty. Still they are living in a state of nature, and international law is still an international morality or a 'law by courtesy'. Sanctity of international law should be as unquestionable as is that of the municipal law and the states should so order their conduct as may be in complete conformity with it.

(3) Law without sanctions is a mighty farce; international law without international military and police is worse than useless. That the U.N. system makes provision for such an army, and that such an army fought against the aggressor in the Korean War is a major event, but that nine-tenth of the troops were supplied by the U. S. and that too, after two months, is equally major. Had the interests of the U.S. not been involved in the Far East, perhaps there would have been no enforcement action. This, however, does not augur well for the future. A permanently standing army should be placed at the disposal of the international body; and this should be utilised in the most impartial manner.

(4) The weakened position of the General Assembly in comparision to the Security Council is also a matter of great concern. It is not consistent with the avowed principle in the Charter of "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." In the case of Japan's aggression upon Manchuria in 1931 and Italy's aggression upon Ethiopia in 1935, it was not the Council, but the Assembly of the League more willing to stronger action against Japan and Italy. Those, who defend the Charter provisions, argue that on the principle of linking responsibility with power, the Great Powers should have decisive voice. It is easy

7. Japan became a member of the U. N. when on December 18, 1956 all the 77 states present voted in favour of her admission.

to insist upon a strong action while it is very difficult to foot the bill of war costs. But, here the smaller states may argue that as a consequence of the war, they also suffer as do the Big Powers in relation to their resources. And then it is not the small nations which usually threaten world peace but the Big Powers themselves which have the major responsibility for preserving the peace. However, the fact that the General Assembly has been, of late, made responsible for the maintenance of world peace, in case the Security Council is prevented from taking action due to the use of veto by any of the Big Five, is a healthy development ; but the fact that the veto power is there and has been resorted to some sixty times by both the leading nations of the world is very unfortunate. Moreover, the U. N. has been designed to maintain peace rather than to make it; its emphasis is on accommodation rather than on coercion. It is certainly not a supra-national legislature. Professor Clyde Eagleton has rightly remarked: "No organ of the United Nations has legislative authority, and no new rules of law can be issued which are binding upon a Member without its own consent, although this is not to deny the great influence of Assembly resolutions." Except for some limitations on the right to use force in international relations, nations are still free to do as their interests demand. Both the League and the U.N. were set up as associations of sovereign states with only limited powers. The United Nations is still a league and not a federation of states.

In the end, it may be asserted that the U.N. is only a mechanism to a certain end which cannot be attained unless those, who run it, are in righte arnest. The ultimate solution, therefore,lies in improving the human nature, which is the spring of all human action and which is responsible for most of the ills of the present-day world. That the U.N is not working smoothly and successfully as was expected of it, is no cause for despair. We are faced with an unhappy dilemma: "United Nations or no nations at all." The wisdom of mankind consists ih making the present international organisation a complete success. In the opinion of Dolivet: "The U.N. is potentially and actually much stronger than the League of Nations and in its strength lies the future hope of mankind."

Trusteeship System of the U. N. : An Improvement Upon the Mandate System of the League

The most interesting international effort to deal with the double problem of imperialism—that of safeguarding the interests of the native populations, and that of preserving the hegemony of the empire builders, is to be found in the Mandate System, devised by the peacemakers of 1919 and administered by the League of Nations.

"Out of a complex background", as Prof. Schuman has stated, "of self-determination, rights of small nations, political expediency and humanitarian sentiments, there emerged the ideas which were subsequently incorporated into the Covenant of the League." "But in the final arrangements," as he further says, "the original principle of the Mandate System was mutilated in details and sullied by the spirit of barter."

The Mandate System, nevertheless, represented an adventure in international supervision over backward areas, and was an advancement upon the colonial system of the 19th century in several respects. In the wake of the second World War, the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, and the Mandate System gave place to the Trusteeship System. (As in the formation of the United Nations, efforts were made to take lessons from the failings of the League, and make the new organisation a definite advancement upon the old, similarly, while formulating the structure of the Trusteeship System, the statesmen tried to remedy the mistakes af the past.)

But the critics came forward and announced that the "novelty was more formal than factual." (The Trusteeship System is an outgrowth and an adaptation of the Mandate System. From an administrative point of view, the two systems have presented very similar organisational principles and methods, although in matters of detail, many differences may be pointed out. In both, certain underdeveloped parts of the world have been under international control exercised by advanced nations serving as trustees for the international community. But neither the Mandate System nor the Trusteeship System made any pretence of ending imperialism in the world.) The nations with colonies—Great Britain, United States, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and others, might keep them unhampered, except that under Article 73 of the Charter, they agreed "to recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of those territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust, the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories."

(But, it would be a great injustice to the diplomats of San Francisco to say that the Trusteeship System of the United Nations is the "old wine in new bottles", or that, it is no better than the old Mandate System of the League. Rather, the new arrangement of dealing with the problem of colonies is a definite improvement upon the old in several respects. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche has remarked: "This new system is no mere continuation of the Mandate System. It is considerably broader in scope and involves a more extensive international supervision. Potentially, it holds forth great promise for the advancement of the

peoples of trust territories towards self-government or independence".)

Improvement as Regards Organisation

(The principles on which the Trusteeship System has been organised differ radically from those which determined the composition of the Mandate System. The Covenant applied only to dependent peoples placed under the mandate; while the Charter applies to all such peoples whether they are under trusteeship or not. Under the Charter, three categories of territories have been specified as eligible for status as trust areas, all with the stipulation that they "may" be placed there-under, not that they "must be". These three categories are: (1) territories then under mandates; (2) territories which might be detached from enemy states as a result of the second World War; (3) territories voluntarily placed under the system by the possessing states.

The principles of organisation of the Trusteeship Council also differ from those of the Permanent Mandate Commission.

(1) The members of the Council are representatives of governments, while the members of the Commission were experts, appointed by the Council of the League on account of their special and expert knowledge Such members lacked the support of their governments, and could hardly be expected to take a strong view of happenings in the mandated territories.

(2) The total number of members of the Council is to be divided equally between states which administer trust territories and those which do not. In the Commission, the majority of members were nationals of states which did not hold a mandate. Each of the Mandatory powers was represented by a member, and such representatives also had to be approved by the Council.

(3) Each of the permanent members of the Security Council is entitled to a seat on the Trusteeship Council. As a result, the five Great Powers and any other member administering trust territory, are assured of permanent representation, while other members of the Trusteeship Council are elected by the Assembly for three years term.

From these arrangements, it follows that the number of members is variable since any addition to the number of states administering trust territory necessitates an addition to the number of elected members.

Improvement as Regards Powers and Functions of the Trusteeship Council:

The purpose underlying the new concept (Trusteeship

Council), is revealed by the following statement of Dr. Ralph Bunche : "The Trusteeship Council is designed to be a more important and effective organ than the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League. It should prove better equipped than was the Mandate Commission to deal with the political problems of the trust territories. The prestige and authority of the Trusteeship Council should certainly be greater than that enjoyed by the Mandate Commission, and its recommendations should carry correspondingly more weight". The Trusteeship Council acts as the link between the administering authority and the United Nations. Although one of the principal organs of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council acts under the authority of the General Assembly. This arrangement differs from the Mandate System in two ways : (1) The Permament Mandate Commission was not one of the main organs of the League ; (2) The Council of the League, and not the Assembly, was the ultimate authority in control of the system. By giving the Trusteeship Council the status of a principal organ, the framers of the Charter expected that the prestige of the agency would be enhanced, and by naming the General Assembly, instead of the Security Council as the ultimate authority, they intended to give smaller and disinterested nations a stronger position.

In the case of the Mandate System, the Permament Mandate Commission was primarily dependent for information upon the Mandatory Powers, and the native peoples had little opportunity of presenting their grievance or of being heard. In the case of the Trusteeship System, therefore, more important functions and powers have been assigned to the Trusteeship Council. It has been empowered : (1) to consider the report from the administering states ; (2) to accept and examine petitions in consultation with the administering authority ; (3) to provide for periodic visits at times agreed upon with the administering authority ; and (4) to prepare questionnaire on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants —on the basis of which each trustee would make annual reports to the General Assembly.

Annual Reports

The idea of annual reports as a means of supervision has been taken over from the Mandate System. But the value of such reports has been enhanced under the Trusteeship System by providing that such reports are to be submitted on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by the Trusteeship Council. This questionnarie, as put by Professior Leonard, is a "truly remarkable document and constitutes a most thorough analysis of the problems of administering a trust territory and place the administering authorities under a serious obligation to analyse and interpret their administrative practices.....Thirty years

ago, it would have verged on the fantastic to suggest that representatives of administering states could be called to the bar, could be subjected to searching examination and cross examination on their administration and would reply to barbed querries aimed at the most intimate details of colonial practice. This process, as it has developed in the Trusteeship council, best symbolises the changes which international organisation has effected in the theory and practice of colonialism."[8]

Acceptance of Petition

The annual reports, however exhaustive and critical, are defective in one way, *i.e.* they contain information supplied by the administering authority, add may not be sufficient to enable the Trusteeship Council to reach to conclusions concerning the state of affairs prevailing in the trust territories. The procedure of petitions, as it operates in the Trusteeship System, is a great improvement upon the practice of the Mandate System. Under the Mandate System, all such petitions had to be submitted through the Mandatory Powers, which had the right to attach their own comments while forwarding them to the Permanent Mandates Commission. But under the Trusteeship System, such petitions may be sent direct to the Trusteeship Council through the Secretary General of the United Nations.

In one more respect, the petition procedure of the Trusteeship System is an advancement over the Mandate System. Under the League, all the petitions were screened out by the chairman of the Permanent Mandate Commission for further submission to the Commission, and because the number of such petitions was quite large, he depended for initial screening upon the Secretariat with the result that most of the petitions did not reach the Commission at all. This practice has been given up, and the Trusteeship Council itself exercises this function through a small *ad hoc* committee. Moreover, the field missions of the United Nations are authorised to receive petitions. This entire procedure has resulted in two advantages : first, the Trusteeship Council receives the true information and secondly, the complainits of the people are really represented.

Periodic Visits

Here also, the practice of the United Nations is a great improvement upon that of the League. The Permament Mandate Commission was not authorised to visit the mandated territories. But the Trusteeship Council sends regular missions which "act only on the basis of the instructions of the Council and shall be responsible to it. It avoids sending on such missions the representative in the Council of the State administering the territory to be visited.

In spite of these improvements, critics of imperialism observe that "the changes effected are scarcely calculated to

8. Leonard, op, cit. p. 502

convince colonial peoples or any one else that any revolutionary reformation has been brought about in the art of imperialism. Although the Charter made possible the transfer to the new dispensation, of non-mandated territories and the establishment of joint trusteeships over other non-self-governing area, no such steps were taken .....As regards the submission of trusteeship agreements, no proposals were made for territories other than League mandates."

Whatever the shortcomings, the Trusteeship System of the United Nations is a marked improvement upon the old practices of colonialism, As one commentator has remarked:

"At the beginning of the period of modern colonialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the colonisers concerned themselves almost solely with the exploitation of the conquered areas for their own benefit and that of the mother country. Gradually humanitarian, political and economic considerations led to a reaction from this concept of colonialism. By the end of the eighteenth century, and to a greater extent in the nineteenth, the religious leaders and politicians of a liberal brand began to talk and write against such abuses as slavery and slave trade, and bent their energies towards the awakening of the masses to the need for a more generous treatment of the so-called backward areas."

The Mandate System, written into the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Trusteeship System, written into the Charter of the United Nations are an elaboration of this ideal of humanitarianism. The formulation of the questionnaire, the conduct of periodic visits, and the moderation and sense of responsibility with which the Trusteeship Council considers the petitions have really contributed a great deal that is new to the art of international organisation.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Middle East in its Historical Perspective

The Middle Eastern region occupied a unique position in the history of the world. This region came to comprise the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab-speaking lands on its northern border, the Arab-speaking lands of North-East Africa (Egypt, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania), Asia Minor or Anatolia which formed the greater part of the Turkish Republic, and Iran. Successive empires had crossed the stage of history—Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Alexander the Great and his generals, the Roman Empire—each uniting all the above, and even more lands under their domination, but each finding it continuously difficult to maintain that unity in view of the local separatisms, and the slowness of communications. In the modern times, this region served as the meeting ground of the conflicting interests of the various imperial States of Europe—Great Britain, France and Russia. Germany joined a bit later, particularly after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 which completed her unification ; and the U. S. A. only in the beginning of the present century.

England and France

However, till the end of the eighteenth century, the interests of the West Europeans were, for the most part, limited to trade and commerce with the countries under Ottoman Empire—trade according to the conditions laid down in the "Turkish Capitulations". But in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, France began to consider the possibility of establishing her control over Egypt, which was at that time in a chronic state of rebellion against the decadent Turkish rule, and therefore in a state of internal chaos and confusion. During the Revolutionary Wars, Napolean invaded Egypt in 1798, and declared that the "conquest of Egypt meant the conquest of the British empire in India". Such a pronouncement made the British Government realise the strategic importance of the Middle East, and she vigilantly watched the events taking place in the region. As early as 1839, the British Post Office adopted, for official communication with the East, the route through Egypt ; and in the 1860's British Government-sponsored, though privately owned, river steamers began to operate on the Tigris between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Employing the weak Ottoman government as a political instrument, London maintained her diplomatic hegemony at Constantinople by supporting the decrepit rule of the Sultan of Turkey against external pressures.

British activity in this region aroused the envy and suspicion of France. Napoleon had already contemplated the construction of a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, but the French proposals had all the time been turned down by the British Foreign Office. But menaced by the increasing influence of Great Britan, France made Fresh proposals and this time she was supported by the other European continental states and the British shipping and business interests. All thes pressures succeeded in winning over the British approbation and also in securing from the Sultan of Turkey the official sanction in 1866 for the canal project. The Suez canal, as it came to be called, was opend to traffic in 1869, and soon after it became the subject of endless controversies, negotiations, diplomatic incidents, and still unsolved problems. As a commercial artery it has at all times been enmeshed in political considerations."[1]

Russia

While Britain and France had been constantly increasing their influences into the Middle East., the influence of Russia was by no means negligible. Checked by the frozen Arctic Ocean in the North and by more advanced nations in the West, Russia naturally moved towards the south in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As early as 1696, Russia had captured the Black Sea port of Azov and before the close of the eighteenth century, had become the chief power in the Black Sea, had secured the right of commercial use of the straits leading to the Mediterranean and had become the recognised protector of Christian churches in Constantinople. Russian policy in this region had two aims, viz., the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of Constantinople. The British Government feared that the establishment of Russian control over Constantinople would greatly weaken the British hold upon India. They, therefore, resented every movement of Russia, and over the Near East, there developed, as one writer has put it, "something like chronic antagonism between Great Britain and Russia." In the face of common danger accruing from the rising power of Germany, the two rivals came closer, and on August 31, 1907, signed the Anglo-Russian Agreement, aiming among other things, "to obviate any cause of misunderstanding in Persian affairs" and to delimit Russian and British spheres of influence in Persia. At the same time "Afghanistan was declared to be outside the sphere of Russian cinfluence." This economic partition was made without the concurrence of Persia, and was therefore resented by the Persians.

Germany

To these interested powers was added, towards the end of

1. Hoskins, H.L. The Middle East (New York, Macmillan, 1954) p. 40.

the nineteenth century, Germany who, by posing as the 'protector of Islam, obtained from the Sultan of Turkey, valuable commercial concessions. But, she did not stop there and developed the idea of constructing a railway from Berlin to Baghdad. This project, if materialised, would have opened Turkey to German exploitation both politically and economically. Naturally, therefore, the project caused great uneasiness in London and Paris.

United States of America

The discovery of the gigantic oil reserves in the Middle Eastern lands in the beginning of the present century led to a new struggle among the industrialised states of the West for the control of these resources. The U. S., which had so far looked upon the Middle East as a sphere of influence of European powers, and particularly of Great Britain, began to covet the lands of the Middle East, as they contained, at least, half of the world's petroleum reserves.

Arab Nationalism

To add to the complicacies of the Middle Eastern politics, the dependent peoples of the Sultan of Turkey were clamouring to break away from their suzerain and establish nationalist and independent governments. Syria, Lebanon, Saud-i-Arabia, Palestine, Trans-jordon and Egypt were all in ferment and were seething with discontent, partly against the foreign intervention and partly against the interference of the Sultan in their internal affairs.

Thus, in the words of Lord Morley "The Near East became the scene of shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths."

The Impact of the War (1914-1918) on Middle East

The Great War of 1914--1918 changed the whole situation in the Near and Middle East as elsewhere. In the opening months of the war, August—Oct. 1914, when Turkey was still neutral, the Arab nationalists sought to exploit the situation to win guarantees of their independence. Husain, the sheriff of Mecca, who ruled the Muslim Holy cities, heartily disliked the efforts of his Ottoman suzerain to centralise provincial administration. This feeling had become all the more acute with the advent of the Young Turks movement. Husain thought it prudent to seek the support of the British in Egypt who needed the Arab support against Turkey. Negotiations were opened with the British High Commissioner in Egyt. The British negotiators were, however, cautious as long as Turkey remained neutral; but in October, 1914, they committed themselves in general terms to "the emancipation of the Arabs and an Arab nation in return for Arab support against Turkey". On June 5,

1916, the Arab revolt began, but it failed to stimulate the civil populations of the Arab provinces and remained confined mostly to the military. The revolt did not make much headway, as it was soon crushed by German and Turkish troops. It, however, immensely succeeded in stimulating the aspirations of politically-minded Arabs.

Cost-War Peace-Settlement in Middle East

The war was over; the Central Powers were defeated and Turkey was completely dismembered, The Ottoman Empire was a thing of the past—its vast Arab Dominions being in the hands of Britain and France. In the meantime, the Kemalists rejected the ancient Islamic basis of the Ottoman Empire, and the new Turkish State explicitly renounced all claim to territories containing Arab majorities. The conclusion of peace and the settlement of the problem, therefore, became easy. Turkey was made an independent secular republic, with Kemal Pasha as its president, and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were placed under the "tutelage of advanced nations", and this tutewas to be exercised by them as "Mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations". The mandates for Labanon and Syria were assigned to France; the mandates for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan to Britain.[2] The remaining Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire secured their independence. This settlement was made on August 10, 1920, through the Treaty of Sevres.

This arrangement could not be permanent and stable and very soon Middle East became the centre of nationalist upheavals on the one hand, and imperialist imposition on the other. The Arabs, who had heavily suffered in their meagre resources during the war and were struggling for independence for long, were no longer ready to tolerate the domination of any outside power. Britain and France had suffered heavily in the war and wanted to compensate for some of their losses by imposing direct rule over the whole region, Palestine, Transjordan Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. This imposition was in no way mitigated by the invention of the Mandate System, which was "little more than a polite fiction created in order to satisfy President Wilson and the idealists who had inaugurated the League of Nations." The then Foreign Secretary of Britain, Lord Curzon, told the House of Lords in June 1929: "It is quite a mistake to suppose that under the Covenant of the League or any other instrument, the gift of a mandate rests with the League of Nations. It rests with the Powers who have conquered the territories which it then falls to them to distribute."[3]

2. The mandate for Palestine was conditioned by an undertaking given by the British Government in 1917 to establish in Palestine a 'National Home for the Jewish People.'

3. Kirk, G. E., A Short History of the Middle East. (London, Methuen, 1948) p. 130.

Middle East in Post-War Years

It was natural that the reaction of the growing nationalism of the Middle East to this intensifying of foreign control, this virtual annexation by Britain and France, should be a violent one. Examined from this point of view, the period of inter-war years may be divided into two parts. In the first period of the post-War settlement, the efforts of the nationalists to throw off the European imperialism were violent and, in some cases, they resorted to armed conflict. In the second period, the agitation was more constitutional in character though armed action still sometimes occured. In Palestine, owing to the special local circumstances, the violence was spread over both periods ; and more intense in the later period ; but even here there was a pause of seven years from 1922 to 1929. It would be convenient in both periods to examine the subject country by country, since it was only towards the end of the second period that the co-ordination of nationalist activity between the various Arab countries, which was to cultimate in 1944 in the creation of the Arab League, became of any significance.

Egypt

Since the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt had forme a vital link in the British communications with the East ; and for thirty years before the war, Egypt was in British occupation though formally it was under Turkish svzerainty. When Turkey entered the war in December, 1914, Turkish suzerainty was abrogated and a British protectorate was established. Egypt, as George E. Kirk has remarked, "was flooded with inexperienced British army officers and civils officials who treated Egypt almost as an occupied territory, in which the rights and wishes of the inhabitants counted for little"[4] Politically-minded Egyptians were irritated by the establishment of the protectorate and the subsequent behaviour of the English which seemed to make the prospect for self-government more remote. Under the leadership of Zaglul Pasha, the nationalist agitation became more intense and he succeeded in winning more support for his campaign to bring about a radical change in the political status of Egypt. On February 28, 1922, Zaglul was informed that the protectorate was terminated, and that Egypt would be an independent state. The following four points were, however, reserved to the discretion on H.M's. Government pending the reaching of agreement on them : (1) the security of Imperial communications ; (2) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct or indirect ; (3) the protection of foreign residents and minorities ; (4) the Sudan.

This unilateral declaration was followed by a Note to the foreign powers intimating that "interference in the affairs of

4. Ibid, p. 132.

Egypt by any foreign power would be regarded by Britain as a menace to her own security". The situation resulting from that declaration was full of embarrassments. As Toynbee has put it, "the granting of independce to Egypt was so limited by these reservations that it amounted in fact to less than Dominion status". Similarly, Kirk wrote : "the Egyptains received it without gratitude, as merely an instalment of independence."

Declaration of 1927

The declaration of 1922 did not end the violent agitation, since the Wafd refused to accept the limitations imposed on Egyptian sovereignty by the "Four Reserved Points." Encouraged by the successes of the Turkish nationalists in exhorting major concessions from Britain and France by armed force, the Wafd started a campaign of murder and terror. Several Englishmen were brutally murdered and matters came to a head, when on November 19, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, Governor-Ceneral of the Sudan, and Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, was murdered in the street of Cairo. Negotiations with the British Labour Government failed in the earlier months and the result was an era of great tensity. In 1927, the British Government; however, agreed to reconsiuer the position and offered two more concessions viz., (1) Britain was prepared to convert the British personnel in the Egyptian Army into a military mission ; and (2) the maintenance of British officials in the Departments of Police and Public Security pending the reform of the Capitulations.

Declaration of 1929

But Mustafa an-Nahhas, who succeeded Zaglul on his death, opposed the conditions because they did not amount to a complete evacuation of Egypt. In May 1929, the British Government issued a statement, redefining her policy in Egypt in the following lines : "Because the interests at stake are of supreme importance to the safety and well-being of the Empire, H.M.s Government reserved, by the declaration of 1922, certain matters for its own determination, but even in these cases it is the desire of H.M.'s Government to act with, and where possible through, the Egyptian Government, respecting, in the largest possible measure, the liberties and independence which by the same Declaration they conceded to Egypt."

In 1929, the Labour Government again came to power and the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mahmud, went to London to reopen negotiations. But the Sudan proved a stumbling block, since Mahmud insisted that "pending a final agreement, there should be no restriction on Egyptian immigration into the Sudan, while the furthest concession, Britain would make, was that the Governor-General would not exercise

unreasonably the right which any government has to control immigration in the interests of its own nationals.

Anglo Egyptian Treaty of 1936

The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in the summer of 1935 brought a note of urgency to the question of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. In March 1936, negotiations began and successfully ended in a Treaty of Alliance, signed on August 26, 1936, in London. Britain undertook, under certain condition, "to withdraw British troops from the interior of the country ; "to maintain them only in the Canal zone ; "to help Egypt to secure the abolition of the Capitulations, *i.e.* the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by nationals of the principal foreign powers in the country ; "to support Egypt's claim to membership of the League ; and "to give Egyptian officials a share in the administration of the Sudan."

These promises were fulfilled when, at the Montreaux Convention of May 8, 1937, the Capitulations were abolished and on May 26, Egypt was admitted as a sovereign Member state to the League. In 1938, an agreement was negotiated between the two countries regarding the accomodation of British troops which, under the earlier arrangements, were stationed to protect the Suez Canal.

Thus, after seventeen years of negotiations, ended the Egyptian problem (though not finally) and Egypt, while upholding her independence, remained fully loyal to her obligations under the treaty.

Iraq

The status of the first British mandated territory, Iraq, was anomalous from the outset. The word 'mandate' translated into Arabic did not convey to the Iraqis any of the sense of temporary trusteeship that it was intended to have, but was rather held to connote, if not annexation and a colonial status, a sort of protectorate remote from the hopes held out to the Arabs during the war. To meet this difficulty, it was decided that H.M's. Government should regulate the relations between Britain and Iraq by a treaty which would in effect enable them to discharge the obligations incumbent on them under the Mandate. The treaty, which was signed in October 1922, included an undertaking by H.M's. Government to use their good offices to secure the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible, and a Protocol signed in the following year laid down that, when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations, the Treaty should lapse. The Treaty was not yet ratified that the League, doubtful about the ability of Iraq for self-government, recommended that the Mandate should be continued for 25 years unless Iraq had been earlier

admitted to the membership of the League before the expiry of that period.

The undertaking given by the British Government in 1922, viz., "to recommend Iraq for membership of the League" became more definite in 1929, when '1932' was fixed as the year when that recommendation would be made. This promise was followed by the conclusion of an Anglo-Iraq Treaty on June 30, 1930 which was to run for 25 years with effect from the admission of Iraq to the League. The Treaty provided for (1) "co-operation in foreign affairs; (2) "mutual assistance in in the event of war; (8) "air bases were to be leased to Great Britain; and (4)"Britisn military assistance was to continue to be provided."

A few months after the conclusion of the Treaty, London informed the League of her intention to recommend in 1932 that Iraq be admitted as a member unconditionally. The Council of the League agreed to the admission of Irag provided that she made a declaration guaranteeing "minority rights, the administration of justice, international law and other safeguards". Iraq signed the declaration, became a member of the League on October 3, 1932, and the mandate was terminated. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 automatically came into force on that date and one of the three mandates assigned by the San Remo Conference came to an end.

The establishment of the Iraqi independence did not, however, establish cordial relations between England and Iraq. Some other problems were raised, and the most difficult of them was that of her non-Arab minorities, of whom the Kurds and Assyrians were the most important. The Iraqis resented the presence, in their midst, of the Assyrians, differing from them in race, religion and language, whose homeland had been left almost entirely to Turkey by the decision of the League. Within the first year of Iraq's admission resulting into the League, disturbances broke out among the Assyrians, resulting in the massacre of five hundred of them by Iraqi troops. But very soon, the Iraqi representative at Geneva expressed regret for the happening and offered to assist as generously as possible those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq to make a home elsewhere.

The other large minority, the Kurds, had been assured under the abortive treaty of Sevres "a united and autonomous and even independent Kurdistan". The British High Commissioner tried to induce the Iraqi Government to grant a special regime to the Kurdish districts, but the attempts failed, because the Kurds broke out in open revolts and were suppressed by force.

However, happy relations with Britain could not be restored. The Government of Iraq went under the influence of

the military, particularly after the *coup d' etat* of 1936. Nazism became fashionable and the German Government was not slow to fish in troubled waters. Very soon the German Minister in Baghdad succeeded in securing a band of young Irakis who were made to believe that self-government wrung from the Britishers was the outcome of the disorders of 1920. The German Minister also exploited in his favour the Iraqis antagonism to the Jews. The Iraqis, like other Arabs, were totally opposed to Jewish immigration into Palestine, (which London was encouraging) and believed that it was a 'breach of the promises' made to the Arabs during the war. Thus by 1939, the Germans had, as Bullard has put it, "a political atmosphere unfavourable to that co-operation in time of war that had been prov ded for in the treaty of 1930."

Transjordan

The other territory, mandated to Britain, was Transjordan. It was divided geographically by the River Jordan, Palestine lying to the west of that river, and Transjordania to the East. Palestine occupied an important place in the Middle East, and presented a complex of problems, and therefore, will be dealt with later in detail. Transjordan was a purely Arab state and was under the rule of the Amir of Damascus. After the collapse of the Damascus Arab Government, the territory was placed under the British mandate as part of the mandate over Palestine at the San-Remo Conference of April 1920.

Soon after, the British High Commissioner convened the local Arab notables and informed them that "H. M's. Government intended to grant them immediate self-government with the help of a few British advisers." Local councils were accordingly set up in the four important towns; and preparations were made for the eventual complete independence. In virtue of one of the clauses of the Mandate, H.M's. Government obtained in September 1922, the approval of the League Council to the exemption of Transjordan from the application of some clauses in particular those relating to the Jewish National Home. In 1923, Britain recognised the existence of an "independent government in Transjordan under the rule of Amir Abdullah, provided such government is constitutional." The relations between Britain and Transjordan were finally settled in 1928 by a treaty whereby "H. M'.s Government recognised the Transjordan government as independent, and the Amir agreed to be guided by the advice of H.M.'s government in foreign relations, and to follow an administrative, financial and fiscal policy such was to ensure the stability and the good organisation of the government and its finances."

Lebanon

France, as a mandatory in the Near East, had no suc h

achievement to her credit as Britain had. The main underlying cause was the mutual distrust. The territory mandated to her was divided by the mandate itself into two—Lebanon and Syria. The population in Lebanon consisted mostly of Arab Christians. In August 1920, Lebanon was expanded to three times its size by the inclusion of the predominantly Muslim towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida and the Christian position thereby weakened. "This was designed", as Kirk has put it, "perhaps to make them more dependent on French protection and less inclined to follow a nationalist line of their own".[5] This exposed the Christian majority to the fate of becoming, in course of time a minority in a state designed to ensure its predominance. But still worse, it introduced a new bone of contention in a country already rich in motives of dissension. The feeling among a large and powerful section of the Lebanese population was against a modification of the 1920 boundaries. Serious disturbances broke out in Beirut and Tripoli in favour of settling the question of the frontiers on the basis of a return to the pre-1920 boundaries. But with the assistance of the French troops, order was soon restored. The Syrians considered the enlargement of Lebanon as harmful to the Lebanese and unfair to Syria. But they took the view that if their intentions were sound, the play of natural forces was bound in time to vindicate it by exposing the artificiality of the present frontiers; and that the day would come when the Lebanese themselves would seek a modification, if not the total abolition of the barriers. Nothing was said in the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 about the frontiers of the enlarged Lebanon. But soon after the signing of this treaty, negotiations were opened in Beirut between the French Government and a delegation of the Lebanese. On November 13, 1936, talks resulted in a Franco-Lebanese Treaty modelled on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1920. The Treaty was to run for 25 years renewable by consent. France undertook to sponsor and secure the admission of Lebanon to the membership of the League within three years of the ratification of the treaty and Lebanon, in turn, agreed to give to France the right to retain, throughout the period of the treaty, her military forces of all arms without restriction as to the locality or the number of garrisons.

Syria

Matters in Syria were not so simple. On the one hand Arab nationalism was as potent a force as in Iraq and Palestine; on the other, France was wholly disregardful of that nationalism. If Britain created in Iraq a unified state by including the minorities, France dismembered Syria by excluding three areas inhabited mainly by Muslims. Not only that, France proceeded to break up the unity which the rest of Syria had enjoyed under Faisal's Arab Administration. This small territory of a little

5. Kirk, op. cit., p. 164.

more than 2,000,000 inhabitants was partitioned into three separate states and endowed with four distinct administrations. The reasons, which the French gave to justify this measure, were that it had been taken in response to the wishes of the people immediately concerned, and that was dictated by clear-sighted and benevolent conception of the true interests of the people of Syria. But the real reason appears to be the French hostility to the Arab Movement The measure had two main objectives, "to foster the growth of separatist tendencies and to turn Arab Syria into an inland state". George Antonius in his book, 'The Arab Awakening', rightly says : "The creation of regional governments functioning quite independently of each other as so many separate instruments of the French will was primarily a device for promoting disunity. It was designed to stimulate the growth of a regional as opposed to a national outlook and so to counter-act the unifying efforts of the Movement". He further says: "In their administrative methods, the officials of the mandatory Powers showed that they were inspired by the same motive. They subjected Arab nationalists to a system of police supervision combined with Martial Law jurisdiction, which recalled, and in some ways outdid, the severity and the partiality of the Hamidian tyranny. They muzzled the nationalist press, subsidized venal newspapers and tried to stifle all outward expression of Arab sentiment. They reserved appointments in the public departments and the local councils to those whom they tested and found subservient.....They showed the same kind of partiality in the grant of concessions and monopolies, and frequently made improper use of the administrative machine to further the interests of French companies and concession holders'. The result was that the undeniable benefits of French rule, both in the moral and the material fields, were eclipsed by its errors and excesses".

This policy of dismemberment and exploitation was keenly resented by the Syrian Arabs, and open revolts began to take place from time to time. Protests to the French High Commissioner met with a discourteous rebuff, and the Arab leaders were arrested as "conspirators". Matters reached a crisis when the revolt spread to the cities of Syria, and Damascus was bombarded by French troops. Martial law was imposed over the important centres of rebellion and the rebels were by and by quelled.

The revolts had, however, taught the French that it was impossible to hold down Syria indefinitely under martial law. The French High Commissioner made efforts at reconciliation : but it was only in 1932 that more serious negotiations started for a Franco-Syrian Treaty modelled on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. No compromise could be made between French interests and nationalist aspirations ; and in 1934, the High Commissioner suspended the Constitution.

Franco-Syrian Treaty of September 9, 1936

In 1936, in France the Front Populaire Government under M. Blum came to power. It showed a more sympathetic attitude towards the Syrian demands, with the result that agreement was reached on a draft treaty on the model of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. After the ratification of the Treaty by the two governments, France would support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. But before the treaty could be ratified, serious differences developed between the Syrian majority and the Turkish minority—the latter objecting to their subjection to an inexperienced Arab nationalist government. Moreover, the Draft Treaty of 1936 met with a formidable and growing weight of opposition in France. After the fall of the Front Populaire Government, the power passed into the hands of those who were opposed to the Syrian independence. And then, the international situation was growing worse every day ; and France felt increasingly reluctant to weaken her strategic position in the Middle East. In July 1939, ultimately the French High Commissioner suspended the Syrian constitution and appointed a Council of Five Directors to rule under his own orders, military defence being controlled from France. Although Syria along with Lebanon at the beginning of the second World War was entirely under French control, she had become almost completely independent before it ended.

The countries lying on the outer edge of the Middle East—Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Persia and Turkey were given full political independence in 1919-20, but they were from time to time hampered in their dealings with greater powers due to the economic weakness and social backwardness of the peoples.

Yemen

Although Yemen was made independent of Turkey by the Allied victory, the Imam did not become friendly to the British ; and very soon began to encroach upon the territory of Aden, disregarding the frontier which had been agreed upon between the British and Turkish Governments in 1914. H. M's, Government sent in repeated warnings but to no result. Utimately, the Yemen troops were forcefully ejected from Aden territory and the Imam was forced to enter into a treaty in 1943 whereby Great Britain recognised the independence of the Yemen, and the Imam agreed to recognise the *status-quo* in the territory of Aden pending final agreement. In 1945, the Arab League was formed and H. M.'s Government welcomed the Yemen's membership of the same.

Saudi Arabia

During the War, Britain had entered into an agreement

with France and Italy, by which these powers undertook "not to acquire, nor to consent to a third power acquiring territory in Arabia or a naval base in the Red Sea." Early in the war, London sent emissaries to the Young Amir of Arab, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, to enlist his support for an Arab rising against Turkey. The Amir assisted the Allies, but was not recognised in the Peace Settlement. In that region of nomadic tribes and undefined frontiers, the Young Amir extended his domain by "a process of gradual encroachment and vigorous administration." In 1926, he invaded Hizaz ; King Hussain abdicated and the territory was annexed by Ibn Saud. His former semi-vassal's relationship to Britain was now clearly out of date ; and in 1927, by the Treaty of Jidda, Britain recognised him as "sovereign and independent King of the Hizaz, Najd, and its dependencies", which were later fused as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud, in return, undertook to maintain friendly relations with the British-protected Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf.

Persia (Iran)

After the signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907, Russia in the North and Britain in the South set to work to absorb completely her zone, and the work of each was made easy by the fact that each government was anxious to avoid friction in view of the over-riding need to maintain the *Triple Entente* as a bulwark against Germany. By a secret agreement of March 1915, the Allies promised to Russia, Istanbul and the Straits and full liberty of action in the northern zone of Persia in return for which Britain was to be free to annex both the southern and neutral zones laid down by the agreement of 1907. In March 1917, there broke out the Communist Revolution in Russia, which demoralised the Russian army and led to the subsequent withdrawal of the same from Northern Persia. After the war, the British Government thought it wise to maintain the integrity of Persia, because the country was in a state of political anarchy and economic bankruptcy, and presented the possibility of becoming a field for the expansion of communism In August 1919, Britain negotiated with Persia a draft agreement, whereby the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was declared as cancelled ; Britain offered to supply advisers, officers, and equipment for the establishment of internal order ; there was to be joint Anglo-Persian enterprise in building railways and improving communications generally ; and Persia was to receive a loan of £2 million. The treaty could not be ratified, partly because of the opposition of some elements in the Persian Majlis which regarded victorious Britain a greater menace than defeated Russia and partly because of the opposition of France and U. S. who labelled the move as one of 'Imperialism'.

Order was, however, restored by an officer of the Persian Cossacks, Reza Khan, who, in February 1921, marched on Teherar.

and arrested the cabinet. Soon after, he denounced the draft agreement with Britain, and, instead signed, on February 25, 1921, the generous terms offered by Soviet Union. The Moscow Government renounced all concessions made to the Czarist Government on conditions that they were not transferred to any other power. Russia also undertook to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia. In return, Russian troops were to be allowed to enter Persian territory, if Persia were unable to prevent a third power from preparing an invasion of Russia on Persian soil. Thus, in the day of military victory, the British were over-reached by Moscow.

In 1925, Reza Khan became the King and the war-weary Persians welcomed his accession to power. Soon, he established his authority throughout Persia and turned his attention to foreign affairs. In 1927, he sent Notes to the foreign powers that all extra-territorial agreements would terminate after one year and new treaties would be concluded. The same year, he claimed the return of Bahrein to Persia from Britain, but H. M's Government rejected the claim. Relations between Persia and Britain began to deteriorate and more seriously disturbed in 1932, when the Shah announced the "cancellation" of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession, which was not to expire until 1961. The Shah's action aroused great resentment in London and H. M.'s Government sent naval units to the Persian Gulf. The matter was finally decided by mutual agreement whereby the concessionary area was to be limited to one hundred thousand square miles to be selected by the Company within five years and young Persians were to be trained in oil technology by Britain.

Relations between Persia and Russia did not improve much even after the treaty. Reza Shah was pursuing a strongly nationalist and anti-foreign policy which was equally directed against Russia, and expression to which was given in the form of embargoes and boycotts from time to time. However, Russia supported Persia in her dispute with Britain and by 1936, she was taking 28 per cent of Persia's exports and supplying 30 per cent of her imports. Russian engineers and technicians were constantly pouring into Persia.

If relations between Persia and Britain were straining, commercial interests brought the former nearer to Germany. In trade, Parsia and Germany were complementary, one having raw materials and some foodstuffs to export, the other, manufactured goods. Very soon, the German Government secured a commercial hold which they exploited for political purposes. They obtained a large share of the business resulting from the Shah's desire to iudustrialise the country. They built factories, and sent Germans to train the young Persians. Persia was becoming almost wholly pro-German, partly for reasons of the developing

trade with that country and partly because of her hostility towards both Russia and Britain. In spite of the Russo-German Non Aggression pact of 1939, Germany was regarded as the eternal enemy of Russia in Persia, and therefore as the natural friend of Persia ; and Britain sharing to some extent the odium attached to Russia as her ally in the first World War, and as having helped her to 'carve up' Iran in 1907.

When the second World War broke out, Iran, officially a neutral, was to all intents and purposes a German ally. The British and Soviet Governments sent representations to the Shah but to no result. Notes were sent to the Shah, asking him to clear Persia of the Nazi agents ; but the Shah was too certain that there could be no Fifth Column in his country. The result was the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in August 1941 and the subsequent occupation of the country by Allied armies. Reza Shah abdicated the throne in September 1941 in favour of his son Mohamed Reza. He opened negotiation with the Allies and the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance was made on January 29, 1942, between Persia on the one hand and Britain and Russia on the other. Persia promised "to help the Allies by providing them facilities for the passage of their troops and supplies and assistance in furnishing labour and material". The Allies were to be free "to maintain the necessary forces in Iran, but the presence of these troops was not to constitute a military occupation, and they were to withdraw the troops not later than six months after the conclusion of hostilities or of peace, whichever might be the earlier". Britain and Russia also undertook to "respect its territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence".

Turkey

The Sultan of Turkey had entered the war on November 5, 1941, on the German side, and when the defeat came, was a great loser and was deprived of his former empire. Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq were all lost to him. In the meantime, the Young Turks, under the leadership of Kemal Pasha, declared their hostility to religion and Islamic traditions in matters of the state and declared Turkey a "democratic republic". They set down to realise their ambition of making Turkey a European, instead of a Middle Eastern and Asiatic power. European manners, European culture and civilisation, and European methods of warfare were adopted and the entire nation was radically refashioned. On April 24, 1920, the peace terms in the form of the Treaty of Sevres were published by the Allies. The Sultan submitted, but for the Young Turks, the terms were "too harsh and humiliating to be accepted". Luckily for them, the Allies failed to agree among themselves about the distribution of the spoils, and sharp dissensions developed among the British, French and Italian delegates. These worked out to the advantage of the Turks. Great Britain must take most of the blame

for the handling of the situation, for the British were chiefly behind that Greek invasion of Asia Minor which aroused among the Turks an irresistible wave of national feeling, and enabled Kemal Pasha, as general of the Turkish National Army, to drive the Greeks out of Asia Minor and establish the new national Turkish state. The Allies were compelled to recognise the Turkish victory and repudiate the onerous Treaty of Sevres. The differences between Turkey and the Western Powers were resolved by the Treaty of Lausanne concluded in July 1923. Turkey agreed to the demilitarisation of the zone of the Straits and to allow the warships of all countries in the Black Sea with slight restrictions. The Allies on their side agreed to respect the territorial and political independence of Turkey and to recognise Kemal Pasha as President of the new Rupublic. These provisions were obnoxious not only to Turkey as limiting her sovereignty but also to the Soviet Union, as they exposed her Black Sea coast to the threat of enemy ships When Turkey was involved in her dispute with Britain and Iraq over the Mosul District, Moscow saw her chance and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey. Although this Treaty established official relations between them, and Russia also gave some technical help for the industrialisation of Turkey, there was not much of cordiality between the peoples of the two countries.

The Turkish Government, on the other hand, was constantly insisting upon the Western Powers that the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Treaty be annulled. It was not until Hitler had occupied Rhineland and Italy had emerged as the aggressive naval power in 1936 which threatened the *status-quo* in the Mediterranean, that the Western Powers favourably looked upon Turkish demands, and conceded them in the Montreaux Convention of 1936. She was allowed to fortify the Straits and to close them to warships of all powers in times of war, unless the powers were acting under the Covenant of the League. Thus, a compromise was made between the Russian claim for wide discrimination in favour of Black Sea powers, and the British argument that the Straits should be equally opened or equally closed to the warships of all powers. This Convention inaugurated an era of cordiality between the Western Powers and Turkey and was followed by an Anglo-Turkish Declaration for the conclusion of reciprocal security pacts in May, 1939 and by the Triple Alliance between Turkey, Great Britain and France in October 1939, directed primarily against Italy.

Compelled by circumstances, the two erstwhile enemies, *viz.*, Britain and Russia, came to an alliance in June 1941 and sought to reassure Turkey by guaranteeing their loyalty to the Montreaux Convention. In August, they declar-

ed that they had no aggressive designs in the Straits, and pledged themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey.

By the year 1937, the two power blocs were engaged in a political and economic struggle for the control of the Middle East, the Fascist governments by encouraging the extremist youth movements and by extensive and costly propaganda, and the Western Powers by entering into political agreements, ensuring them some advantages. Moreover, the Middle East oil fields provided a new and potent reason why foreign powers began to be interested more in this region and interfere in its internal matters. Partly due to the impending threat of another world war and partly due to antagonism to this interference, the Arab states began to come closer. Common hostility to the Jews served as the further stimulus for unity. But it was not until 1945, that the Arab states really came together and signed the Charter of the Arab League. On March 22, 1945, Arab Leaders from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Egypt drew up a pact in Cairo to "strengthen relations, safe-guard their independence and sovereignty and promote economic, social and cultural co-operation". The League functioned through a Secretary General, a Council and six committees and concentrated its attention on supporting Egypt in her quarrel with Britain and on fighting Zionism, boycotting Zionist goods, and denouncing all efforts to make Palestine a 'Jewish Homeland'.

PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

Historically considered from 65 B.C. to 634 A. D., Palestine was a part of the Roman Empire. From 634 to 1917, it remained a province of the Ottoman Empire. When Turkey surrendered in the first World War, she lost claim to all her dependencies ; and Palestine, along with others, passed over to the League of Nations, which, in turn, mandated it to Britain. Palestine was probably the smallest of the Near Eastern countries, with an area of only 10,000 square miles, much of which was desert. This ancient land was the matrix of Judaism and Christianity and was almost equally sacred to Mussalmans. All these faiths believed in human brotherhood, piety and love. But in the 20th century, this holy land became a scene of hatred and violence. This paradox could be explained by the geographical and strategic position of the country and by the antagonistic interests, rights and claims of the three parties concerned, the Arabs, the Jews and Britain.

Rights and Claims of the Arabs :

The rights of the Arabs were derived from actual and long standing possession and rested upon the strongest human foundation. Their connection with Palestine went back uninterruptedly to the earliest historic times, when during the

seventh century, the Arabs, from the Arabian Peninsula, occupied the country and permanently settled there. The earlier inhabitants inter-married with the conquerors, acquired their speech, customs and ways of thought and became permanently Arabised. "That all later attempts to expel the Arab peasants from the country-side in which they developed their homesteads and their trees, their shrines and graveyards, and all the memories and affections that went with life on the soil, were forcibly resisted, was quite natural."

In addition to these natural rights, the Arabs also acquired specific political rights ; this was during the first World War, when Turkey joined it on Germany's side. The Allies were in great need of the help of the dependent peoples of the Sultan. This help would be forthcoming at a stipulated price and a bargain was struck through negotiation between the British High Commissioner in Egypt, MacMahon, and the Sheriff of Mecca, Husain. The Allies promised to the Arabs "independence after the war" in return for Arab support against the Sultan during the war. And the independence of the Arabs meant, as they interpreted it, the independence of the Palestine Arabs too. Thus, the Arab claims rested on two distinct foundations, the natural rights of a settled population, in great majority, agricultural, to remain in possession of the land of its birth-right, and the acquired political rights which followed from the disappearance of Turkish sovereignty, in the overthrow of which they had a great share, and which Great Britain, through a contractual agreement, was bound to recognise. Thus, the Arab hostility to any outside interference was based upon self-preservation as well as self-determination. Moreover, the Arabs did not like, in their midst, the presence of more rich and advanced Jewish community. Although the presence of the Jews had improved the economic conditions of the Arab peasants and labourers and had put money into the pockets of the Arab landowners who had done nothing to develop the land until the Jews came, the Arab masses did not like the spectacle of the Jews settling among them at higher standards of skill and culture and taking on the more lucrative positions in the country. And in this case, it was not only the opposition of the Arabs of Palestine, but the resistance of the entire Arab world, which had behind it the power to create acute disturbances over the whole area of the Near and Middle East and in Africa right along the Mediterranean coast to Algeria and Morocco. Any trouble in this area directly affected France and Great Britain, for it threatened the French Empire in Northern Africa and the British communication with her Eastern Empire.

Rights and Claims of the Jews :

The rights of the Jews were of a different order. In some countries of Europe and the U.S., the Jews were in a precarious

condition, and had no national state of their own. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a feeling developed that the Jews must have a national state to which they might migrate, and in which they could live in peace, freedom and the dignity of self-government. The motive was altogether generous and humanitarian and rested on the theory that the Jews of the world formed one race and so could become one nation. In the eyes of many thoughtful Jews, Palestine could be the only fit place for their home. Such was not the original intention of the founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl; but when in 1903, the British Government offered to make Uganda available for Jewish colonisation, a majority of Zionist pioneers over-ruled Herzl, rejected the offer and carried the vote in favour of a Palestinian state. They based their claim on the historic connection of Jewry with Palestine which they represented as entitling the Jews to return to their ancient homeland.

The claim of the Jews was, moreover, based not only on that historic connection, but also on the help the Jews gave to the Allied cause during the first World War and promise made to them in return. In November 1917, there was published, what came to be known as 'the Belfour Declaration,' which stated; "H.M's. Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People and will use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of other non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."

Before its issue, the Declaration had received the approval of the President of the U.S., and was subsequently endorsed by the principal Allied Powers. It had thus the additional sanction of a wide international recognition. The Declaration did not fulfil the Zionist aspiration to a Jewish national state but it pledged England's good-will and assistance towards the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

When the news of the Declaration reached Husain's ears, he became nervous and asked Britain for an explanation. The British Government informed him that their support of the Zionist aspiration went only "in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political." This, however, satisfied the Sheriff.

Interests and Motives of Great Britain :

The motives which impelled the British Government to issue the Belfour Declaration were many. It was said, for instance, that the Jews used their financial and political influence to bring the U.S. into the war on the side of the Allies, and that the Belfour Declaration was a reward for actual services rendered.

Again, it was stated that the Declaration was issued in return for promises pledging large subscriptions from Jewish sources to war loan funds. But actually speaking, the British Government was moved by two considerations, one political and the other imperialistic. The political aim was "to win over the powerful Zionist elements in Germany and Austria who were actually in negotiation with the Central Powers, for the issue of a Turkish Belfour Declaration,' by providjng them with a positive interest in an Entente victory, and at the same time to mitigate the hostility of Jews in Allied countries towards Russia and give those Jews who had been so active in overthrowing the Tsarist regime, an incentive to keep Russia in the war. The imperialistic aim, first propounded by Kitchner, was to secure Palestine or a part of it as a bulwark to the British position in Egypt and an overland link with the East. Whatever other considerations. political, financial , religious or humanitarian might be, the determining motive was the desire to occupy Palestine for strategic reasons.

The importance of Palestine in the Imperial scheme became more clear as the war proceeded. Its importance lay primarily in its proximity to Egypt, from which it was separated by the almost desert Sinai Peninsula. Before the war, it was believed that a desert was as strong a bulwark as a fortified frontier and since the Turko-Egyptian boundary lay across the eastern extremity of Sinai, Egypt was safe. But in 1915, a well-equipped Turkish army crossed the desert and reached the banks of the Suez Canal. Modern science had conquered the desert and the Suez Canal was no longer as secure as it was believed to be. Even if Turkey were the master of Palestine, there would be cause for concern. But now that France was claiming a special position for her in Syria, it became imperative for Britain to interpose a buffer between her position on the Suez Canal and the future French position in Syria. Hence ,the Belfour Declaration. It prepared the ground for the claim which was afterwards to be preferred in the fulness of victory, that since England had given a solemn undertaking to the Zionists in regard to a national home in Palestine, it was only in the fitness of things that the task of governing Palestine for the fulfiment of that undertaking be assumed by England.

Moreover, the problem of Palestine could not be localised. By its very nature, it was a world problem entangled with international relations at many points. The discovery of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia in the beginning of the present century made the Middle East an important factor in world politics. The oil question seriously reacted upon the problem of Palestine because the natural outlet for pipe-lines to carry oil to the Mediterranean was across Palestine, which thereby became important to British as well as American politicians for economic as well as

for political reasons. And then, to the west of Palestine lay the Mediterranean sea, whose eastern part formed an important link in Britain's communications with Asia and even apart from oil, an area of "immense strategic importance in the calculations of all military authorities who framed their policies with an eye upon the possibility of another world war".

Attempts to Solve the Problem

In April 1920, when Britain, France and the U.S. met in a conference at San Remo to dispose of the Arab territories, London received a mandate over Palestine, coupled with the obligation to apply the Belfour Declaration. This decision aroused deep resentment among the Arabs, and at the General Syrian Congrees, they declared their opposition to Jewish immigration into any part of Syria which for them, included Palestine. On the other hand, the Jews took it for granted that the conversion of the country into a Jewish State was "only a matter of time". With this conflict of interests, it was not surprising that there were two out-breaks of disorder in Palestine even before the issue of the Mandate—one at Easter in 1920 and the other in May 1921, when many Jews were killed by the Arabs and many Arabs were killed or wounded in the repression of the disorders by the authorities. The first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was very sympathetically disposed to Zionism and favoured the immigration of Jews into Palestine, with the result that thousands of Jews immigrated between the years 1920-1925.

Churchill White Paper of 1922

Concerned at the continued unrest, the British Government issued a statement of her policy which appeared in the 'Churchill White Paper' of 1922. The White Paper repudiated Dr. Weizmann's interpretation of the Jewish home, that "Palestine should become as Jewish as England is English and declared that H. M's Government had no such aim in view, nor did they contemplate the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine. The establishment of the Jewish National Home required that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration, which, however, should not be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the "economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals".

The White Paper raised some hopes. It came to be widely believed that it had ruled out the possibility of the establishment of a Jewish State and for the next six years, the *status-quo* was quietly maintained. Rather the period was used by the two contending communities not to seek an understanding with one another, but to consolidate their efforts for further action—the

Jews to establish their homeland and the Arabs to destroy it.

Shaw Commission and White Paper of 1930

The White Paper of 1922 had, however, left a lacuna by not saying that Jewish immigration should be upto the limit of economic absorptive capacity but that it should not exceed that limit. More and more Jews continued to migrate into Palestine, the Zionist Organisation maintaing in that the country could support more. This created more resentment among the Arabs, with the result that in August 1929, riots aaing broke out. Some 133 Jews were massacred and six agricultural settlements totally destroyed. The British Government appointed a Commission under Shaw to investigate into the causes of the riots. On the basis of his report, which condemned the policy of "too much of Jewish immigration", H. M's. Government issued another statement of policy in 1930, which stressed rather the obligations of the Mandatory power towards the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. Dr. Weizmann protested the White Paper was inconsistent with the terms of the mandate, whose main purpose was the Mandatory's obligations towards the Jews. So great was the out-cry that Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald felt himself obliged to write what the Arabs nick-named "the Black Letter" to Dr. Weizmann, stating that "H. M's. Government did not intend to prohibit the acquisition of additional land by the Jews and that it had no intention of going back on the promises to the Jews".

The most important feature of the White Paper of 1930, the control of land transfers, was never put into effect. In January 1933, Hitler came to power and began the persecution of the Jews. A stream of refugee Jews began to move out of that country and looked towards Palestine as the only country they could enter "as of right and not on sufferance". Confronted with this problem of asylum, the British Government consented to the admission of Jews into Palestine in unprecedented number and thereby pigeon-holed the Shaw Commission Report. The result was that, while down to 1932, the average immigration was 9,000 a year, it rose to about 62,000 in 1935; and these figures did not include clandestine illegal immigrants who amounted to thousands per year.

This rapid increase of Jewish immigration was followed by violent Arab attacks on H, M's. Government policy, alleging that its deliberate purpose was "to drive the Arab nation away from its home-land". On the other hand, the Jews demanded "the opening of Palestine and Transjordan to not thousands but millions of Jewish immigrants". In November 1935, in an atmosphere of extreme political excitement, the five Arab States presented the High Commissioner with three main demands : (1) "The establishment of democratic government in Palestine ; (2)

"The prohibition of land transfers from Arabs to Jews ; (3) "The immediate stopping of immigration". But not much progress was made and the result was that disturbances broke out again in 1936. The British Government announced its intention to send out a Royal Commission "to investigate the causes of unrest and alleged grievances of both communities".

Royal Commission and Partition Plan

The Peel Commission's Report, it came to known after the name of its chairman, published in July 1937 has been described as "a great State Paper—direct, out-spoken, showing remarkably sympathetic understanding both of the Zionism of the Jews and nationalism of the Arabs." The Report concluded that the promises made to the Jews and Arabs were irreconcilable and the Mandate in its existing form was unworkable. It, therefore, proposed "a radical solution of the surgical operation, dividing the country into a Jewish and Arab State, with a small residuary enclave from Jaffa to Jerusalam left incharge of the Mandatory."

The British Government sent the Woodhead Commission to prepare a detailed scheme of partition. The Arabs, however, supported by the Arab States, rejected the partition plan as entirely unsatisfactory and again riots started all around. The Commission reported the 'unworkability of the plan, saying that "it was impossible to give the Jews a workable area without leaving an unfairly large Arab minority and the bulk of the Arab-owned citrus areas in the Jewish state, while the residual Arab state would not be economically self-supporting". The Commission, instead, proposed a scheme of economic federalism by which the Mandatory would determine the fiscal policy for Arab and Jewish areas which would be otherwise autonomous.

London Round Table Conference and White Caper of 1939

The British Government invited the representatives of Jews and Arabs to a Round Table Conference in London early in 1939. Both parties rejected the British proposals and H.M's. Government issued another 'White Paper' in May 1939.' It "declared unequivocally that it was not part of Government's policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state, regarding it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate" The Paper, however, proposed the creation of an independent Palestinian State in treaty relations with Britain at the end of ten years, 75,000 Jewish immigrants to be admited in the first five years, after which further immigration was to depend upon Arabs' consent.

The Jews condemned the White Paper as an "out-rageous breach of faith," claiming that it denied them the right to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine. Similarly, the Arabs were also not satisfied and reiterated their stand on the earlier position.

Under the shadow of the 'Munich Pact of 1938,' the British Government tried to bring the two communities to compromise, but when they refused, Britain was compelled, by the menacing international situation, "to treat the question in terms of *raison d' etat*" and to buy a respite for herself by an appeasing concession to the Arab world, for the Jews however, infuriated, could obviously be relied on not to make common cause with their Nazi persecutors, whereas the hostility of the Arabs would present immediately a formidable theat to the vital British position in the Middle East.

The Zionist, while cooperating whole-heartedly in the struggle against the Nazis, continued to oppose the hated White Paper policy. They organised country-wide demonstrations with arson and some bomb incidents. The official Zionist Organisation, encouraged by the Zionists of the U. S., adopted in 1942, the Biltmore programme (drawn up in a convention in New York). It demanded, first "the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth, secondly, a Jewish army and thirdly, unlimited Jewish immigration placed under the authority of the Jewish agency".

The rich and influential Jewish community in the U. S. induced the government to exert pressure upon London for action. Americans were, stirred by the Nazi atrocities upon the Jews; and several the states legislatures passed resolutions supporting the cause of the Jews.

The Jews abroad continued towards Palestine a great flood of illegal immigrants, while some of the Jews in Palestine organised acts of violence against the Mandatory which began with the destruction of bridges, railways and other public property and degenerated to brutal atrocities. As the war approached its end on the Continent, David Ben Gurian, Chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine described the White Paper of 1939 as a "relic" and announced plans for bringing 2,000,000 European Jews into the country. On August 16, 1945, and frequently thereafter, President Truman asked that the White Paper be rescinded and that Jewish immigrants be admitted freely and at once to Palestine. In October 1945, violence and confusion started in, Palestine, with 100,000 British troops trying to check the flow of Jewish refugees whose transit from Europe was carefully planned and financed by the Zionists and their sympathisers throughout the world. Arab leaders reconstituted the Higher Committee and passively watched the Anglo-Jewish conflict.

Thus, several British commissions of enquiry and official British statements of policy failed to solve the Palestine tangle during this period of thirty years from 1915 to 1945. In 1945, a new approach was made when, on November 13, London and

Washington jointly announced the appointment of a 12-men Commission to make recommendations. The eminance of its members and its composite character aroused hope of a successful issue; but when its report was published in May 1946, the recommendations were most disappointing, this time to the Arabs.

OIL AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Position before First World War

"The discovery of gigantic oil reserves in the Near and Middle East," as Prof. Schuman has put it, "was the most decisive single development in 20th century." A keen struggle began among the industrial countries of the West for the control of these oil reserves. In 1901, Muzaffarud Din, Shah of Iran, granted to a British subject W. K. D' Arcy an oil concession that covered the whole of Iran except the five northern provinces. Oil was struck some sixty miles north of Ahwaz in 1908, and in the following years, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company came into being. Before the first World War, the British Government acquired a controlling interest in the company's capital stock. While the government undertook not to interfere in the commercial managemant of the company, the latter became to all intents and purposes an arm of British Admiralty and of British strategic policy.

Russia was a landlocked country, and seeking an outlet to the sea had always been the motive of her foreign policy. Moreover, for her industrial development, Middle Eastern oil was equally necessary. Thus, partly for reasons of trade and commerce and partly for reasons of industry, Russia entered into an agreement with Britain in 1907 whereby Iran was partitioned into spheres of influence and areas of exploitation—the Northern provinces for Russia and the southern ones for Britain. The agreement really meant an Anglo-Russian monopoly of concession and control in Iran.

This was resented by Germany, as she was developing her own railway projects in the region. Berlin at once asked for equal commercial rights in Iran. After a good deal of negotiations, a compromise was made between Russia and Germany in the Potsdam Agreement, signed on June 19, 1911. Germany promised not to seek railway or other concessions in Northern Persia ; Russia agreed not to oppose the Baghdad Railway.

In U. S. also, it was being felt that the American output of oil would not for long both keep pace with the growth of home demand, and supply the increasing needs of the other markets, and therefore, her eyes also fell upon the oil of the Middle East. In 1908, President Roosevelt sent Admiral Chester to Turkey ; and the latter began negotiations for rail and oil concessions in the Ottoman Empire. This concession was gran-

ted after a good deal of negotiations only on April 30, 1923, and was much more ambitious than the one granted two decades earlier to the Baghdad Railway Company.

World War I and After

The part played by oil in the prosecution of the Great War of 1914—18 was realised by every government and public. As Stephen and Hemslay Longrigg have recounted, three consequences followed from the war as regards oil industry. The first was the establishment of a British oil industry on a scale with which even the vast industry in America must seriously reckon with. The second was the keen awareness of European Powers notably France, of their need to secure oil supplies of their own, while the U.S., alarmed at the foretold exhaustion of their own resources, determined not to be left behind with diminishing reserves and an increasing offtake. Finally, the new political structure in Middle East, the Mandate system and the great increase of the Western acquaintance with this region, seemed to offer a new and yet unexplored oil world to the enterprise of the West.

So, after the first World War, the Near and Middle East became a theatre of acute international friction for the control of its oil. The Ottoman Empire was dismembered and Britain received Mandates over Palestine and Iraq and France over Syria and Lebanon. This led to the beginning of a new era in the exploitation of the Middle Eastern oil. The Bolshevik Government of Russia having renounced her concession of 1907 in Iran, the Governments of London and Paris reached an agreement for the division between them of rights to exploit oil resources in the Middle Eastern countries on April 14, 1920 at San Remo. The Government of London insisted successfully upon the abandonment by Turkey of her rights over the districts of Mosal reputed to be rich in oil reserves in favour of Iraq under the British mandate.

The U.S. looked with resentment upon the British-French partitioning of the Middle Eastern oil. Strongly and promptly the Washington Government protested against this violation of the 'Open Door' policy agreed upon at Paris on the ground that she had a right to be consulted before the resources of the land jointly conquered from the Central Powers were disposed of. A period of sharp diplomatic skirmish began and numerous notes were exchanged between the British and American Foreign Offices. Sir John Cadman personally went to Washington in the early winter of 1921 and endeavoured to come to a business agreement with American oil interests. The Standard Oil Company was offered a quarter share in the Turkish Petroleum, a half interest in Northern Iran and prospecting rights, previously obtained but hitherto opposed, in Palestine.

But the Standard Oil Company was not the only American oil company interested in Turkish oil. There were at least half a dozen and with these also, the British had to negotiate. At length, on March 14, 1925, a bargain was struck and the American companies secured a 23¾% participation in Turkish Petroleum Company Ltd. (later on Iraq Petroleum Co. Ltd.) The State Department apparently felt relieved to see so troublesome a question settled.

Fortunately, the Russian Revolution of 1917 relieved Iran of pressure from the North. In unilateral proclamations and in the Russo-Iran Treaty of 1921, the Bolsheviks announced the renunciation of Czarist imperialism, their forgiveness of Iranian debts to the Czarist Government, their abandonment of all claims to extraterritorial privileges for Russian nationals and their annulment of all Russain concessions in Iran. The Treaty of 1921 promised non-interference by Russia in the internal affairs of Iran. (Article 6 of the Treaty, however, permitted Russia to send forces to Iran, if the country should ever become a base for anti-Soviet activity). The economic renunciations, so magnanimous in appearance, did not return to Iran much that would have been valuable to Russia, and the latter insisted that the profitable fishery concession should be transferred to the Soviet Government's control. The Russians withdrew their army from Iran, but kept a cruiser anchored in the port of Enzeli. Aside from the presence of the cruiser and the question of the fisheries, Iran substantially escaped Soviet interference until the second World War.

The British practice in Iran, however, amounted to what might be termed "interference in the internal affairs' of that sovereign nation. Throughout the south and west, British consuls and political agent played a part and exercised an influence considerably beyond the ordinary duties of such officials. They organised medical services, settled disputes between tribal chiefs, and in some cases, acted informally as judges in local controversies. This naturally created distrust in the mind of Reza Shah who had developed a hatred for the foreigners who, he thought, had made his country a 'pawn' in the game of power politics. He conflicted with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com. The Company had grown enormously since the first World War, but in 1932, because of the devaluation of the pound and the fall of oil prices on the world market, royalties paid to the Iranian Government fell. Consequently, Reza Shah declared the concession abrogated which was not due to expire until 1961. The Shah's unexpected action aroused grave apprehensions in London. Not knowing what it might portend, H. M's. Government sent naval units to the Persian Gulf but that this was not the old style of naval demonstration was proved by their submission of the dispute to the League of Nations. The League referred the issue back to the disputants who

concluded in 1933 a new concession to replace the existing one. The period of the concession was extended to 1988 and the concessionary area was to be limited to one hundred thousand sqare miles to be selected by the company within five years. An excellent feature of the new agreement was a provision whereby a regular stream of young Iranis were to receive in Britain the professional education necessary for the oil industry.

Until about this time, except for American, French and Dutch participation in Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd., the oil production of the Middle East, chiefly in Iran with a small amount from Egypt, was by British Companies. About the end of 1928, the Standard oil Company of California acquired an oil concession covering most of the Sheikhdom of Bahrein, a British protectorate. After a considerable obstruction by the Colonial Office, clear title was secured on August 1, 1930, and the discovery of an important oil field was completed in June 1932. By the agreement of May 29, 1933, the Company also obtained a concession over an extensive area in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Bahrein operations continued to be conducted by Bahrein Petroleum Company Ltd., and those in Saudi Arabia, by California-Arabian Standard Oil Company.

In 1943, the Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, proposed that the U.S. Government should purchase California Arabian Standard Oil Company, its properties or a share in them. Negotiations were conducted for several months but to no result. The proposal was again repeated and now changed to one of building a government-owned pipeline across Arabia to the Eastern Mediterranean. On February 6, 1944, the Secretary was able to announce agreement in principle between the government and the companies. In the early spring of 1944; two American Companies-the Socony Vacuum and the Sinclair sent representatives to Tehran and submitted proposals for granting oil concession in south-eastern Iran. The matter dragged on for several months without reaching the stage of active consideration by the Iran Government.

During the second World War, the Japanese conquest in the East and occupation of Burma and the closing of the Mediterranean route meant that the supplies of oil for the Allies on the Western Front had to come almost entirely from America. But in the face of the increasing and extravagant absorption of its own oil production by the U. S., it came to be realised that the oil fields of the Near and Middle East were destined to become one of the main sources of world supply. Iran output rose in 1945 to 17 million metric tons and still further in 1946 and in Saudi Arabia where a great newly-discovered oil field was just beginning to be opened up, output was more than trebled between 1939 and 1943.

The international struggle for oil entered into a new phase in the Autumn of 1944, when the Assistant Commissioner of the Soviet Foreign Office, Kavtaradze, appeared in Tehran and demanded reinstatement of the oil Koshtaria Concession of 1916 for the northern provinces. This concession had been cancelled by the Russo-Iran Treaty of Friendship of February 16, 1921. He also made it known to the then Prime Minister of Iran, Sa'ed, that in this case, it was a government, not a private company, that had made the application and non-acceptance would be treated as an "unfriendly act."

Premier Sa'ed, however, took permission from the Iran Majlis to postpone the discussion of any oil concession until after the withdrawal of the foreign troops from the Iranian soil and refused the demand. This led to the Soviet-managed separatist revolution of 1945—1946, in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan and the northern provinces.

The Prime Minister, encouraged, by the British and American Ambassadors who accepted the decision of the 'sovereign government' of Iran to postpone this inflammatory question, maintained his resolution. On December 2, 1944, the Iranians Majlis passed a law, designed to prevent all further negotiations on the subject of oil with representatives of other governments or of private companies, and prohibited the signing of any agreement in this connection.

In January 1946, Iran referred the dispute to the Security Council of the U. N. Direct negotiation between the parties to dispute was authorised but nothing came out of it. Occupation of the Iranian territory by British; American and Russian troops had been sanctioned by a tripartite treaty which expired on March 2 1946. British and the American troops retired, but Soviet troops remained, and retired only after another protest to the Security Council, and after the announcement by the Iran Government on April 5 of an agreement with the Soviets for a jointly-owned company to explore and exploit the northern provinces, an agreement subject to ratification by the Majlis. There were further difficulties and increasing pressure, but with the withdrawal of the Red Army, Iran was able to reoccupy and re-establish her authority,in the rebel areas. On October 22, 1947, the Majlis declared the proposed agreement of April 5, 1946 to be null and void, and announced that Iran would embark on a five year exploration programme to be financed out of its own resources.

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CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

The sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries have been styled as the period of explorations and colonisations. This was the time when the adventurous sailors and seamen of the European countries went out in search of new lands, and whenever they came across peoples of different cultures and colours, they were pleased with the idea that they have "achieved something for the motherland." This quest for the new world resulted in the discovery of Africa, Asia and America and very foon, the three continents became the scene of the intrusion of the European nations. "The history of the Far East from 1800," as D.M. Ketelbey, has put "is the history of one movement in many aspects. It is the history of the intrusion—the forcible intrusion-of the West upon the East. Against its will the East was invaded and the haughty seclusion in which it had wrapped itself for three thousand years broken down."[1] England and France penetrated into southern Asia, the former controlling India and Burma and the latter occupying Indo-China. Russia expanded in the north, and dominated the land from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. It was Russia who first moved towards the Far East and as early as 1633, she had conquered Siberia and the Pacific.

Far East in the Nineteenth Century

During the 19th century, the countries of Europe as well as the United States were faced with the new problem of industrialism—raw material, surplus goods and surplus capital and began to look upon China and Japan as very promising areas for economic penetration. They wanted to open these countries as a field for commercial expansion. Neither China nor Japan liked thes foreigners, but the latter fastened themselves like "leeches" upon Chinese territories and eventually effected a forcible entry. At first, the question was very simple, the opening of China for the trade of the West, but in course of time, new complicacies were added to the situation and "to trade was added empire ; to commercial gain political aggression." Until well into the nineteenth century, China was practically closed to Europeans. They wooed China for long but the latter would not lift her veil. Hence she had to be forced to satisfy European lust for trade. Great Britain took the lead in exposing her to the gaze of the world. When in 1800, the foreign trade in China was declared illegal, the British merchants began to smuggle opium with the connivance of the local Chinese officials. New competitors rushed in to have a share in this obnoxious trade. A good deal of illegal

1. Ketelbey, C.M.D A History of Modern Times, (London, George G. Harrap. 1929) p. 492,

trade developed, and the Chinese Government took harsher measures to stop it. This led to acts of violence on both sides and the ultimate result was a war in 1839, between England and China. The 'Opium War' as it came to be called, ended in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking by which China ceded Hongkong to England and agreed to open five ports to Europeans *viz.*, Shanghai, Ningoo, Foochov, Canton and Amoy. In 1844, France and the United States appeared to share the fruits of British victory, and were followed by Holland, Belgium, Portugal and Prussia during the next decade, all of whom secured from China the privilege of trading at the five treaty ports.

The Opium War had revealed the weakness of China, and the superiority of the British strength, The greed of trade &commerce produced an aggressive mind, and the British felt dissatisfied with what they had attained so far. An excuse was not hard to be found, and on a slight insult to a British flag, war was declared upon China in 1856. After two years of fighting, the Treaty of Tientsin was signed, and England obtained huge concessions and privileges including the privilege of extra-territoriality. This was resented by the other European nations, and there was a feverish rush among them to make treaties with China embodying concessions and privileges. Within thirty years, almost all the European nations joined in the scramble and entered into Chinese trade.

The foreigners did not limit themselves to the economic exploitation of China, and although her integrity was respected, the outlying dependencies began to be snatched away from her. In her north, Russia obtained the province of Maritime Manchuria, and in the south, France forced a recognition of her protectorate over Annam and Tonkin in Indo-China. Japan cast her eyes upon Korea, a state tributary to China and forced a war upon China in 1894. The war ended by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and China was forced to renounce her suzerainty over Korea. During this period, the U S. also obtained trading privileges in China, first through the treaty of Wanghia in July 1844 and then through two subsequent treaties of Tientsin in 1858 and of Burlingame in 1868.

FAR EAST FROM THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

"The Sino-Japanese War," as Ketelbey has remarked, "was the critical and decisive event in the modern history of the Far East, and from it followed consequences of fundamental importance."[2] First, it greatly increased the power and prestige of Japan and enabled her to revise her own 'unequal treaties imposed upon her by the European Powers. Within a short time all rights of extra-territoriality, enjoyed by the foreigners, were abolished, and she was free to regularise her customs duties without any interference from foreigners.

2. Ibid; p. 510.

Secondly, the victory of 1895 stimulated Japanese imperialism and introduced a new factor in the Far Eastern politics. For more than two decades, she had been nursing her ambition, strengthening her military and accumulating her resources. She had now put them to a test and was convinced that she was capable of achieving more. The victory of Japan over China also convinced the Europeans that Japan was a power to be reckoned with, and that a new partner had come in to share the spoils of military triumphs.

The third important result of the war was that it revealed, beyond doubt, the weakness of China thereby exposing her to increased spoilation by the foreigners. China became another Africa, and soon a new struggle for concessions, for leased territories and for spheres of influence began and seemed to promise the imminent partition of the Empire. China had been opened up and now she was to break away into pieces.

During the years from 1895 to 1914, the history of the Far East is woven about three main threads : (1) The new aggression of the European Powers and their own rivalry ; (2) the ambitions of Russia and her clash with Japan ; (3) the rise of nationalism among the Chinese and their revolt against the foreigners.

New Scramble for Concessions in China

Hardly was the ink dry on the Treaty of Shimonoseki before the representatives of Germany, Russia and France in Tokyo told the Japanese that their possession of Liaotung would menace the peace of the Far East. The Three Powers proceeded to check Japanese penetration in Asia not because of any love for China, but because of a determination that the new-born power of Japan should not thwart their own schemes in China. The Japanese victories had seemed hardly more menacing to China's security than to Russia's ambitions. The cessation of the Liaotung Peninsula with the strong ice-free harbour of Port Arthur, giving to Japan a strategic command of Peking, brought her into serious rivalry with Russia in Manchuria. Count Witte said to the Tsar Nicholas II : "We cannot allow Japan to quit her islands and get a firm foothold upon the Asiatic mainland. That would effectively block our Far Eastern policy of peaceful penetration".

When the Tsarist Government sent a Note to Japan advising the latter not to occupy the Liaotung Peninsula in prepetuity, because such an occupation would destroy the political balance in the Far East, she was supported by France and Germany. She was supported by France, because the latter was strengthening her alliance with the former in Europe, and by Germany either because of the "Yellow Peril", or because, she wished to play a larger part in Pacific affairs, or to make a bid for Russian friendship. In view

of the intervention of the Three Powers, Japan gave up her gains and the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur went back to China.

The insincerity of the Three Powers, who posed as friends of China, was soon revealed. In 1897, two German Catholic missionaries were murdered in Shantung. Germany used this incident as a lever to secure the lease of the port and district of Kiao-Chow for ninety-nine years, with concession of two railways in Shantung. The other countries of the West took immediate alarm and proceeded to force China to give them more concessions. France obtained in 1898 the lease of Kwang-Chouan and the right to build a railway from Tonkin to Yunan. At the end of 1897, Russia also seized Port Arthur and the neighbouring harbour of Talien-wan and secured its lease for twenty-five years as also the right to carry the Trans-Siberian railways across Manchuria to Vladivostok. Great Britain could not afford to be a distant spectator, and asked for the extension of her Hong Kong territory, and for the lease of Wei-hai-wei "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in Russian occupation". In midsummer 1899, the Italians also put in a bid for a leased area, but the Italians were weak and the Chinese refused.

By the scramble for concessions, China lost more to the intervening powers than it would have lost to Japan. By November 1898, Britain obtained nine concessions for 2,800 miles of railway; Russia three for 1,500; Belgium one for 650; and France three for 300 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, as Buss has put it, "the Chinese saw the European Powers seeking their own profits in China through financial imperialism just as an earlier generation had witnessed the struggle for the expansion of commerce".[3]

U. S. 'Open Door' Note

The United States had for some years, owing to a number of actions, been regarded by China, as her best friend among the Western Powers. From 1844, the United States had taken a full part in the opening up of China to foreign trade; but she had not engaged in battle against her, and only through treaties had secured some trade rights. The international scramble for concessions, and the appropriating of 'spheres of influence', placed her in an awkward position, and the trading rights, she so far enjoyed, were now under challenge. She, therefore, enunciated the doctrine of 'open door' and on September 6, 1899, notes were sent for transmission to the Governments of England, Italy, Germany, France, Japan and Russia, asking each to give formal assurances and lend its co-operation in securing like assurances

3. Buss, C. A. The Far East. (New York, Macbhaillan, 1955). See Chapter 5, pp. 79-95 for details.

from other interested powers that each, within its respective sphere of whatsoever influence, would observe the 'open door' principle, that is, give equal opportunity for trade of all nations, levy uniform tariffs and harbour dues, and discriminate in favour of one nation against another; the powers who have opened the doors of China should not close their doors against each other. All the powers, except Russia, willingly or unwillingly accepted the principle, and the latter remained silent on the question of the uniformity of harbour and railroad charges. The acceptance of the 'open door' principle checked, at least for the time being, the movement toward the further partition of China.

RUSSIAN AMBITIONS IN CHINA AND CLASH WITH JAPAN

Anglo—Japanse Alliance of 1902

Russia had been pursuing the policy of 'peaceful penetration in the Far East and sometimes by posing as the friend of China, and sometimes by military conquest, she had established strongholds in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Eastern Turkistan. She had brought her boundaries to River Amur and to the frontiers of Korea. She had been preparing herself for the appropriation of Manchuria. She had succeeded in ousting Japan from Liaotung with the help of France and Germany. She had occupied Port Arthur and secured the concession of trans-Siberian Railway.

Japan very much resented the insincerity of the Western Powers. She was particularly swelled into deep indignation when Russia herself occupied Port Arthur, which she had forced Japan to renounce earlier. Great Britain also equally resented the expansion of Russia. Common dread of Russia led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, whereby the two powers affirmed the principle of 'open door,' and agreed, that if either power was attacked by two enemies at once, the other would come to its aid. The real importance of the Alliance was stated in clause I, which recognised the special interests of both powers in China and the special interests of Japan "politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea."

Basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

This alliance was not born of Far-Eastern considerations alone. It was the first material success of Britain in the effort to end her isolation. From the British point of view, the Russian threat to Manchuria and Korea was secondary to the Russian threat in China, generally in Tibet, in Persia and Turkey. British efforts towards a compromise with Russia had failed, and so in order to prevent an understanding between Russia and Japan, London decided upon an alliance with the latter. Japanese considerations were primarily Far Eastern—to advance

her interests in Korea, to protect those interests from Russian threat arising in Manchuria and, as with the British case. to end her own isolation dating back to the 'Triple Intervention' of 1895,

The Alliance with Britain put Japan in a very strong position, and she was now capable to challenge Russia. In July 1903, she opened direct negotions with Russia for an understanding on both Manchuria and Korea, but the latter evaded any satisfactory reply. Public opinion in Japan loudly demanded that Russia's advance in Manchuria be stopped ; leading newspapers clamoured for war. In the early months of 1904, war broke out between the two imperial nations. After a long and bloody battle, the war came to an end by the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. By the terms of the treaty, Russia ceded to Japan the lease of Liaotung and her ice-free harbour of Port Arthur, together with the southern half of the Russian railway to Port Arthur ; she promised to evacuate Manchuria, and recognised Japanese influence in Korea.

Significance of the Russo-Japanese War

The war left Japan the most powerful nation in the Far East and checked the expansion of Russia. It gave Japan the lead in the Far East and, from that date, she entered openly in competition and rivalry with the European Powers in China and started on a blatant imperialism. The war had powerful repercussions in China too. With Japan as their serious rival, the Western nations started on a fresh struggle for opportunities and concessions, for sheres of influence and areas of exploitation.

Rise of Nationalism in China and Revolt against the Foreigners

The greatest and most far-reaching consequence of the Russo-Japanese War was that it stimulated a sense of nationalism and pride among the Chinese. The influx of foreigners, diplomats, merchants and missionaries, and their exploitation of the Chinese wealth, had created among the people a great anti-foreigners sentiment. There started an organised campaign against foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians, resulting sometimes in murder and plunder of Christian communities. A secret society called the Righteous Fraternity of Fist-fighters, better known as the Boxers, was organised, and the cry was raised : the "foreign devils" should be ousted from the country. After China's disastrous defeat by Japan in 1894, certain influential Chinese officials added their voices to the demand for progressive action and sterner measures. Some agrued for reform, some for revolution, but all were for change in some manner. The Russo-Japanese War gave a new impetus and a strong impetus, to the anti-foreign feelings. The Chinese took a leaf from the fate of Japan and started on a course of equipping their country with all the paraphernalia of modern civilisation. China in the

years 1901 to 1911 experienced a comprehensive programme of reform : educational reform, constitutional feform, the campaign against opium, reform in the army and navy and miscellaneous reforms.

These reforms did not, however, satisfy the Young China Party, specially in view of the immense impetus which Chinese nationalism received as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. They demanded the end of the Manchu dynasty, whose corruption and incompetence had brought all the disaster upon China and the establishment in China of parliamentary government. As long as the Dowager Empress was alive, she managed to keep in check the growing discontent of the masses. But with her death in 1908, China was left under a child. Signs of dissatisfaction began to appear ; and revolutionary societies, hostile to the Manchu dynasty, sprang up. The people found in Dr. Sun Yet-sen a very skilled leader and an enthusiastic revolutionary, who turned the anti-Manchu agitation into a republican movement. Alarmed at the progress of revolutionary propaganda, the Imperial Government called a National Assembly in 1910 and offered to introduce a constitutional government of the parliamentary type. But the followers of Dr. Sen were not satisfied by palliatives and, in 1911, they took up arms against the Manchus, captured Nanking and established a 'provisional republican government' under the presidentship of Dr. Sen. The Revolution came to an end when, on February 12, 1912, the boy-emperor, the last of the Manchus, abdicated the throne and China was proclaimed a Republic.

The First World War and the Far East

The victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 put her in a predominant position in the Far East, and she began to tread on the path of imperialism undaunted. Having forced Russia to withdraw from Korea, Japan herself began to interfere in Korean affairs and annexed that country outright in 1910. He opportunity came when war broke out in 1914 and the Western Imperialists were absorbed in the European tangle. Following the outbreak of hostilities in September, 1914, President Yuan Shih-k'ai remarked to the American Minister : "Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China." As early as August 3, 1914, China requested the United States to obtain from the European belligerents assurances that they would not carry their struggle into Chinese territories or waters—a request which the American Government acted upon without success. Prior to Britain's entry into the war, the Japanese public opinion regarding the conflict as purely a European affair, favoured, as did public sentiment in the United States, a policy of neutrality. But on Britain's entry into the war on the night of August 4, the Japanese press assumed a new and militant tone. It recalled Germany's role in the Three Power Intervention of 1895 ; it

reminded the public of Japan's obligations to Great Britain under the Alliance of 1902, and to France and Russia under the treaties of 1907; it stressed that Germany's military preparations at Kiaochow were a menace to the peace of the Far East; it in the end advocated attack on Germany's Far Eastern possessions. On August 15 the Japanese delivered the ultimatum to the Germans demanding the withdrawal or disarming of their ships and the delivery within thirty days of their leasehold in Kiaochow to Japan with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. Germany ignored the ultimatum. On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on Germany. This decision to join Great Britain in the war was not based (as explained by the Foreign Minister Count Komei-kato) on legal obligations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for "the general conditions were not such as to impose upon Japan the duty to join the war under treaty obligations," but "as a voluntary expression of friendship towards Great Britain under the Alliance". In addition, Tokyo also welcomed the occasion "as an opportunity to destroy the German influence from eastern Asia and to enhance the international position of Japan".

By the end of 1914, Japan succeeded in seizing Kiaochow, in occupying the railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan and other German islands north of the equator—Marianas, the Carolines and the Marshalls. With these gains, Japan had completed her military contributions to the war, and from the beginning of 1915, Japan's relationship to the war was essentially non-military. On October 19, 1915, Japan announced its adherence to the Declaration of London in which the nations fighting against Germany pledged themselves not to make a separate peace with the enemy.

The Twenty-One Demands

On January 18, 1915, Japanese Minister Hioki at Peking presented to President Yuan a group of Twenty-One Demands designed to "insure" Japan's position in China at a time when Europe was preoccupied with war. The demands were in five groups; first group related to Shantung, the second to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the third to certain coal and iron concessions; the fourth to non-alienation of territory, gulfs, harbours and coasts, and the fifth, consisting of six articles, demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers, the purchase of munitions, the privilege of religious propaganda, police control and an economic preference amounting in Fukien to practical dominance.[1]

These demands sought to close China to Europe, to keep Asia for the Asiatics and, as such, they have been characterised as "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Had they been accepted in their entirety, the Chinese Republic would surely have become a Japanese protectorate. Negotiations started between China and Japan and extended upto May 7, 1915, when an ultimatum

was presented to China. Two weeks later, on May 25, China and Japan signed a number of treaties and notes embodying many, though by no means all, of the objectives set forth in the original demands.

The United States and the Twenty-One Demands.

Japan's diplomatic relations with the Uuited States were cordial as long as Japan followed the objectives of the 'open door'. When she shifted from the 'open door' to a policy of special interests, it aroused American opposition. The Twenty-One Demands precipitated Secretary Bryan's warning on March 13, 1915 that "the Government of the United States cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking impairing the treaty rights of the United States, the political or territorial integrity of China or the open door."[4] Japan bided its time to neutralise the American objection. Vicount Ishii came to the United States immediately after the latter formally became a co-belligerent against Germany and signed with Secretary of State Robert Lansing an agreement on November 2, 1917, by which "the Governments of the United States and Japan recognise that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous."[5]. In other words, the United States was committed to the Japanese claim upon Shantung.

European Allies and the Twenty-One Demands.

China's acceptance of some of the Japanese demands, concerning the rights and possessions of Germany in China, was not liked by the European Allies who held the view that the final decision on such matters should await the end of the war and should incorporate the willingness of all the partners. But the opportunity of Japan came in the spring of 1917, when the Allies, in desperate straits to protect their merchant shipping from German submarine attacks, asked for reinforcements from Japan. Japan agreed to supply the ships, and in a series of secret agreements in February and March 1917, she obtained from England, France and Russia a promise of support for its demands for permanent legal title to its conquests over Germany in China and the islands north of the equator. With these agreements, Japan had completed the diplomatic structure which she had erected to guarantee its special interests in the Far East. Her delegates, after the end of hostilities, went to the Peace Conference confident of obtaing fruits of victory, for which the legal ground-work had been so carefully prepared.

4. State Department. U.S. Relations with China, 1944-1949, hereafter cited as China White Paper, p.7.
5. Ibid., p. 8.

The Far East and the Peace Conference

Like the powers of Europe, Japan and China had entered the war for reasons of their own, and so they went to the Peace Conference for purposes of their own. Japan's victory over China in 1895, and over Russia in 1905, had given her confidence of being one of the great powers of the world. The Great War gave her a virtual commercial monopoly in the foreign trade of India, China, Australia and the Netherlands Indies. Japanese industry experienced an unprecedented growth and her production increased tremendously. It made Japan a first-rate industrial nation with problems of surplus goods and surplus capital. Japan, therefore, went to the Peace Conference conscious of her newly found economic and political power. She sought general recognition of her status as a great power and specific recognition of her hegemony in the Far East.

Japan's Demands at Paris

At the Peace Conference, Japan presented three demands: she asked for cessation of the former German islands in the north Pacific Ocean (the Marianas, the Corolines, and the Marshalls); confirmation of her claims to the former German rights in Shantung province; for a declaration of racial equality among states as a basic principles of the proposed League of Nations.

These demands led to the widespread and bitter opposition from some of her former allies and associates in arms. Japan's claim to the German islands violated the Wilsonian principle of 'no annexations' her claim to Shantung and Kiaochow ran counter to a young and virile Chinese nationalism; and her demand for a declaration of racial equality raised a storm of protest from some of the British dominions, particularly Australia. Still greater opposition to Japanese demands came from the United States, for the end of the war witnessed the beginning of a more intense American-Japanese rivalry concerning China. It was a conflict of Japanese imperialistic expansion versus the traditional American policy of the 'open door' and the integrity of China. President Wilson declared himself ignorant of the Lansing-Ishii agreement and refused to be bound by the secret treaties and agreements between England and France on the one side and Japan on the other.

China's Demands at Paris

Moreover, the delegates of the Chinese Republic put forth their own claims. They sought to regain complete control over Shantung and to awaken the world to the imperialistic aims of Japan. They demanded the cancellation of the agreements relating to Shantung province made between Japan and China in 1915 and 1918, on the ground that China signed the 1915 agreement under threat of war. China also hoped that in the spirit

of President Wilson's 'fifth point', all limitations upon her sovereignty might be relinquished.

Attitude of the Allies

The European Allies and Japan looked upon the Chinese delegation with suspicion, because soon after, it became evident that the latter was less concerned with the problem of making peace with Germany than with using the conference to free China from her semi-colonial status. As Paul Hibbert Clyde, in his book, 'The Far East', has put it, "To statesmen of the traditional and conservative school, this purpose was alarming, for it implied an attack not only on Japan's "special interests" but also upon the larger system of influence' and the 'unequal treaties,' in general, to which all the victorious great Powers were parties. In addition to the mistrust of Japan, England and France were further aroused because both before and during the Paris Conference, Wang and Koo (leaders of the Chinese delegation,) set out systemetically to cultivate the sympathies and enlist the support of the Amercian delegation which in turn, was not loath to give the Chinese the encouragement they desired."[7]

Japanese demand for 'racial equality' was rejected by the Peace Conference, largely as a result of the veto of President Wilson. But the Japanese pressed for the acceptance of their rights in Shantung. They had lived upto their obligations as an ally, not only clearing the Germans out of the Far East, but policing the Pacific and part of the route to Europe. This had meant a serious drain on the national treasury, in addition to involving the loss of life of Japanese subjects. When the Japanese delegates threatened to leave the Conference, as the Italians had done over the Fiume question, the Anglo-French statesmen induced President Wilson to accept the Japanese contention. The opposition of Wilson weakened, and with the loss of his support, the Chinese lost their case at Paris, for the other powers were definitely committed to Japan by their agreements made during the war.

Far Eastern Provisions of Treaty of Versailles

By the terms of the Peace, Japan succeeded to the German position in Shantung, acquired under the agreements of 1898, and subsequent agreements, including the lease-hold of Kiaochow Bay and the economic rights enjoyed in the province.

This succession was conditioned by a verbal promise given by the "Council of Three" that Japan would restore to China,

6. On July 3,1900, U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay had sent a note to the European Powers asking them to respect the "territorial and administrative integrity of China.

7. Clyde, P. H. The Far East (New York Prentice-Hall, Inc- 1948) p. 406

by direct negotiation, all political rights in the province, retaining for herself only the economic rights and privileges.

China was relieved of all responsibility for the fulfilment of her obligations to Germany under the terms of the Boxer Protocol ; she regained control of the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, she was confirmed in her possession of the public properties of the German Government in China, except those of a diplomatic and consular character, and she secured the restitution of the astronomical instruments taken from Peking at the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

Reactions of the Peace Settlement in China

When the news of the award reached China, the people were filled with rage and anger. The Chinese delegates at Paris also tried to register their opposition to the award by signing the treaty with reservation as to the Shantung clauses, and when they were denied the right to sign with reservations, they refused to append their signatures to the document. The Chinese delegates left the Peace Conference practically empty-handed and China, outwitted and betrayed, gave herself over in bitterness to a more violent nationalism.

The first reaction to the Shantung decision came in the form of students movement; directed both against officials in the government who were suspected to be Japanophile and against the Japanese in China. Merchants and bankers came to the support of the students, and they instituted a nation-wide boycot against the Japanese. As a result of the pressure exerted by these two elements, Japan indicated a willingness to enter upon negotiations with China to carry out her promise with respect to Shantung. The Peking Government, however, refused to consider such negotiations "except on the basis of complete and unconditional restoration". This impasse continued until the meeting of the powers in Washington in 1921-22.

Reactions of the Peace Settlement in United States

The Shantung clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had serious repercussions in the American political circles. When the Treaty was reported to the Senate on September 10, 1919, among the many amendments was the proposal to reverse the Treaty by restoring Shantung directly to China. A long and verbose debate took place in the Senate, as well as in the daily and periodical press, on the lecture platform and in the pulpit. There was a strong public sentiment that the transfer of German rights to Japan was "an out-rageous affront to international morality". The Treaty of Versailles was defeated by the Senate in March 1920.

Here a question may arise : Was the U.S. Senate really in-

terested in the hopes and aspirations of China ? The question may be very well answered by the statement of Hosack in his book, 'The Shantung and the Senate'. He says : "It is doubtful whether the Senate was genuinely interested in the fate of Shantung at all. The moral arguments advanced in the Senate .....were basically an effort to protect the moral reputation of the United States rather than an effort to apply ethical standards in world affairs. The question of practical and actual relief for China was of less importance than the abstract moral integrity of the United States. Furthermore, the proponents and opponents of the Shantung clauses viewed the question in the light of its effect upon the passage or rejection of the Treaty as a whole. In other words the fate of Shantung so far as the Senate was concerned, was a subordinate issue". There was the group of Senators "irreconcilables" as they came to be called, who were against the Treaty in any form and were determined to defeat it by fair means or foul.

Reactions of the Peace Settlement in Japan

Although Japan had obtained Shantung at Vetsailles, the Japanese delegates were not very happy. As Buss has stated, "they encountered determined hostility from Chinese, who were in no mood to surrender Shantung to the Japanese. They were not able to obtain a clear-cut international recognition of the principle of racial equality to which they were dedicated. They were not able to get outright title to the German possessions north of the equator in spite of wartime agreements. Mandates, subject to supervision by the League of Nations, seemed poor substitutes for colonies which Japan had expected to receive and to develop strictly for its own benefit. The Japanese signed the Covenant of the League of Nations, but they were not too happy about commitments, to respect and preserve against external aggression the independence and integrity of member states, including China. They disliked the obligation to settle disputes by arbitration, conciliation, or adjudication before resort to war .....Japan was equally frustrated in its venture into Siberia. It had not been able to gain a military or diplomatic victory over the Russians and it had stirred up suspicion in the minds of its allies because of the blatant exposure of its expansionist ambitions on the Asian mainland".[8]

The Far Eastern Peace Settlement thus created bitterness and resentment in China, disappointment in Japan and nervousness in the United States. The Chinese were bitter, because they had been forced to surrender to Japan what they expected to retain for themselves; the Japanese were disappointed, because they did not obtain what they were promised to be given ; the Americans were nervous because the gains of Japan had made

8. Buss, op. cit., p. 351.

her the most dominant power in the Far East and the latter was pursuing a course of policy designed to oust the United States from that region.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Its Backgrounnd

United States Dissatisfied by the Far Eastern Peace Settlement

One of the most important result of the Far Eastern Peace Settlement was the growing rivalry between Japan and the United States. The co-belligerency of the United State and Japan failed to harmonise their respective Far-Eastern policies. Since the day of Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, the Washington Administration had begun to look upon Tokyo's movements with suspicion. In the words of Clyde, "dollar diplomacy in Manchuria, riental migration in California, special interests versus the open door' in China had already made it clear that there was a growing coolness in the traditional nineteenth-century friendship between Japan and the United States By 1920, there was a widespread popular conviction in the United States and Canada, and to a lesser degree in Great Britain and France, that Japan had shown little interest in the defeat of German militarism, and that she had used the war primarily to advance Japanese hegemony in China."[9]

During the years 1918—1920, the American-Japanese relations considerably deteriorated, and this was traceable in the differences which arose out of the "Twenty-One Demands of 1915, the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, the Japanese programme as presented at Paris with respect to Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific, and finally, to Japanese military and railway policies in Siberia and Manchuria during the Inter-Allied Intervention of 1918."

The Island of Yap and the U.S.

The real cause of friction between the United States and Japan was not the question of Shantung as it appeared to be; rather even in the case of questions which had a direct and immediate bearing upon real and tangible American interests in the Pacific, the United States showed only a half-hearted concern. Recently, controversy arose between Japan and Amrica as to the future of the hitherto insignificant island of Yap. This was a small island located in the western Carolines, and recently taken over by Japan from Germany. Its importance lay in the fact that it was a submarine cable centre in the German-Dutch system which connected the Netherlands Indies with Shanghai, and also in the fact that it was linked by cable with the trans Pacific American cable running through Guam to Manila. At

9. Clyde, op. cit. p. 442.

the Peace Conference, Wilson pleaded for its internationalisation so that it might not fall under the exclusive control of Japan. But the Conference mandated Yap, along with other Geman island, to Japan. The Americans were very much concerned over the island's importance as a cable centre for United States communication with the Philippines.

United States' Concern over the Naval Race

Of great concern to the Americans was the three-sided appalling naval race which began shortly after the end of the war's military phase. Amicable relations between the United States and Great Britain gave credence to the open secret that America and Japan were preparing to fight each other in the Pacific. Apart from the danger it constituted in regard to peace, the naval race cost Great Britain, Japan and the United States vast sums of money that the two Island empires, especially, could hardly afford. The war had seriously drained the British finances and Japan, though she had grown richer in the war years, was no match for America's industrial structure. In United States, both the Republicans and Democrats were against war and wanted reduction in armaments. Wilsonian peace programme and the ideals for which they had fought the war, were still fresh in their memory.

The United States' Dislike of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

From its inception, the Ango-Japanese Alliance had remained the keystone of their policy in the Far East, and the Americans had feared that in the case of a war between Japan and the United States, Great Britain might fight on the side of Japan. In order to allay this fear, the British took precaution to incorporate in the Treaty, at the time of its renewal in 1911, a provision that "should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail such Centracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such a treaty of arbitration is in force." But Anglo-Japanese relations during the war and the British attitude to Japan's demands at the Peace Conference once again led to the conviction that the Alliance was a bulwark of Japanese policy in Asia. When therefore in 1920, negotiations were in progress between Great Britain and Japan for the further renewal of the Alliance, the United States felt very unhappy about it. Even British assurances given in 1920 that the Alliance would not be binding in the event of war between the United States and Japan, did not dispel the American fears. When after 1919, Germany and Russia against whom the Alliance was primarily directed, were no longer threatening the position of Japan or Great Britain, the Americans thought, the Alliance was directed against their country and would eventually involve the United States in a

war with Japan and Britain. This feeling made the Americans nervous and a way out was felt necessary. London was also at this time pre-occupied with the question whether she, under a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance, "was to support the special interests of Japan in the Far East or to align herself more solidly with the traditional American principles of the 'open door' and the integrity of China."

The time seemed ripe for the calling of an international conference; and on Augnst 11, 1921, President Harding issued formal invitatations to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan "to participate in a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armaments in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921." On the same day, the Government of China and on October 3, those of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, were invited "to participate in the discussion of Pacific and the Far Eastern questions, in connection with the Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament."

The Washington Conference

The conference was in session from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, and concluded six treaties and passed twelve resolutions in addition to a special bilateral treaty between China and Japan about Shantung and another, between the United States and Japan about Yap and other mandated islands north of the equator, signed one week later. The settlements determined the political status of the Far East for a decade and regulated the fundamental controversy between the United States and Japan until the Mukden incident.

(1) Four Power Pacific Treaty

The first fruit of the Conference was the Four-Power Pacific Treaty, signed on December 13, 1921. By this 10 year treaty pronouncing the formal death of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the U.S., Great Britain, France and Japan agreed: (1) to respect one another's rights in the regions of the Pacific in respect to their 'insular possessions and insular dominions"; (2) to meet in joint conference "for consideration and adjustment" of any Pacific question and involving their said rights, which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy; and (3) if the rights of the Contracting Parties "are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, to communicate with one another fully"

(2) The Five-Power Naval Treaty

The Four Power Pacific Treaty paved the way for other treaties, and was followed by the Five Power Naval Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922 between the United States, Great Britain

Japan, France and Italy. It called for a ten-year construction holiday and for the scrapping of some ships already planned or being built. It limited capital ships to 35,000 tons and 16-inch guns, and aircraft carries to 27,000 tons and 8-inch guns. The five signatories, the U.S., Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy were to maintain a ratio in capital ships of 5 :5 : 3 : 1.67 : 1.67. The Treaty was to apply until December 31, 1936, and might be terminated thereafter through two years, notice by any signatory.

"The Four Power Pacific and the Five Power Naval treaties," as put by MacNair and Lach, in their book "Modern Far Eastern International Relations," "in addition to saving enormous expenditures upon armaments and eliminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, resulted in the removal, for an indefinite period, of the likelihood of war between the United States and either Japan or Great Britain."[10]

(3) The Nine-Power Open Door Treaty

The third important fruit of the Conference was the Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922 between the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. The signatories pledged themselves : (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China ; (2) to maintain and advance the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in China ; and (3) not to take any action or support any action designed to create sphres of interest or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts o Chinese territory.

The Americans regarded this treaty as the victory of 'open door, and the optimists considered it as "a Magna Charta for China" But it had its own limitations. The treaty contained no sanctions and primarily depended upon the good faith of the powers. As remarked by Buss "it was a self-denying pronouncement rather than a pact for collective security. It did not bind anyone to action ; it relied completely on good faith."[11] Similarly Griswold has commented: "The treaty went as far as pen and ink could go to preserve a peace founded on such antithetical elements as those inherent in the *status-quo* in the Far East."[12]

The fourth treaty was signed between the signatories of

10. MacNair, H. F. and Lach, D. F. Modern War Eastern International Relations.
(New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1950) p. 230.
11. Buss, op. cit. p. 384.
12. Griswold, A. W. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, p. 311.

the Five-Power Naval Treaty and related to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare. The fifth treaty supplemented the Four-Power Pacific Pact; and the sixth one, the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty, permitted China to increase the customs tariffs. All these treaties were signed on February 6, 1922.

(4) Sino-Japanese Treaty

Besides these six treaties, another treaty was signed between Japan and China on February 4, 1922, whereby Shantung was returned to China, and Japan was permitted to retain control of the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway for fifteen years.

(5) American-Japanese Treaty

The United States had been carrying on long negotiations with Japan as regards the island of Yap, and the same resulted in a treaty on Februry 11, 1922, whereby the United States recognised the Japanese mandate over the former German islands in the North Pacific, while Japan, in return, granted to American citizens residential, cable and radio rights on Yap.

Besides, the Conference also adopted some twelve resolutions concerning the foreign postal agencies in China, the question of extra-territoriality, the foreign radio stations and other miscellaneous issues.

Achievements of the Washington Conference

The Washington Conference was one of the most important event in the history of the Far East after the first World War. It was hailed as an outstanding success. It achieved what the Paris Peace Conference failed to achieve, *viz*, the inauguration of peaceful relations in the Far East. The Anglo-American diplomats had assembled at Washington with two main objectives : to prevent the Anglo-American-Japanese naval race ; and to prevent the predominating influences of Japan, which involved the integrity of China. The Five-Power Naval Treaty had secured the first objective ; the Four Power Pacific Pact and the Nine Power Treaty had attained the second. These Treaties removed certain definite strains upon the Anglo American and Japanese-American relations; and the likelihood of a war between the three empires was removed for long. England could now no longer be a silent spectator, should Japan continue a policy of aggression upon the Asiatic mainland.

"The Japanese menace" in the words of Carr, "to the integrity of China and to Anglo-American naval supremacy in the Pacifiic had been removed."[13] Japan had been forced to abandon her sole war gain on the mainland of China and the

13 Carr, E.H., op. cit., p. 22.

powers had jointly agreed to safeguard the integrity of that country. China was offered one more opportunity to put its house in order, to save its own distracted inhabitants, and to play a part in world affairs as a modernised sovereign state. Thus, stabilisation was achieved in the Far East at least for a decade.

Shortcomings of the Washington Arrangements

The Washington treaties and arragements were not without their defects and shortcomings. As put by Clyde : "While the powers were prepared to make limited concessions toward a naval holiday in capital ships, and toward the principle of consultation in future disputes arising in the Pacific and the Far East, they were not prepared to extend naval limitation to other categories of ships or to land armies, nor were they prepared to surrender in China their special rights resting on nearly a century of 'unequal treaties.' A world which wanted peace, still placed its trust in nationalism and special alliances rather than in disarmament and collective security."[14] In China, the conference did little more than freeze the *status quo*. While the United States and Great Britain gave all the possible help to protect China's integrity and took steps to loosen the Japanese grip upon the unhappy country, the basic interests of both the nations were carefully guarded. The venerable policy of equality of economic opportunity was restated, and for the first time, legally defined.

If Japan had given up her forward policy on the Asiatic mainland, it was not the case of a voluntary renunciation. The general public in Japan was tired of war-hysteria, and was disposed to peace and internationalism They were happy with the idea of the naval holiday, even though it involved the numerical inferiority of Japan. But the Japanese war-lords and admirals could not reconcile to the diplomatic defeat Japan had suffered at Washington. Japan looked upon the Four-Power Pacific Pact as an 'imposition of the United States' resulting from the insincerity of her partner, Britain. She viewed the Five Power Naval Treaty, as a denial to her of the equality of status with London and Washington ; and she considered the Nine Power Treaty as the complete triumph of the United States over Japanese diplomacy and the final blow to its drive for special interests in China. So huge were these losses that it was difficult for the Japanese pride to swallow.

FAR EAST FROM WASHINGTON TO MUKDEN

China after the Washington Conference

The powers at Washington had agreed to make certain

14 Clyde, op. cit. p., 461.

concessions to China, so that the framework of its republicanism could be saved from collapse; and China could offer effective resistance to the new imperial power of Japan and to the 'Soviet contagion' which lurked beyond the long Sino-Russian frontier. They had agreed to the revision of the Chinese tarriff, to relinquish the post-offices they had maintained on Chinese soil for many years ; they withdrew their forces from Siberia and terminated their control of the Chinese Eastern Railway : and Japan had been compelled to cede Shantung to China. But the Chinese showed no inclination to take advantage of these gains, and Secretary Hughes could tell Minister Sze in 1923 that China had shown no disposition to put her house in order. When in early June 1924, the Chinese Government asked Washington 'to scrap the programme adopted at Washington' and without more ado, to accord China full equality among the nations, the request was scornfully turned down. Such an attitude of the United States was largely determined by the civil war in China.

Shortly after the Washington Conference, civil war broke out over the whole of northern and central China, which was divided between the authority of rival provincial governors. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the most important personality in China, and President of Kuomintang, became the head of the government at Canton in 1923. He was very much influenced by Russia and appointed, though not officially, Michael Borodin as his adviser and that of the Kuomintang on behalf of Soviet Russia. The new-born Chinese Communist Party was accepted as the ally of the Kuomintang, and steps were soon taken to reorganise the latter on the lines of the Russian Communist party. In 1924, the First Congress of the Kuomintang committed itself to three great policies : (1) alliance with the Soviet Union ; (2) alliance with the Chinese Communist Party ; and (3) support of workers and peasants. In May of the same year, a treaty was signed with Soviet Russia, whereby Russia gave up her extra-territorial rights and her concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, recognised China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia and a commission was to arrange for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

On March 12, 1925, there took place one of the most important events in China's struggle for freedom ; this was the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. His death gave him a recognised status in China as the patron saint of Chinese nationalism. As Harold M. Vinacke, in his book,'A History of the Far East in Modern Times, has put it : "Sun Yat-sen was transformed overnight into the legendry hero and patron saint of the Kuomintang and of Nationalist China. All doubts as to his wisdom were laid at rest ; his past mistakes and comparative political ineptitude were forgotten. From one who had been regarded by many as a visionary and by not a few as a chronic trouble-maker, he came to be regarded as the fount of all wisdom. This as well as the Russian

influence and direction had the effect of transforming the Kuomintang into a vital force in Chinese politics". The revitalized Kuomintang, the labour and peasant unions, the students movement and the new cultural renaissance, all combined to develop the anti-foreign feeling into a bitter and implacable feud.

Borodin directed all his energies to create, among the Chinese, a bitter resentment against the foreigners and particularly Great Britain—the principal enemy of the Soviet Union and the chief sponsor of the 'unequal treaties'. But the influence of Borodin would have not been so dominant, had it not been for the Shanghai Affair of May 1925. On May 30, some Chinese students, engaged in a peaceful demonstration in the International Settlement at Shanghai against conditions of labour in the Japanese-owned cotton mills, were fired on by Sikh and Chinese constables under British officers, and nine Chinese were killed. Chinese anger at this "inexcusable outrage" took the form of a general strike supported by virtually all sections of the populace. Anti-foreign outbreaks resulting in loss of life and property damage occurred at different places. A further and more serious shooting incident took place on June 23, 1925 in the British concession at Canton. A wave of indignation swept through China ; Canton instituted a successful boycott of all British goods and a general strike of Chinese workmen paralysed business in British Hongkong. Even the moribund Peking Government protested these incidents and asked for a complete revision of the treaties in the name of "the legtimate national aspirations of the Chinese people".

If from 1915 to 1925, the Chinese nationalism was directed against Japan, from 1925 to 1927 it was directed against British imperialism. On January, 1, 1927, the Nationalist capital moved from Canton to Hankow, a more central situation for a national capital. A few days later, a Chinese mob overran the British concessions at Hankow. In the face of the rising tide of Chinese nationalism, Great Britain adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and during February and March 1927, concluded agreements with the Nationalist Government handing over the Hankow and Kiukiang concessions to China.

Peking Government and Revision of 'Unequal Treaties

While the Nationalists were furthering their cause in Hankow, Nanking and other cities of the south, the conservatives and militarists Government at Peking were also asserting China's right to be rid of the 'unequal treaties'. The only difference lay in the fact that while the Nationalist did not hesitate in resorting to force and violence against the foreigners, the Peking Government took to peaceful negotiations. During the two years 1925-27, treaties were concluded with Austria, Finland, Belgium, France, Spain, and even Japan, whereby the latter agreed to revise the old treaties.

Such a policy of the Peking conservative government was not liked by the Nationalists, who, after having been established in Hankow, developed pretentions to become the central authority for the whole of China. In May 1927, Nationalist forces marched northward in an atttempt to occupy Peking and reached a point on the Yellow River some 500 miles south of Peking. In the midst of the advancing Nationalist revolt, a misfortune overtook the country : this was the split in the ranks of the Kuomintang. There were already the right and left wings in the Kuomintang, and once the Nationalists had reached the Yangtze, the gulf became wider. As Clyde", has remarked : "Conservative propertied members of the Kuomintang, apprehensive because of the growth of labour and peasant unions, bent on industrial and rural reform,foresaw that the Nationalist movement under Russian inspiration was leading to independence and social revolution, instead of to "an independent China in which the people would be docile". Instead of pursuing the national programme jointly the two wings moved further apart. The left wing was in favour of continuing the revolutionary programme under the guidance of Borodin and Soviet Russia. The right wing was influenced by the recent pronouncements of friendship and gestures of goodwill of Great Britain, and coveted respectability and recognition by the Great Powers. Chiang Kai-shek, who had been recently dropped by Honkow from membership of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, assumed the leadership of the right wing. Chiang, it has been opined, was purchased by the Western imperialists, and he did not hesitate in playing a puppet in their hands. He had no sympathy for communism and no inclination to be advised by Moscow. He set up a rival Kuomintang Government at Nanking, and asked the Hankow Government to expel Borodin and his colleagues. In the meantime, it was revealed during the raids on Russian Embassy in Peking, that Borodin was under direct orders from Moscow and that the "Communist International' had approved plans for the Sovietization of China. These and such other revelations brought to an end the Russian influence in China. In July 1927, Borodin and his Russian assistants fled to Russia and many Chinese communists were put behind prison bars.

China from 1927 to 1931

After having established the National Government at Nanking, Chiang proceeded to extend his sway over the other parts of Chinese territory, and, very soon, Nanking ruled over a large area than any government since the collapse of the Yuan Shih k'ai. He also took over the conduct of China's foreign relations. On June 16, 1928, he called upon the foreign governments to conclude the new treaties with China with full regard to the sovereignty and equality of states. The United States was the first power to act. On Jully 25, 1928, a treaty was concluded whereby the

United States conceded tariff autonomy to China, subject of course, to most-favoured nation treatment. This treaty was followed before the end of 1928 by similar agreements with Great Britain and other powers.

The Western Powers, whose interest in China were primarily commercial, wanted an orderly and peaceful China where trade could prosper, and therefore diplomatic relations were soon established between them and China, the former having recognised the Nanking regime. But Japan, whose interest in China was political, preferred to see China weak and divided against itself and refused to conclude any new tariff agreement. When in May 1927, the Nationalist forces reached a point on the Yellow River, Japan took alarm ; she did not like that North China should go under the effective control of a central Chinese Government. Japanese troops were landed in the Shantung province, and certain strategic points were occupied with the object of checking the further advance of the Nationalist troops. This act showed that Japan, which had abandoned her designs in Shantung under the pressure of the powers had not abandoned them for good, and was simply bidding time to re-establish her control. This led to the outburst of resentment against Japan, and a campaign of boycott of the Japanese goods was launched throughout the countty. The activities of the Japanese people and government worked as a uniting factor, and in the face of Japanese opposition, the whole of North China, as far as Peking, recognised the authority of the Nationalist Government. China was once more united under a central government (though only in name and the civil war continued intermitently.) In the face of Japan's ambitions upon their country, the Chinese adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Western Powers, and as Carr has remarked : "at no time since 1919, had there been less friction in the conduct of China's international relations than between 1927 and 1931." [15]

Japan after the Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was in many respects "an unhappy diplomatic denouement for Japan." [16]The Western Powers had jointly expressed their sympathy for China and had compelled Japan to give up the privileges she had recently acquired at Paris in 1919. They had committed themselves to the integrity of China. She had been forced to abandon her alliance with Great Britain which had been the chief support of her 'forward policy,' In the face of such set-backs, Japan had no alternative than to abandon, at least for the time being, her imperialism and to pursue a policy of peaceful co-operation with the West.

15. Carr, E. H. op. cit. p. 161.
16. Buss. p. 352.

Japan and Co-operation with the West

The first favourable development in Japanese policy occurred late in 1922 and early in January 1923, when the government carried out the restoration to China of Kiaochow in accordance with the Shantung Treaty signed at Washington. Then on April 14, 1923, the Lansing-Ishii's notes of 1917, regarded by public opinion both in China and United States as thoroughly obnoxious, were cancelled by the mutual consent of the two governments. American-Japanese sentiments reached the height of goodwill, when in 1923, the United States contributed money and supplies to the amount of some $7,000,000, for relief and reconstruction in the Yokohama earthquake disaster of September 1. Japan continued to play a respectable and in some cases, a distinguished role as a Member of the League of Nations. A number of Japan's most distinguished statesmen, diplomats, jurists and public men served with the League. Japan was also active in the field of arbitration and adjudication of international disputes. She was a signatory of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. When, under the League of Nations, the principle of international adjudication acquired new life, Mineichiro Adachi was named a member of the League Committee which drafted the statutes for the new Permanent Court of International Justice. The Tokyo Government in 1929, adhered to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Pact of Paris). When in February 1927, President Coolidge invited the powers to a disarmament conference at Geneva to extend and supplement the principles adopted at Washington, Japan accepted the invitation and participated in the Conference though the latter ended in failure. Again in April 1930, Japan signed the London Naval Treaty with Britain, United States, France and Italy. During this period. Japan was being regarded by Western powers as a bulwark against communism in Asia, and as a protector of the common treaty rights of foreigners against the extreme demands of Chinese nationalism.

Japan's Co-operation with the West Half-hearted

If Japan co-operated with the West, she did not forget the fundamental character of her foreign policy. It was as put by Clyde, "a policy of imperialism aud expansion resting onwell-publicized assumptions of a 'special position' and 'special rights.'" Stealthily and steadily, Japan continued to seek for herself an exclusive position in South Manchuria, and to increase her relative naval power in auxiliary ships beyond the 5:5:3 capital ship ratio, granted her by the Washington Naval Treaty. Here her policies were distinctly at variance with those of Great Britain and the United States. Once Great Britain dispelled its fear of Germany, it looked upon Japan as a potential rival. Japan was a menace to British interests in China. The sharpest conflict of

interest arose from trade competitions by which Japan threatened to displace British leadership in the international markets of the world.

Relations between Japan and the United States were also far from satisfactory. If the out-pouring of American sympathy during the Yokohama earthquake brought the sentiments of goodwill to the highest pitch, the enactment of the immigration law in April 1924 excluding Japanese from the United States, caused a complete reversal in Japanese - American relations. "The Japanese," as Buss has put it, "were offended and insulted. They looked upon American protestations of good will as hypocrisy and felt personal affront as well as national opposition in American attitudes on China policy, immigration, naval competition and trade rivalry."[17]

Japan and Russia

The Western powers had been looking upon Japan with distrust and suspicion. In the midst of the professions of friendship and goodwill they were pursuing unfriendly policies. In this state of uncertainty and indecision, Japan looked towards Russia and China for friendship. Economic and political interests of both Japan and Russia demanded an end to the unhappy relations between the two. There was in Japan an increasing demand for the products of Siberia's mines, forests and waters. Public opinion demanded the re-establishment of normal relations in which trade and commerce might develop with some freedom. As a result of protracted negotiations begun in June 1923, a treaty was signed on January 20, restoring relations between the two powers. In view of the need of Japan with regard to natural resources. Russia agreed to grant concessions to Japanese for the exploitation of mineral, forest and other natural resources of eastern Siberia. Both countries pledged themselves to restrain all their officials and all organisations officially subsidized from engaging in propaganda likely "to endanger the order and security" of either. Russia agreed to adjust on terms favourable to Japan debts due to Tokyo by the Tsarist Government and Japan, in turn, agreed to withdraw her troops from northern Sakhalin by May 15. From 1925 to 1931, except to some aggravating and protracted negotiations on the old problem of Japanese fishing rights in Russian waters, the relations between Japan and Russia remained almost calm and cool.

Japan and China

From 1922 to 1927, the policy of Japan towards China was largely determined by Shidehara, who assumed towards China an attitude of courtesy and equal treatment. He became the

17. Buss, op. cit., p. 353.

spokesman of those elements who saw "the future of Japan's industrial and commercial progress in a policy of conciliation and adjustment to China's new nationalism without renunciation of Japan's 'life line' in South Manchuria." The first step in the 'policy of conciliation' towards China was taken when Kiaochow was restored in 1923, and a number of Japanese post-offices were closed. The second demonstration of goodwill came when, as a result of shooting, some Chinese were killed in the International Settlement at Shanghai and Japan proceeded to pay an indemnity to bereaved Chinese families. Again, when in March 1927, the Japanese consulate was attacked by the Chinese and several Japanese nationals were wounded, the Japanese naval forces did not join in the Anglo-American bombardment of Nanking.

This 'weak' policy of Shidehara pursued in the face of mounting anti-foreignism in China, aroused bitter resentment among Japanese militarists, in business circles and even in the government. In April 1927, Shidehara was forced out of office and replaced by General Tanaka who was in favour of an aggressive policy towards China. He re-emphasized that Japan "had special interests in Manchuria and eastern Mongolia," and that "it was her duty to maintain peace and order there" and that "her rights and interests in these areas would be protected if threatened by disturbances incident to the Nationalist movement or other civil strife." The first manifestation of this policy came in June 1927, when Japanese troops were sent to Shantung to check the further advance of the Chinese Nationalist troops towards Peking. In April 1928, Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan, capital of Shantung and terminus of the Kiaochow railway, where Japanese economic interests were extensive. There the first clash occured on May 3, between Nationalist and Japanese troops. An ultimatum was issued demanding the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalists forces from Tsinan. On May 8, more Japanese troops were sent to Shantung. Heavy casualties and losses were suffered by the Japanese troops, and 'positive' policy of Tanaka was subjected to a severe criticism in the political circles of Japan He was forced to abandon the policy and the Tsinan incident was formally settled by an exchange of notes on March 28, 1929.

THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

Internal Conditions of Japan in 1930-31

There had been for long rivalry in Japan between the civil authorities and military generals. Both wanted to make of Japan a great power in the Far East. But while the civilians sought to achieve it through co-operation with the West, the militarists pinned their faith in a policy of military conquest The Washington Conference had been a victory for the civilians

who succeeded in keeping the military party in check for a decade; but the offensive attitude of the Chinese after 1927 towards Japanese interests exhausted the patience of the populace. The militarists launched a movement, designed to adopt a sterner attitude towards China and the same had the support of a "public opinion rendered desperate by the economic depression and furious by the recurrence of Chinese boycotts and other causes of irritation." Economically Japan was becoming increasingly dependent upon the outside world for imports of food and raw materials, and export of her industrial goods. Her chief export was silk, and this needed a higher level of world prosperity, and when under the growing strain of the economic depression, the United States and other countries began to levy high tariffs to protect their own industries, the condition of Japanese industry became most miserable. Her own industries did not have a sufficient backing of capital to stand a period of strain, and her 'economic area' was too small to be protected by tariffs. Naturally, therefore, Japan wanted to extend her 'economic area.'

The population of Japan, which was less than thirty million in 1854, stood at 70 million people in 1930. Her population was constantly increasing. Artificial methods of birth control were not popular in Japan. The country was no longer self-supporting nor was the industry, on which the support and employment of the people depended, of outside supplies. Most of the important raw materials required have to ce imported from abroad. Prosperity of international trade was therefore a matter of life and death for Japan. During the economic crisis, this trade came to a standstill and the people were in a miserable plight. Emigration to the American or Australian continents was forbidden to her by rigid immigration policies designed to protect their standard of living from Japanese competition. Moreover, the Japanese did not like to leave their land ; and this was evidenced by the fact that by 1935, less than a million Japanese had taken up residence outside, in Asiatic countries including China and Manchuria, the Philippines and the Straits Settlements. Attempts at colonisation of the settlement type had almost invariably been a failure. Industrialsiation was the only way out. But as an industrial state, Japan was lacking in resources. And industrialisation carried with it a need for constantly expanding markets for goods. Markets and access to tesources, when they both lie outside the state, lead to the search for colonies and this leads to International wars.

Military conquest was thus the urgent problem of Japan in 1930-31. She had already occupied Korea ; Manchuria was now the next target. As Ketelbey has put it, "the existing economic privileges there of Great Britain and U. S. aroused her indignation and envy. Increasing Russian penetration aroused her fear.

Growing Chinese nationalism and the imminent consolidation and industrialisation of China prompted urgent action. Chinese weakness offered the opportunity. Economic need and imperialist aspirations provided the incentive and the excuse. Co-operation with the Great Powers had so far done little for her. Japan determined to take her own fate into her own hands."[18]

Why Manchuria Chosen as the Field For Action ?

Japan had covetted Manchuria for long, but she failed to have it in her exclusive possession, partly because of the opposition of the Chinese and partly because of the opposition of Western powers. Now that the latter were busy in the solution of their economic problems, created by the world-wide slump, Japanese cupidity was aroused once more. Economically Manchuria was an exceedingly fertile land of some 380,000 square miles, as large as the combined area of Germany and France. In 1928, the total value of Manchuria's agricultural products, including such principal crops as wheat, millet, barley, and soya-beans was in the neighbourhood of $650,000,000. There were also some important minerals like coal, iron, gold and timber. A very large amount of Japanese capital had been invested in Manchuria, and the protection of that investment was a national urgency.

Strategically, her control of Manchuria would give Japan a peculiarly valuable base for offensive or defensive operations against either China or the Soviet Union. The vast and contiguous land of Manchuria promised to be a fit place for colonisation for rehabilitating the constantly-increasing population of Japan.

Moreover, there was a good deal of railway politics in Manchuria. As early as 1905, Japan had constructed the South Manchurian Railway both for political and economic reasons. After the Russo-Japanese War, the S.M.R. (South Manchurian Railway) had decided to finance the construction of only such Chinese lines as would be "feeders" to its own road terminating in the great port of Dairen. The Chinese did not like the increasing control of Japan over their transport system and after 1924, they embarked upon their own programme of Railway construction quite independent of Japanese capital. The construction of these "parallel lines" greatly prejudiced the Japanese monopoly in South Manchurian Railway and greatly intensified the Sino-Japanese friction. A new controversy arose over the construction of the important projected railway from Tunhua to Kwainei designed to link Central Manchuria with the Northern Korean border and its sea ports at Seishin, Rashin,

18. Ketelbey, op. cit., p. 533.

and Yuki. Japan insisted that this line should be built and that China had agreed that Japan should participate in financing it. But the Chinese did not like it because they feared Japan would use the new line as an additional means of controlling Manchuria.

There were similar other issues complicating the situation and the Sino-Japanese negotiations, started to resolve that during the first six months of 1931, ended in failure. By mid-summer, it became clear that no settlement was possible through compromise and negotiations. In the midst of tense relations, there occured the unfortunate case of Captain Nakamura He was a Japanese military officer and was on a mission in Manchuria for the Japanese army. On June 27, 1931, he was killed by some Chinese soldiers in north-western Manchuria. The case was not very important in itself, but it was used to inflame national sentiment, and the Japanese press broadcast it as a "wilful insult to the Japanese army." The army became impatient, took the matter in its own hands and waited for the excuse.

Mukden Incident

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan had acquired the right to maintain some 15,000 troops in Manchuria for the protection of the South Manchurian Railway. On the night of September 18-19, 1931, a Japanese patrol near Mukden, the headquarters of the Japanese troops, alleged to have found a detachment of Chinese soldiers attempting to blow up the mainline. The Japanese soldiers immediately went into action and a major battle ensued. As a result 10,000 Chinese troops in Mukden were disarmed and within four days, all the towns within a radius of 200 miles north of Mukden were occupied by the Japanese troops. By and by the campaign spread over the whole of Manchuria.

The Chinese Government made an appeal to the Council of the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant. On September 30, 1931, the Council passed a resolution, asking Japan to withdraw her troops immediately and "restore normal relations". Since Japan was committed to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, and the Pact of Paris, she declared that her act was not one of aggression but a "police action" necessary to protect the Japanese lives and property from Chinese bandits. The Council appointed a Commission of the representatives of the five Great Powers (Great Britain, the U S., France, Germany, and Italy) under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton to investigate on-the-spot "any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan." The Commission submitted its report in November to the Council, rejecting the various pretexts on which Japan had been justifying her action in Manchuria and declaring Japan's action

as one of "naked aggression". But the Japanese Government disregarded all activities of the League and her armies continued their onward march. By the end of 1932, the whole of Manchuria had been occupied by the Japanese forces, and established as the state of 'Manchukuo' under Japanese domination. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League adopted a report which found that "Japan had not acted in selfdefence as alleged" and that "the establishment of Manchukuo was not a spontaneous and genuine independence movement." "Japan," the report added, "had failed to respect Chinese territorial and political integrity." But no thought at the time was given to appplying sanctions against Japan, and here the matter ended.

International Reactions of the Manchurian Episode

Rections in China :

As was natural, Japan's aggression against Manchuria led to serious repercussions abroad. The immediate effect of the Japanese intervention was in China. A country-wide boycott of Japanese goods, accompanied by riots and violence, was launched and as early as September 21, 1931, National anti-Japanese Associations were formed at Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking and other cities. All kinds of relations with the Japanese were forbidden, and those, who violated these rules, were severely penalised.

The second immediate reaction was that sincere efforts were made by the various classes or groups of Chinese society to iron out their erstwhile differences in the face of a national enemy in Japan. Before the end of September 1931, representatives of the Canton and Nanking administrations met in a conference, and decided to oust Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues from national leadership. The control was transferred to the Cantonese leaders until, with the Japanese intervention in Shanghai, in January 1932, they were discredited and Chiang was called back to power. After 1933, a popular movement, supported by almost all classes, by the small middle class and workers of the cities and also by the peasants and landlords of the counsryside, was launched to resist the Japanese aggression, and to offer the invaders united front. But no united front was possible without some agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Kuomintang liberals wanted a united front, including communists but among the conswarvatives, the reactionaries, and the fascists of Kuomintang, it was more important to crush the Communists than to resistJsapan. The Communist Government, established in Kiangsi in November 1931, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, also desired a united front, but they offered no concessions to other groups to make such a front possible and in fact, did not do so until directed by the Comintern. In the face of growing

bitterness with Japan, Moscow developed in China the idea of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and, though no agreement was signed, negotiations were conducted during 1937. Hardly some progress was made that Japan renewed hostilities at Peking in July of the same year.

Reactions in United States :

For the United States, Japan's invasion over Manchuria was a direct challenge to the Nine Power Treaty, to thePact of Paris, to the collective security system of the League of Nations and indeed to all governments who were interested in the maintenance of world peace. The Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson regarded Japan's act as a flagrant violation of treaties, but he was not willing to take any action likely to lead to open war with Japan. During 1931, the United States did not propose to the European Powers any anti-Japanese action which the latter rejected. In fact, when the League powers sounded out the American Secretary of State as to whether the United States would support a policy of sanctions, the latter gave no encouraging reply. Rather his instructions to American representatives at London, Paris and Geneva revealed that he was not in favour of any action against Japan, likely to lead to the outbreak of war. Perhaps in his policy-making, Stimson was limited from the beginning by his country's military unpreparedness for war, and by the anti-war temper of both Congress and the people, as well as by other factors.[19] On January 7, 1932, he simply informed China and Japan that the United States "cannot admit the legality of any situation *defacto* nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate fo the sovereignty,' the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the 'open-door' policy ; and that it does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties".[20]

This enunciation of the American policy came to be known as "Stimson's Doctrine of Non-recognition". The economic

19. Secretary Stimson urged British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, to invoke the Nine Power Treaty ; but the British Government expressed its reluctance in such a *demarche* ; and Stimson did not 'press' further. For detailed accounts of why the United States did not act strongly against Japan, see Stimson, H. L. *The Far Eastern Crisis.*
(New York, Harper, 1936) pp. 152-179.

20. China White Paper, op cit, p. 13.

troubles of United States were so acute that neither the Administration at Washington nor the public opinion would like a stronger action against Japan. They were too busy in their domestic troubles to pay serious attention to the Far East. It was not until 1938 that the United States became strong enough to take a serious protest of Japan's activities.

Reactions in Soviet Union :

The Soviet Union was more directly concerned than any other power. Her anxiety was increased by the refusal of Japan to enter into a non-aggression pact with Moscow, which the latter proposed towards the close of 1931. InFebruary 1932, after Japan occupied Harbin, the heart of former Russian enterprise in North Manchuria, the Soviet Union adopted a stiffer attitude. They protested to the Japanese actions but their protests lacked teeth, because they were not in a position to risk a war. As Buss has put it: "They contented themselves with verbal barbs, usually in *Izvestia* or *Pravda*, repeating their expressed sympathy with the Chinese people, charging the Japanese with anti-Red plots, and warning the Japanese that the Soviet Union would have to strengthen its own defence".[21] Due to her weakness in the Far East, Russia after 1933, proceeded to strengthen her military position at home, and diplomatic status abroad. She needed the backing of a strong military before shifting its policy from peace to resistance ; and therefore with the inauguration of the second Five Year Plan, Russia concentrated on adding to its military and economic strength in the area east of Lake Baikal. A Far Eastern army of 250,000 men was kept ready to face any Japanese invasion. On the external front, Russia reestablished diplomatic relations with China on December 12, 1932, negotiated an alliance with Outer Mongolia and repaired its diplomatic fences in Europe and the United States. Within five years, Russia was in a position to discard its attitude of softness and to take a firmer stand against Japaneseexp ansionism in the Far East.

Reactions in the League Circles:

The Manchurian episode was the first major test of the collective security system of the League of Nations. It heralded the return to "power politics" which the League proposed to check. The League, of course,performed a useful task through the investigation of the Lytton Commission, but beyond that it failed to go. It was rather the failure of Great Britain and France, the powers which dominated the League and upon whom rested the responsibility of upholding the collective security system. Of the three powers, principally interested in the Pacific, neither Russia nor the United States was member of the League, and it

21. Buss, op. cit. p 331.

appeared that the entire burden of any naval operations, required, would fall exclusively upon Great Britain. To that extent, London was not willing to go. She had her own reasons for that. The U.S. was a new rival to Great Britain in the Far East, and the latter had been bolstering up Japan since the last decade of the nineteenth century. Although Japanese growing strength was a menace to the British interests, United States was no less. And then, a new factor had entered the world politics in the post-war years, and this had to be reckoned with : this was Communism in Russia. As Germany was bolstered up to 'contain' Communism in Europe, Japan was strengthened to serve the same purpose in the Far East. Although on the insistence of the U.S., Great Britain had agreed to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 by the Four Power Pact at Washington, the statesmen of both the countries (Japan and Great Britain), on more occasions than one, reiterated their adherence to their co-operation in world affairs. When Japan actually opened offensive in Manchuria, the British Tory Press actually rejoiced, and brought such headlines as "Japan is the only element making for order and good government in the Far East" or Japan is rendering good service to civilization by restoring law and order in Manchuria". The bourgeois elements in Great Britain, which were influential in shaping the foreign policy, admired fascism as "insurance against Communism".

JAPAN FROM MANCHURIA TO MARCO POLO BRIDGE.

In Japan, the years following the Manchurian crisis were marked by the final triumph of totalitarian forces, the repression of moderate elements, and the gradual convergence of Japan's policies with the ambitious programmes of Germany and Italy. The days of party politicians had ended, and those of the militarists, of the reactionaries and of Japan's unique type of fascism had begun. There was in Japan never a personal dictatorship in the sense in which Hitler and Mussolini might be so described; this was the dictatorship of a group or caste or a coalition of groups. Even this military caste was not in complete and exclusive control of the administration; civil bureaucrats, representing many shades of political thought, still held high ministerial posts. Thus, the political picture was confused and complex. When the militarists took matters into their own hands by seizing control of Manchuria, their object was not only to extend Japanese sway on the mainland but also to seize political power within Japan itself. The army officers were politically-minded and they were intent on reforming the country. As Clyde has put it "their reverence for the Empepor, their championship of the depressed classes (particularly the peasants who were their fathers and brothers), and their indiscriminate clamour against corrupt party politicians won them a large foll-

owing." During the years from 1930, hundreds of societies were formed to support militarists and the Imperial House. They drew much of their membership from rural Japan from which areas came most of the conscripts for the army. They were naturally opposed to capitalism; and favoured some form of state socialism under the Emperor. The wealthy industrialists and professional politicians were also not inactive, and they established their own organisations to further their cause. Out of this welter patriotic societies, military and civilian, came the succession of terroristic plots, *coup d'etats*, and assassinations which punctuated Japan's political life from 1931 to 1936."

Japan's Monroe Doctrine

In this state of confusion and chauvinism at home, the Japanese Government pursued a forward policy abroad so as to distract the public attention. Japan had long aspired to be "the guardian of the peace and security of the Far East and in pursuit of this goal had developed her doctrines of "special interests" and "paramount interests". As early as the close of World War I, Japan had spoken of her "Monroe Doctrine" in eastern Asia. Now that she had acquired in Manchuria a strong foothold on the Asiatic mainland, she gave more formal and clear expression to her aims and ambitions in Asia. On April 17, 1934, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, Eji Amau issued a statement of Japan's policy towards China, saying that: "Japan would object as a matter of principle to any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance which must give rise to political complications. Supplying China with war planes; building aerodromes in China, detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, and contracting loans to provide funds for political uses would tend to make friendly relations difficult among Japan, China and other countries and to disturb peace in East Asia."[22]

In 1932, Japan had established herself in Manchuria; in 1934, she asserted her right in the whole of China. The Amau statement was not so much a threat to China, as a warning to the Western Powers. They regarded Japan's programme as unjust and illegal, while Japan looked upon their opposition as amounting to denying her the right to existence. The years following Manchuria were, therefore, the period of tension between Japan and the Western Powers on the one hand, and between Japan and China on the other.

The Collapse of Naval Limitation

In this tension, Japan rode roughshod over the feelings and pronouncements of the Western Powers. Due to the bellicose attitude of Japan, and, of course, due to a number of other fac-

22. China White Paper, p. 15.

tors, the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva had failed in 1932 ; the International Economic Conference at London had also met its doom in 1933. On December 28, 1934, Japan exercised her privilege of giving two year's notice of her intent to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. At the same time, Japan also made it clear that at the new naval conference scheduled to meet in London in 1935, she would insist on naval parity. An attempt at a new agreement failed ; Japan withdrew from the London Conference and the treaty which was signed on March 25, 1936, between Great Britain, United States and France became, in the words of Clyde "a sort of death gasp of naval limitation" without the adherence of Japan and Italy, The whole structure of international naval co-operation, so assiduously constructed since Washington (1922) collapsed ; the naval race began which entailed "ship construction and equipment, dock-building harbour dredging, and laying out of airfields from the Aleutians to the mandated islands." Inside China to quote the words of Buss, "Japan used intimidation, fraud, artifice, chicanery, negotiation and force to evade, abrogate, alter, redefine, or break treaty provisions." She taiked of a 'holy war' and conceived that she had a mission to purge China "of liberalism, democracy, socialism, and communism as the 'rotren fruits of the West." She launched an "Asia for the Asiatics" campaign against the West. She also raised the bogey of fighting against communism, and this won her the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain and United States, and gained the friendship of Italy and Germany. On November 25, 1936, Japan signed, what came to be called "the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy, providing for mutual exchange of information about communist activities and discussion of cooperative measures to be taken in mutual defence against communism.

The Renewal of Fighting between Japan and China

The year 1937 opened with acute international tension. Hitler and Mussolini had openly begun to express their hostility to democracy, communism, and territorial *status quo*. The democracies were at cross purposes and were unable to unite in opposition to the growing totalitarian group. The system of collective security of the League of Nations had been flouted time and again and its impotency hand become an established fact. Attempts at disarmament had ceased and a new race for rearmament had begun with a fresh vigour. Russia was still an international outcaste, and was looked down upon both by the democrats and the fascists. In this atmosphere of crisis, Japan decided to restart hostilities against China.

As early as the summer of 1935, some local Japanese military officials had established near Manchuria a puppet regime under the name of East Hopei Autonomous Government.

Soon after, the Japanese started illicit trade in this region, partly, to pile up their pockets with the enormous profits, and partly, to sap the resources and efficiency of the Chinese administration. Strengthened partly by the Anti-Comintern Pact with Italy and Germany, and partly by the appeasement policy of the Western Powers, Japan reopened histilities in 1937 against China on the one hand, and Soviet Union on the other. On July 7-8, 1937, Japanese troops clashed with some Chinese troops at the Marco-Polo Bridge, and soon after the Japanese Government demanded from the Chinese Government that "all Chinese troops should immediately be withdrawn from North China; all anti-Japanese propaganda be stopped forthwith; and cooperation against communism be extended." By the end of July, the hostilities spread over the whole of North China and thousands of innocent non-combatants were done to death by the Japanese soldiers On July 29, Chiang Kai-shek gave a stirring call to his people, and asked them "to fight to the finish as one man" to save their fatherland. On August 29, 1937, China entered into a Non-aggression Pact with Moscow, whose possessions were equally under invasion of Japan. In the month of September, the Chinese Communist Party established a united front with the Kuomintang to resists the Japanese aggression against their country.

But the Japanese continued their advance. On December 15, 1937, the capital city of Nanking was occupied and thousands of old and infirm persons, innocent childern and helpless soldiers were mercilessly butchered by the Japanese army. A provisional puppet regime was established in the ravaged city.

But even these miseries and sufferings failed to break the spirit of the Chinese people and they "decided to fight to their last man to save the motherland." The zeal of the invader being exhausted, Tokyo sought the mediation of Berlin, and offered terms of peace, demanding that "Chiang Kai-shek should repudiate communism, the Non-aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, recognise Manchukuo, pay the costs of war and lastly, appoint Japanese advisers to conduct the administration." But the Chinese contemptuously disregarded these peace overtures.

Fighting was again resumed in the spring of 1938 and the Japanese armies occcupied the island of Hainan in February 1939 and a month later, seized Spratley Island. Tokyo made another appeal to the new Chinese capital, Chunking, to surrender, and escape further bloodshed; but again met with a rebuff. In March 1940, Japan established a new puppet regime at Nanking under the headship of Wang-Chang wei, who had been expelled from the Kuomintang in January 1939, for his half-hearted loyalty to the motherland. In November 1940, Tokyo recognised this government as the legitimate Government of China, and entered into a number of agreements with it. By the close

of the year 1940, the Chinese war became a part of the second World War.

Russo-Japanese Relations from 1937 Onwards

The reopening of war between Japan and China in 1937 also affected the Russian interests in the Far East. On August 21, 1937, Russia signed a general non-aggression treaty with China. Relations with Japan continued to deteriorate. Japanese troops launched a number of attacks upon the Russian troops to provoke Moscow, and to test her strength as well. One such incident took place on June 20, 1937, when Japanese forces clashed with the Soviet detachment along River Amur ; but the Russian Far Eastern army defeated the Japanese. A full-scale battled occured in July 1938, when the Japanese troops stormed the heights of Changkufeng where the Korean, Manchukuo and Soviet borders met. On August 11, 1938, however, the Russians retook most of the territory, and the hostilities came to an end by an armistice. In early February 1939, fighting again started on the River Argun, and after a brief gap, again in September on the Manchu-Mongol frontier near the Khalka River.

These incidents revealed to the Japanese war-lords that victory against Soviet Russia would be a tought affair and therefore, they left the latter in peace. In the meantime, Russia-Japanese relations were affected by the unexpected Russo-German Non-Aggression pact of August, 23, 1939, and the outbreak of a general European war in September, 1939. At the beginning of 1939, Russia faced diplomatic isolation. As stated by Buss "Russia had no basic confidence in Great Britain, 'which grinds in the dust, Hindus, Arabs, blacks in Africa, and the workers at home', nor in France, which 'deserted Czechoslovakia in its hour of need and stood in awe of Hitler', nor in the United States, which "hates communism as much as facism." Russia therefore, made fresh gestures of friendship towards Japan. Tokyo desired improved relations with the Soviet Union. With Great Britain and France preoccupied in Europe, Japan found an opportunity to expand in South-Eastern Asia. Moreover, Japan felt that Germany, by entering into a pact with Russia, "had bought salvation for itself at the cost of releasing Russia's energies for an instantaneous mighty blow against Japan." Russia and Japan ended their points of dispute and entered into negotiations. The result was the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April 13, 1941. The pact was a pledge of neutrality—by Japan towards Siberia and Outer Mongolia, and of Russia towards Japan and Manchukuo. In June 1941, Japan and Russia signed a commercial convention and a one-year barter agreement. Russia and Japan also signed a declaration of mutual respect for the territorial

integrity and inviolability of the Mongol People's Republic and Manchukuo in order to eliminate a grave source of friction between Russia and Japan.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 and involvement of Great Britain and France therein, Japan took further steps in her policy of expansion in southeastern Asia, in French Indo-China, in Thailand, and in the Netherlands Indies. The story of Japan's aggression and regression in the Far East has already been discussed in earlier pages of this volume, and need not be mentioned here.

Attitude of the United States towards the Far Eastern Episodes

The diplomacy of silence, which the Washington Administration followed during the Manchurian crisis, was short-lived. The Amau statement of April 17, 1934, or the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, as it came to be called, was the most serious challenge to America's principle of 'open door' in China. Washington was henceforth convinced that the only way to check Japanese ambition was a programme of military preparedness. It began to build up the American fleet, and through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, it made available $50,000,000 in credits to the Chinese Government. From 1934 onwards, American-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate. About a week after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Secretary Hull issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy (maintenance of peace; national and international self-restraint; abstinence from the use of force in the pursuit of policy; abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and so on). The Japanese Government simply commented that she concurred in these principles, but their attainment was subject to the special circumstances of the region concerned and the country involved. She continued her military adventures in China. Public opinion in U. S. was very much stirred by the brutalities of the Japanese military. On September 2, 1937, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Grew to "suggest to Japanese officials that Japan, by the course it was pursuing, was destroying the goodwill of the world".

Towards the end of September, Japan started extensive air raids of Chinese cities which threatened the life and property of Americans in China. The Washington Administration protested to Japan that "any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and humanity". It also expressed the hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking would be avoided. But Japan justified her action on the ground of military necessity.

On October 5,1937, President Roosevelt delivered at Chicago his famous "quarantine speech". He declared that "the existing

reign of terror and international lawlessness had reached the stage where the very foundations of civilisation were seriously threatened". He appealed for a quarantine against the "international anarchy" of the aggressors and asked for "positive endeavours to preserve peace".[21]

America was not yet ready for the action, armed sanctions, which Roosevelt called for. In order to end the undeclared war between Japan and China, the United States and eighteen other nations met in a conference at Brussels from November 3 to 24, 1937. Germany and Japan refused to attend the conference and the others who attended, refused to apply force against Japan. The conference had begun in defeatism and ended in gloom.

On December 12, 1937, an American gunboat, the "Panay", was sunk in River Yangtse. On the same day, three tankers of an American Oil Company were destroyed and several British ships were fired upon by Japanese bombers. The United States prompty demanded, and obtained apology, reparations, and guarantees for the future. Still the American public was not willing to be involved in a war with Japan. From 1938 to December 1941, the United States sought to balance its conflicting objectives : to protect its nationals, to keep out of war, to restrain Japan, and to work for the re-establishment of peace and the enforcement of orderly processes in international relationships". In the pursuit of these objectives, the Washington Administration took a number of steps. On several occasions, it protested against Japanese interference with the right of its nationals in China. On July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that it was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries which bombed civilian populations. In 1939, the moral embargo, as it came to be called, was extended to materials, essential for airplane manufacture and to plans, plants and technical information for the production of aviation gasoline. A credit of 25,000,000 dollars was placed at the disposal of China, and the latter was enabled to exchange its silver for American dollars. When Japan occupied the Hainan and Sprately Islands in February-March 1939, the United States on July 26, 1939, notified Japan that it was giving the requisite six-month notice of abrogation of the Trade Treaty signed on February 21, 1911. It meant that the U. S. was preparing the way to combat Japan's "new order" by economic means.

When Japan, after March-April, 1940, started penetration in south eastern Asia, the U. S. Congress passed the National Defence Materials Act, authorizing the President "to prohibit or control export of any military equipment, munitions, machinery, tools and materials or supplies for the manufacturing, ser-

21. Ibid. p. 19.

vicing, or operation thereof when necessary in the interest of national defence".

On June 15, 1940, Roosevelt set up the National Defence Research Committee, and eminent physicists were called upon to develop the atomic bomb. On August 28, 1940, the Selective Service Act was passed, and on September 2, 1940, a deal was struck with Great Britain which provided for the exchange of over-aged destroyers for the use of bases vital to American defence. Two new credits, one of $25,000,000 and the other of 100,000,000 were advanced to China. On January 6, 1941, Roosevelt declared. "At no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened as it is today." He also enunciated the doctrine of the famous "Four Freedoms:(1) freedom of speech and expression ; (2) freedom of every person to worship God in his own way ; (3) freedom from want ; and (4) freedom from fear. Roosevelt denounced American neutralism in the face of the advancing armies of Japan, and called for allout aid to those who were the victims of Japanese aggression. This appeal led to the passage by Congress of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941. On May 27, 1941, the President proclaimed the existence of an unlimited national emergency.

The relations between Japan and U. S. reached the bursting point in 1941. On May 12, 1941, Admiral Nomura delivered the first draft proposals to Secretary Hull, and a good deal of negotiations ensued But the ultimate result was the breakdown of all efforts at peaceful solution of the American-Japanese differences. On December 6, 1941, came Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and with that, open war began between Japan and United States. The further developments may be studied in the chapter on War.

China during the Second World War

The second World War proved a blessing in disguise for China. It provided her an opportunity of releasing herself from the limitations upon her sovereignty imposed by the Western Powers. During the four and a half years of the undeclared war with Japan, 1937-41, the Chinese united together to present a solid front to the enemy, though this unity did not mean that China was at peace with her-self. In December 1941, when Japan was involved in war with United States, China also declared war upon Japan on behalf of the Allies.The Alliese were faced with a life and death struggle with Japan, and in the struggle, China, though weak and poor, promised a useful and dependable ally. The United States, therefore, decided to strengthen China, so as to deprive Japan of the advantages which might accrue to her from a weak China. On Januaty 1, 1942, China signed the Declaration of the United Nations. Soon after, a loan of $500,000,000 was advanced to China without

strings attached. Tariff autonomy had already been conceded to China more than a decade earlier. Now on January 11,1943, both Washington and London concluded treaties with China providing for immediate relinquishment of the extra-territorial rights they enjoyed in China. This was followed by the passage of a bill on December 17, 1943, repealing the laws which had barred Chinese from American shores. This law was greeted with great enthusiasm in China, and the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo, described it as "reaffirming our faith in American fair play and American friendship." The fact of growing friendship became stronger when from November 22, to 26, 1943, Chiang Kai-shek met Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo as one of the Big Powers to discuss the problems of war and peace in the Far East.

But the year 1944 opened with ominous stars for the Sino-Western friendship. This change was mostly due to the developments in the inside of China where the old rivalry between Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party revived. When Japan restarted hostilities against China in 1937, the Communists and Kuomintang Nationalists had come together in the face of a common enemy. But soon after, the unification movement was "gripped by a creeping paralysis." The Nationalists and the Communists continued to fight the Japanese aggression but their unity was gone, and by 1944, signs of a crack were clearly visible. The Communists accused the Kuomintang "of breaking the agreement (truce) which was to create the united front, of attacking and attempting to exterminate the Communist Fourth Route Army in the lower Yangtse, an attack which was made but which failed, of failing to replace the party dictatorship with democratic government." The Kuomintang in turn accused the Communists "with bad faith in 1937 truce, of refusing to obey orders of the National Government, and of revolutionary and treasonable intent in attempting to maintain a state within a state."

These charges and counter-charges resulted in the complete breakdown of friendly relations between the Communists and the Nationalists and the way was paved for a civil war. The American people and Government which had so far looked upon the Chinese with respect and sentimental attachment, began to look with disgust and denunciation. The State Department sent a military mission to the Yenan (Communist) Government in July 1944, and in summer of the same year, deputed vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, to the Chungking (Nationalist) Government to emphasize upon the latter. the imperative necessity of a strong and united China. The U. S. Government feared that the rift between the Communist and Nationalists would result in a rift between Moscow and Chungking, and this would further result in

a rift between Moscow and Washington. But all these attempts at compromise failed in the autumn of 1944. On August 18, 1944, President Roosevelt sent a personal representative, Patrick J. Hurley, to China with the mission of promoting harmonious relations between Chiang and the Commander, of the China-Burma-India theatre, General Stilwell. The President had advised that Stillwell should be put in joint command of the Chinese and Amercian forces. But this was disliked by Chiang and the relations between him and Stilwell deteriorated beyond repair.

However, General Hurley, who was now appointed ambassador to China on the resignation of Clarence E, Gauss, endeavoured to avert a rupture in the Sino-American relations. On his advice, the American Government sent huge supplies of war material and financial support to the Chinese National Government. Mr. Hurley also tried to harmonise the relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang Nationalists; but all his efforts failed and China stood on the verge of a civil war. However, there came the sudden collapse of Japan in August, 1945 and China, along with other of the United Nations, "shared in the glory of this military triumph."

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CHAPTER X

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

The role of the United States in world affairs may be said to begin with her participation in the Great War of 1914 The prewar movements in different countries of the world had nourished among the Americans hopes of a perpetual reign of law and justice. But the beginning of a ferocious conflict in Europe stunned and surprised them. On August 4, 1914, the World War was on. President Wilson at once offered his good offices, but they were politely but firmly rejected and he only proclaimed American neutrality from the war. On August 15, 1914, the State Department informed the American bankers that "in the judgment of this government, loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality". Most people welcomed this gesture, viewing the Old World's resort to bloodshed as something "horrible and unclean". The Chicago Herald asserted: "Peace-loving citizens of this country will now rise up and tender a hearty vote of thanks to Columbus for having discovered America".

From 1914 to 1916, President Wilson "vacillated between the assertion of American rights and reluctance to face the consequences of asserting them, between dread of a German victory and dread of war to prevent a German victory. Thus, he took a zigzag course, now one way because the British blockade infringed the American doctrine of the freedom of the seas; now the other way because German ruthlessness outraged American sensibilities".[1]

But the U. S. could not keep itself aloof from the war for long. On September 4, 1914, Wilson said before the Congress: "We have no part in making this war, but we shall have to pay the bill". The statement was exact and the warning prophetic. From the beginning, the U. S. was vitally affected by the war. 'American population included representatives of every racial group whose homelands were involved in the war and their emotions were naturally aroused. Her commercial and financial relations extended to every European nation and particularly bound up with England rather than Germany".

Yet in 1914 there was an almost universal determination to stay out But the determination was deeply affected by the happenings in Europe and the neutralists became the belligerents.

1. Lippman, W., United States Foreign Policy (London, 1943) p. 20

WHY U. S. ENTERED INTO THE WAR ?

Submarine Warfare by Germany

The American participation in the war was precipitated by the German submarine warfare. Early in 1915, Berlin proclaimed that from February 18, 1915, she would destroy every enemy craft found in the waters about the British Isles without regard to the safety of those aboard and that even neutral ships might accidently suffer a like fate. Rumours were reaching the American people that Germany was constructing ocean-going submarines of a new and larger type which were capable of very servere destructions. In March 1915, a U. S. citizen was drowned by the torpedoing of a British steamer *Falaba*, in May, an American tanker *Gulflight* was attacked and some six days after, an unarmed British liner *Lusitania*, carrying military supplies from New York was sent to the bottom, resulting in the death of 1200 men including 128 Americans. On March 24, 1916, more American lives were put in jeopardy by the torpedoing, without warning, of an unarmed French Channel steamer, *Sussex*. On January 31, 1917, Germany informed Washington that hereafter she would sink on sight all ships, neutral as well as belligerent, in certain waters about the British Isles and in the Mediterranean. By April 1, 1917, eight American vessels had been sent to the bottom and 48 lives had been lost. The Americans were enraged and on April 6, 1917, the Congress voted a declaration of war against Germany.

Threat of World Conquest by Germany

Moreover, the constantly-expanding German power made the Americans realize that if Germany won, the United States would have to face a new and aggressively expanding German empire, with Britain, France and Russia its vassals and Japan its ally. In such a position, they felt the defence of the Western Hemisphere would require immense armaments over and above those needed in the pacific and that they would have to live in a state of perpetual high and alert military preparedness, German victory would make the world unsafe for the American Democracies from Canada to the Argentine. American suspicion of Germany had been intensified by her cynical violation of Belgian neutrality.

Amer ican Financial and Trade Interests

And then during the years 1914-1917, the American financiers had lent about 1½ billion dollars to the Allied Governments against only 27 Million dollars to the Central Powers. Allied defeat, they thought, might mean the repudiation of all these debts, or at least their postponement indefinitely. Besides the factor of loans, there was trade. Even before

the war, a large percentage of American trade with the Allied nations. On the outbreak of war, trade with Germany became negligible, and with France and Britain mounted impressively Munition exports to the Allies increased from $ 40,000,000 in 1914 to $ 1,290,000,000 in 1916.

Psychological Affinity between the U.S. and European Allies

And then, there was psychological affinity between the U.S. and the Allies, particularly England. The Americans spoke the same language as the English and had the same thoughts, and controlled most important avenues of communication, The Allies had ready access to the American people and enjoyed the good will of many American societies and leaders of public opinion. France was very popular among the Americans who, they thought had been caught unprepared and without the slightest provocation by Germany.

Zimmer Mann Note

Popular imagination was aroused to the pitch when President Wilson gave to the press, March, 1, 1917, the famous Zimmermann Note in which the German Foreign Secretary had invited Mexico to unite with Germany and Japan in a war against the U.S. and to have Texas for her share of the booty. It galvanized American opinion against Germany, and against the eleven filibustering Senators who were striving to prevent the arming of American merchant ships.

Russian Revolution of March 1917

It was the unexpected Revolution in Russia on March 12, 1917 which crystallised the American decision for war. "If the Russian revolution, as Bemis has put it, "would have occurred three or even two months earlier, Germany, with the promise of victory and relief on the eastern front, would not have played the 'last card' of unrestricted subsmarine warfare; the United States would not have entered the war and Germany would have won, or there would have been a compromise peace which would have kept Germany astride the war-map."[2] But the humiliating treaty of Brest Litovsk, which Russia signed with Germany on March 3, 1918, assured the Central Powers "a free hand in regulating and expanding their eastern frontiers for future penetration beyond, and complete liberty to concentrate their whole war efforts on the Western front of battle" [3] If the Allies had been left to face the collapse of Russia without being sustained by the intervention of the U.S., it seemed certain that France would not have survived the year and the war would

2. Bemis, S.F. A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York Henry Holt and Co., 1950) p. 614.
3. Temperley, H.W.V., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris Vols. 6 J, p. 14

have ended in a peace by negotiation or in other words, a German victory. This phenomenon had a decisive effect on American policy at a psychological moment, particulary on President Wilson, who was still struggling to keep his country out of the war.

The President now concluded that armed neutrality would not be an adequate defence of the freedom of the seas against the unleashed submarine. Following an insistent public opinion, he went over to the cause of the Allies.

The entry of the U. S., occuring at a crucial moment for the Allies, put at their disposal not only an unplumbed reservoir of manpower but also unlimited money, food stuffs, minerals, manufacturers, shipyards, and material resources of every kind."

Thus reinforced, the European Allies succeeded in overpowering the enemy, and on November 11, 1918, Germany laid down her arms, and signed the armistice term presented by the victors.

The Fight for a 'Just Peace'

Prior to U. S. entry in the war, President Wilson sounded the belligerents as to their conditions for peace. On December 18, 1916, he addressed to every belligerent government a note asking for a statement of the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people, that the war had been fought out. Lloyd George announced that Britain's terms would be "complete restitution, 'full reparation' and effectual guarantees for the future. Germany's terms, announced confidentially to Washington, included a slice of France, economic control of Belgium, and plenty of indemnities. Clearly there could be no getting together on either basis. Faced with this intransigence on the part of the belligerents and convinced that the time had come when the U. S. must cooperate in securing and maintaining would peace, Wilson, on January 22, 1917 outlined in general terms the kind of peace settlement, the American people would be willing to enforce. It was to be "a settlement giving liberty to the Poles and autonomy to oppressed nationalities, guaranteeing freedom of the seas, destroying the old system of divide Europe and substituting instead a world community of power ; a peace without indemnities, without annexations except to return Alsace-Lorraine to France and give Russia free access to the Mediterranean."[4]

The Russian Revolution in March 1917 resulted in the overthrow of the Tsarist Government and the entrenchment of

4. Link, A. S., American Epoch
(New York, Alfred A, Knopf) P. 219.

the Bolshevik Government which disclosed all the secret treaties entered into by the Allies with Russia, Rumania and Japan. In late April 1917, Wilson and his private Secretary, Colonel House, talked with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Belfour, and came to know of the secret terms of these treaties. He learned that Britain and France planned to exact huge indemnities from Germany. On several occasions, as link has put it, "Wilson attempted to broach the subject with the British and French and was frightened from his effort by warnings that such talk would cause a fatal division in the face of the impending German onslaught on the Western front". The President, however, comforted himself with the idea that he could press Britain and France to accept his terms, once the war was over. "By that time", he said, "they will, among other things, be financially in hands" [5].

Even after America entered the war Wilson continued to advance the ideas of a liberal peace with Germany. In his war address, he declared that the United States had "no quarrel with German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering the war". The climax of this campaign for a just peace came in the 14-Points enunciated in January 1918.[6]

Wilson at the Peace Conference

The war was over and it was decided that the peace conference would be held at Paris. When it became known that Britain, France and Italy would be represented by their premiers, Wilson decided to go in person. Wherever he went in Paris, he was welcomed as the "savior of humanity and a prophet" from the New World to redress the grievances of the Old". Gifts and honours were showered upon him. But when he set down, along with the veteren Allied diplomats, to deliberate upon the problems of peacemaking, he was overwhelmed with the problems. He discovered that it was easier to win the war than to make the peace. The very atmosphere of Paris reeked with fear and hatred of Germany. The destructions wrought by Germany were fresh in their minds. People remembered the harsh terms Germany had imposed upon Russia in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk only nine months before. They were also convinced that if Germany would have won on the western front the terms would have been no less merciless The Allied diplomats, who had heavily suffered at the hands of Central

5. Ibid.

6. Wislon enunciated this programme on the suggestion of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Belfour, who advised the President to do so, to counteract the effect of the appeal made to the peoples of the world by the Bolsheviks of Russia.

Powers, were in no mood to let Wilson dictate them the peace terms. England, France, Japan, Italy and Rumania had driven advance bargains through secret agreements during the war, and each nation had its own special necessities, claims, aspirations and jealousies. And then, the broad principles of peace, enunciated by Wilson in the 14-Points, often lent themselves to differing and sometimes even conflicting interpretations—a fact of which Wilson's antagonists took prompt advantage.

The result of these circumstances and situations was that the peace which resulted from six-months of deliberations was not the one which Wilson desired or to which he had committed the American nation. On June 28, 1919, Germany signed the treaty and condemned it as violating the 14-Points and intolerably harsh. On July 10, Wilson submitted it to the Senate for ratification. Here Wilson's diplomacy was put to a heavy ordeal and a storm of opposition burst forth from every quarter.

Treaty of Versailles—Rejected by the Snate

The Treaty of Versailles met with severe criticism and opposition in the United States, The opposition was compounded of varied and diverse elements: "Personal hostility to Wilson, Partisanship, and Senatorial pique, indignation of German-Americans who felt that their country had been betrayed; Italian-Americans angry over Fiumerish-Irish-Americans stirred up against England, then engaged in trying to snppress the cein Fein revolution, conservative disapproval of what was alleged to be leniency toward Germany, liberal disapproval of severity toward Germany: and a general feeling that Wilson and America had been tricked and that we should avoid future European entanglements."[7]

Besides the various groups of Americans, there were four distinct groups within the Senate that participated in the struggle over the ratification of the treaty, At one extreme were the 'irreconcilables—Lodge, Lad Follette, Knox, Borah, Johnson; McCormick, and others who were unalterably opposed to any participation in world affairs, and were determined to undo the whole work of President Wilson. On the other extreme, were many Democrats, faithful followers of the President, who were for all-accepting. In between were the 'Major Reservationists and 'mild reservationists', who belived in the wisdom of the latter, with a view to protect American interests. Neither Wilson's Democrates nor Lodge's 'Irreconcilables were willing to compromise, and the result was that, when put to vote, the treaty failed to secure two-thirds majority votes. On March 19, 1920, the State sent the Treaty back to the President with formal notice of its inability to ratify.

7. Morison S. E. and Commager, H S. Growth of the American Republic (New York, Oxford Varsity Press, 1942) p. 494.

Why the Senate Refused to Ratify the Treaty ?

That a country whose Chief Executive played a leading role in the formulation of the Versailles Treaty and in the drafting of the League Covenant should refuse to be a party to the two important documents of international importance came as a shock to some and a surprise to others. An analysis of the situation however revealed . that President Wilson himself was partly responsible for the demise of his progeny. He had prepared the American people to wage a war against Germany, because the submarine warfare was against the principles of international law, because democracy was in the throes of a rout, and because, a new world order was needed to be found to save civilisation from the "scourge of war." These arguments did not appeal to the nation much, with the result that when the war was over, the Americans felt that they fought for no good reason at all, that their victory was meaningless. and that they had been manoeuvred into a non-American war by the international bankers and the British diplomats.

And so, having failed to make plain that the war was waged for a vital American interest, President Wilson had no way of proving to the nation that his settlement of the war really concerned the United States. Thus, the longer the Senate debated the Treaty of Versailles with its Covenant, the more the Americans felt that there was no compelling connection between their vital interests and the programme which Wilson offered them. They saw that the League imposed upon the United States the unprecedented commitment to help enforce the peace of Europe: They did not realise and they were not taught to understand what British and French power meant to the security of America's vital interests all over the world. In the words of Walter Lippmann: "The legalistic, moralistic, and idealistic, presentation of the war and of the League obscured the realities, caused it to appear that for what we were asked to give to our allies, we were to receive nothing from them." The result was that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the Senate with the Covenant of the League as the main target of attack.

Wilson's choice of the members of the peace delegation to Paris was another factor. They were Secretary of State, Lansing, Henry White, Colonel House and General Bliss. There has been a widespread demand for a nonpartisan peace commission, and many people thought that the President should have taken Root or Roosevelt or Taft. In the Senate there was deep resentment that the President had not selected any members of that body to accompany him.

There had been severe critics of Democratic leadership in Congress and growing dissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet. In response to the appeals of Democratic

adoption of reservation restricting the right of the Court to render advisory opinions. Member-states refused to accept the reservation. President Hoover in 1930 and Roosevelt in 1935 again urged, thouge vainly, membership in the Court. In the meantime, however, several distinguished Americans including Charles E. Hugheg, John Bassett Moor, and Frank B. Kellogg, served as judges on the tribunal.

Co-operation, though non-official, with the Legaue of Nations

A second manifestation of the American cooperation in the 1920's was the gradual change in the official attitude towards the League. Many of the activities and decisions of the League involved matters in which the U. S. was vitally interested. Hence after six months, during which the Administration tried so completely to forget the League that no reply was sent to the communications received from Geneva, 'observers' began to be sent to conferences where questions of national concern were at stake. They were authorised to present the government's viewpoint but not to vote in determining the outcome. Observers were also attached to the League committees on traffic in women and children, the opium trade and health. Numerous American experts in law, science and medicine served the League in their individual capacities. After 1924, Washington openly began to send delegates to participate fully in League Conference when her national interests demanded. By March 1930, they had taken part in 22 such gatherings. Before the end of 1931, the U.S. had adhered to a total of 13 agreements sired by the League, maintained five permanent officials in Geneva and even sent a representative to work with the League Council during the Manchurian episode. The draft of these events meant, if not the formal, ultimate membership of the League though the Republican spokesmen considered the League issue "as dead as slavery."

United States and Disarmament

Another area of U. S. co-operation in world affairs was the issue of disarmament. As early as 1921, President Harding convened a Nine-Power Disarmament Conference in Washington and out of it emerged the Five Power Naval Treaty, the Four Power Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and several other treaties and resolutions. In 1927, President Coulidge called another conference at Geneva to extend the principle of limitation to smaller crafts, such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines. On Hoover's urging, the British Government called another disarmament Conference in 1930 in London, and out of it came the London Naval Treaty. In February 1932, Washington participated in the World Disarmament Conference convened by the League in Geneva.

Arbitration Treaties and the United States

The U. S. Government also cooperated with the European Powers in the search for a means to ensure world peace. From the beginning, Washington had cooperated with the work of the Hague Tribunal. President William H. Taft (1909-1913) and President Wilson had attempted to extend the scope of arbitration to embrace disputes of all kinds, even those involving national honour. By the time of the World War, Secretary Bryan had negotiated with thirty nations treaties providing for a commission to investigate all disputes not otherwise arbitrable and for a 'cooling off' period of one year pending the settlement during which neither party to the dispute should resort to any act of force. The war had interrupted these attempts and once it was over, they were resumed. The U. S. was not a party to the Locarno agreements of 1925 committing the European Powers to the pacific settlement of all disputes; but when two years later, the French Premier, Briand, sought to extend the network of arbitration and non-aggression treaties to the U. S. Secretary Kellogg seized the opportunity to establish American leadership in this moment. Briand had offered a bilateral treaty between France and the U. S. for the outlawry of war. Secretary Kellogg countered with the suggestion of a multilateral treaty of the same character. The result of these negotiations was the Kellogg-Briand Pact on August 27, 1928. The U. S. not only signed this Pact, but in collaboration with Premier Ramsay MacDonald, declared in October 1929 : "Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge".

United States and European Economy

However disinterested the U. S. professed to be in European politics, she was of necessity interested in European economy. Before the armistic of November 1918, the U. S. had lent to the Allies something over seven billion dollars. After the armistice, loans and credits to the sum of three and a quarter billion dollars more were extended to the European Allies and to some of the succession States—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania, Austria and Hungary, while they were staggering to their feet amid the ruins from which they arose. These were used for purposes of reconstruction and were 'peace' rather than 'war' debts. America expressed her willingness to take into consideration their financial capacity in arranging payments. Between June 1923 and May 1930 seventeen governments, all except Russia, America and Nicaragua, entered into agreements promising to clear their liabilities in course of time. For the means to defray these obligations all the debtor nations relied upon the reparation payments from

Germany. But the reparation amount fixed for Germany in 1921 ($ 33,000,000,000) was too heavy for Germany and a revised plan in 1924 and another in 1929, named respectively the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan after the names of two American financial experts, provided for progressively smaller amounts, and easier terms of payment. Later on in 1931 when the world was in the throes of the economic crisis, the over-strained German finance stood on the verge of collapse. In the summer of 1931, President Hoover offered one year moratorium or postponement of both debt and reparation payment. But Germany could not resume payments and in 1932 Bruning declared that Germany would not pay any reparations.

In December 1932, France, Belgium and four other Governments stopped their payments to the United States. All governments, except Finland, followed suit the next year. In April 1934, the Congress only passed the Johnson Act forbiddin American financiers to advance any loans to any foreign government which was in default on its debts to the United States.

United States Attitude Towards the Soviet Union

American antipathy to the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 in Russia was as great as that of the European Democracies. A limited number of American troops joined the Allies in widely-separated attacks on Soviet Union. Five thousand American soldiers fought in the Archangel Murmansk campaign in 1918-19 and 9,000 Americans participated in the attacks on Vladivostok and eastern Siberia.

Following the failure of the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919 to devise any solution of the problem of Soviet Russia, the U.S., during the next fourteen years, rufused to extend recognition to that Republic. The fundamental reason for this was the irreconcilability of the revolutionary Communistic theory and practice of government with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism. The Soviet Government strengthened this determination of Washington by its refusal to sanction the loans and contracts made by previous Russian Government with the U.S. and its nationals, and by its refusal to extend to American citizens in Russia the type of protection customarily extended to aliens in the other countries of Europe. Further, the ardour of revolutionary propaganda not technically from the Soviet Government but from its 'international image'—the Third International, militated against American recognition.

The passage of time, however, served to smooth down,) irreconcilable differences between the two countries, One by one, the European Powers recognized Moscow, and in 1934, Russia became a member of the League of Nations. On November 16, 1933, Washington also extended diplomaticre,-cognition to the Soviet Government and in return for this,

Moscow promised not to carry on propaganda activity in the U.S. to guarantee religious freedom and fair trials to Americans in Russia, and negotiate a settlement of Tsarist debts to the United States.

Even before recognition, however, a very considerable volume of trade, more indeed than existed after recognition, sprang up between the two Republics. Their citizens visited even without directly visaed passports. The more radical features of Russian Government gave way to a slightly less vigorous state Communism. To keep in friendly relation with the capitalist world, Stalin had adopted the concept of "Socialism first in one country" and propaganda activities were also suspended.

And above all "the increasing tensions of the Far Eastern politics," as Bemis has stated, "where the intetests of Russia and the United States supported each other more than they did Japanese policy, impelled the two nations, so different in their constitutional structure and social organisation, to close up the gap of diplomatic irreconcilability".[10]

In order to increase more trade avenues with the Soviet Union the U.S. Government established, on Februaty 12, 1934, an Export-Import Bank to facilitate exchange between the two countries. But Secretry Hull's bright hopes of friendship and mutual accommodation were soon belied by Russian refusal to honour pledges made in November 1933. Negotiations over debt settlement failed because the Russians refused to acknowledge the interest of the debt. Consequently, the State Department blocked the extension of any credits to the Soviet Union. "More damaging to Russian-American relations", as Link has put it, "was the Kremlin's refusal to call off the dogs operating in the guise of the American Commuist Party. Until 1941, relations between the two governments were formally correct but hardly cordial."[11]

INAUGURATION OF THE ROOSEVELT ERA AND UNITED STATES VIS-VIS EUROPE

It was a gloomy day, March 4, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat, took the oath as President of the United States. The economic machinery of the country was almost at a standstill; the national income had fallen considerably; the unemployment figure rose to 13,000,000; approximately 40% of the farms were mortgaged, strikes and violence had become common occurrences and almost every state found it necessary to place restriction on banking operations.

The people looked towards the new administration with

10. Bemis, op., cit. pp. 723-24.
11. Link, op. cit., p. 45.

some hope. The international horizon was beclouded with Japanese aggression against Chinese province of Manchuria; Hitler, committed to unsettle the arrangement of 1919, was winning increasing popularity in Germany; Fascism was making headway in Italy and disarmament conferences were coming to nought. In short, Roosevelt was confronted, as one commentator has put it "with the double task of restoring commerce in a world sorely afflicted with economic maladjustments and promoting peace in a world drifting towards war". He, however, seemed optimistic and called out defiantly; "This Great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper. He promised a 'New Deal' and asked Congress for broad executive powers to wage war against the emergency.

The people rallied to the support of the President; Congress gave him all backing and in the record time passed bills, making the President one of the most potent executives in the world in the American peacetime history. The pressure of domestic affairs for a time absorbed most of the government's energies But important political developments were taking place abroad and demanded their share of the President's attention. The aggressive intents of Japan in the Far East and Hitler's rise to power in Europe made Roosevelt more concerned about the problems of world peace and security. As kinsman of Theodore Roosevelt and political heir to Wilson, the President desired to play a large role on the international scene; and seeing further ahead than most of his countrymen, he sensed the growing perils that endangered world peace. Secretary Hull and the President became convinced quite early that the aggressive policies of the European Fascist powers were as great a menace to American security as they were to the European Democracies and, therefore, they thought the foreign policy should be so conducted as to give all possible support to the nations endeavouring to check the march of Fascist aggression.[12]

But the public opinion in America did not accept the thesis that a European war could vitally affect the security of the United States, or that any attack by the Fascist armies of Germany and Italy was possible. The American attitude to the developments abroad was therefore largely determined within the framework of public opinion at home.

American Isolationism

When Japan started aggression against China in Manchuria, Secretary Stimson suggested strong action. He did not give up his longing, before January 9, 1933, to see Japan brought to book "by sanctions or some other mode of action even if likely to result

12. Beard, C. A. American Foreign Policies in the Making (1932-40) (New Heaven, Yale Varsity-Press 1946) p. 29.

in war"[13]. But partly owing to the economic distress at home, partly to the intransigence of London and largely owing to public apathy, Stimson had to content only with "non recognition of territorial and political changes effected by military force"[14].

In 1935-36, Mussolini prepared plans for the conquest of Ethiopia and in the far East, Japan continued her penetration of China. While, thus, a humiliated Germany, a frustrated Italy and a truculent Japan were paesaging new aggressions, the American people were obsessed with the idea of non-involement in world affairs. As early as January 1933, the outgoing Hoover Administration had asked Congress for power to impose an arms embargo on aggressor nations and to make arms available to the victims as well as to countries joining in the sanctions. Upon entering office, Roosevelt also renewed the request. The request was received favourably by the House of Representatives in April 1933, but it was turned down by the Senate. On August 21, 1935, rather, the Congress passed the Neutrality Act, and declared not to export arms, ammunition and implements of war from any place in the U. S. to any port of a belligerent State. On October 3, 1935, Italy started the invasion of Ethiopia and two days after, the President declared the U.S. neutrality from the war, and enforced the Neutrality Act. This Act was due to expire on Feburary 29, 1936 and on February 28, Roosevelt signed a Resolution, amending the Act of the previous summer and extending it to May 1937. In July 1936, civil war started in Spain and in January 1937, the Neutrality Act was amplified to extend the arms and loans embargoes to foreign states "afflicted by civil strife".

During the first four years of his Presidency, Roosevelt suggested to the country no change in the policy of non-entanglement; no attempt was made to change the public opinion. His second inaugural address, in January 1937, did not contain even a passage on foreign affairs; on the countrary, it "displayed a resolve to grapple with domestic issue yet unsettled —issues presented in his own description—one-third of the Nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished."[15]

Bases of American Isolationism

The bases of American isolationism were vast and social. Geographically considered, the advocates of isolationism said, the United States was separated from Europe and Asia by thousands of miles of salt water, and should therefore not

13. Ibid., p. 137.
14. For details, see China White Paper, p. 13.
15 Langer, W. L., and Gleason, S. E.
The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940
(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952) p. 11

involve herself in far-off entanglements. The political argument of the isolationists was that the founders of the Nation cherished a suspicion of the Old World Powers, and the course of events in Europe has deepened this suspicion. The more important arguments presented by the isolationist school were economic and social, and covered a number of points. First, they asserted, free trade was a thing of the past and fitted only England, and that too, in a special period (1845-1914) during which he was the leading industrial nation in the world. "The Manchester doctrine of free trade," in the words of Allan Nevins, "was based on the idea that each nation and region ought to produce those commodities for whiah it was best adopted, but the advance of Science and technology has now placed many nations roughly on the same footing, enabling each to produce nearly all that it needs for home consumption. International exchanges have thus became far less important than previously."

Further, the isolationists held that "the pressure of unemployment makes the old economic inter-nationalism impossible. Whenever men lose their jobs, they will force the Government to raise trade barriers to restore employment." They maintained further that" currency difficulties also make the doctrines of Adam Smith un-workable. Uneven exchanges and depreciation create trade barriers and a long period of international monetary stability will be essential before men can even talk of free commerce."

They also asserted that "nations which attempt to keep markets of their neighbours open by force are likely to provoke armed resistance" and argued that the profits of free international trade are often illusory. The United States in 1929-30, for example, sold large quantities of valuable goods for bad paper.

Moreover, the American Isolationists presented a social basis for their cause. They pointed out that the United States represents a medley of national stocks, thus far very imperfectly fused and that as yet the Republic has not gained a distinct personality not found its soul as older lands like England and France have done. Time and quiet are needed for this process. The country cannot achieve a distinct culture and character unless it is kept insulated from distracting outside influences." [16]

DRIFT FROM ISOLATIONISM

While the Administration apparently kept itself aloof from European entanglements, the President took certain steps which

16. Nevins, A. America in World Affairs. (New York, Oxford, 1941) pp. 77-78.

gave the indication of a resolve to abandon neutrality in favour of foreign involvement. When the civil war began in Spain, the State Department went beyond the terms of law. Although it knew that the embargo provisions of the existing Neutrality Act did not apply to Civil War, it continued to warn American citizens against shipping arms to the belligerents in Spain including the Spanish Republican Government, then officially recognized by Washington. January 1937, Roosevelt sought to make interference with arms shipment 'legal' by asking Congress for a special act to authorize applying the embargo to civil wars and on January 9, 1937, this Act was signed. On its surface, the new embargo law had the appearance of non-intervention, but in effect, it deprived the Republican Government in Spain of arms and ammunition. Moreover, this action was in violation of an established principle of international law that a neutral country should not change its legislation after a war had broken out in such a way as to discriminate materially against a lawful belligerent."

Another illustration of the shift was the attitude of the State Department towards the Sino-Japanese war which restarted on July 7, 1937, The Neutrality Act of May 1937 had obliged the President to embargo the shipment of war material when he found that a state of war existed abroad. But Roosevelt did not apply the embargo and in July 1937, the State Department issued a manifesto to sixty Governments of the world on the sanctity of treaties nnd international law.

After a few weeks, on October 5, 1917, Roosevelt delivered in Chicago his famous' quarantine speech' "generally regarded as having marked an important departure in American foreign policy."[17] This was an address on the world situation in whic he discarded the doctrine of neutrality for the American nation and commended the doctrine of collective security, He spoke with feeling about "the present reign of terror and international lawlessness, forecast more frightful scenes, declared that in such circumstances, America could not expect 'mercy or escape' from attack, and called for "united action against the aggressors on part of 90% of the world's population that cherished peace, freedom and security." [18].

This speech was a surprise for the Americans. "Internationalists greeted it," as ceard has pointed out, "with rejoicing as conclnsive evidence that President Roosevelt had at last spurned in the name of the United States, the principle of non-entanglement and non-intervention in the political and military operations of European and Asiatic powers, and had aligned himself on the side of full cooperation with "peace loving nation in

17. Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 11.
18. For details see annex. 20, China White Paper, p. 451.

designating and taking collective action against the aggressor Germany, Japan and Italy."[19]

But the Isolationists criticized the President in 'blunt' language. Six of the major pacifist organisations issued a declaration that Roosevelt "points the American people down the road that led to the World War." A campaign was launched to secure 25,000,000 signatures to a "keep America Out of the War" petition.

The fascists in Germany and Italy and war-lords in Japan were emboldened by this public reaction in the United States. The European Democracies, England and France, began to doubt if American people would ever be with them in their fight against the enemies of democracy. The event was followed by bolder actions on the part of the aggressor countries.[20] Two months later, an American gunboat, '*Panay*' was sunk by Japanese bombers. On March 7, 1936, German troops had already reoccupied the Rhineland; in early November, the Rome-Berlin Axis had been formed, on November 25, 1936 the German-Japanese Anti Comintern Pact had been signed. During 1937, Germany's preparations began with greater favour. On March 14, 1938, Austria was occupied and Hitler began to cast his eyes towards Czechoslavokia.

Munich Pact and Its Reaction in Washington

On September 29, 1938, came the Munich Pact, whereby the German forces were permitted to occupy the Sudetanlard on October 1, 1938. The reaction in the U. S. was sharp and immediate. "Within three month after Munich, President Roosevelt completed the change-over from a political strategy whose primary emphasis was on the achievement of domestic reforms to one whose primary emphasis was on the achievement of a foreign policy of collective security".[21] Relegation of that struggle to a secondary position was the result of a decision that Axis aggression presented greater dangers to the American people than did domestic evils. Roosevelt was convinced that the Munich agreement meant not peace but war, and he rejected Chamberlain's assumption that Hitler had been pacified.

Hitler quickly gave proof that skepticism of "peace in our time" was justified. On October 9, he returned to the attitude of menace, and announced expansion of German armaments ; and said he could not rely on Chamberlain's promises because he might be replaced at any moment by Duff Cooper, who had resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty in protest against the Munich agreement, by Churchill or by Eden-all of whom were "agents of Jewish internationalism and Bolshevism".

19. Beard, op. cit. p. 187.
20. Hill, C. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, Hodder and Stoceghton, 1948) 2 Vols. I, p. 546.
21. Rauch, B. *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbour* (New York, 1950) p. 80.

Roosevelt's response was prompt. Two days after Hitler's return to menace, the President announced an expansion of U. S. armaments, naval and military, amounting to 300,000,000 dollars. Secretary Hull urged the importation and stockpilling of strategic raw materials. Congress was unwilling to appropriate sufficient funds ; so Hull in April, 1939, attempted barter trade of surplus wheat and cotton for British, Dutch and Belgian rubber and tin.

The central event in the history of Roosevelt's new orientation was his Annual Message to Congress on January 4, 1939, when he spoke of undeclared wars raging "all about us" and of threats of new aggression "all about us". He admonished Congress that war perils were mounting higher and higher. "Storms from abroad", he said, "directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good faith. He also intimated that the neutrality legislation might well be changed, for he declared : "We have learned that our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly-may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim". He also emphasized the need of greater preparedness for defense. Yet he did not urge a repeal of the neutrality legislation or any orher measure pointed in the direction of action on the part of the U. S. against aggressors.

Having charted his new domestic and foreign courses, the President gave over to Congress and the people the task of deciding whether and when would be authorised to begin the new voyage. In his anxiety to reduce internal dissension, he did not for several months press Congress for action on the Neutrality Act. Such pressure in the recent past had raised the cry against him of "dictator". Roosevelt "was fearful that strong leadership would antagonise the strengthened opposition in Congress and result in a defeat which would have the disastrous effects of encouraging the Axis and discouraging Britain and France. Seven bills were introduced in the House and four in the Senate to modify or repeal the Neutrality Act. Outwardly, the administration supported none of them and offered no alternatives."[22]

International situtation deteriorated in March 1939, when Hitler sent his armies into the Czech capital and took control of what remained of unhappy Czechoslovakia. The dictator's cynical violation of an agreement upon which the ink was hardly dry, caused such a profound revulsion of sentiment in Britain that Chamberlain was forced to abandon appeasement.Reaction in

22. Ranch, op. cit. p. 109.

Washington was equally violent. Speaking for the President on March 17, acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, condemned Germany's "Wanton Lawlessness" and use of "arbitrary force". The President now ventured all his prestige in the fight to obtain the outright repeal of the arms embargo, but to no avail. On May 19, Roosevelt called the House leaders to White House and declared that repeal of the arms embargo might prevent war and would certainly make an Axis victory less likely if war occurred. But Congress would not budge an inch from its position. On July 18, 1939, he invited the Senate leaders to discuss the European situation and declared that he had done his best and the Senate would have to take responsibility for refusing to act to protect the nation's security.

Meanwhile, Roosevelt and Hull worked as best as they could to restrain Germany and Italy. On March 22, 1939, for example, the President warned the New Italian Ambassador that the U. S. would extend aid to Britain and France in the event war broke out, and promised that he would cooperate with Mussolini in any effort for peace. Broadcast everywhere, Roosevelt's message bolstered British and French courage and threw the German and Italian leaders into a paroxysm of rage.

U. S. and the War

During the Summer of 1939, the leaders of Europe engaged in last minute negotiations in preparation for Armagedon ; the Anglo-Russian negotiations failed and the Russo-German negotiations succeeded and resulted in the Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939 The stage was now set ready and on September 1, 1939, German armies poured into Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on the Reich. On September 5, 1939, the President issued an official proclamation of neutrality and put the Neutrality Act into force, as he was bound to do.

Again and again during the debate that raged from June to November over modifications in the Neutrality Act, Roosevelt and his supporters in Congress had assured and reassured the American people that their purpose was to preserve the neutrality of the U. S. and avoid being drawn up into foreign wars. But the isolationist asserted that a repeal of the embargo on munitions was a step in the direction of war, and would lead, in due time, "to the sending of American boys to fight on European fields". In his broadcast of October 26, he denounced their plea, and stated that no responsible person in the government had ever suggested that.

At length, Congress yielded to the President's plea for the repeal of the munitions embargo in the interest of peace and neutrality for the U. S., and in November, passed a new Neutrality Act which permitted the sale of munitions to belligerents on "cash and carry" basis.

As the months passed by, Hitler attained victory after victory, and by the spring of 1940, Oslo, Copenhagon, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris all fell in quick succession. The conquest of England itself seemed alarmingly close in June 1940. Inspired by these advances in early February 1940, Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to London, Paris, Rome and Berlin to sound out the possibilities of a first and lasting settlement. Welles soon discovered, what he and every informed person already knew-that "Hitler would agree to no settlement which Britain, France and the U.S. could approve and that the ultimate decision must be made on the battle-field."[23]

The fall of France and the seeming imminence of British defeat shocked the American people with an almost indescribable fright, and stimulated much wild talk of an immediate German invasion of the Western Hemisphere. The threat of Nazi Victory intensified the great debate over American foreign policy that had been in progress since the Munich crisis. This debate between proponents of strong support for Britain, and the non-interventionist did not end until Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbour; but it was evident long before this date that the former had won the battle for control of the American public mind.

The result of this was that, beginning in the summer of 1940, Congress and Administration took a series of steps during the course of the next twelve months, which led to the collapse of neutrality and to undeclared Naval hostility with Germany: (1) Facilitation of purchase of military aircraft by Britain and France by giving them priority over military orders from the U.S. Government with American manufacturers; (2) Rushing from U.S. Government arsenals, through private co-oporations, of large supplies of rifles, machine guns, trench mortars and other military equipments to England, (3) Roosevelt's speech of Dec. 29, 1940, declaring that the U.S. would be the "arsenal of democracy;" (4) Passage of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941; (5) Measures for the defence of Greenland April 7, 1941 taken under the Act of Havana; (6) Construction under outright ownership of the British Government of armament factories in the U.S., (7) Establishment of direct relations with the independent Government of Iceland, April 1941, and military occupation by British and Canadian troops.

The effect of all these and a few other measures was a virtual, though not yet declared, warfare with Germany.

In June 1941, Hitler launched his attack against the Soviet Union. Immediate assistance to the Soviet Union was made "immensely difficult by the opposition of isolationists, the

23 Link, op. cit. p. 477

Catholic press, and many anti-Communist Americans. Although he was uncertain of public and Congressional reaction, Roosevelt began discussions that led to an Anglo-Soviet-American conference in Moscow in late September 1941 and an agreement by which Britain and the U.S. promised to furnish 1,000,000,000 worth of aid to Russia before June 30, 1942. And when Congress voted a new $ 6,000,000,000 appropriation for Lend-Lease production and export and rejected an amendment forbidding extension of aid to Russia in October, Roosevelt declared the Soviet Union eligible for Land-Lease assistance on November 7, 1941."[24]

United States *Vis—A—Vis* the Far East

If, during the nineteenth century, the United States had proclaimed its disinterestedness in European affairs (through the Monroe Doctrine in 1822), such was not the case in regard to the Far Eastern countries—China and Japan. When, as a result of the Opium war, (1839-1941) England obtained, through the 1842 Nanking treaty the Island of Hong Kong and trading rights in five Chinese ports, Washington signed with the Government of China the Treaty of Wanghia on July 3, 1844 and obtained whatever treaty rights other powers gained "with respect to trade, residence, religious activity, tariffs or other commercial regulations.," And later on, during the 19th century, when European powers began to seek more territorial and commercial concessions in China, sometimes even at the point of pistol, the United States treated her with diplomatic courtesies. What the Europeans got through force the Americans secured through friendship.

In 1853, Commodore Perry of the United States navy landed at the Japanese coast and requested the Emperor that Japanese ports should be opened to American ships. Soon after, a treaty was signed; two ports were thrown open to American ships for provisioning rather than for trade although commercial privileges were implied.

As in the case of China, other European nations also rushed to secure privileges for them, and soon Japan entered on a decade of treaty-making with the chief countries of the West. By 1867, she had granted to the foreigners commercial relations and open ports, extra territorial rights, tariff powers and general diplomatic and consular privileges".[25]

But while the contact of China with the West resulted in her deeper and continuous penetration, Japan's contact resulted in a political upheaval. The Japanese took a cue from the fate of China, and undertook an extensive programme of industrial and commercial development. As a Japanese writer has put it : "Japan began to run after Western ideas as fast as she could".

24. Link op. cit. p, 492.
25. For details, see China White Paper, pp. 4-6.

Very soon, she became a first rate power in the Far East and a rival of the European nations in relation to China.

During 1890's, Russia, Germany, France and Japan sought more and more commercial concessions and spheres of influence in China, and almost partitioned the Chinese Empire among themselves. This created uneasiness in London and Washington. At the instance of a British diplomat Alfred E. Hippistey, Secretary of State, John Hay, in September 1899, asked the powers involved in the struggle over to China to give guarantees to maintain 'open door' in their 'spheres of influence or interest' and to adopt no measure likely to prejudice the interests of other nations. This note remained unheeded and on July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay urged the other powers to declare that the world "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity" and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire". Hereafter, Washington became an advocate of "open door" in China, and whenever there was a threat either to this or to the 'territorial and administrative integrity of China', she reacted strongly and sharply.[26]

The World War, the United States and the Far East

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in July 1914. President Yuan Shih Kai remarked to the American Minister in Tokyo that "Japan is going to use this war to get control of China". As early as August 3, 1914. China asked the United States to obtain from the European belligerents assurance not to carry their struggle into Chinese waters or territories—a request which the U. S. acted upon without success. So long as England did not enter the war, Japan remained neutral. When on August 4, 1914, London declared war on Germany, Tokyo developed a militant tone. She recalled Germany's role in the three Power intervention in 1890's and reminded the Japanese public of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and stressed that Germany's preparations at Kiaochow were a menace to the peace of the Pacific. On August 15, 1914, Tokyo sent an ultimatum to Berlin, asking for the surrender of the same to Japan. On August 19, Secretary Bryan informed the Japanese Government that the United States hoped that Japan demanded the surrender by Germany of the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with the purpose of restoring that territory to China. Germany ignored the Japanese ultimatum and on August 23, 1916, Tokyo declared war upon Germany. Kiaochow was seized, railways from Tsingtao to Tsinan were usurped and the German islands north of the equator Marianas, carolines and the Marshallas were occupied by Japan.

On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hioki, secretly presented to China the Twenty-One, Demands. When

26. For details, see China White Paper, pp 4-6.

they became known in Washington, great resentment was expressed and on May 11, 1915, Secretary Bryan notified both Japan and China that the U. S. "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China impairing the treaty rights of the Unites States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to china commonly known as the Open Door policy".[27]

In April 1917, the U. S. entered the war and became an ally of Japan. The community of interest brought Tokyo and Washington closer and on November 2, 1917 the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made. The Governments of the two countries recognized that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States, recognizes that Japan has special interest in China

The end of the War witnessed intense U. S. Japanese rivalry. Japan's imperialistic ambitious clashed with American 'open door'. At the Paris peace conference Wilson refused to abide by the secret treaties which Japan had made with her European Allies and also expressed his ignorance of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. In the face of opposition from the American delegation Japan threatened to withdraw from the Peace Conference. Lloyd George and Clemencean prevailed upon Wilson and the latter, fearing lest the peace conference should end in failure yielded to Japanese claims.[28]

Peace Settlement and after

The Far Eastern provisions of the Peace Settlement created bitterness in China, uneasiness in Japan and nervourness in the United States. There was widespread feeling in the U.S., U.K., France and Canada that Japan had done every little to win the war and had utilized it to advance her hegemony in China. Japan's policy in Manchuria and Siberia during the inter—Allied intervention in 1918 caused further suspicions of Japan intents. The new Republican President Harding called a conference at Washington in order to check the increasing influence of Japan in the Far East ; and out of this emerged the Four Power Pact, the Five Power Naval Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty. and several other treaties and resolutions. All these agreements resulted first in averting a clash between the U. S. and Japan, and secondly, in checkmating the predominance of Japan in the Far East. London and Washington were happy over the achievements but Tokyo was more than dissatisfied. She considered the

27 For details see annex. 12, ibid, p. 436

28. For Far Eastern Provisions of the peace settlement of 1919, see Chapter IX of this book.

Four Power Pact as an imposition from the U. S., the Five Power Naval Treaty as a denial to her of equality of status and the Nine Power Treaty as a blow to her drive for special interests in China. These misfortunes were difficult for the Japanese war-lords to swallow.

United States and Japan from Washington to Manchuria

Whatever the short-comings of the Washington arrangements they inaugurated an era of friendly relations between Washinpton and Tokyo. Consequent upon the Sino-Japanese treaty of February 4, 1922, Shantung in full sovereignty was restored to China. As a result of direct negotiations, the Lansing Ishii agreement of 1917 was abrogated on April 14, 1923. When in September 1923, Yokohama in Japan was hit by a severe earthquake and faced tremendous destruction, the U. S. offered $7 million as aid.

But the relations took an adverse turn when in 1924, the Congress enacted the Immigration Law, and prohibited the free entry of the Japanese into United States. This was very much resented in Japan. In 1927 Shidehara, a pacifist, was forced out of office, and Tanaka, an advocate of positive action, became the Prime Minister. Soon a strong policy was adopted. In June 1927, Japanese troops were sent to Shantung to check the further advance of Chinese Nationalist troops towards Peking. In April 1928, the Japanese forces clashed with the Nationalists in Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, and in September 1931, began the invasion of Manchuria by Japan— a step which was a direct challenge to the League system of collective security, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris.

United States and China form Washington to Manchuria

Through the various agreements, made at Washington in 1921-22, the U S Government was able to secure guarantees as to the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to the observance of 'open door.' Thereafter, the State Department continued to adhere to non-interference in China's internal affairs. She kept herself aloof from the struggle of the warlords in China. During 1927 when the Nationalists were advancing towards the North, Secretary Kellogg only announced, January, 27, 1927, American policy to be "in every way to maintain an attitude of the most careful and strict neutrality as among the several factions that have disputed with one another for control in China".[29] After the Kuomintang achieved a degree of unity in China, the U.S. recognized its government on July 25, 1928 by concluding a treaty restoring tariff autonomy to China. When in 1929, hostilities commenced between China

29. China White Paper, p. 11

and Soviet Union in Manchuria, the U.S. reminded them of their obligations under the Pact of Paris. In September 1931, Chinese northern province of Manchuria was invaded by Japan, and Washinton was faced with a dreadful situation.

United States and Japanese Aggression in China

When Japan started aggression and forceful expansion in Manchuria the U.S., in cooperation with the League of Nations, of which she was not a member, sought a peaceful solution of the controversy. Secretary Stimson reminded Japan of her obligations under the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928. When these warnings fell on deaf years in Tokyo Stimson announced, January 7, 1932, the policy of non-recognition of tertitorial changes brought about by force. The U.S., continued in the following years, to assert its treaty rights in China in the face of the extension of Japanese activities. On April 17, 1934, Eiji Amau, a Japnese Foreign Office spokesman, issued a statement proclaiming (i) Japanese "special responsibilities in East Asia" and (2) Japanese political guardianship of China, and warning the powers against commercial, political or financial under-takings' prejudicial to Japanese interests in China. The U.S. reacted sharply and on April 29, 1934, reaffirmed its treaty rights in China.

Japan continued to penetrate deeper into China. Late in 1935, she attempted to convert the five northern provinces of Shantung, Suiyuan, Shansi, Chahar and Hopei, into an autonomoug area. Again Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, reiterated, December 5, 1935, the position and interests of the U. S. in China. Following a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops on July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge, outside Peiping an undeclared war began between the two countries. Secretary Hull urged a policy of self-restraint upon the Japanese Government. On July 16, 1937, he issued a statement on fundamental principles of international policy: "abstinence from the use of force in relations between states, abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement.[30] In August 1937, the U.S. offered its good offices to Japan in an effort to settle the controversy : but Japan did not respond to the offer. The Japanese activities in China increased in intensity and it became apparent that Japan was bent upon solving the controversy by force. On October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt, in his 'quarantine speech' at Chicago, condemned, without mentioning the name, the Japanese resort to undeclared war against China. When the American gunboats were sunk in the Yangtse River by Japanese bombers, Washington

30. Ibid, p. 18.

demanded from Tokyo expressions of regret, complete indemnification and assurances that such incidents would not occur again. During 1938, the U.S. continued to emphasize upon Japan the observance of 'open door' in China, but Tokyo continued to ignore.

By way of moral and material support to China in its resistence to Japan's undeclared war, the U.S. placed at China's disposal, a credit of $ 25,000,000 to facilitate the exportation of American products especially the war material. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation granted a three-year $ 50,000,000 wheat and cotton credit to the Chinese Government. American aviation officers established training schools for Chinese pilots and crews at Canton and Hangchow. On July 26, 1939, the U S. gave notice to Japan of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed on February 21, 1911. As a result of this action, after January 26, 1940, the U.S. was in a position to resort to successive economic measures against Japan, and the shipment of oil, scrap iron, machine tools and other war materials to Japan was greatly restricted. Again on September 25, 1940, the Export-Import Bank, announced another loan of $ 25 million to China.

American-Japanese Informal Conversations in 1941

In order to settle peacefully the various economic and political problems of the Far East the U.S. entered into informal exploratory conversations with Japan in the spring of 1941. During these conversations, which lasted until December 6, 1941, an effort was made to draft an agreement containing the principles on which peace could be maintained in the Pacific area. The U.S. insisted on the 'open door' in China, on the inviolability of territorial integrity of China; and on the principle of pacific settlement of international controversies. Japan, on the other hand, sought to obtain recognition from the U.S. of Japanese hegemony in the Far East. The differences proved irreconcilable, and on December 7, 1941, Japan suddenly bombarded Pearl Harbour. This Japanese aggression abruptly ended the bilateral informal conversations; and the U.S. became an ally of China in repulsing the onward march of Japan. Only then, the U.S. threw all its might and resources in fighting the aggressive forces of Germany and Italy in Europe. The American diplomats co-operated with the European Allies in several wartime conferences held to devise plans for successfully fighting the war, and for solving the postwar problems on a permanent basis.[31]

31. For details of U. S. role in the war, see Chapter on War of this book.

The United States and the Philippines

Apart from China and Japan in the Far East, the U.S. came in early contact with the Philippines also. In 1898, she was involved in war with Spain on Cuba's account and found herself in possession of the Philippine Islands. The American expansionists of the era—Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge and Captain Mahan emphasized the importance of this newly-acquired territory in American' thrust for colonies and markets abroad. The more the American economic power increased, the more assertive she became in the Far East. In 1909, the U.S. rejected 'open door' in the Philippines and soon acquired almost a monopoly of the export and import trade of the islands.

The increasing penetration of the U.S. resulted in nationalist upserge among the islanders and Washington was faced with independence movement in the country. Wilson's pronouncement of loft ideals during the war (1914-1918), 'self determination' and 'freedom of the dependent peoples filled the Filipinos with an increased urge for self rule and liberation from foreign domination.

Immediately after the war, the Philippine Government sent a special mission to Washington. Wilson informed the mission that independence was 'almost in sight', In his Annual Message to the Republican Congress in December 1920, Wilson reminded the legislators of 'Our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands." But the Congress took no action. The Republicans, who controlled the Congress as well as the Administration after 1921, were opposed to the grant of comlete independence to the Philipphines. An Investigation Commission, under General Wood and Cameran Forbes, was sent, and it reported that the Filipinos lacked adequate education in political matters, that there was, in the island, an irreconcilable diversity of opinion on conditions of independence, and that the islands were not ready economically and militarily for independence. The matter was therefore shelved. In 1927, Coolidge came to the White House and he too was opposed to the complete independence for the Philippines.

The U.S. however, tried to persuade the Filipinos to take their minds off independence and settle down to the serious task of self-government. This lecturing only served to cause greater resentment among the people, and struggle for freedom was further sharpened. After the economic depression of 1929-30, most Americans changed their views on the problem of Philippines. The American Federation of Labour, several farm groups and patriotic societies looked upon the Philippines as a menace to American economic interests ; and they all advocated freedom for the Islanders. In December 1932, after the election

but before the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. Congress passed the Hare-Hawes Cutting Bill, which provided for independence after a transition period of ten years.

This Bill was resented by the Filipinos, and in March 1934, it was repassed as the Tydings-McDuffie Act.[32] This law was accepted by the Philippine legislature on May 1, and the Islanders were put to the hard test of running their own practical politics.

THE U. S, VIS A VIS LATIN AMERICA

Quite early in the nineteenth century, the Washington Government had realised the necessity of preventing European interference in the affairs of the New World. They wanted that the days when the rivalries of the European Powers were fought on American soil, should go. An excellent opportunity arose in 1823 when Spain, aided by the Holy Alliance, sought to suppress her revolting colonies of South America and their republican governments which they had set up. In his address to Congress on December 2, 1923 President Monroe proclaimed that the American continents "were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonisation by European Powers", and that the U.S. would not permit any "extension of their system to any portion of this hemisphere". This came to be known as "Monroe Doctrine' and laid down 'America for the Americans' principle. It was a unilateral act of the U. S. taken without previous consultation of the beneficiaries in the interests of the U. S. herself ; it was not a collective arrangement between all the independent states of the Western Hemisphere either for their joint security against European Powers or for their individual security against one another.

In the beginning, the Monroe Doctrine was a defensive measure based on self-interest and the idea of a natural separation between the Old and the New Worlds. But as the U. S. increased in strength, the Monroe Doctrine actually gave the U. S. an opening for intervention that might be indistinguishable from aggression in the eyes of a Latin-American country that was the object of it; for it might be argued and on some occasions was argued in the U.S. that the Administration at Washington could not fairly require other powers to abstain from interference in Latin-American countries for the safeguarding of their own interests unless the U.S. herself undertook the responsbility there, when she judged this necessary in the capacity of an international policeman to maintain order or to restore it.

32. Under the Tydings—McDuffie Act, many powers were reserved to the U. S. The Commonwealth still recognized the supreme authority of Washington and acts of several categories were still to be approved by the American President, for example, acts affecting currency, trade and immigration.

Accordingly, the phase of conquest, which had ended in 1846, and had been solely at the expense of Mexico, had been followed by a phase of intervention which, at one time or another, affected not only Mexico but many other republics as well. The policy of the U.S. towards her Latin-American neighbours after 1893 was one of 'dollar diplomacy'. This led to bitterness of relations with the peoples of Latin America, and in order to satisfy them President Wilson, who came to the White House in March, 1913, made public a "Declaration of Policy with regard to Latin America," which he caused to be dispatched to American diplomatic officials. It declared :

"One of the chief objects of my Administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two Continents.....The U. S. has nothing to seek in Central or South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two Continents, the security of the governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest."

To this statement of policy must be added the later (October 27, 1913) Mobile address, stating specifically that "the U. S. will never again seek one aditional foot of territory by conquest." Together they constituted the distinctive policy of Wilson towards Latin America. It did much to win the confidence and goodwill of the sister republics all over the Southern Continent and Central America.

Inauguration of the Republican Rule and the Liquidation of Imperialism in Latin America.

As Bemis has put "the auspicious outcome of the World War of 1914-1919, and its diplomatic aftermath in the Far East and the Pacific—the Washington treaties of February, 1922—marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Latin —America policy of the United States, the liquidation of imperialism." On the occasion of the centenary of Brazilian Independence in 1922, Secretary Hughes declared the policy of the Republican Administration towards Latin America and said : "We sincerely desire the independence, the unimpaired sovereignty and political integrity and the constantly increasing prosperity of the peoples of Latin-America. We have our domestic problems incident to the expanding life of a free people, but there is no imperialistic sentiment among us to cast even a shadow across the path way of our progress. We covet no territory ; we seek no conquest ; the liberty we cherish for ourselves we desire for others ; we sincerely desire to see throughout this hemisphere an abiding peace, the sign of justice and the diffusion of the blessings of a beneficent cooperation."

The first step in the liquidation of imperialism was taken as early as June, 1921 when the U.S. Military Governor in the Dominican Republic announced an eight month's period of preparation to meet the required conditions and complete all necessary arrangements for the independence of that Republic.

Secretary Hughes next turned to the problem of Central America. In 1922-23, Conferences were held in Washington under the chairmanship of Hughes to deal with the affairs of Central America, and the result was the twelve treaties between the five republics of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvodor, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua) for the general purposes of "conserving peace and solidarity among themselves, for disarmament, for free trade, for the study and inauguration of elaborate programmes of education, labour legislation, social welfare, transportation, and reciprocal rights of citizenship." But the principal achievement of the Conference was the adoption of a convention, to which the U. S. was also a party, for submission of disputes, which had proved insoluble through diplomatic channels, to an independent Commission of Inquiry, pending whose report the parties undertook to refrain from hostilities.

After 1927, the old policy of 'dollar diplomacy' was abandoned, and expressions to this effect were made by the U. S. diplomats on several occasions. At Havana, in a speech outside the conference to the American Chamber of Commerce, one of the delegates, ex-Secretary Hughes, declared that "the intervention of the U. S then in evidence were only for the purpose of ensuring stability as a means of securing independence. We have no desire to stay. We entered to meet an imperative but temporary emergency and we shall retire as soon as possible." Again in 1928, when the U. S. signed the Pact of Paris, Secretary Kellogg said before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on December 11 : "Even without this treaty, does anybody believe that the present governments of Europe are in any position to attack anyone of the south American counfries and impose upon them their form of government ?" In 1929, a special conference met at Washington and worked out two treaties—the General Convention of inter-American Conciliation, and the General Treaty of inter-American Arbitration.

President Hoover, between his election and his inauguration, made a trip to the principal countries of South America for the purpose of better understanding their relations with the United States. One result of this was personal understanding reached with the political leaders of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. Another important step in the direction of liquidating imperialism was the withdrawal of all U. S. troops from Nicaragua and Haiti. Again on February 6, 1931, Secretary Stimson said: "The Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of the U. S. versus Europe—

not of the U. S. versus Latin-America." Similarly the Under-Secretary of State, William R. Castle, stated that the Monroe Doctrine "conferred no superior position on the United States" In this way, partly through pronouncements and partly through practices, the Hoover Administration completed the foundations for Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbour' policy.

Roosevelt and Latin-America

In his first inaugural address, President Roosevelt declared, "I would dedicate this nation to the policy of good neighbour." This statement registered its greatest triumphs in the Western Hemisphere. Speaking to the Pan-American Union on April 14, 1933, Roosevelt said,: ".....Friendship among Nations, as among individuals, calls for constructive efforts to muster the forces of humanity in order that an atmosphere of close understanding and cooperation may be cultivated. It involves mutual obligations and responsibilities.....Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognises only equality and fraternity.....It is of vital interest to every Nation of this Continent that the American Governments individually take without further delay, such action as may be possible to abolish all unnecessary and artificial barriers and restrictions which now hamper the healthy flow of trade between the peoples of the American Republics."

During the years, following 1933, the pronouncements of Roosevelt and steps of foreigh policy advanced rapidly to the threshold of the new doctrine. At the seventh Pan American Conference at Montevideo in 1933, the U. S. signed, with other Latin-American States, the convention on the rights and duties of States. After Montevideo, it still remained "a task for Latin American diplomacy to tie down the United States absolutely and unreservedly to the Doctrine of non-intervention," as defined in Article VIII of the Inter American Treaty on the Rights and Duties of States. Roosevelt had declared that "the definite policy of the U. S from now on (after the Montevideo Conference) is opposed to armed intervention." In pursuance of this statement, the Roosevelt Administration soon proceeded to demonstrate its good faith in having abjured definitely armed intervention by itself alone. One by one in the months after Montevideo, it proceeded to divest the U. S. of existing treaty rights to intervene in Caribbean "protectorates" : Cuba, Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

On January 30, 1936, Roosevelt proposed a special inter-American Conference "for the purpose of co-ordinating and enforcing the existing peace machinery, inter-American economic amel o-ration, the furthering of cultural rapproachement as an aid to political solidarity and fending off from that side of the oceans, the disastrous effects of strife in the Old World." The Con-

ference opened at Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936 and the U. S. signed a number of conventions "showing friendship and co-operation with Latin America." On the morrow of Buenos Aires (December 24 1936), Panama ratified the treaty signed with the United States on March 2, 1936, abolishing the protectorate over that country. The Eighth International Conference of American states met in Lima, Peru, in December, 1938. The representatives signed a declaration, affirming "continental solidarity" and "collaboration" and providing for "consultation" among the foreign ministers, meeting "when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them," whenever the peace, security, or territorial integrity of an American Republic should be threatened.

When the second World War started in Europe, the foreign ministers met for the first time at Panama late in September, 1939. The U. S. asserted that the twenty-one American Republics could not permit "their security, their nationals, or their legitimate commercial rights and interests to be jeopardised by belligerent activities in close proximity to the shores of the New World." A "neutrality zone" was set up including all of South and Central America and North America south of Canada and extending out to sea 300 to 1000 miles. On the initiative of the U. S., the foreign ministers again met in Havana, Cuba, from July 21 to 30, 1940. The Conference approved a convention and a supplementary Act "continentalizing" the Monroe Doctrine and declaring that "when islands or regions in the Americas now under the possession of non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations may set up a regime of provisional administration;" pending eventual independence, or restitution to their previous status, "whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just."

After the Japanese attack and declaration of war upon the U. S., the Latin-American states expressed, in various ways, their solidarity with Washington. All Caribbean and Central American states, except Mexico, declared war upon the Axis Powers. All south American states, except Chile and Argentine, broke off relations with the Axis. In 1942, the foreign ministers again met for the third time in Rio de Janeiro and adopted resolutions of solidarity, which *inter alia* provided that :

(1) "An act of aggression against one American states was aggression against all. (2) "Diplomatic relations with the Axis must be broken. (3) "There should be an exchange of strategic material, the stabilisation of exchange and the taking over of all air-lines by the governments. (4) "A committee should be appointed to organise and corelate the control of subversive activities."

Facing the heaviest threats of all their independent history the American Republics huddled together instinctively under the military wings of the "Good Neighbour of the North." They afforded to the U. S. highly important and useful war materials. and temporary naval and air bases. Before the end of the war all of the nations of the New World (even including unfriendly Argentine at the last moment) declared war on the enemies of the United States. At San Francisco, on June 26, 1945, all the Latin American Republics became Charter members of the U.N.

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CHAPTER XI

FOREIGN POLICY OF GOVERNMENTS[1]

What Is Foreign Policy ?

The modern world is organized on the basis of the nation-state system, that is each of the countries among which the surface of the earth is divided constitutes a politically self-governing national state, asserting itself to be sovereign. The number of such states is somewhere between 80 and 90. These states exist, in the words of Pitman B. Potter, "in widely divergent physical, geologic, geographic and climatic situations, and are composed of more or less divergent racial and cultural strains."

Variations in local situation, economic and mineral resources and physical phenomena are bound to produce variations of interest and demand. And these divergences give rise to hostile, or at least different programmes of action towards other peoples.

Whereas the individual citizens of a state, although claiming equality in the eyes of their domestic law, and having varying interests, acknowledge a common duty to conform to that law, or are speedily brought to obedience by the local police or magistracy, no such situation exists in the case of nation-states. And whereas the presence of a well-organized system of government within each state makes possible the peaceful adjustment of varying interests in the national sphere, no such phenomena exist in the international arena. Whereas 'live and let live', compromise, and co-operation have been the prevailing spirit within national frontiers, the pursuit of unbridled self-interests has been the chief motivating force in international relations. The promotion of national security and prosperity has been the primary objective of every state.

But with the shrinking of the globe, as manifested by the "more abundant penetration of the trade, peoples, communications and anxieties of each nation into the domain of others, and the consequent increase in the impact of any action of any government upon the interests of others", it has become increasingly necessary that there should be a proper relationship between national interests and international responsibilities. The way in which a government ascertains the states rights, obligations, interests, and responsibilities in international relations and makes decisions in order to protect those rights, observe those obligations, promote those interests and discharge those responsibilities is known as the art of conducting foreign policy, or foreign relations.

1. For United States' Foreign Policy, see Chapter X of this book'

Factors Determining Foreign Policy

Sometimes a distinction is made between a government's conduct of foreign relations from its conduct of domestic affairs, in that in the former case, policies and attitude should be adopted or discarded not only in relation to national law and opinion but also in relation to international law and the probable reactions of foreign governments. But in reality, such a distinction is more imaginary than real, for what a state does at home and what it does abroad will invariably be dictated by paramount concern for its domestic interests. These concepts of national security and prosperity are, in themselves, largely determined by geographical situations, economic strength, military power, national characteristics, historical traditions, relative power position of states, and the world environment in general. These factors determining the foreign policy of the nation-states, big or small, can be classified into four: the geographic, the economic, the demographic, and the strategic. Of these, "the first is constituted by the territory of a state, viewed from the standpoint of position; the second, by its land and people considered from the aspects of raw material, self-sufficiency and standard of living; the third, by the population examined in respect to size and ethnic make-up; and the fourth, by physical geography and armaments regarded in relation to territorial security."

The Geographic Factor

The remark once made by Napoleon that "the foreign policy of a country is determined by its geography" has been corraborated by numerous scholars, statesmen and soldiers. Sir Austin Chamberlain once wrote: "Geographical facts have been decisive for the course of British history and explain, just as they dictate, the main principles of British policy and the preoccupations of British statesmen." Similarly, once a famous French diplomat Jules Cambon remarked: "The geographical position of a nation is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy—the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all" A German statsman, Richard Von Kuhlmann, put the thought into its larger political context when he observed: "Geographical position and historical developments are so largely determining factors of foreign policy that regardless of changes in the form of government, the foreign policy of a country has a natural tendency to return again and again to the same general and fundamental alignment."

The simple accident of location on the surface of the earth materially affects the interests and position of nations in the sphere of international relations. Plains and plateaus, rivers and mountains, and the climatic circumstances of temperature and rainfall greatly determine the production of food-stuffs and raw

materials. Similarly, the presence of natural barriers like mountains, deserts, forests, ice swamps, rivers and seas greatly determines the problem of national security, while the absence of these leaves a country open to frequent foreign attacks. The Tsars of Russia and, later on, the rulers of the Soviet regime recognized the lack of year-round ice-free ports as a national weakness, and considered "access to the warm-water ports" as a long term goal of Russian foreign policy. The policy of isolation from European affairs pursued by the United States for more than a century has been a source of great strength and protection ; and that it was made possible by her geographically isolated position is beyond question. That Belgium became the battle-ground, inspite of its neutral position during the two world wars, is due to the fact that she is the natural gateway between Germany and France. How the English Channel served as a great barrier to troop invasion of English by the powers of Europe has been displayed by successive wars. One significant concern of the British Foreign office has always been to insure the neturality of the low countries or their control by a remote or peaceful nation. As soon as they fall into the hands of a dynamic power, Britain must act. The integrity of the low Countries has always been of great concern to Britain and France and they immediately come together, if an aggressive third power threatened this approach to London and Paris. The close proximity of England to Europe always led her statsmen to pursue the policy of balance of power towards the continental states.

Similarly, in the present "Machine Age", the development of national industry has cecome a matter of great concern to every nation, because upon the extent of that development depend its prosperity in peace and its strength in war. In fact, only those states which are industrially well-advanced, hold that rank of Great Powers. And this industrial development of a state largely depended upon its accessibility to to reserves of energy, coal and water power, iron and the other raw materials essential to industry. Moreover, the climate of a nation's territory is also of primary importance, for only in the temperate zones does human energy attain the high degree of efficiency necessary to large-scale industry. Thus, the problem of national security and prosperity of those statess which are rich in iron and coal deposits have easy access to "the World that matters" or would be different from those who lack in them. And the statesmen, when they would frame the foreign policies of their governments, would be grettly influenced by this phenomenon.

The Economic Factor

If the geographic factor involves the question of location, the economic is a matter of self sufficiency and population

pressure. From the point of view of their production, states may be divided into three categories : the industrial, the agrarian, and the balanced. The industrial states are those which have established huge centres of production, but largely depend upon foreign sources of essential raw materials for running them and are incapable of producing sufficient foodstuffs to feed the native populations. Such category of states are France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland and Belgium.

To the agrarian group belong those states, which are rich in raw materials and minerals, and produce sufficient foodstuffs, but are unable to establish any considerable national industry due to the lack of resources in coal and iron. Some of the smaller countries of Europe, almost all the states of Latin America and a number of them in Asia may be put under this category.

In the third group, the balanced, may be included such states as are able to produce sufficient foodstuffs to feed their people, and also maintain their industries mainly from the resources of their own territory. Only the U.S., the Soviet Union, the British Empire could be included in this category.

It may however be pointed out that neither a wholly industrial country nor wholly an agranian, may claim to be a Great Power. Not even the U. S. and the Soviet Union, which have been more richly endowed than ethers, can pretend to attainment of economic self-sufficiency the reason being that the strategic raw materials are too unevenly distributed around the surface of the globe.

Exactly the same situation exists if the problem of population were examined. Just as huge supplies of raw material and natural resources are necessary to acquire a Great Power status, similary, a large population is necessary to supply the raw materials of a powerful army and navy. But, on the other hand, if the population constantly goes on increasing in relation to the available sources of food and habitation, it becomes a cause of weakness and involves the government of the country in all sorts of complications.

As stated by Simonds and Emeny, "the desire to acquire markets and to possess new lands rich in natural resources, to insure the prosperity of larger populations at home quite as much as to obtain territories abroad suitable for colonisation, was one of the compelling motives of national policy in the case of certain of the Great Powers of Europe in the closing quarter of the nineteenth century, and in fact to the very eve of the World War itself."[2] It was this motive that led Japan to invade

2. Simonds, F. H. and Emeny, B., The great Powers in World Politics (New York, American Book Company, 1939) p. 93.

Manchuria in 1931 and Pearl Harbour in 1941. Germany's demand for the return of her lost colonies and her declared ambitions for expansion to the East, particularly in the Russian Ukraine, was based quite as much upon the need of markets and of raw materials as upon the need of a larger area for her population. In her cry of "place under the sun" (*laben-saraum*), Italy was guided by almost the same motives.

The above analysis naturally leads to the conclusion that the abundance of one commodity and the lack of another on the one hand, and the pressure of constantly increasing population on the other, profoudly affect the foreign policy of nations. These will drive the nations, subjected to such pressure, "to seek changes in the territorial *status quo* of the world and thus bring them into collision with the states whose interest lies in maintaining the *status quo* both of their own territories and of those of other states."

The Demographic Factor

The third important factor, influencing the foreign policy of nations, is demographic, which is constituted by the people of a state considered from the two aspects of numbers and ethnic circumstances. The first aspect includes two elements, *viz.*, the size of the population and the extent of development of the technique of production. A relatively large population on the one hand and a huge and efficient industrial production on the other go to make a nation Great Power. The Soviet Union is a Big Power, because she possesses both the requisities while India is not, because, though she has a large number of people, she is not industrially so advanced, as to be self-sufficient in her needs. And this fact goes a long way to determine the extent to which a nation is able to pursue an independent course of foreign policy, and leave an impress upon world events.

Ethnic make-up of nations is the second important aspect of the demographic factor. The problem of those states, whose population belongs predominantly to one race or nationality is quite simple. But the population of several countries of Central Europe comprised so many ethnic minorities, particularly after the first World War, that the minority problem became an important factor leading to the outbreak of the second World War. Of the ethnic minorities in Europe early in 1938, the Germans were the most considerable. Under the Versaille's Treaty of 1919, some ten million of German speaking people were separated from the Reich, seven million being transferred to Austria and three to the newly-created state of Czechoslavakia. Quite a considerable number of Germans was inclded in the borderlands of Poland and France and in the successor states of the western part of Russia. This separation of the

Germans from the Reich and tha erection of Polish Corridor, which not only created a German minority but also shattered the territorial unity of Germany, produced one of the most acute post-war problems in Europe. Similarly, millions of Magyars were scattered over Czechos.avakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia; the Bulgarians of Mecedonia were handed over to Greece and Yugoslavia. The presence of minorities speaking the same language as its own people just across the frontiers of a state usually resembles that of population pressure, since it inspires the government and people of such a state with the hope of expanding their boundaries to include these minorities, thereby to achieve ethnic unity." Thus, the aspiration of the French after the Franco-Russian War of 1870-71, to recover the French-speaking districts of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany; and that of the Italians to liberate the Latin populations of Trieste and the Trentino considerably influenced the foreign policies of the two countries. Similarly, after the First World War, the "irredentist" ambitions of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, shaped not only the foreign policies of these states, but also affected the peace of Europe. The statesmen of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, who were faced with no problem of considerable magnitude, identified the "Irrendentist" aspirations of European states "as no more than ambitions to acquire new markets, fresh sources of raw materials and wider lands for colonisation or for the enhancement of power and prestige." But, as put by Simonds and Emeny, "to assign economic or purely imperialistic causes for polices which have their origin in ethnic circumstances is, however, to err fatally." The foreign policy of Hitler's Germany was dominated by one purpose: "to bring about a unification of the German nationality by combining in one state the seventy five millions of Teutons of Central Europe." But the apprehension that such a unification would make Germany the most powerful state in the Centre of Europe led the French, the Italians and the British to combine to preserve the *status-quo*. Thus, the importance of the demographic factor in the determination of foreign policies of states must be clearly realised.

The Strategic Factor

Last but not the least important factor in the determination of foreign policy of nations is the strategic. The charactor of its boundaries and the absence of national protective frontiers greatly determine the security problem of a natiou. In the case of those states, like the British Isles and Japan, which enjoy an island position, the sea functions as a great barrier to foreign attack, particularly if, in response to their natural situation, they have developed naval power as the first line of defense. The United States is in a very advantageous position. Although geographically, she forms a single continental unit, strategically

it functions as an island, because of "the natural security of its land frontiers and the fact that its Pacific and Atlantic coasts are joined by the Panama Canal making the navy primary weapon of defense against attack upon either coast". Similarly, a continental state must maintain a strong military, whereas the army is the exclusive instrument of defense for a land-locked country.

Distance is another factor of great strategic significance. Removed by vast stretches of ocean from world centres of disturbance in Europe and Asia, the United States enjoyed a long period of peaceful expansion and consolidation in the western hemisphere, whereas England, due to its proximity to Europe, was always involved in continental convulsions. It may however be mentioned in this connection that the development of modern aviation has profoundly affected the security problem not only of Great Britain, but also of the United States, and other countries situated far-off.

The more effective protective barriers intimately related to physical geogaraphy are the mountains, deserts, snow, ice swamps and forests. Each of these plays its own peculiar strategic role according to the circumstances of the nation concerned.

Soviet Union is one of the few countries having the most secure boundaries. Most of her southern frontier is in mountain and desert areas ; the northern border is virtually impenetrable by virtue of its swamps and ice fields ; forests and swamps lie on her north-eastern and north-western portions : "General Mud" and General Marshes"[3] were the two most significhnt defenses of Russia both during the first and the second World Wars against German invasions.

The importance of forests and mountains as natural bariersr is likewise seen in Latin America. With few exceptions the frontiers of the South American countries are protected against land attack. On the continent of Asia, the protective importance of mountains, deserts and plateaus is best illustrated in the cases of Tibet and the northern border of India. In Europe, Switzerland has enjoyed a high degree of security by virtue of her mountainous territory inspite of the fact that she has been in the midst of armed conflicts.

The fact that natural barriers to attack play an important strategic role led China to construct the Great Wall with total length of 1,500 miles, and similarly inspired France to construct the Maginot line, running from the Swiss border to the North Sea. Both of these served as great man-made defense barriers.

3. Idid.

Similarly. a nation's geographic situation greatly determines its attitude towards the problem of armaments. If, for an insular state, navy is the first line of defense and the military, the second, for a continental state, it is the reverse of it. Although armaments would be adopted to geographical situation, their strength and size would depend upon the political climate of the region in which a particular stateis place d.

In Europe, where the security of most of the states was always in jeopardy, even the smallest states had to spend heavily on armaments. Whereas before the first World War, the United States was for away from the centre of conflicts, and therefore spent much less on war preparations, she had to bear a heavy burden of armaments after it and much more after the Second World War. Whereas Czechoslovakia with a much smaller population had a vast army, Mexico with a much larger population had much less, the only reason being that the former was situated in the midst of politically unstable conditions, whereas the latter was not. Whereas the command of atleast European and Australasian waters was of considerable significance to England, it was not so essential for Russia, for the simple reason that Great Britain possessed a vast empire scattered in all parts of the world. The cutting of communications between the colonies and the mother country would heve struck at the very life line of the latter. To the Russian army, the Trans-Siberian railroad is of as great strategic importance as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are to the British and American navies ..... And just as a navy second to none appears to British or American eyes indispensable to inter-oceanic security so is a vast military establishment the first bulwark of Russian defense of her European and Asiatic extremities, the naval branch having but secondly importance." In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the facts whether peoples live on Islands or continents, whether their countries are situated in Asia, Africa, Europe or America, whether they have natural resources of raw material to supply their industry and food supplies to feed their populations greatly determine the foreign policy of nations. As put by one commentator : "To know the physical circumstances of a state is therefore to understand its national policy. To know the extent of its resources is to perceive the strength which it can mobilise to support that policy. To persuade a people to change its policy it is necessary to modify the circumstances which are responsible for that policy. To compel a state to abondon its policy it is necessary to muster a force decisively superior to the force of that state. These simple facts constitute the foundations of international relations and they have always to be considered in the light of the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the individual state."

Foreign Policy as Distinguished from Diplomacy

Two terms 'foreign policy' and 'diplomacy' are sometimes misunderstood, and even misused in the science of international relations. The two are often employed as synonyms, when we say : "the American diplomacy proved an utter disillusionment in China, or that British diplomacy of "divide, and rule" proved most disastrous for India." Truly speaking, it is not the success or failure of diplomacy but of foreign policy of a nation, which is the more significant factor. "Diplomacy", as defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, "is the management of international relations by negotiation ; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys, the business or art of the diplomatist." The function of diplomacy is the management of the relations between independent states by processes of negotiation. Whereas foreign policy is the 'legistative' aspect of the problem of inter-state relations, diplomacy is its executive aspect. In a democratic country, whereas the matters of foreign policy are decided by the cabinet with the approval of the legislators, they are executed by the civil sarvants, who constitute what might be called 'the diplomatic service,' or individually called 'diplomats'. The diplomat is supposed to possess no party affiliations ; his duty is, as put by Nicolson, "to place its experience at the disposal of the Government in power, to tender advice, and if need be, to raise objections. Yet, if that advice be disregarded by the Minister as representative of the sovereign people, it is the duty and function of the civil service to execute his instructions without further question."[4] Writing on Ambassadors in his book, *'The Principle, and Practice of Diplomacy'*, Sardar K. M. Panikkar stated : "Ambassadors have a double function. They are in a country to translate and give effect to the policies of the Home Government but a no less important function is to acquaint the Home Government with the policies, attitudes of mind and the general conditions of the countries, to which they are accredited."[5] Similarly, as stated by the same author, "diplomacy, used in relation to international policies, is the art of forwarding one's interests in relation to other countries."

Thus, according to the basic theory of diplomacy in a democracy, "the diplomatist, being a civil servant, is subject to the Foreign Secretary ; being a member of the cabinet, is subject to the majority in Parliament ; and Parliament, being but a representative Assembly, is subject to the will of the sovereign people."[6]

4. Nicolson, H., *Diplomacy* (London, Oxford Varsity Press, 1950) p. 81
5. Panikar K. M,, *The Priciples and Practice of Diplomacy.* (Delhi, Ranjit Publishers, 1952) p. 51.
6. Nicolson, p. 82,

To summarise, it may be said : Foreign policy is the art and rocess of making decisions on issues of international oncern, while diplomacy is the art and process of executing hose decisions *Vis-a-Vis* the other states.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Basic Principles

The course of British foreign policy during the inter-war period, as ever before, has been largely determined by its geographical situation. As early as January 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out in his "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany":

> "The general character of England's foreign policy is determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean plank of Europe as an Island State with vast overseas colonies and dependencies,whose evistence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea power".

Great Britain is an island separated from the Continent of Europe only by a narrow streak of water. This island, moreover, became the centre of world-wide empire whose arterial roads are on the oceans and through the narrow seas. Domination of the seas and control, at least iufluence, over the watet ways to the East-the Mediterranean, the Suez and the Middle Eastern region especially Egypt and Palestine, has therefore been her vital concern both for the defence of the home islands and for the security of the Empire and this has necessitated the maintenance of naval supremacy.

The waters which divided her from Western Europe were so narrow that she could never for long ignore the developments on the opposite shore of the English Channel or the North Sea. The neutrality of the Low Countries became a British interest, their frontiers became the British frontiers ; their independence the condition of Britain's independence and England's safety became inseparably connected with their safety. It was to secure the independence of the Low Countries that England fought Spain it the sixteenth centrury, took battles with Napoleon in the nineteenth, and entered the War against Germany in 1947.[7]

The maintenance of balance of power in Europe has been the third central aim of British Foreign Office since the days of Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey. It was in fact the oldest and soundest principle. "The business of Britsh Statesmanship", as

7 The insular security of Great Arit ain was further impaired with the development of aeronautics which facilitated the bombardment of the Brit ish Isles from bases on the Continent.

Simonds and Emeny have put it, was to see that parity existed, not only among the Great Powers individually, but also between any two coalitions into which these powers might divide, in order that the danger of any pursuit of hegemony by an individual State should be abolished.' The policy of balance of power was succintly expressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain when he said in the House of Commons : "All our great wars have been fought to prevent one great military power dominating Europe and at the same time dominating the coasts of the Channels and the ports of the Low Countries."

Britain's geography explains another basic fact of her foreign policy, viz., the freedom of the seas, so that the English people could carry their manufactured goods and import raw materials and foodstuff the very basis of their survival. Trade has always been the life blood of Britain and its promotion and protection has always been her major concern.

Britain's dependence upon foreign trade also made her the advocate of the freedom of commerce, that is, the exchange of goods between countries without let or hindrance, or "the natural protection of the weaker communities", as Sir Eyre pointed out.

The Treaty of Versailles was only the first step towards the new order which the Allies hoped to establish after the Great war. Many great problems still seemed to darken the international horizon. These were the French demand for security, the Reparations and Inter-Ally War Debts, the Communist Revolution in Russia, the problem of peace and the instruments of peace like the League of Nations, disarmament and collective security, the British Empire, the U. S.-Japanese contest for supremacy in the Far East and so on

Britain and French Quest for Security

The most pressing problem of international politics after 1920 was the French quest for security. The refusal of the American Congress to ratify either the Treaty of Versailles or the Guarantee Treaty of March 1919 made France more anxious about her security. She, therefore, urged that Germany should be compelled strictly to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and showed a strong desire to enforce by arms the payment of reparations and disarmament of Germany. The contention of France was supported by the *Little Entente*.

Great Britain desired to bring Germany back to the concert of Europe. Lloyd George held that "a free, a contented and a prosperous Germany is essential to civilisation." He wanted to give a liberal interpretation to the Treaty of Versailles. This was for several reasons. First, London did not like France

in a pre-dominant position in Europe; secondly, the economic exhaustion of England during the war demanded the speedying up of international trade; and since Germany was a good importer of English goods, her economic recovery was of great urgency; thirdly, the central position of Germany on the map of Europe promised a counterpoise to the Communist expansion towards Central Europe; and finally, Britain also realized that any guarantee with France would mean a perpetual drain upon her resources and the consequent neglect of her internal and imperial problems.

But while the attitude of Great Britain towards Germany was fundamentally different from that of France, Lloyd George strongly opposed the attempt of Germany to restore her military power. The army that Germany was maintaining was twice as large as the Treaty of Versailles allowed. In April 1920, a German force had entered the demilitarized Rhine area. At a Conference held at Spa in July 1920, Lloyd George insisted on the strict observance of the terms of the treaty, and a great amount of German guns and munitions of war was destroyed.

The Anglo-French divergence, however, regarding the future of Germany was clearly visible in their attitude towards the several issues of international politics during the postwar years. In 1922, London hailed the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Soviet Union, whereby mutually advantageous commercial relations were restored. In 1924, England resented the military occupation of the Ruhr Valley by the French and Belgian Troops without the concurrence of the other powers, signatories to the Versailles Treaty. The same year, Britain refused to ratify the German Protocol, designed to deal with the problem of French security on the ground that, if she accepted the fact, she might be required to take part in a European War for a cause which did not affect her own interests. Just as the national interests had caused the U. S. to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, the same led London to repudiate the Protocol of Geneva. In 1925, while Great Britain was quite willing to guarantee the Western frontier of Germany in the Locarno Agreements, she refused to guarantee the eastern frontier of Germany, where the clients of France, the powers of the *Little Entente*, were located. England favoured the entry of Germany in the League of Nations and in 1926, she became a semi-permanent member of the League Council. In 1928, London signed the Pact of Paris, enunciated by Briand, but made far-reaching reservations as to its applicability.

In 1929, the world was thrust into the economic crisis. The problem of security fell into the background and England, as all others, was involved in new troubles. In 1933, Hitler, dedicated to the repudiation of Versailles Treaty, rose to power in Germany. The French quest for security now became a need

of the hour and the French statesmen, out of nervousness, looked arround for allies to encircle Germany with friendly powers. In May, 1935, pacts of friendship were made with Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

In this new situation, England's policy underwent a phenomenal change. She found in the Nazi dictatorship a strong counterpoise for Soviet-totalitarianism and adopted towards the former the policy of appeasement. On March 16, 1935, Hitler announced that Germany "no longer considered herself bound by the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty" and London only ignored the declaration. On June 18, 1935, Britain signed a Naval Pact with Germany. Paris expressed its horror. On March 7, 1936, Berlin declared herself free from the obligations of the Locarno Treaty and 20 000 German troops re-occupied the Rhineland. Public opinion in London and Paris was shocked but there was no open condemnation. In March 1938, Austria was occupied by Germany and the Western Democracies "moaned like sincere widows". In September 1938 came the Munich Pact, whereby Czechoslovakia was put at the mercy of Hitler. That was the climax of appeasement. The French Foreign Office was nervous; willy-nilly she toed the British line. When the war broke out in 1939, London took decisions for Paris also. In June 1940, France was attacked and within a fortnight, she lay at Hitlers's feet. French fears came out true and England's wishful thinking about Hitler's motivations involved her in a life and death grapple once again.

As regards Italy, another fascist power in Europe, Britain welcomed her growth as a strong power in the Mediterranean to check and balance the pre-dominance of France. Moreover, a strong Italy in alliance with Germany promised to check the expansion of Soviet Union. Hence appeasement of Mussolini as well. This explains the British bungling of the infamous Hoare-Laval plan and the subsequent recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. This also explains the British non-intervention in the Spanish civil war, in which Mussolini had thrown his lot in favour of General Franco; and London calmly witnessed the murder of Spanish Democracy.

Britain, Reparations and War Debts

The Treaty of Versailles had provided that Germany should pay to the Allies £1,000,000,000 by May 1921, and should deliver to France a varying amount of coal upto a maximum of 20,000,000 tons a year and to Belgium 8,000,000 tons a year. The final terms of reparations were referred to a Reparation Commission which fixed Germany's total liability at £6,600 million. England and France differed as to their attitude regarding Germany's reparation liabilities. Lloyd George doubted whether Germany could pay the reparations the Allies demanded. Britain's point of view was that Germany had been so drastically crushed that she

was no longer to be feared. She therefore favoured the cancellation of all clauses in the Treaty which hampered and delayed Germany's return to normalcy. Britain adopted this attitude not because this was just but because Germany's economic recovery was essential to her own trade.

But France was inexorable. She was convinced that any failure of cash payment or coal delivery was due to the deliberate default of Germany and she desired, by the further occupation of German territory, to secure the full payment of reparation. By May 1921, the Allies, however, concluded that Germany could not pay the terms which had been imposed upon her. They reduced the total of reparation payments by about one half. In 1922, Germany declared that she was unable to pay reparations. France asserted that any default was due to the deliberate action of Germany. In December 1923, the Reparation Commission declared that Germany had deliberately defaulted in its delivery of coal. In January 1924, France, in defiance of Great Britain, occupied the Ruhr Valley. This proved disastrous both for Germany and France. In 1924, through the Dawes Plan and in 1928, through the Young Plan, London attempted to put Germany's financial house in order. In 1929-30, the world was faced with the "economic crisis" and Germany's economic difficulties were also aggravated. In order to give Germany time to recover, President Hoover declared a moratorium of one year for both war debts and reparations. Great Britain welcomed the declaration, but France assented to this arrangement with reluctance because she persisted in the belief that the failure of Germany was deliberate, and feared that Germany would use the money to increase her military forces. The Lausanne Conference, held in 1932 to deal with the question of war debts and reparations, put an end to reparations and relieved Germany of her obligations to the Allied countries.

Another problem, which needed to be solved, was the Inter-Ally War Debts. In 1918 the debts, due from the Allies to the U.S., amounted to £1,415,000,000 and the latter had incurred no debts to any of the Allies Great Britain was owed £1,861,000,000 and owed £1,216 000,000 The balance of debt was in favour of Great Britain but against France, Italy and Belgium.

The question of war debts created serious differences between London and Washington. "The Americans pointed out that they had paid in cash for all goods, they had purchased and held that a repudiation of the debt owed by Great Britain would be contrary to the best traditions of commerce. They asserted that they had entered the war to save the Allies, that they had sent 2,000,000 men to fight in Europe at a cost of £30 000,000,000 and unlike the Allies, had received no German colonies after the war." Great Britain, on the other hand, argued that "the interests of the United States and the cause of democracy had been

maintained by the united action of the Allies in the Great War that Germany was the common enemy of all and that it was the duty of the Allies to use all their resources in men and money as a common fund.....". At the Peace Conference, Great Britain had suggested that all war debts between the Allies should be cancelled. In August 1922, she offered to cancel all debts due to her from the Allies and all reparation payments due from Germany except that portion which would enable her to pay her debts to the U. S. Both these suggestions were unacceptable to Washington.

No satisfactory solution could be found. President Coolidge reasserted the demand of the U. S. that war debts should be paid in full but the debtor countries found great difficulty in meeting their obligations owing to the failure of Germany to pay reparations and to the economic crisis caused by the increasing depression in trade. In December 1932, France repudiated payment, but Great Britain paid in full. In June and December, 1933, London paid £ 2,000,000 instead of the £ 19,000,000 which was due. In June 1933, the sixty-four countries met in London to face the worldwide economic crisis, but no agreement could be made and the problems of war debts was shelved.

Britain and the Communist Revolution in Russia

Communism was a great challenge to the democratic countries of the West and the rise of Bolshevism in 1917 in Russia was viewed with great alarm in London and Paris. During the years 1917-1920, the Western countries reinforced the counter-revolutionary forces within and organized armed attacks on revolutionary forces from without. Allied intervention, however, failed and the West realized that the Soviet Union had come to stay. True to her policy of 'let by-gones be by-gones,' London was the first of the Allied Powers to enter into a Trade agreement with Russia on March 31, 1921, and the latter undertook to cease all anti-British propaganda. In April 1922, Lloyd George convened a conference at Geneva to deal with the economic position of Russia. The Russian delegates "used the occasion to preach the cause of Communism and, with great effrontery, suggested to Lloyd George that if theAllies would pay five million pounds as compensation for damage done to Russia owing to the support given by Great Britain and France to the recent rebellions against the Soviet, the latter would discharge the debts due from the Czarist Government to the Allies, which amounted to half that sum". This was a very uncomfortable situation for the Allies and the negotiations ended in failure.

The Third International adopted a policy of aggressive class-warfare and anti-capitalist propaganda. The British Foreign Office protested but the Soviet asserted that they had no official control over the Third International. In 1923, some

British subjects in Russia were ill-treated by the Soviet Government and great resentment was felt in London. The Conservative Government under Lord Curzon adopted a stiff attitude.

In January 1924, the Labour Party, with Ramsay MacDonald as Premier, came into power and a new era in Anglo-Soviet relations began. A friendly policy was adopted and in February diplomatic recognition was extended to the Soviet Government. Negotiations were commenced to settle the outstanding causes of grievances between the two countries. Matters were moving smoothly when in October 1924 there occurred the 'Zinoview letter' episode. This letter seemed to prove that some members of the Labour Party were on friendly terms with the Third International. A storm of public indignation was aroused; the Labour Party was thrown out and in November 1924, the Conservatives again returned to power. Anglo-Russian relations took a turn for the worse. Treaties drawn up by MacDonald were repudiated. The Third International persisted in its anti-British propaganda activities and British people extremely resented it. During May-June 1926, London was involved in a serious general strike and the Soviet sent £ 380,000 to support the miners. This was strongly protested by Austen Chamberlain. Grave suspicions were felt that the Soviet Trade Delegation and 'Arcos', the Chief Russian trading agency in London, were supporting the British Communists and on May 12, 1927, a raid on Soviet House showed that these suspicions were correct. In consequence the Trade Agreement of 1921 was broken off.

In 1929, the Labour Party, which favoured friendship with Russia, again came to power. Arthur Henderson concluded another commercial treaty, and diplomatic status was again granted to a Soviet Trade Delegation.

In the summer of 1933 two employees of the Vickers-Maxim Company were arrested by the Soviet Government on charges of espionage and sabotage and put in prison. The Foreign Office strongly protested against the arrests but the Soviet refused to liberate the prisoners. The British Government broke off all commercial relations.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria seriously undermined Russian interests in the Far East. The Soviet feared that Japan, if securely established in Manchuria, will probably attempt to secure Vladivostok and the maritime provinces of Eastern Siberia. The rise of Hitler to power in Germany was another danger. He was the sworn enemy of Communism and was committed to 'colonize' eastern Europe. These developments caused a complete change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The activities of the Third International were suppressed and hands of friendship were extended towards the West.

But London refused to grasp. London saw in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy strong counter-stroke to Russian totalitarianism. The policy of appeasing the dictators was adopted and all gestures of friendship from Moscow were turned down. Even in the shadows of death, the Anglo-Soviet negotiations for a non aggression pact failed and the Soviet Union was thrust in the German fold (Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939). Only when in June 1941, Hitler started the invasion of Russia and the Western Powers thought their own security endangered in the event of Russia's annihilation, London cast her lot with Moscow and on July 12, 1941 signed a pact with USSR guaranteeing aid in war against Germany. From 1941 onwards, London and Moscow went hand in hand both in the battle-fronts and the diplomatic conferences till the war came to an end in 1945.

Britain and the Far East

Great Britain had her vast trade and commercial interests in the Far East. Since the days of Opium War, the volume of British trade had been increasing ; and she had obtained several trade, missionary and extra-territorial concessions in China and Japan. When in the opening years of the present century, the United States, Russia, Germany and France threatened her interests, London made friendship with Japan in 1902. During the first two decades, Tokyo acted as the watch-dog of British interests in the Far East. But the end of the war witnessed the commencement of United States-Japanese contest for supremacy and the American people held the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 as the shield for Japanese expansionism in China. England, emerging from the war exhausted and weak, could not afford to incur the displeasure of Washington and agreed, at the conference in 1921-22, to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the Four Power Pact. But this was only a formal change and the Anglo-Japanese collaboration continued in the post-war years. Sentiments of friendship were expressed by the representatives of the two countries on several occasions. When in 1931, Japan started the invasion of Manchuria and the U.S. proposed sterner measures, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, expressed reluctance. London discouraged the machinery of the League of Nations from taking any firm action against Japan. After 1933, Britain adopted towards Japanese aggression in China the same attitude as she did in regard to Germany and Italy in Europe. viz., 'appeasement'. When in 1937, Japan restarted hostilities against China, London only connived. Not only that, England, along with the other Western Powers, continued to supply Japan the wherewithal to carry on war on the Chinese territory. A huge volume of trade developed between the two countries. Britain thought a powerful Japan would be a fit bulwork against Soviet Communism. Only when the United States

stronghold in the Far East, Pearl Harbour, was bombarded by Japan, and the British interests were under threat of invasion, the British reversed their pro-Japanese policy. War was declared upon Tokyo and Britain sincerely cooperated with the U.S. in the destruction of Japanese military power in the Far East and South East Asia.

Britain and World Peace

The Great War was so destructive and calamitious that the Western diplomats were constantly seized of the problem of permanent world peace in the post-war years. Collective security and disarmament were considered as the two guarantees of future peace, and both were incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations. But London lost her interest in the League from the beginning particularly because of the withdrawal of the United States from its membership and because she realized that in the event of U.S. non-participation, she would have to undertake huge responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. Moreover, she had no interests in the security of those states which lay beyond the orbit of her domain. Britain began to look upon the League as a "machinery whose only use was loud noise and whose only production was pious resolutions couched in masterly language of diplomacy evolved after thousands of bitter and sweet experiences". As early as 1921, the real force of article 16 of the Covenant was watered down at the instance of London and quite a different interpretation was given to the provisions of collective security. During 1920's, Britain displayed very little enthusiasm in the repeated attempts made to strengthen the security system of the League. She did participate in the various conferences held to discuss the problem of disarmament, but here the interests of the powers were so vitally far apart that no progress could be possible.

The collective security system of the League was put to a heavy ordeal in 1931 when Japan started the invasion of Manchuria. Britain showed her unwillingness to participate in any collective action and the aggressor went unpunished. Again in 1934, when Italy started aggresion against Ethiopia the lukewarmness of London and Paris denied the League another opportunity of upholding its system of collective security. In 1935-36, Hitler began to repudiate the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty and Britain kept quiet. In July 1936, there began the Civil War in Spain, and while Germany and Italy actively assisted General Franco, London assumed silence in the name of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria and London connived. When latter in the same year, he began the 'rape' of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain arranged the Munich Pact. The road which England had taken was the way to war. The League and its peace provisions were flouted one

after the other. The only occasion when its machinery could be usefully utilized for England came in 1939, when Soviet Russia invaded Finland in November. The League met and at the instance of Britain, condemned and expelled the aggressor from the family of nations.

Great Britain and the Empire

Great Britain controlled a vast empire abroad comprised of 440,923,000 people in 1922, and an area of more than a quarter of the globe. Canada, Newfound Land, Australia, South Africa, Newzealand and the Irish Free State were the first components of the empire but they were almost self-governing independent communities in their internal affairs. India was a sort of semi dominion. Then, there were crown colonies differing from one another in the extent of self-rule ; these were Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, Malaya, Gibralter, Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, Bahama, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Uganda and Sarawak (Borneo) were the British protectorates. And lastly, there were territories mandated by the League of Nations in 1919 ; these were Palestine, German East Africa, German South West Africa, Western Samoa, German New Guinea, Arab Iraq and lesser territories.

The War of 1914-1918 stimulated among the dependencies a new urge for national pride and nation-hood and a new attitude developed towards the mother country. As early as 1907 representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Union of South Africa met the British Government in an Imperial Conference to discuss the problems that confronted the empire as a whole and that affected the relations of the members one to another. In 1917, the Imperial War Conference recommended that the self-governing Dominions, which the colonies now came to be called, should be recognished as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth. In the years immediately following the war, no legal steps were taken to grant the demand of the Dominions They were, however, separately represented at the Peace Conference, signed the Peace Treaties independently and became original members of the League of Nations. This greatly increased their status and altered their relations with the mother country. In the post-war years, the Dominions as well as Britain took several steps which brought the former nearer to the status of sovereign states.

In 1923, for example, Canada signed the Halibut Fisheries Treaty with the United States, without the participation of the British Government. In 1925, Britain signed the Locarno Pact and undertook responsibilities from which the Dominions were specifically stated to be free, unless they wished otherwise which none of them did. In 1926, the Belfour Committee of the Imperial Conference defined the Dominions as "autonomous

communities within the British Empire, in no way subordinate to one another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" In 1929, a technical Committeee of the representatives of the Dominions was appointed to recommend steps that should be taken to enforce the Belfour Declaration and on the basis of its report, the British Parliament adopted in December 1931, the Statute of Westminister. It affirmed that "no law hereafter made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to any of the Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the request and with the consent of that Dominion". This Statute, in a way, created a "British Commonwealth of independent Nation"--a group of independent political entities owing allegiance to one and the same symbol of unity, the Crown. As early as 1930, the Dominions had contended successfully that their choice of governor-generalship should be accepted. In 1931, the Irish Free State assumed a Great Seal of its own and in 1936, declared its independent status. On January I, 1938 its new constitution went into effect. As a result of the status, acquired by the statute, several Dominions proceeded to appoint their own diplomatic representatives abroad and to enter into treaty relationship independent of London.

Britain and the Second World War

The outbreak of the war in September 1939 greatly affected the foreign policy of London. The Frankenstein monster, which she had created in Germany to devour up the Soviet Union, became formidable to itself and being faced with the dilemma of annihilation, London rallied to the support of Germany's victims. In collaboration with France, Britain declared war upon Germany on September 3, 1939. In July 1941, even the hitherto international outcaste, the Soviet Union, was befriended. In December 1941, the U. S. entered the war, and thereafter, England was left in the secondary position, the major decisions of policy being made by Washington and Moscow. She, however, suffered heavily at the hands of the Axis Powers, and when the war ended in 1945, Britain was bankrupt and completely exhausted both in men and money. She was no longer capable to retain her hold upon the dependencies and the structure of the mighty empire, so assiduously constructed, through a long period of stress and strife, began to crumble. The British Commonwealth became the Commonwealth of Nations. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Egypt-all became free and England was relegated to the status of a second rate power.

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FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

Foreign policy is never original, it is determined by a certain order of facts—historical, traditional, economic and geographical. But in the case of Russia, it might be said that history and tradition were irrelevant to her contemporary foreign policy, since the upheaval of 1917 made so complete and revolutionary a break with Russia's past that the new era must be judged on its own principles, those of the Marxian dialectic and the proletarian revolution. The leaders of the Revolution expected an immediate extension of the class conflict, the collapse of imperialism under the strain of war, the setting up of Communist states in Europe and Asia. But when none of these things occurred, and they were thrown back for foreign policy upon the old postulates of Russia's troubled development, those of self-preservation and security. The really striking difference was the change of terms.

The old hostility towards the West and the old fear of encirclement reappeared in the guise of anti-capitalism; the former expansion and search of security became the expansion of communism and the advancement of the worker's cause.

The Revolution of 1917 was a mighty challenge to the concept of state sovereignty, because the new order was international in character and aim; it was a challange to the capitalism of the West because it aimed to inaugurate an era of socialism, it was a challenge to the creditor countries, who had advanced; huge loans to the Czarist Government, because the new government refused to make any payment. Thus the chain joining Russia with the West was broken, and the problem before the Russian statesmen was: how to resume that relationship? The League of Nations could not serve the purpose, because it was under the domination of the capitalist West. The only way left was of alliances with the countries not directly under the spell of the West.

Russian foreign policy may well be divided into six phases. The first phase began with the commencement of the Revolution and continued upto 1921; the second phase may be said to continue from 1921 to 1927; the third phase lasted from 1927 to 1933; from 1934 to 22nd August 1939 continued the fourth phase; from August 1939 to June 22, 1941, may be said to comprise the fifth phase, and from June 22, 1941 to 1945 was the last phase of the period under discussion.

FIRST PHASE

The early years of the Soviet regime mere spent in a struggle for mere existence as desperate as any in Russian history. The Communists regarded their revolution as but a step towards the world revolution of the international proletariat, leading to the universal overthrow of capitalism and nationalism. The capi-

talist countries regarded the Communists as dangerous fanatics whose subversive assault on the existing order must be met by ruthless suppression through every means, The Soviet Govern, ment, soon after its coming into power, opened peace negotations with the Central Powers, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918 with Germany. The humiliations of this treaty were "calmly tolerated by Soviet Russia under the sincere conviction that the farther the Germans would advance into Russia, the more they would become the carriers of revolution to their own land."

In August 1918, Soviet Russia was subjected to an Allied blockade and to military intervention. The intervention coincided with counter-revolutionary uprising within Russia, subsidized and supported by the Allied Governments. It was a dual fight—fight against capitalism without and fight against Russian nobility and bourgeoisie within. But the Red Army under Trotsky proved more than a match for its enemies, domestic and foreign. The war came to a close in October 1920.

SECOND PHASE

Soviet Russia emerged from four years' of struggle intact but destitute and exhausted. Her immediate need was commerce and contact with the West in order to restore her ruined economy. As always, she feared and distrusted the West as greatly as she needed it. Strategically also her problems had not changed. In the East, Japan threatened her to overrun Siberia; in the West, the peace treaties set up a ring of states excluding Russia from Europe and depriving her of her Baltic outposts. Security thus remained the fundamental problem of her foreign policy. In 1922, at the World Economic Conference in Geneva, the Soviet delegation horrified the conference by proposing that the Conference should consider that Article of the Versailles Treaty, which prescribed general disarmament and should begin working out the proposals accordingly. But this was rejected.

This, however, did not disappoint Soviet Russia and very soon she convened a disarmament conference of the States bordering on her frontiers. In accordance with its principle of national self-determination, the Soviet Government recognised the independence of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Poland. Poland was further pacified by the cessation of several million Ukrainians under the Treaty of Riga of March 1921. Japanese expansion in the Far East was checkmated by creating the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer. In 1924, Soviet Russia reached an understanding with China regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria. She concluded the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany on a very cordial basis. With England, she entered into trade agreement in March, 1921.

THIRD PHASE

Stalin, who was not, by personal experience, an internationalist, realised the futility of the world proletariat revolution, and saw the wisdom of 'socialism first in a single country'. Not that he abandoned the terminology of revolution, but that he saw the wisdom of consolidating it first at home, which would also help consolidating the hostile West. In order to achieve his purpose, he managed to oust the permanent revolutionaries—Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamanev. The Comintern, which was organised in 1919 as the instrument of world revolution, naturally tended to fall back into the background. From 1927 onwards, there were series of pacts which the Soviet Union signed for non-aggression and definition of an aggressor. In 1928, the Pact of Paris was signed by almost all the states of the world. Soviet Union not only was the first to ratify the Pact, but convened a conference of its neighbours to arrange that it should come into force immediately without waiting for universal ratification. The Soviet Government proposed to Poland and Germany the conclusion of Baltic Pact including Baltic States as well for guaranteeing mutual aid and assistance in case of aggression against any one of the signatories. But the proposal was rejected by Germany and Poland. Again Russia, along with France, suggested to Germany the conclusion of an Eastern Locarno applying the principle of the 1925 Pact to eastern Europe. But Germany rejected this proposal too. Again for the third time, Soviet Russia proposed to Germany a tripartite mutual assistance pact, the third party being France. But this too was not to be. Thus being thrice disappointed, Soviet Union alone proceeded to enter into a pact of friendship with France in 1932, which was renewed and strengthened in 1935; and which in itself was followed by a similar pact with Czechoslovakia about a fortnight later.

During this period of the third phase, Moscow also made repeated proposals for disarmaments. In 1929, she proposed to the West universal partial disarmament by proportional and progressive reduction. When in 1932, the U. S. proposed the general reduction of armaments by one-third, the Soviet Union hailed the move; but this was soon withdrawn. Thus, all these proposals were voted down by the Western Powers.

FOURTH PHASE

The triumph of fascism in Germany in 1933 altered fundatally the peace problem of U.S.S.R. Hitler was openly committed to conquest in the East and to an armed crusade against Bolshevism. To prevent assault from Berlin, Moscow must arm herself to the teeth, and must make sure that if Russia fought with the aggressor from the West. she would not fight alone. She concluded non-aggression Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia,

cultivated closer relations with Britain and Turkey ; entered the League to cooperate with the Western Democracies and thereby to embroil the new force. Similar defensive arrangements were made in the Far East. Diplomatic relations were established with Washington in November 1933. A Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed with Outer Mongolia in March 1936 in order to check the penetration of Japan into Inner Mongolia. A Far Eastern Army of 250,000 men was established in the Maritime Provinces ready to fight the Japanese invaders and, by January 1936, the figure rose to 13,000,000. It was equipped with 6,000 tanks and 7,000 aeroplanes.

All these pacts and alliances considerably strengthened the position of U.S.S.R., at home as well as abroad. The years 1934-1935 saw a sudden resurgence of Comintern. Just as in the larger sphere of inter-state relations, Russia was forced to seek alliance with the democratic West in order to withstand the greater danger of Nazi Germany, so now in each country, the Communist Parties formed a common front with other progressive elements against fascism. Very soon, Stalin could command in a number of states a body of devoted and disciplined followers ready to carry out his behests.

But if the Soviet Union was strengthening her defences against fascism, Hitler and Mussolini were preparing themselves for the offensive. She was the target of Germany and Italy in Europe and of Japan in the Far East. Both Germany and Japan drew closer and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936. Italy adhered to it a year later and was followed by Hungary, Manchuria and Franco's Spain. The Western Democracies succeeded in their game of playing fascism against communism and vice versa. The foiling of fascism everywhere became the cardinal point of Russian foreign policy. In July 1936, when civil war broke out in Spain, Russia sent aid to the Democratic Government and called upon the Anglo-French Governments to cooperate in resisting the progress of fascist Franco. But the West, out of her distrust, did not respond. The Spanish Democracy perished ; the attempts of the fascists succeeded and those of Soviet Union failed.

Moscow made another attempt to win over the West during the Czechoslovak crisis. The Czech state had pacts of mutual assistance with both France and Russia. When in August 1938, Germany began to lay claims upon Czechoslovakia, Moscow sounded Great Britain and France, but the latter were found lukewarm. Not only that, Sudetenland was handed over to Germany at a conference between Britain, France, Germany and Italy at Munich to which Russia, France's ally, and Czechoslovakia's guarantor, was not even invited. The policy of cooperation with the West proved a complete failure.

In the autumn of 1938, Russia found herself in a state of complete jeopardy. Russia had no trustworthy allies; France could no longer be relied upon; Britain was leaning more towards Berlin than towards Moscow. There was little Russia could do. In December 1938, Russia tried for a rapproachement with Poland, but the latter bluntly refused. In January 1939, approches were made to Berlin but she was found utterly hostile. Thus the position of the Soviet Union was extremely vulnerable. The world situation was getting from bad to worse and day by day Moscow felt nervous.

In a disposition of utter disappointment, Moscow once again turned towards London. In the face of the fascist aggression, she proposed a pact of the three powers—Russia, Britain and France; but both London and Paris refused. On May 8, 1939, England and France asked the Soviet Union to give unilateral guarantee to Poland in case of an attack from Germany or Rumania. In reply, Moscow again proposed an *entente* of the Three Powers to defend one another as well as the Baltic States between the *Reich* and the Soviet Union. A good deal of negotiations followed but the result was a failure.

FIFTH PHASE

From the failure of these negotiations began another phase of Russian foreign policy. She once again turned towards Germany and on August 23, 1939, Ribbentrop came to Moscow and signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Germany now seemed to have abandoned its anti-Soviet policy in order to crush the West first.

The war resolved Russia's immediate problem of security, for no European Power was for the time being in a position to attack her. But Moscow could not ignore the possibility of an overwhelming victory by one side or the other, in which case the victor's appetite for expansion might once more be whetted by Russia's great domains. The temporary security from the Western affairs gave Russia the opportunity to consider the problem of permanent security and the means of ensuring it.

The first step which Moscow took to strengthen her defences, was the seizure of the former Russian territories of Poland. On September 28, 1939 a new Soviet-German accord partitioned Poland along the ethnological frontier. The second step was the imposition of protectorates over the Baltic States. Moscow acquired the right of establishing garrisons on Baltic territory and to maintain naval and air bases. The third step was Moscow's invasion and early occupation of Finland over the latter's refusal to grant a 30-year lease for a Red naval base at Hango. All these steps did not give to Moscow a feeling of complete security, and on June 15-17, 1940, Soviet troops abruptly occupied all of

Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia. On January 10, 1941, Moscow signed a new trade agreement with Berlin and reaffirmed neutrality and the Soviet-German friendship.

SIXTH PHASE

But underneath these gaities of friendship burnt the fire of hatred and mistrust. The Nazis had already, as early as August, 1940, decided to attack the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1941, the attack was ultimately launched. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Finland and Denmark, all in quick succession, declared war upon Russia and the whole of fascist Europe was lined against her.

This was now a grave occasion for England. The collapse of Russia would mean the annihilation of Europe and Hitler, in full mastery of Europe, would be a formidable foe for the entire world. Even the United States, though far off from the theatre of war, could not feel secure. Immediately after the attack, Premier Churchill proclaimed solidarity with the Soviet Union and on July 12, 1941, Cripps and Molotov signed an accord which later led to the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of May 26, 1942. Roosevelt followed Churchill and extended all assistance to the Soviet Union to save her from the scourge of imperialist Germany.

By the end of 1942, most of Stalingrad had fallen to the Nazis ; but the Reds refused to be cowed down, and continued their desperate struggle during 1943 and 1944 to drive the enemy out of the Russian soil. In the autumn of 1944, the table turned and Russian forces inflicted crushing defeats upon Hitler's troops. Rumania, Finland, Bulgaria and Poland all capitulated in succession, and by the middle of January 1945, Berlin was in Allied hands. In the Far East also, Japan was subdued by the joint efforts of the Allies. On August 6, 1945, the U. S. dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war upon Japan, perhaps to put up a claim in the spoils of victory[8]. On August 14, Japan surrendered and the war came to an end.

The Soviet Union, which fought the war for the Western Democracies, came out of it once again as a dreadful enemy. Fascist Europe having been turned down, the U. S. now decided to deal with another threat to democracy, *viz*,, totalitarian Russia. Moscow, whice came out of the war a strong and confident power, decided to pursue her old policy of world Communist revolution; and the consequence was the intense bitterness in international relations. In the words of Prof. Schuman : "In the

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8, Soviet Union declared war against Japan in accordance with the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. But at the time, when Moscow really entered the Far Eastern war, Japan was on the verge of collapse and U. S. and England did not need her participation.

shadow of death in 1942, America and Russia were comrades in arms ; three years later, they would be suspicious strangers : four years later, they would be political enemies."

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GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY

Economically crippled, politically segregated, militarily humbled, nationally humiliated, and physically exhausted, Germany came out of the first World War like "a pale person just out of the game." The Treaty of Versailles reduced the European area of Germany by one-eighth, and her population by six million; it deprived her of all colonies and virtually all investments and holdings abroad. Her navy, formerly second only to Britain's, was virtually wiped out, and her army remained not more than that of Belgium. All sources of raw material were detached with the result that even the industrial plants, which were left with Germany, were incapable of working to full capacity. Besides, the method in which the treaty was prepared and the manner in which it was presented, left among the Germans the feeling that it was 'a dictated peace' and therefore not binding upon them either legally or morally. The slogan in Germany in 1920 was: "down with Versailles."

German Foreign Policy under the Weimar Republic : 1920-33

The early years of the Weimar Republic were difficult years of national humiliation and economic adversity. As stated by E. Lipson in his book, '*Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*: "Germany felt herself an outcast, a moral leper among the nations. At conferences which decided her fate, her delegates waited in the ante chamber ; in the assembly at Geneva she was denied a seat ; her territory was occupied by foreign troops ; and her sovereignty was shared with foreign commissions which supervised the execution of the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versaill s." This general gloom was intensified by the economic troubles which followed in the wake of the Great War. For this, the payment of heavy reparations and the immense budget deficits, created by the cost of financing 'passive resistance' in the Ruhr during the French occupation, were greatly responsible. The policy of 'passive resistance' proved disastrous for the Germans. Those who were opposed to the Weimar Republic hatched various plots in Bavaria looking towards the overthrow of the Berlin Government. Those who favoured it demanded a "policy of fulfilment and reconciliation" with the West. The one, who more than all others developed a constructive foreign policy for Germany based on the idea of western orientation, was Gustav Stresemann who became the Foreign Minister in August 1923.

In one of his letters, dated September 7, 1925, to the ex-Crown Prince, Stresemann laid down the three great tasks that confronted German foreign policy : (1) the solution of the reparation question in a sense tolerable for Germany and the assurance

of peace which was an essential requisite for the recovery of her strength ; (2) the protection of Germans abroad, those 10 to 12 million of their kindred who then lived under a foreign yoke in foreign lands ; (3) re-adjustment of their frontiers, the recovery of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and a correction of the frontier in Upper Silesia. The Germans could acquiese in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and accepted as final the new western frontier with France and the Low Countries ; they could not assent to the surrenders in the east, the loss of Danzig, the cessation of West Prussia and Posen to a new Polish Power, severing East Prussia from the body of the *Reich* ; the cessation to Poland of upper Silesia , the exclusion from the *Reich* of the Germans of Austria and Bohemia.

With such aims and objects, the Germans realised that the only countries they could count for some support were Soviet Russia and England. In April 1922, Foreign Minister Rathenau concluded the Rapallo Treaty with Russia. Germany accorded *dejure* recognition to the Soviet Government and each renounced all war claims and pre-war indebtedness. In 1926, a non-aggression pact was concluded with Russia.

Economics and Stresemann's Policy of Reconciliation

Stresemann's policy began to bear fruit when the Western Powers, led by Great Britain, agreed to an examination of Germany's finances. The Dawes Plan, which resulted, made possible the economic rehabilitation of Germany. Within a year, it led to the military evacuation of the Ruhr. Early in 1927, the Inter-Allied Commissions of control were abolished, their functions being transferred to the League, of which Germany was now an influential Member. In 1928, there came the Young Plan which finally settled the reparation problem and fixed Germany's reparation liabilities far below that originally fixed by the Reparation Commission in 1921. It was also decided that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from the Rhineland by June 30, 1930 and France agreed to it.

These hard-won gains had, however, as the French Rightists correctly predicated time and again, increased the German appetite. Suddenly, Stresemann was confronted by a strenous opposition, ostensibly directed against the Young Plan for settling Germany's reparation payments, but actually driving towards a more radical foreign policy. Stresemann died in October, 1929 in the midst of these domestic quarrels, and his opponents unleashed a stupendous propaganda against reparations and in favour of German re-armament. The German representative at Geneva began to raise difficulties.

In 1931, the Western Powers were presented with the *fait accompli* of a customs union with Austria, expressedly forbidden by the Peace Treaties of 1919. This customs union was declared illegal by the Permanent Court of International Justice, the American member agreeing with his British and French colleagues. As an expression of their disapproval of Germany's action, the Western Powers withdrew their short-term credits to Germany. The serious economic depression in Germany was worsened "by the collapse of world markets, the alarming rise in unemployment, the abandonment by Britain of the gold standard and the international stampede into protectionism." "It is upon the wreckage," as put by Hupe and Possony, "of the German economy that Hitler, abetted by the apathy of the German masses and the preoccupations of the Great Powers, rose to power on January 30, 1933." In June 1933, the Reparation Powers met in a Conference at London to discuss the whole issue of reparation and debt payment; but it was of no use now, as already in January 1932, Bruning had declared that Germany would pay no further reparations whatsoever. With that, the first objective of German foreign policy had been achieved.

Politics and Stresemann's policy of Reconciliation

In the domain of politics, the first step in bringing about a reconciliation between the Western Powers and Germany was taken by Great Britain, who, from the outset, had shown a more sympathetic attitude towards the defeated enemy. In 1925 was signed the Treaty of Locarno between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, whereby Germany pledged herself to accept permanently her western frontiers with France and Belgium as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, that is, she renounced her claims upon Alsace-Lorraine. She also agreed to maintain the Rhineland as a demilitarized zone. Both Germany and France agreed that neither would resort to war against the other; and each had the right to invoke the military aid of the remaining parties to the treaty in the event of unprovoked aggression. In 1926, Germany had been admitted to the membership of the League with permanent seat on the Council. The withdrawal of the foreign troops, which had begun by the French withdrawal from Ruhr in 1924, was completed in 1930. But the fruits of the policy of reconciliation, pursued by the statesmen of the Weimar Republic, did not achieve in Germany the recognition which they deserved. For, all the time, the political situation was steadily deteriorating, and this was, as already mentioned, aggravated by the economic troubles of the people. Thus, the economic miseries and politi-

cal ambitions of the Germans put their destiny in the hands of a political sect, called itself by the name of the Nationalist Socialist German Worker's Party.

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER HITLER AFTER 1933

Aims of National Socialists

As early as 1920, Gottfried Feder had laid down a twenty-five-point programme for the National Socialists. Among other things, they demanded "union of all Germans by the right of self-determination, abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, and ousting of all non-Germans from the Reich." While he was confined in the fortress of Landsberg, Hitler wrote the first and after his liberation, the second volume of *Mein Kampf* which became the bible of the National Socialist movement. He foreshadowed the future programme of Germany's territorial ambitions and laid down : "The German Reich, as a State, should include all Germans.....'The aim of National Socialism must be to secure for the German people an extension of the space in which our people must live.' If we speak today of new territory in Europe, we can primarily think only of Russia and the border states..... If the Urals with their immeasurable wealth of raw materials, Siberia with its rich forests, and the Ukraine with its limitless cornfields, lay within Germany, this country under National Socialist leadership would swim in plenty. We would produce so much that every single German would have more than enough to live on." For France, he expressed a deep-seated antagonism by writing: "France is the eternal and mortal enemy of the Grman nation." Thus, if the conquest and dismemberment of Russia was the central aim of Hitler's foreign policy, the destruction of France, whose own greatness depended upon the weakness of Germany, was no less. And as stated by Arnold Toynbee in his *'Survey of International Affairs*: "If Russia and France were the original and lasting object of Hitler's hostility, Britain and Italy were the original object of his collaboration." Britain was alarmed by the new French military predominance in Europe, and became the champion of the recovery of Germany. Hitler hailed Mussolini, as the "inaugurator of revisionism" in Europe. He perceived that Germany and Italy had the same ends.

Methods of National Socialists

As regards the methods, Hitler stated that the "reliance on force and the rejection of compromise should be the keynote of German methods. The new regime preferred to take rather than receive ; to tear up treaties by a unilateral repudiation of

its obligations rather than to modify them by amicable negotiations; to spring its measures suddenly upon the world without any warning; and to keep the nerves of Europe on edge by creating an atmosphere of tension."

Hitler's state-craft consisted in his adroitness in the art of timing. The series of diplomatic *coups* by which he demolished the Treaty of Versailles were carried out at a time when the West was paralysed partly by its own contradictory interest and partly by the fear of Communism. The period from 1933 to March 1939 was "one of a series of perfectly graduated triumphs, each in turn applauded by the dominant part of public opinion in the Western Great Powers". On October 14, 1933, Hitler announced the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmanent Conference and the League of Nations in order to obtain freedom of action and release herself from the restraints laid down by the Covenant. On January 26, 1934, Hitler signed a Pact with Poland; on January 13, 1935, was held the plebiscite whereby the Saar basin merged with the German territory. On March 10, 1935, came the announcement that a German Air Force was once again in existence. On March 16, the law was passed "for the Reconstruction of the National Defence Force," and military conscription was introduced. Threats and warnings came from the Western Powers; but for them Hitler had nothing but contempt. Even this united front of the West was broken when the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on June 11, 1935. On March 7, 1936, German troops re-occupied the Rhineland, thereby abrogating the voluntarily-accepted Locarno Treaty of 1925. On November 1, 1936, came the announcement of the formation of Rome-Berlin Axis; on November 18, Hitler extended diplomatic recognition to Franco's Government.

In the meantime, Hitler raised the bogey of "saving Europe from the menace of Bolshevism," and the Western Democracies were thoroughly duped. On November 25, 1936, Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. The Western Democracies thought that they, by appeasing Hitler, were deflecting the *Reich* against Moscow; but in this, they were sadly mistaken, for Hitler had never forgotten the humiliations of Versailles and was determined to take revenge upon his foes.

Hitler had prepared the stage for territorial expansion and the hour of action had come. On March 10, 1938, the Berlin radio horrified the world by announcing that a Communist rising was imminent in Vienna, and that Germany must at once act "to save her nationals" there. Two days after, German troops entered into Austrian territory and on March 14, 1938, Vienna was in Hitler's hands.

Czechoslovakia was the next victim. Outright attack and annexation in this case was not wise, since Czechoslovakia was

closely allied with France and Russia, both of which had guaranteed her against aggression from Germany. Hitler, therefore, resorted to negotiations; which ultimately resulted in the Munich Pact on September 29, 1938. Great Britain and France had agreed to a proposal whereby the German forces were to begin occupation of the Sudetenland on October, 1, and continue their advance by stages until October 10, 1938. Chamberlain and Daladier thought that Hitler would thereafter march towards Kiev and the Black Sea and clash with Moscow.

But here they were sadly and tragically mistaken. The same month Ribbentrop went to Rome and told Mussolini that "Hitler was convinced that they must count on inevitable war with the Western Democracies within a few years. Czechoslovakia was liquidated. With Poland, Germany intended to continue a policy of friendship. Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary wanted to tighten their links with the Axis. Russia was weak and would remain so for many years; all our energies can be directed against the Western Democracies."

After the fall of Czechoslovakia, Hitler's mind was being preoccupied with the great question, East or West. Ultimately the decision was made, and the choice fell upon the West. But before launching an attack, Hitler wanted to ensure that Germany would not be stabbed from the rear. Poland though friendly was an untrustworthy ally, and therefore was dealt with first. On April 28, 1939, Hitler denounced the Polish German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934 on the one hand, and the Anglo-German naval accord of 1935 on the other. Instead, Germany signed a Ten-Year Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality with Soviet Russia on August 23, 1939.

Germany During the Second World War

Thus, the stage was set for the Polish invasion which actually began on September 1, 1939, and took Hitler two weeks to occupy all the western provinces, and three weeks to possess the whole of Poland. On September 28, 1939, Berlin and Moscow partitioned Poland between them, Germany taking the Polish speaking industrial areas of the West, and Soviet Union satisfying herself with the agrarian regions of the East.

A master of strategy, Hitler allowed the next eight months to pass without any action, perhaps to cause inactivity among the Allied commanders by giving the idea that he had given up his plans of further aggression. It was on April 9, 1940, that Hitler struck his first blow on the West. Denmark was invaded and occupied by the German army in no time. By June 9, 1940, the two Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden, were also conquered, and their governments fled to London. In

the meantime the Lowlands (Belgium and Holland) were also invaded and on May 15, Holland and on June 3, Belgium, also surrendered.

Now was the turn of France. Within less than a fortnight, the whole country was bombarded by the German planes and razed to the ground. On June 14, 1940, Paris fell to the German armies and on June 22, the French Government signed the armistice terms.

Britain was now the next objective. But this was a hard nut to crack, and needed the sharpest of strategy and mightiest of army to deal with. Hitler decided to consolidate and complete his conquest of the Continent before launching an attack upon the British Isles. On October 8, 1940, German troops entered and soon occupied Rumania. Soon after, Bulgaria was threatened. The Foreign Minister yielded to the Nazis, and on March 1, 1941, made Bulgaria the seventh signatory of the Triple Alliance. On April 6, 1941, Berlin declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece, and in a few days occupied both of them. During the next ten days, Crete was wrested from the British hands, and Great Britain had no means to defend her Mediterranean possessions. On June 18, 1941, Berlin entered into a Ten-Year Pact of Friendship, Neutrality and Non-Aggression with Turkey. All was now in readiness to attack the Soviet Union, to crush which decision had already been made by the Nazi High Command in August 1940. Hitler had decided to crush Russia before invading England, so that the latter might not stab in the back and frustrate his designs on England.

On June 22, 1941, Soviet Russia was attacked both from land and air. All the Axis Powers, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Slovakia joined Hitler in his 'holy war'. Great Britain and U. S. declared their solidarity with Moscow. Nazi forces reached within the striking distance of Stalingrad and the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse. But the collapse of Moscow would have been ruinous to Britain and America. Both of them came to the rescue of the Soviet Union with all their might ; and on March 8, 1944, over 2,000 American aeroplanes smashed Berlin; and Germany's strength was almost broken. On April 29, 1945, a million German troops surrendered in Italy and Austria. On May 2, Berlin fell to the Allies, and on may 7, Germany signed a document of unconditional surrender. On June 5, 1945, London, Washington, Paris and Moscow jointly assumed 'supreme authority' in respect of Germany, and the German High Command. Germany was partitioned into zones, whereby the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the U. K. acquired 40,000 square miles of German territory, and France 20,000 square miles. Berlin was also divided into four urban zones, and placed under Four-Power Command. Thus ended the story

of the efforts of a Nation, wronged and humiliated in 1919, and endeavouring since then to exist, to expand and to overpower.

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France was one of the oldest of the Great Powers in the Western state system. It was in France that feudalism gave place to autocracy and autocracy to democracy. It was in France that there occurred the most important event of the modern period viz., the Revolution of 1789—"a force at the touch of which thrones and altars tumbled down in shapeless confusion involving all Europe in a terrible cataclysm." It was France which witnessed the rise and fall of glorious dynasties and splendid traditions. But all this glory and splendour came to a disastrous end after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. French hegemony was lost to Germany. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and other humiliations of the Treaty of Frank furt stuck a deep wound in the heart of the French nation ; and it was to recover this lost ground that the French efforts were directed from 1871 to 1914. After four years of fighting and bloodshed France achieved her goal. Germany was reduced to utter bank ruptcy ; Austria-Hungary had been thoroughly destroyed ; and French power and prestige was predominant in Europe. In 1918-19 France had the pleasure of victory, but lacked the sense of future security.

It has been pointed out that France's life-long enemy had been Germany, or the Power controlling that country. Hence France's dominant foreign policy always had been the protection of her north eastern border. As pointed out by Jean-Girandoux, "All our treaties whether of victory or even of defeat had been signed in confidence and in hope. The treaties of 1815, which dismantled our natural frontiers, were received by the majority in the country with a sigh of relief. The Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 provoked only one reaction in France, the desire for revenge. The treaty of our greatest victory, on the other hand, that of Versailles, had been beaten into shape under the device 'security'. It was not a question of obtaining this security for some years, for the period required to overhaul a country worn out by the war, but of eternal security. We wanted centuries of security—to be able to go in security to the end of the world and to the Last Judgement." The French delegates had two aims at the Paris Peace Conference ; (1) the payment of reparations by Germany ; (2) security against future aggression. But the peace arrangement of Versailles failed to guarantee to the French this security. Poincare himself pointed out : "It was in this respect that we suffered our greatest disillusionment after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George before leaving Paris had signed guarantee pacts which promised France the aid of the United States and England in case of an attack by Germany. However, these pacts were never ratified. France remained alone in the presence of Germany." Thus, the fear of a German attack in the future continued to harass the French like a nightmare.

The search for security became almost an obsession with the French in the 1920's. The French statesmen built up three main lines of defence as an insurance against a revival of the German hegemony. The first line was the chain of alliances with the small powers in the central and eastern Europe ; the second line of defence was the League of Nations, which was established as an instrument of collective security ; and the third line was her understanding with Great Britain, her wartime ally.

French Security and the System of Alliances

The first alliance which France made was with Belgium. She was another country equally concerned about her security against Germany. She, therefore, presented a good ally on the north western frontier of Germany. Military conversations between the French and Belgian staffs resulted in the signing of a military convention on September 7, 1920.

An important ally on the east of Germany had been lost in Russia, and France decided to replace her by Poland. Poland was also in need of security against Germany, as she was established at the expense of the latter. Fear of aggression from Germany worked as a strong bond, and the diplomatic negotiations culminated in a Franco-Polish treaty of alliance on February 19, 1921. France was now assured that if Germany should attack her, she would be aided by Poland in the east, and Belgium in the west. Paris, however, was not yet content with the security she had obtained so far. She turned to Czechoslovakia, and in 1924, a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance was signed in Paris. Two years later, a treaty of friendship was signed with Rumania, whereby both the signatories promised to consult each other in all matters which might threaten their external security. In 1927, another treaty was signed with Yugoslavia almost on the same lines.

These treaties of friendship and alliance with those states of central and eastern Europe which were interested in perpetuating the Peace Settlement of 1919, conferrd upon France a position of leadership, and the latter was convinced that in case of an aggression from Germany, she would have the support of a solid bloc of states bordering on all sides of Germany. These treaties were further supplemented by the Locarno Pact of mutual guarantee which bound Italy and Great Britain to come to the aid of France, in case she was attacked by Germany. The Pact of Paris, to which both France and Germany were signatories, renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Thus, during the ten years immediately following the first World War, France greatly strengthened herself against any possible attack from Germany.

French Security and the League of Nations

The statesmen of France had come to recognise in the League of Nations a potent guarantee of national security through collective action. France extended all-out assistance to protect the security system of the League, and Briand in particular, became the League's foremost stateman and one of the outstanding figures of the period. When, in the Assembly of 1923, an interpretation was offered to the effect that in the application of Article 10, each Member would be free to decide for itself the extent to which it would be bound to comply with any request on the part of the Council for action in giving force to that Article, France offered great opposition and the resolution could not be passed. In 1924, Herriot from France and Mac Donald from Britain personally went to Geneva for the League Assembly and they set a precedent of far-reaching importance. Thereafter the foreign ministers of most other European Powers attended the session of the Assembly, and Geneva came to be recognised a meeting-place for the statesmen of Europe. In 1927, when President Coolidge of the U. S. convened a disarmament conference at Geneva, France refused to participate on the ground that outside conferences hindered the disarmament work of the League. Thus, in the words of Carr, "the years from 1924 to 1930 were the period of the League's greatest prestige and authority", and France was greatly instrumental in adding to its strength.

French Security and Great Britain

The third line of defence against German invasion was, of course, Great Britain. She had cooperated with France in the defeat of Germany and naturally therefore, Paris hoped that London would also cooperate in perpetuating the weakness of Germany. But here she was sadly disappointed. She made the unfortunate discovery that the wartime Anglo-American cooperation would not be had in the post-war era. The United States had withdrawn from the Continental affairs and Great Britain had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Germany. She was anxious to liquidate the War of 1914-18 and enable the German people to recover their economic strength, for if they had been her chief competitor before the outbreak of hostilities, they had also been one of her principal customers. Britain did not permit the annexation of the Rhineland by France ; she discouraged the outright annexation of German colonies . she did not like the imposition of too heavy a reparation bill upon Germany ; she condemned the occupation of the Ruhr Valley by French and Belgian troops. All these moves indicated the direction the Anglo-French relations were taking. Britain was interested in preserving the balance of power on the Continent ; and the preponderant position of France during the post-war years

seemed to disturb it. She therefore was unwilling to offer France any further guarantee beyond the promise of aid in case the Germans should actually invade the country.

French Attempt to Reconcile Germany

The Germans had not forgotten the losses and humiliations of Versailles and were determined upon revenge. Great Britain could not be relied upon in times of difficulty. The League of Nations would be powerless in the light of the British attitude and interests. Millions of Germans spread over Central Europe made alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia meaningless, for any time they should become united and armed, they would throw off their friendship to the wind, and cast their lot with their blood brethren in Germany. The intransigent policy pursued by M. Poincare towards Germany proved unsuccessful. The French people revolted against his methods and, in 1924, Poincare was made to resign, and the President of the Republic, M. Millerand, was constrained to relinquish his position. The new Ministry reversed the foreign policy of its predecessor. It stood for a resumption of cordial relations with Great Britain which implied leniency towards Germany. Co-operation with London was facilitated by the advent of the Labour Government under Ramsay MacDonald, and with Germany, by Stresemann's policy of reconciliation.

The more important fruits of the new policy were : (1) the evacuation of the Ruhr : (2) the Dawes Plan ; (3) the Locarno Pact ; (4) the admission of Germany into the League of Nations ; (5) the Young Plan ; (6) the Pact of Paris ; (7) the evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930. A more important signal of the cordiality between France and Germany was the passage in 1927 of a law by which the length of compulsory military service in France was reduced to one year.

Hitler's Rise to Power and the Problem of French Security

Those, who hoped that the Locarno Treaty and the other steps taken in the direction of reconciliation between Germany and the French bloc would establish permanent friendship, were sadly disappointed. After 1929, relations between the two sides began to deteriorate and the concessions made to Germany failed to digress her from her destined goal. The financial miseries of the people, caused by the economic crisis of 1929-30, and the political convulsions following the Treaty of Versailles put Hitler in power in Germany. With Hitler's advent to power, security was no longer a matter to be discussed round the table but became a need of the hour.

Fresh efforts were made to 'strengthen the bonds of the French security system. In the summer of 1934, the French Minister, Barthou, visited several European capitals and endea-

voured to renew the bonds of friendship with the East European countries. But he was assassinated at Marseilles on October 9, 1934, and was succeeded by Pierre Laval. He made fresh overtures of friendship to Russia and Italy. Russia was equally afraid of Hitler's designs and welcomed the French proposal. On May 2, 1935, the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact was signed. But relations with Italy were far from satisfactory. She claimed possession of Dijbouti, the Red Sea port of French Somaliland, & also demanded special status for the Italians settled in Tunisia. These colonial disputes were aggravated by the clash of ideologies, fascism being in complete contrast to the principles of democracy This friction made Italy lean towards Germany, and there developed the likelihood of an Italo-German alliance. In order to win Italy back to her fold France offered to make several concessions and signed an accord an January 7, 1935.

But if France was seeking new friends, she was losing her old ones. Although she had signed a number of alliances with the small and middle powers in eastern Europe, France failed to implement them politically, economically and militarily. When Hitler rose to power, France showed signs of growing weakness and did not interfere with Germany's rearmament. Her 'allies' grew lukewarm towards a connection with France and the alliances, the latter had forged, lost much of their effectiveness. In 1934, Poland, one of the mainstays in the system, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Two years later, Belgium announced the termination of her military alliance with France By supplying a market for her goods Germany won over Yugoslavia to her side. Besides, several other agricultural states were also drawn into the German economic sphere. In 1936, the French Foreign Minister again toured the capitals of the allies in the east, but the results of his trip were disappointing. The same year, France was faced with the problem of the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Britain was not willing to use force against Germany over this open violation of the Versailles Treaty and the French Government, then in the midst of domestic crisis, decided not to force the issue. The French leaders were criticised for not forcing Hitler to withdraw. The policy, which the government pursued in the face of Italo-German adventures, led to the triumph of the Popular Front in the elections of May 6, 1936. They strengthened France politically, but did not produce vigorous action in the face of the growing, Nazi threat. The crowning humiliation came in September 1938 when the Munich Pact was signed, and Daladier and Chamberlain agreed to the cessation of Sudetenland to Germany. It marked the culmination of appeasement and the warrant of death for the Western Democracies. In fact, during the decade preceding the second World War, France had no foreign policy ; only she maintained foreign relations. In so doing she, out of helpessness,

followed the British line of appeasement. This was a deadly policy and was bound to result in disaster. France's search for security came to an end and once again the pounding of German military boots were heard on the French soil. On September 3, 1939, the Third Republic was at war with Germany and, within less than a year, Paris lay at the feet of Hitler. On June 22, 1940, the armistice was signed, and a fascist regime was established at Vichy under Marshall Petain. Thousands of Frenchmen outside France joined the 'Free French' movement of Marshall de Gaulle who established a 'Provisional Government' in London and continued the fight against Germany. The combined efforts of U. S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. liberated France from the shackles of German militarism and the fourth French Republic was born on October 13, 1946.

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FOREIGN POLICY OF JAPAN

The history of the 19th century is the history of imperialist expansion on the one hand and nationalist upsurge on the other. Like other under-developed and undeveloped regions of the world, Far East also attracted the attention of the Western world. Its cupidity fell upon China and Japan. China was partitioned by the European Powers into respective spheres of influence and spheres of interest and her outlying dependencies were annexed. In 1853, Japan was brought out "of her rigid seclusion into which she had wrapped herself for the last two centuries." In that year Commodore Perry of the U.S. Navy appeared in Japanese waters with four warships and partly by persuasion and partly by threats, induced the Japanese authorities to conclude a treaty opening two of her ports to American seamen driven by storm or shipwreck to the Japanese coast. Although the stipulation was only for the provisioning of ships, trade and commercial privileges were implied. Japan was opened up and soon the nations of Europe rushed to conclude treaties with her and they too secured commercial and extraterritoriol rights. Soon an extensive trade developed between the Western nations and the two Far Eastern countries.

Japan, however, took lesson from the fate of China, andthe government undertook the task of reshaping the country in the European fashion. All of the technological paraphernalia of of the West were introduced—heavy factories, railways, steamships, well-equipped army and navy; Western education, dress and manners were adopted, and Japan became a first rate power—a power strong enough to challenge the Western dominance. To face the West Japan made friendship with a great European Power in the Far East viz.,Great Britain which was also interested in protecting her trade against European rivals and concluded an alliance in 1902. In 1905, she inflicted a crushing defeat upon Russia and this raised her power and prestige enormously in the eyes of the world. She continued to advance her interests in China.

Japan during the War of 1914

The first World War proved a boon to Japan. Finding Germany involved in Europe, Japan asked her to withdraw all her warships from the Far East and to deliver Kiaochow to her "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." In the absence of a reply, Japan occupied the territory by force on August 23, 1914. In 1915, when the Western Powers were in the grip of a 'titanic struggle' and were too preoccupied to turn their attention to the Far East, Japan presented to China the famous 'Twenty-One Demands' with a forty-eight hour ultimatum. The essence of these demands was 'to close China to Europe' and to keep 'Asia for the Asiatics'. Since the Allies

wanted Japan's cooperation in the war or at least her neutrality, they agreed to support these claims at the peace conference.

Japan from the Peace Conference to the Washington Conference

When the war ended and the powers met in a conference at Paris, Japan was recognised as the heir to all the rights and claims of Germany in Kiaochow and the province of Shantung. Wilson agreed to these concessions to Japan only reluctantly. Since her acquisition of the Philippines, the U.S. had developed increasing interests in the Far East and the expanding power of Japan was a mighty threat to her interest. A showdown was therefore needed and the U.S. convened the Washington Conference. Japan, apparently a strong power, was essentially weak and the government was fully conscious of its weakness. She could not afford to pull the matters too far and calmly agreed to the loss of prestige as well as privileges; she agreed at Washington to the restoration of Shantung to China ; to sign the Nine-Power Treaty for the preservation of 'open door' in China and respect her territorial integrity, to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 by the Four Power Pacific Treaty, including France and the United States, and to limitations upon naval reconstruction programme under the Five Power Naval Treaty.

Japan from Washington to Manchuria

During 1920's, the internal politics of Japan was marked by the growth of liberalism, democracy and representative government. But there was no essential difference of purpose between the liberals and conservatives, between the civilians and militarists as regards the foreign policy of Japan. "It was a policy of imperialism and expansion resting on well publicised assumptions of a 'special position' and 'special interests'. No Japanese government, however much wedded to the principles of liberalism, proposed to relinquish the essentials of this policy. Japan looked upon the Washington treaties as a complete triumph of the United States over her diplomacy and a severe blow upon its drive for special interests. After 1922, Tokyo was faced with three main issues. The first was the new and vigorous Chinese nationalism, which resulted from the legacies of the World War and which, sooner or later, seemed to collide with Japanese ambitions on the Asiatic mainland. The second problem was created by the failure of the inter-Allied intervention in Siberia for the destruction of Russian Bolshevism. This meant that Japan must keep a close watch upon the movements of Russia in the Far East. The third equally important issue was the Anglo-American, instead of the Anglo-Japanese, collaboration in the Pacific, inaugurated by the Washington treaties. 'The United States had begun to feel more concerned about the 'Far Eastern affairs and had become a power to be reckoned with.

To all these problems the Japanese statesmen were to find an answer during the post-Washington years.

Japan and China from 1922 to 1931

Towards China, as Buss has stated, Japan "wavered between the policies of Baron General Tanaka, which relied upon strong diplomatic notes, silver bullets, and armed force, and those of Baron Shidehara which assumed towards China an attitude of courtesy and equal treatment." From 1924 to 1927 and from 1929 to 1931, the years when Shidehara was Foreign Minister, Japan pursued a policy of 'reconciliation' towards China. The first step in this direction was taken in 1923, when Kiaochow was returned, and a number of Japanese post offices on Chinese soil were closed. The second step came in 1925, when Japan paid compensation to the families of those Chinese who were killed in the police firing at Shanghai. In 1927, when the Japanese consulate had been attacked by the Chinese and the U.S. and Britain resorted to the bombardment of Nanking, Japan did not join the Western Powers.

This weak policy of Shidehara caused great resentment among the militarist and conservative elements of Japan and led to the fall of his ministry. In April 1927, Tanaka became the head of the cabinet and adopted a strong, or 'positive', as it came to be called, policy towards China. The first fruit of this policy was the sending of Japanese troops to Shantung in June, 1927 ostensibly to protect Japanese life and property being threatened by the march of Chinese Nationalists towards the North. By April 1928, the Japanese troops advanced as far as Tsinan, capital of Shantung and on May 3, clashed with the Nationalists troops. The military adventures continued, but without any definite gains. The people in Japan condemned the extravagant and fruitless policy of Tanaka and forced the resignation of his Government in July 1929. Shidehara again returned to the Foreign Office and the policy of reconciliation was resumed.

Japan and Soviet Union from 1922 to 1931

Shidehara's policy of peaceful relations had its bearing upon the Russo-Japanese relations as well. The Japanese forces were withdrawn from the mainland of Siberia, and negotiations were started for an amity with Russia. On January 20, 1925, the Russo-Japanese Treaty was signed and most of the political and economic issues were resolved. From 1925 to 1931, in the words of Clyde, "Russo-Japanese relations maintained a relative calm, subject to some aggravating and protracted negotiations on the old problem of Japanese fishing rights in Russian waters." This was made possible by Japan's loss of friends abroad, together with the effects of the immigration act in the United States and

the Russian cooperation with the Chinese Nationalists. But this was only an armed truce, and Japan looked upon Russia as a national and ideological menace.

Japan and the Western Powers from 1922 to 1931

As with China and Russia, so with the U. S. and Great Britain, Japan maintained peaceful relations, though tempered here and there with feelings of resentment and distrust. In 1923, Tokyo accepted with gratitude America's help to the victims of the great earthquake in Yokohama. But the enactment of the immigration bill by the U. S. Congress in April 1924, caused great resentment in Tokyo. However, Japan, as a great power and original member of the League of Nations, continued to participate in every major international conference. In February 1927, Japan cooperated with the United States and Britain at Geneva in applying the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio to all categories of naval armaments. In August 1928, she signed the Pact of Paris, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. In April, 1930, Japan signed with Britain and the United States, the London Naval Treaty whereby the signatories accepted a maximum upper limit in all categories of vessels. To state in the words of Clyde: "Japan's adherence to the London Treaty marked the high point in the nation's struggle towards liberal, civilian and responsible government, but it also marked a decision by the militarists to oppose, by force if necessary, any further challenge to their special position in the constitutional and political life of the nation".

Japan from 1931 to 1945

The Washington arrangements were a severe blow to the growing power of Japan ; and she was not to be balked away like that. She was determined to extend her sway over as wide an area as possible, and the constantly-growing population and need of markets for goods and investments supplied her, as Prof. Schuman has put it, "a plausible rationalisation of expansionist ambitions". Japan was hit hard by the Great Depression in the price of raw silk in the U. S. The markets, which she had captured during the war, had been lost as swiftly as they had been won ; and the 'economic bizzard' which had descended on the world with the 'break on Wall Street' in October, 1929 had blasted Japan's international trade and had transferred the control of Japan's political destinies in the hands of those elements whose existing conviction was that Japan's difficulties at home could not be solved otherwise than by foreign conquests. She found that the Western World was pre-occupied with the economic troubles and would not act to stop her in her adventure. The authentic wealth of Manchuria was a sufficient prize for enterprise ; and so the attack was launched in September 1931. Within a year, the whole of Manchuria was occupied and

established as the state of Manchukuo under Japanese protection.

The rape of Manchuria was followed by the penetration of China itself ; and during the years 1932-1936, vast Chinese territory was occupied by Japan. On March 27, 1933, Japan came out of the League of Nations so as to act more independently. In April 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office announced the Amau statement, embodying Japan's sole responsibility for the peace of the Pacific. This was a sort of Monroe Doctrine, designed to keep the West away from the Far Eastern affairs. On November 25, 1936, Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and prepared herself for a still greater adventure.

In July 1937, Japan opened fresh offensive against China on the one hand and against the Soviet Union's Far Eastern possessions on the other. Four times from 1937 to 1940, the Japanese forces clashed with the Soviet troops, but all the time they were repulsed. Tokyo realised the strength of the Soviet Union and decided to leave her in peace.

The real brunt of Japan's fury fell upon China and repeatedly her territory was invaded. In the autumn of 1936, Japan proposed to Chiang Kai-shek "to grant to the Japanese, economic concessions, to suppress all anti-Japanese propaganda, to cooperate in suppressing the Chinese Communists and for that end, to accept Japanese advisers". But he refused to be cowed down ; instead, he gave a stirring call to all the elements of the Chinese life, asking them to unite in the face of the Japanese aggression. In September 1937, the Communist Party of China declared her solidarity with the Kuomintang to resist the foreign foe. Even this could not go a long way to desist Japan from her goal. Japanese troops continued their advance and by March 1940, occupied the Chinese capital. A puppet regime was established at Nanking and was recognised by Tokyo as the "legitimate Government of China" on November 30, 1940. These advances of Japan were resented by the West and a number of protests and warnings came. Japan realised that she would not be allowed to go too far unchecked. So, she tried to strengthen her position to face any interference from Europe and America. On January 13, 1940, Premier Hiranuma declared: "We shall shake hands with those who agree to the establishment of a New Order in East Asia by Japan ; but we cannot shake hands with those who oppose such a policy". On the lines of this declaration, Tokyo entered into a Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940.

The problem before Japan after her adventures in China was : what next ? Soviet possessions in the Far East had been attacked and had been found formidable. Attack upon the British possessions was an inducement, but this involved heavy

risks. Japan nevertheless could not sit silent. On April 13, 1941, Tokyo entered into a Five-Year Pact of Non-aggression with Moscow, whereby both parties agreed to peaceful and friendly relation.

Tokyo's Foreign Office decided to have a trial of arms with London and Washington and resorted to warlike measures. In the midst of professions of peaceful intensions, the Japanese planes bombarded Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 and caused heavy destruction. The next day, Washington declared war on Japan. On December 9, H. M's. 'Prince of Wales' was sunk off the Malayan coast by the Japanese bombers. London protested and Tokyo declared war on Britain too. Thus, Tokyo was at war with the Allies on December 10, 1941.

In the first phase of the war, Japan marched like the whirlwind and, within a few months, swept over Hongkong, Guam, the Philippines, Siam, Burma, Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch Indies. Japanese forces reached as far as the eastern border of India.The British resistance was on the verge of collapse. America came out with her full force, and inflicted crushing defeats upon the Japanese army and the navy. In this dark hour, Soviet Union also denounced the Neutrality Pact of 1941 on April 5, 1945. Tokyo endeavoured to use Moscow's good offices to settle terms with the Allies, but to no result. On July 26, 1945, the Allies presented their terms for peace with Japan ; but the latter found them too humiliating and therefore rejected. On August 6, a new force entered the war—this was the atomic bomb. In the twinkling of an eye, the city of Hiroshima was obliterated. Two days after, Moscow also declared war upon Japan. Three days after a second bomb fell upon Nagasaki and the morale of the Japanese nation and the government was shattered. On August 10, Tokyo offered to agree to the terms of July 26 "provided the prerogatives of the Japanese Emperor were not touched." But the Allies refused to give any guarantee and demanded unconditional surrender. Tokyo had no alternative. On August 14, came the surrender and on September 8, Japan was occupied by American troops. The drive for a New Order in East Asia war checked ; the forces of aggression were swept aside and humanity heaved a sigh of relief.

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FOREIGN POLICY OF ITALY

The year 1870 marked the end of an era in the history of modern Italy—the era of her unification. Italy had been freed from foreign domination, united into one State, and provided with parliamentary institutions. But her problems were not over; rather she was faced with a new set of problems. Italy had been made; but Italians were yet to be made. Italy had been united; but Italians were still scattered over lands not included in the new kingdom at the time of its creation, *viz.*, Trent, Trieste, and the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Italy had been made one nation; but she lacked the wherewithal to feed that nation. Italy's foreign policy after 1870 was therefore directed towards two ambitions—the desire to secure "Italia Irredenta", and the desire to create an empire in Africa. The first could be achieved only at the cost of Austria; the second at the expense of France. This meant a major conflict with two major powers of Europe. For that Italy was not yet ready. She, therefore, moved patiently and cautiously and made slight gains here and there.

Her real opportunity came when the first World War broke out and both of her adversaries were involved in a life and death struggle and both needed her help. Europe was divided into two hostile camps—the camp of the Triple Alliance Powers and that of the Triple Entente. Italy bargained with both of them for promises of territorial compensation and agreed to fight the war for the camp which promised most. The *Entente* Allies were more lavish in their promise because their promise was at the cost of the enemies, while promises on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary involved a loss of their own territory. Great Britain promised to surrender to Italy, Trieste, Tyrol, and Trentino, plus concessions in the Near East, and a secret treaty was signed in London on April 26, 1915, embodying these promises.

Italy and Peace Settlement of 1919

When the war ended and the Allied Powers met at Paris, Italy found herself duped, and the promises made to her in 1915 were not fulfilled. The idealism of Wilson, the nationalist ambitions of Serbia, and the Anglo-French reluctance to permit Italy dominate the Mediterranean came in the way. The Italian delegates left the Paris Conference in utter disappointment. All Italy felt grieved. Her first disappointment came in the case of Fiume. The unwillingness of the Paris diplomats to award that city to Italy greatly shocked the Italians; and, when in November 1920, the government signed with Yugoslavia the treaty of Rapallo, recognising the independence of the Free State of Fiume, the Italian nationalists denounced the government for its weakness. The second disappointment came in her inability to make of the Adriatic an Italian lake, which implied the control of

Two years later, in November 1926, Mussolini made another gain when Italy signed the Treaty of Tirana with Albania, whereby the latter became almost a dependency of the former. In the spring of 1928, Great Britain, France, and Spain invited Italy to share in the international government of the Free City of Tangier on the west coast of Morocco. This was looked upon as a great diplomatic triumph of Mussolini by the Italians. In 1930, he attempted to advance Italy's position in the Mediterranean by demanding naval parity with France at the London Naval Conference. On the ninth anniversary of the March on Rome (1931), Mussolini advocated revision of the peace treaties in the interest of both the former Central Powers and Italy. In 1932, the Italian Foreign Minister, Grandi, proclaimed the urgency of a territorial redistribution in North Africa. Thus in the decade after 1932, in the words of Benns, "Mussolini succeeded in strengthening Italy's hold on the Adriatic, in increasing her prestige in the Mediterranean, and in extending her diplomatic and commercial influence in south eastern Europe."

Nazi Revolution of 1933 and Mussolini's deal with the Western Democracies

The Nazi Revolution of 1933 brightened the hopes of a rapproachement between Italy and Germany, as both the countries were committed to the revision of peace treaties. But it marked no turning-point in Italian policy. The Nazi designs on Austria put a serious strain on relations. Mussolini, who had already in 1931 sided with France to oppose an Austro-German Customs Union, formed an "Italo-Austro-Hungarian Triangle" by means of the Rome Protocols of March 17, 1934. After the murder of Dollfuss on July 25, 1934, he sent his troops to the Brenner frontier, and joined with Great Britain and France in several attempts to support the independence of Austria and restrain German rearmament such as the declarations of February 17 and September 27, 1934 on Austrian independence and the Stresa Conference of April 1935. These moves, however, did not mean the abandonment of his revisionism or his desire for a European Concert of Four, both of which motives were visible in the original Italian proposal for the Four Power Pact of June, 1933. That Mussolini had his designs over Africa was known everywhere. The British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had given him no explicit warning at the Stresa Conference. Moreover, the Anglo-German Naval agreement of June 18, 1935 led Mussolini to conclude that there was no essential unity between London and Paris and both of them, for fear of Germany's growing power, might let Italy off free in her Ethiopian adventure. All these considerations influenced him in favour of risking his war of aggression against Ethiopia in October, 1935. Within less than a year, the conquest and eventual occupation of Ethiopia was complete and by July 1936, Italy had her empire in Africa.

In the spring of 1936, Spanish military generals made several visits to Rome and Berlin and put before Hitler and Mussolini their plans for a *coup d'etat*. Both the fascist dictators thought that Spain's going fascist would mean the extension of more area under their control, which in itself would mean a more solid front against the 'enemy'. The plans were therefore approved and rather hailed. In July 1936, the military revolted and General Franco started an organised war against the Democratic Government. Italian troops in thousands and Nazi agents and technicians poured into Spain to reinforce the rebels. On November 18, 1936, both Rome and Berlin recognised Franco as the ruler of Spain. Britain, France and U.S. assumed non-intervention, and allowed the Spanish Democracy to die at the hands of the Fascist dictators.

They, however, took alarm at the growing power and influence of Italy. The British route to India through Suez and the Red Sea was now at the mercy of Italian bombers; French communications with North Africa could be any time cut by Italian air power. The uneasiness of London and Paris had its reactions in Rome, for Mussolini did not like to estrange the Western Powers at this stage. He tried to conciliate them. Eight agreements were signed with Britain on April 16, 1938. Negotiations, begun with France in April 1938, however broke down as reports reached Rome that war material was reaching Republican Spain through France. On May 14, 1938, Mussolini, in one of his speeches at Geneva, declared that Italy and France stood "on opposite sides of the barricades."

France was lost and Mussolini tried to make friendship with Germany. Hitler had also expressed profound admiration for Mussolini, because he was convinced that the more skilful choice of partners was from those states whose interests compelled them to travel the same road for the time being, quite irrespective of whether they were reputed to be hereditary 'friends' or 'enemies' in the past. On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, and following the example of Germany, announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations in December. In September 1937, Mussolini visited Berlin and in May 1938, Hitler paid a return visit to Rome. Secret economic protocols were signed on May 14, and December 18, 1937. The Nazi and Fascist leaders became convinced that unless Germany and Italy remained united, the Western Powers would destroy first the one and then, the other. Mussolini came to realise that his ambitions and demands would form a barrier to a settlement with the Westesn Powers while his help to Hitler and the consequent victory of the latter would have the advantage that the price of Italian help could be paid from newly-conquered territory without Germany having to sacrifice anything she already had. Germany, therefore, appeared to be the more promising horse to back.

Mussolini, however, was not blind to the fact that Germany was becoming an uncomfortably dynamic and dominant partner. Nazi leaders had repeatedly assured Rome that the Mediterranean was destined to be an Italian sea and the Alps to be Italy's inviolable northern frontier, even though this involved sacrificing the German minority in the South Tyrol. Mussolini had no alternative than to put reliance upon these assurances.

In the face of the impending world catastrophe, President Roosevelt on April 15, 1939, made an appeal to Hitler and Mussolini "to refrain from further aggression, and to respect the territorial integrity of the neighbouring countries." Both the dictators treated it with contempt and, on May 22, 1939, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met in Berlin and signed an "unlimited Military Alliance," threatening the Western Powers with war, if they opposed their 'just demands'. However, at the time of signing the Pact, the Italian Foreign Minister made it clear to Germany that Italy would not be ready for the war at least before three years and Germany agreed not to create circumstances which would lead to a war during this period. So, when Germany opened hostilities against Poland in September, 1939. Italy declared her neutrality from the war. Mussolini had decided the course of his action "to attack, when the Allies were almost exhausted by the ravages of war, but had not yet capitulated, for that would save Italy from the destructions of war and would entitle her to a share in the spoils of victory." Such an hour came when Hitler inflicted crushing defeats in the North and West and France was on the point of collapse. That all being done, Mussolini thought, Britain would not stand for long. Soon June 10, 1940, Italy entered the war and declared her hostility against France and Great Britain. Soon, French troops surrendered and Paris signed the armistice terms with Berlin on June 22, 1940 and with Italy, thought two days later.

Now the Axis Powers sought to launch an invasion against England. Mussolini completed the solidarity of the Central Powers by entering into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Japan on September 27, 1940, thereby completing the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis. Italy opened war with Britain by invading her Mediterranean possessions, *viz.*, Greece, Egypt, Somaliland, Sudan and Kenya. The Italian troops made some progress and occupied British Somaliland. But very soon, the English troops recovered their position and inflicted crushing defeats upon the Italians on almost every front. Italy came to the brink of disaster and Mussolini gave up the battle as lost. Simply he dittoed the German line of policy and obediently followed Hitler in declaring war, first on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and then, on U.S. in December.

The Italians suffered heavy miseries and privations. On June 22, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel dismissed Mussolini from premiership and on July 28, dissolved the Fascist Party. Badoglio became the Premier and formed a new government. He declared the continuance of war on the one hand and opened secret negotiations with the Allies on the other. On April 29, 1945, however, the Allied troops entered Rome and the government surrendered. On December 9, 1945, a new democratic government was set up in Rome. This was the fate of the second partner of the Fascist Triplice.

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